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 The rule of law in EU external relations: 
An introduction
1. Introduction
For the European Union, the rule of law is a multifaceted notion of ‘primor-
dial importance’.1 It is a foundational value (Article 2 TEU) – to be upheld 
and promoted in its relations with the wider world (Article 3(5) TEU) – and 
a guiding principle for the Union’s external action in general (Article 21(1) 
TEU). The concept plays a central role within the EU. This was emphasised 
by then Commissioner Reding, in the context of the debate on the rule of 
law and its specific importance for the Union, when she stated that ‘[r]
espect for the rule of law is in many ways a prerequisite for the protection 
of all other fundamental rights listed in Article 2 TEU and for upholding 
all rights and obligations deriving from the Treaties.’2 In the context of the 
high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on the rule of 
law at national and international level on 24 September 2012, the European 
Union issued a statement on its relation to the rule of law in which it called 
the latter one of the ‘pillars on which our European Union is built.’3 More 
importantly, the significance of the rule of law for the functioning of the 
EU legal order has come to the fore very prominently in the context of the 
‘rule of law crises’ in a number of the Member States, Poland, Hungary, 
and Romania in particular. With the Commission4 and the European Parlia-
ment5 both triggering the Article 7 TEU procedure relating to grave rule of 
law concerns with regard to the first two Member States, the EU is more 
1 Report from the Commission on Bulgaria’s progress on accompanying measures follow-
ing Accession, COM(2007) 377 fi nal, 27 June 2007, p. 23.
2 Viviane Reding ‘The EU and the Rule of Law – What next?’ SPEECH/13/677, 4 Septem-
ber 2013, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-677_nl.htm.
3 Statement by Commission President Barroso at the high-level meeting on the rule of law, 
New York, 24 September 2012. Also see the Pledges of the EU and its Member States on 
the rule of law made on the occasion of that same meeting. See the EU ‘pledge registra-
tion form’ available at: https://www.un.org/ruleofl aw/fi les/Pledges%20by%20the%20
European%20Union.pdf.
4 Commission Reasoned Proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union regarding the rule of law in Poland, COM(2017) 835 fi nal, 20 December 2017.
5 Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to 
determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a 
clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded, 
(2017/2131(INL)), 4 July 2018.
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forcefully attempting to tackle internal rule of law backsliding.6 The Union 
is very much aware of the fact that the internal and external dimension of its 
values are interlinked since it must be seen to uphold the rule of law inter-
nally if it wishes to uphold and promote it externally. As the 2016 Global 
Strategy provides: ‘Consistently living up to our values will determine our 
external credibility and influence.’7
In relation to the Union’s external dimension, in a 2011 Joint Communi-
cation with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
the Commission firmly formulated the EU’s mission regarding its values: 
‘The EU must be principled when it comes to the norms and values it seeks 
to uphold, creative in the ways it does so, and absolutely determined to 
achieve concrete results.’8 Stressing the ‘critical importance’ of the rule of 
law for the EU’s external policy, the Union has stated that respect for the 
rule of law is not only ‘an essential condition for peace and stability in the 
consolidation and support of democracy’, but also for conflict prevention, 
conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.9 Strengthening it lies at 
the heart of the enlargement process and the Stabilisation and Association 
Process,10 and its consolidation is vital for sustainable development.11 In the 
words of Commissioner Timmermans, ‘[t]he rule of law is part of Europe’s 
DNA, it is part of where we come from and where we need to go,’ and, thus, 
it needs to be pursued both at the national and international level.12
6 In relation to the current state of play in Romania, see Eszter Zalan ‘Romania Faces Rule 
of Law Criticism in EU Parliament’ 3 October 2018, available at: https://euobserver.
com/political/143006.
7 ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy', June 2016, p. 8.
8 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy ‘Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – 
Towards a More Effective Approach’ COM(2011) 866 fi nal, 12 December 2011, p. 4.
9 EU Statement on behalf of the European Union and its Member States by the head of 
the delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, at the UN Security Council 
Debate on ‘The Promotion and Strengthening of the Rule of Law in the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security’, 19 January 2012.
10 Council Conclusions ‘Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process’, Doc. 
10555/18, 26 June 2018, pnt. 5.
11 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Mem-
ber States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission 
‘The New European Consensus on Development – Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’ 
OJ[2017] C210/1, pnt. 61.
12 On 31 August 2015, in his keynote speech at a conference on the European Union and the 
rule of law at Tilburg University, the Netherlands, fi rst vice-president of the European 
Commission Frans Timmermans stated that: ‘For Europe, the rule of law is not just an 
inspiration, it is also an aspiration; a principle that guides both our internal and external 
actions’. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/
timmermans/announcements/european-union-and-rule-law-keynote-speech-confer-
ence-rule-law-tilburg-university-31-august-2015_en.
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However, what is meant by the term ‘rule of law’? Any state or organ-
isation concerned with upholding the rule of law at home or promoting 
it in other countries is confronted with the challenge of conceptualising 
the notion. This necessarily involves the identification of the attributes 
that are constitutive of the concept. The term, however, is surrounded by 
a vast divergence of understandings, and thus, identifying the constitutive 
attributes, or elements, of the rule of law represents a daunting challenge. 
This challenge arises, not because of its supposedly ‘essentially contested’ 
nature,13 but by the fact that scholars from different disciplines as well as 
practitioners from the field of rule of law reform use a panoply of meanings 
within a variety of contexts when it comes to the term. More particularly, 
the term is employed in the field of legal philosophy, development eco-
nomics, and democratic theory, and commonly brandished by politicians, 
academics, and practitioners to convey a wide array of different concepts.14 
This has led Casper to observe that ‘calls for the rule of law … are quite 
undifferentiated and rarely specify what conditions have to be met in order 
to justify the conclusion that, in a given context, the rule of law is actually 
being furthered.’15 This holds true for general studies into the rule of law, 
but also for research into the rule of law in the EU context.
13 W.B. Gallie ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1955-
56), p.  167. For further elaboration on the meaning of essentially contested or contestable 
concepts see Richard Fallon ‘The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ 
Columbia Law Review 97 (1997), p. 6 and Jeremy Waldron ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially 
Contested Concept (in Florida)? Law and Philosophy 21 (2002), p. 12.
14 Rachel Kleinfeld Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad. Next Generation Reform Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2012), pp. 1-36.
15 Gerhard Casper ‘The Rule of Law - Whose Law?' Stanford CDDRL Working Paper no. 10 
(2004), p. 5.
4 The rule of law in EU external relations: An introduction 
2. Problematique and Research question
While there is a growing amount of research on the rule of law in the con-
text of the EU,16 missing from the existing literature is a detailed compara-
16 Dimitry Kochenov & Petra Bárd ‘Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU 
– The Pitfalls of Overemphasising Enforcement’ Reconnect Working Paper No.1 (2018); Ami-
chai Magen & Laurent Pech ‘The Rule of Law and the European Union’ in Christopher 
May & Adam Winchester Handbook on the Rule of Law Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2018), 
pp. 235-256; Theodore Konstadinides The Rule of Law in the European Union Oxford: Hart 
publishing (2017); Dimitry Kochenov ‘The EU and the Rule of Law – Naïveté or a Grand 
Design’ in Maurice Adams, Anne Meuwese & Ernst Hirsch Ballin (eds) Constitutionalism 
and the Rule of Law. Bridging Idealism and Realism Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(2017), pp. 419-445; Werner Schroeder (ed) Strengthening the Rule of Law in Europe Oxford: 
Hart Publishing (2016); Christophe Hillion ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal 
Mandate and Means’ in C. Closa & D. Kochenov (eds) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight 
in the European Union Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2016), pp. 59-81; Carlos 
Closa & Dimitry Kochenov (eds) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2016); Ségolène Barbou des Places ‘Enforcing 
the Rule of Law in the EU. In the Name of Whom?’ 1 European Papers (2016), pp. 771-776; 
Dimitry Kochenov & Laurent Pech ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in 
the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’ 11 European Constitutional Law Review 3 (2015), pp. 512-
540; Sionaigh Douglas-Scott ‘Justice, Injustice and the Rule of Law in the EU’ in Dimitry 
Kochenov, Gráinne de Búrca & Andrew (eds) Williams Europe’s Justice Defi cit? Oxford: 
Hart Publishing (2015), pp. 51-66; Armin von Bogdandy & Michael Ioannidis ‘Systemic 
Defi ciency in the Rule of Law: What It Is, What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done?’ 51 
Common Market Law Review (2014), pp. 59-96; Geert De Baere ‘European Integration and 
the Rule of Law in Foreign Policy’ in: Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis (eds) Phi-
losopfi cal Foundations of European Union Law Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), pp. 
354-383; Laurent Pech ‘“A Union Founded on the Rule of Law”: Meaning and Reality of 
the Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ 6 European Constitutional Law 
Review (2010), pp. 359-396; Dimitry Kochenov ‘The EU Rule of Law: Cutting Paths through 
Confusion’ 2 Erasmus Law Review (2009); Laurent Pech ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitu-
tional Principle of the European Union’ Jean Monnet Working Paper no. 4 (2009); Dimitry 
Kochenov EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession Conditionality in the 
Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law The Hague: Kluwer Law International (2008); Fran-
cis G. Jacobs The Sovereignty of Law. The European Way Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (2007); Koen Lenaerts ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System 
of the European Union’ Common Market Law Review (2007); Eric Carpano État de Droit et 
Droits Européens Paris: L’Harmattan (2005); Dimitry Kochenov ‘Behind the Copenhagen 
Facade: The Meaning and Structure of the Copenhagen Political Criterion of Democracy 
and the Rule of Law’ 8 European Integration Online Papers (2004); Karen J. Alter Establishing 
the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe Oxford: 
Oxford University Press (2003); Amaryllis Verhoeven The European Union in Search of a 
Democratic and Constitutional Theory The Hague: Kluwer Law International (2002); Anthony 
Arnull ‘The Rule of Law in the European Union' in Anthony Arnull and Daniel Wincott 
(eds) Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2002); Maria Louisa Fernandez Esteban The Rule of Law in the European Constitution The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International (1999); Lord Mackenzie Stuart The European Communi-
ties and the Rule of Law London: Stevens & Sons (1977); Gerhard Beber Rule of Law within 
the European Communities Brussels: Institut d’Etudes Europé ennes de l’Université Libre de 
Bruxelles (1965). For contributions on the EU rule of law in the context of the literature 
on the general principles of EU law, see for example Ola Zetterquist ‘The Judicial Defi cit 
in the EC: Knocking on Heaven’s Door?’ in Ulf Bernitz, Joakim Nergelius & Cecilia Cart-
ner (eds) General Principles of EC Law in a process of Development The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International (2008); Armin von Bogdandy ‘Constitutional Principles’ in Armin von Bogda-
ndy & Jürgen Bast Principles of European Constitutional Law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2006).
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tive contextual analysis of the concept of the rule of law the EU promotes in 
its external relations across different foreign policy fields. Existing external 
policy research has focussed primarily on democracy promotion, treat-
ing the rule of law as the means in order to reach democratic ends, with 
a strong focus on enlargement or the European Neighbourhood Policy,17 
rather than a more wide-ranging approach across more foreign policy 
areas. This is problematic to the extent that it blurs conceptual boundaries 
and that the ensuing observations are necessarily limited to the field from 
which they arose. Thus, treating these observations as reflective of general 
trends in EU external relations at large would amount to an arbitrary 
inference. Furthermore, the debate has very often been couched within the 
confines of the EU’s mechanism of conditionality and questions regarding 
its effectiveness.18 The last decade has, however, seen the emergence of 
academic literature towards conceptualisations of the rule of law as a legal 
17 See for example Elena Baracani ‘EU Democratic Rule of Law Promotion’ in Amichai 
Magen & Leonardo Morlino (eds) International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: 
Anchoring Democracy? (2008), p. 53; Elena Baracani ‘U.S. and EU Strategies for Promot-
ing Democracy’ in Federiga Bindi (ed) The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing 
Europe’s Role in the World (2010), p. 303; Richard Youngs ‘What Has Europe Been Doing?’ 
19 Journal of Democracy (2008), p. 161; Jan Zielonka ‘Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by 
Example?’ 84 International Affairs (2008), p. 471.
18 See for example, Marko Kmezić ‘EU Rule of Law Conditionality: Democracy or ‘Sta-
bilitocracy’ Promotion in the Western Balkans’ in Jelena Džankić, Soeren Keil & Marko 
Kmezić (eds) The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans. A Failure of EU Conditionality? 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2018), pp. 87-109; Dimitry Kochenov EU Enlargement 
and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and 
the Rule of Law The Hague: Kluwer Law International (2008); Heather Grabbe The EU’s 
Transformative Power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Euro-
pe New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2006); Frank Schimmelpfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier 
(eds) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe New York: Cornell University Press 
(2005); James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse & Claire Gordon (eds) Europeanization and Regi-
onalization in the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2004); Karen E. Smith ‘The Evolution and Application of 
EU Membership Conditionality’ in Marise Cremona (ed) The Enlargement of the European 
Union Oxford: Oxford University Press (2003), pp. 105-140; Heather Grabbe ‘How Does 
Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity’ 8 Jour-
nal of European Public Policy (2001), pp. 1013-1031; Karen E. Smith 'The Conditional Offer 
of EU Membership as an Instrument of EU Foreign Policy: Reshaping Europe in the EU’s 
Image?' 8 Marmara Journal of European Studies (2000), pp. 33-46; Karen E. Smith ‘The Use 
of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?’ 3 
European Foreign Affairs Review (1998), pp. 253-274.
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and political value in EU external relations.19 In many of these accounts the 
need for a detailed exposition of the EU rule of law in external relations has 
been highlighted.20 Not only in order to fill the gap and do justice to the 
acknowledged pivotal role of the rule of law in relation to the EU’s other 
two well-researched primary values of human rights and democracy, but 
also for reasons of consistency and clarity. Relevant EU instruments tend 
to pay little attention to conceptual issues and rarely specify what the rule 
of law stands for, adapting the content on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, 
in the few accounts on the rule of law in external relations to date, scholars 
have concluded that the EU, when acting as an exporter of values, has 
adopted ‘superficial, diverse and/or unconvincing definitions’21 of the 
rule of law. With more focus than ever on the external aspects of the rule 
of law in the EU’s external action and in the light of its post-Lisbon global 
ambitions as an international actor and the related attempts at externalising 
certain value-laden goals, research efforts in order to clarify and square the 
EU’s seemingly inconsistent approach to the rule of law, are called for.
In this light, the present thesis tackles the largely unexplored question 
of the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in its external relations. How 
does the EU understand and portray the rule of law in its external relations, 
with a particular focus on development cooperation and enlargement? To 
this end, the main research question is divided into two sub-questions: a. 
Are there discernible differences between the legal concept of the rule of 
19 Marko Kmezić EU Rule of Law Promotion. Judiciary Reform in the Western Balkans London: 
Routledge (2017); Laurent Pech ‘The EU as a Global Rule of Law Promoter: The Consis-
tency and Effectiveness Challenges’ 14 Asia Europe Journal (2016), pp. 7-24; Olga Brulyuk 
‘An Ambitious Failure: Conceptualising the EU Approach to Rule of Law Promotion (in 
Ukraine)’ 6 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2014); Laurent Pech ‘Promoting the Rule of 
Law Abroad: On the EU’s Limited Contribution to the Shaping of an International Under-
standing of the Rule of Law’ in Fabian Ambtenbrink & Dimitry Kochenov (eds) The EU’s 
Shaping of the International Legal Order Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2013), 
pp. 108-129; Laurent Pech ‘Rule of Law as a Guiding Principle of the European Union’s 
External Action’ CLEER Working Papers (2012); Nicole Wichmann, Rule of Law Promotion 
in the European Neighbourhood Policy: Normative or Strategic Power Europe? Baden-Baden: 
Nomos (2010); Neil Walker ‘The Rule of Law and the EU: Necessity’s Mixed Virtue’ in 
Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker (eds) Relocating the Rule of Law Oxford: Hart Publish-
ing (2009); Nicole Wichmann ‘The EU as a Rule of Law Promoter in the ENP’ in Thierry 
Balzacq (ed) The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Governance, Neighbours, 
Security Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan (2009), p. 111; Erik Wennerström The Rule of Law 
and the European Union Uppsala: Iustus Förlag (2007); Nicole Wichmann ‘Promoting the 
Rule of Law in the European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategic or Normative Power?’ 2 
Politique Européenne (2007), pp. 81-104; Marise Cremona ‘The European Neighbourhood 
Policy: Partnership, Security and the Rule of Law’ in Nathaniel Copsey & Alan May-
hew (eds) European Neighbourhood Policy and Ukraine Brighton: Sussex European Institute 
(2005); Marise Cremona ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional 
Issues’ CDDRL Working Paper no. 25 (2004); Dale Mineshima ‘The Rule of Law and EU 
Expansion’ 24 Liverpool Law Review (2002), p. 73.
20 See for example Wennerström (2007), chapter 5; Wichmann (2007), p. 82; Burlyuk (2014), 
pp. 26-46.
21 Pech (2012), p. 8.
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law as defined in legal theory and as applied in the practice of the European 
Union? b. Subsequently, is the legal concept of the rule of law the same or 
different in the practice of the EU in its policy areas of development coop-
eration and enlargement as two specific subfields of EU external relations?
3. Delineating the research question
It is submitted that there are four major difficulties in defining the rule of 
law in the area of EU external relations. First, the concept, even in its inter-
nal dimension, is opaque, with no concrete definition of the term provided 
in the Treaties.22 Secondly, in policy documents, the rule of law is linked 
to a number of areas, such as trade, the protection of human rights, good 
governance, law enforcement, anti-corruption, judicial reform, and secu-
rity policy agendas.23 The multitude of substantive areas with which it is 
associated prevents the emergence of a core, common understanding of the 
notion both in its internal and external dimension. Thirdly, another problem 
of conceptualising the EU rule of law is the fact that it is applied in two 
distinct contexts: the EU context and the national context. Member States’ 
respect for the rule of law is a conditio sine qua non in order for the EU legal 
order, with its legal interdependence and mutual trust among its members, 
to constitute a ‘Community based on law’.24 However, whereas states have 
to tackle such questions as how to constrain governmental powers, how to 
ensure various forms of justice and open government, and how to shape fair 
ways of regulatory enforcement, the Court of Justice’s case law on the rule 
of law has reduced the substance of this community of law roughly to the 
22 The substantive vagueness of the concept has also been acknowledged, amongst oth-
ers, in the Council Conclusions ‘Fundamental rights and the rule of law’ Doc. 10168/13, 
29 May 2013 and in the Commission 2012 Report on the Application of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, where it stated that ‘there is not yet a 
clearly agreed common understanding of the concept of the rule of law and of the extent 
of its coverage within the systems of governance in Member States’, Commission 2012 
Report on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
COM(2013) 271 fi nal, 29 May 2013, pnt. 9.
23 Kleinfeld (2012); Wichmann (2009), p. 113; Cremona (2005); Cremona (2004); Sionaidh 
Douglas-Scott ‘The Rule of law in the European Union - Putting the Security in the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice’ 29 European Law Review (2004).
24 Walter Hallstein ‘Die EWG als Schritt zur Europäischen Einheit’ in Thomas Oppermann 
(ed) Europäischen Gemeinschaften und der Rechtsstaatsgedanke Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt (1979), p. 109.
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requirement of effective legal protection at the EU level.25 Accordingly, the 
focus of the case law has been mostly on the rule of law within the Union 
itself, not in the Member States. However, in its external relations, where it 
is tasked with the promotion (Article 3(5) TEU) and the consolidation and 
support (Article 21(2)(b) TEU) of the rule of law, the EU is engaged at the 
national level of states and their efforts to strengthen this value. In other 
words, in its various external policies such as in development cooperation, 
enlargement, and the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU is involved 
in rule of law related state-building activities at the domestic level.26 On 
the basis of the foregoing, it becomes clear that both contexts necessarily 
encapsulate a different understanding of the rule of law.
The potential for conceptual confusion on the basis of the intermingling 
of the EU and the national contexts, however, stems from the reliance on 
values in the Union’s own constitutionalisation-narrative. Over the last two 
decades, the Union has purposefully and increasingly positioned itself as 
a ‘union of values’,27 both internally and externally,28 thereby repeatedly 
underscoring that the rule of law constitutes an essential element of its 
identity.29 Moreover, since Article 6 EU on the EU’s constitutive values was 
included in the EU Treaty with the Amsterdam revision, the rule of law, as 
a value ‘common to the Member States’, explicitly pertains to the constitu-
tional law profile of the Union, which is not only applicable to the EU itself, 
but also to the Member States (see Articles 2 and 7 TEU). Consequently, 
conceptualisations of the rule of law as it manifests itself in the national 
traditions of the Member States underpin the EU’s constitutive identity 
rhetoric and form the foundation for the rule of law as an objective of its 
external policies (Article 3(5), 21(1) and 21(2)(b) TEU).
Finally, it is asserted that one of the most problematic aspects of the 
concept is that it is used to serve a number of different functions – a fact 
often overlooked in literature. More particularly, most of the existing stud-
ies focus on the content and do not take into consideration the functions 
25 On this argument see Schroeder (2016), p. 6; Monica Claes & Matteo Bonelli ‘The Rule 
of Law and the Constitutionalisation of the European Union’ in Schroeder (2016), pp. 
265-289 at 271-274. For case law substantiating this point see, for example, Case 294/83 
Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para. 23; Case 2/88 
IMM – Zwartveld and Others [1990] ECR I-4405, para. 16; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and 
C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Bakaraat international Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] 
ECR I-6351, para. 281; Case 583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Katanami and Others v Parliament and 
Council, EU:C:2013:625, 3 October 2013, paras. 91-92.
26 In relation to the Western Balkans, see for instance, Andrea Lorenzo Capussela State-Buil-
ding in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and the EU in the Balkans London: I.B. Tauris (2015)
27 Commission’s Second Annual Reports on the ‘Stabilization and Association Process for 
South East Europe’ COM(2003) 139 fi nal, 26 March 2003, p. 3.
28 See for example the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the Union, Presidency Conclu-
sions, European Council Laeken, 14-15 December 2001.
29 On the relationship between the EU’s values and, in particular, its external identity, see 
Marise Cremona ‘Values in the EU Constitution: The External Dimension’ CDDRL Work-
ing Paper (2004).
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that the rule of law serves, in order to arrive at a definition.30 As it will be 
discussed in detail below, the EU uses the rule of law in order to pursue a 
wide array of goals. Definitions that do not take into account the distinct 
functions the concept serves, do not accurately describe the notion.
Against this background, it is submitted that the research question 
(defining the concept of the rule of law in EU external relations) cannot be 
answered before explaining, at the outset, the function to which it is related. 
For this purpose, the goal of the next section is to delineate the research 
question by identifying and discussing the main functions of the rule of 
law in the EU. It will be argued that there are four major functions, namely, 
the rule of law as a foundational value, the rule of law as a value ‘com-
mon to the Member States’, the rule of law as a benchmark and objective in 
external relations, and the rule of law as a guarantee for EU security. It will 
be asserted that although these functions are, to a certain extent, interre-
lated, a better understanding of these will aid the the discussion in the next 
chapters. A brief caveat needs to be introduced at this point. Although the 
identification of the functions of the rule of law are helpful in understand-
ing the place of the rule of law in EU external policy, these functions do not 
per se inform the definition of the rule of law. As such, the discussion below 
provides the necessary background in order to introduce the reader to the 
various roles the rule of law fulfils, it will, however, not form part of the 
analytical framework of the thesis (which will be explained at the end of 
Part I), since the research question focusses on the definition of the rule of 
law rather than its function. In order to delineate the research question also 
geographically, the overview of the rule of law-functions will be followed 
by a brief exploration of the selected two case-studies for this thesis.
3.1 The four functions of the rule of law in the EU
According to the Treaty on European Union the rule of law has four inter-
related functions. It applies not only to the Union itself as (1) a foundational 
value, but, as evidenced by Article 2 TEU in which the notion is mentioned 
as one of the values underpinning the EU,31 (2) as a core value of the legal 
order of its component parts, the Member States:32
30 See for example Kochenov (2008).
31 The Preamble of the TEU calls it a ‘universal value’. On this point see for example N.S. 
Marsh, ‘The Rule of Law as a Supra-National Concept’ in A.G. Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays 
in Jurisprudence Oxford: Oxford University Press (1961). For evidence to the contrary see 
for example Ruti Teitel ‘Global Rule of Law: Universal and Particular’ in András Sajó (ed) 
Human Rights with Modesty – The Problem of Universalism Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers (2004), p. 231; Douglas J. Simsovic ‘No Fixed Address: Universality and the Rule 
of Law’ 35 Revue Juridique Thémis (2001), pp. 739-773.
32 Also see the fourth paragraph of the Preamble of the TEU.
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The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member 
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, soli-
darity and equality between women and men prevail.
Furthermore, (3) the rule of law is a benchmark and guiding principle for 
EU external action. According to Article 3(5) TEU, the EU shall uphold and 
promote the rule of law in its relations with the wider world, as well as 
seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and 
international, regional or global organisation that share the these values 
(Article 21(1) TEU).33 Consequently, as the Member States have endowed 
the Union with the task of consolidating and supporting it in all fields of 
its international relations (Article 21(2)(b) TEU), the rule of law is used as a 
benchmark and guiding principle for the EU’s external action (Article 21(1) 
TEU). Finally, (4) the notion serves as a guarantee for the EU’s own security. 
On the basis of Article 21(2)(a) TEU, the rule of law is linked to the Union’s 
own security and fundamental interests, which it shall strife to safeguard 
through its external action. These four aspects of the rule of law, while inter-
related, fulfil different functions in the EU context.
In the following sections, each aspect is discussed in turn. Through this 
comprehensive approach it will be demonstrated that the EU rule of law is 
used differently, depending on the function it fulfils. It will be argued that 
each function answers to a different set of questions and finds its relevance 
in different academic contexts.
3.1.1 The rule of law as a foundational value
As mentioned above, according to Article 2 TEU, the EU is founded on a 
number of values, the rule of law among them.34 As a foundational value, the 
rule of law has two aspects. First, it is a standard for the EU’s own conduct35
33 The European Neighbourhood Policy, laid down in Article 8 TEU, forms a specifi c cat-
egory of relations based on the rule of law and the other values: ‘The Union shall develop 
a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of pros-
perity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised 
by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.’
34 Also see Article 21(1) TEU in which the rule of law is mentioned as an inspiring principle 
for the EU’s own creation and subsequent integration. Curiously, the Preamble to the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights does not explicitly mention the rule of law as a foundati-
onal value, instead listing the ‘indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, 
equality and solidarity’. However, the same paragraph stresses that the Union is ‘based 
on the principles of democracy and the rule of law’.
35 See Commission Communication on A new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of 
Law, COM(2014) 158 fi nal/2, 19 March 2014.
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and that of the Member States.36 Secondly, it has a constitutive dimension37 
for the EU’s own identity and for its self-perception as a value-driven inter-
national actor.38 This first aspect of the rule of law relates to those questions 
associated with the content and meaning of the rule of law for the European 
Union legal order itself: What did the Court of Justice of the European 
Union mean in relation to the rule of law concept when it referred to respect 
for ‘the principle of the rule of law within the Community context’ in Gra-
naria39 and its description of the Community as ‘a Community based on 
the rule of law’ in Les Verts?40 What is the specific significance of the rule of 
law for the functioning of the EU as one of the values mentioned in Article 
2 TEU?41
The second aspect of the rule of law as a foundational value is linked 
to those questions related to the literature in the fields of political science, 
history, and sociology on the role of the rule of law in relations to the nature 
and identity of the European Union:42 What are the values that constitute 
the European identity? If these values are projected externally in EU foreign 
policy, what role do they play in the EU’s identity formation process as a 
‘normative actor’? How does this process contribute to a construction of an 
identity that differentiates the EU from other international organisations? Is 
it possible to give specific meaning to the rule of law as a value, rather than 
looking at the role of the values en groupe?
The development of both aspects has been heavily influenced by the 
way the EU has progressively focussed on the promotion of its values in its 
external relations: the identification with the rule of law as well as the other 
values has become an increasingly important part of EU policy-making, 
36 See for instance the pre-accession process which links progression towards accession, 
and thus to the status of Member State, to the applicant’s respect for the Union’s values. 
See for example the fourth paragraph of the Preamble of Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of 
11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ[2014] 
L77/11.
37 See for example Joined cases C-402/05 P and C 415/05 P Kadi v Council [2008] ECR I-6351, 
para. 285. See also Annex I to COM(2014) 158 fi nal/2 in which the Commission refers to 
the rule of law as ‘a legally binding constitutional principle’.
38 Recently, see the EU Global Strategy (2016), pnt. 3.5.
39 Case 101/78 Granaria BV v Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwproducten [1979] ECR 623, 
para. 5.
40 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para. 23.
41 See for example Timothy Moorhead ‘The Values of the European Union Legal Order. 
Constitutional Perspectives’ 16 European Journal of Law Reform (2014); Pech (2009).
42 See for example Jeffrey T. Checkel & Peter J. Katzenstein European Identity Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (2009); Furio Cerutti & Sonia Lucarelli The Search for a Euro-
pean Identity London: Routledge (2008); Erik Eriksen ‘The EU – A Cosmopolitan Polity?’ 
Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2006), pp. 252–269; Ludger Kühnhardt ‘From National 
Identity to European Constitutionalism’ Center for European Integration Studies Bonn, Wor-
king Paper (2004); Thomas Risse ‘European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have 
We Learned?’ in Richard Herrmann, Marilynn Brewer & Thomas Risse (eds) Transnatio-
nal Identities (2004) pp. 247–272.
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both internally43 and externally,44 ever since the inclusion of the rule of 
law as a ‘fundamental element’ of the ‘European Identity’ of the Member 
States dating back to the early 70s.45 In fact, the constitutionalisation of 
the Union’s values, including the rule of law, has to a large part been the 
result of the EU’s external action.46 This is for example demonstrated by 
the revision of then Article 6 TEU with the Treaty of Amsterdam to include 
the rule of law as a foundational value, a direct codification of enlargement 
practice.47 At the same time, the EU’s growing self-identification as a ‘Union 
of values’48 underwrites the legitimacy of its value-promotion abroad.49 In 
the mid 90s the Commission already argued for the close link between the 
external promotion of values and their constitutive nature when it stated 
that ‘the European Union has gradually come to define itself in terms of 
promotion of rights and democratic freedoms.’50
The Commission’s proposal for ‘A new framework to strengthen the 
rule of law’ serves as an example of external policy influencing the rule of 
law as standard for the EU’s own actions.51 Precipitated by the problems 
following the accession of Romania and Bulgaria and the political events 
in new Member States such as Hungary and Poland, inter-institutional 
debates52 gave rise to an intensified discussion on the discrepancies 
between strong pre-accession monitoring and little post-accession supervi-
sion, and the use of Article 7 TEU. The latter provides a preventive as well 
43 In this regard, see Jacobs, who stated that ‘the ultimate source of authority is no lon-
ger the sovereign in the shape of a monarch, or even in the shape of a Parliament; but 
rather certain values, or certain fundamental principles, which form an inherent part of a 
well-functioning legal system.’ Francis G. Jacobs The Sovereignty of Law: The European Way 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007), pp. 61-62.
44 Burlyuk (2014); Marise Cremona ‘Values in EU Foreign Policy’ in Malcolm Evans & Pan-
os Koutrakos (eds) Beyond the Established Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU and 
the Rest of the World Oxford: Hart Publishing (2011), p. 281.
45 Copenhagen European Summit 14-15 December 1973 Declaration on the European Iden-
tity Bull EC 12-1973.
46 See for example, Neil Walker ‘Big “C” or small “c”?' 12 European Law Journal (2006), pp. 
12-14.
47 See Christophe Hillion ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny’ in Christophe Hil-
lion (ed) EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach Oxford: Hart Publishing (2004).
48 Commission Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. Respect for 
and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 fi nal, 9 July 
2003, p. 12.
49 Andrew Hurrell On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007), pp. 77-83.
50 Commission Communication on The External Dimension of the EU’s Human Rights 
Policy: From Rome to Maastricht and Beyond, COM(1995) 567 fi nal, p. 3.
51 Commission Communication on A New EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, 
COM(2014) 158 fi nal/2, 19 March 2014.
52 See for example the Tavares Report on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and 
practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 
2012), 2012/2130/(INI), A7-0229/2013, 24 June 2013.
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as sanctioning mechanism in case of (a clear risk of) a serious breach of the 
values mentioned in Article 2 TEU.53
The prospect of the ‘big-bang’ accession round in 2004 heightened the 
necessity of having access to a mechanism for the protection and consoli-
dation of the rule of law within the member States: ‘With the forthcoming 
enlargement and the increased cultural, social and political diversity 
between Member States that will ensue, the Union institutions must con-
solidate their common approach to the defence of the Union’s values.’54 In 
other words, Article 7 TEU was devised to keep domestic changes in the 
area of democratic values, the rule of law, and the protection of fundamen-
tal rights in post-communist countries locked in after their accession to the 
Union, as accession would mean the end of membership conditionality.55 
Looking into the possibility of regular assessment of the Member States on 
their continued compliance with the rule of law, as it had been doing on the 
basis of annual progress reports in the context of the pre-accession process, 
the Commission proposed a new framework, complimenting Article 7 
TEU. This framework is to address and resolve situations where there is 
a systemic threat to the rule of law, before the conditions for activating the 
mechanism foreseen in Article 7 TEU are met.56
External policy has also influenced the rule of law in its second func-
tions as a foundational value in relation to the EU’s own identity as a value-
53 On the (problems with the) use of Article 7 TEU see for example Carlos Closa, Dimitry 
Kochenov & J.H.H. Weiler ‘Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union’ 
RSCAS EUI Working Papers no. 25 (2014). Further, the literature mentioned in footnote 16.
 Violations of the rule of law related to EU law can be tackled on the basis of the infringe-
ment procedure under Article 258 TFEU. In relation to Hungary, the Commission start-
ed infringement proceeding for violation of the equal treatment directive (Directive 
2000/78/EC) and the data protection directive (Directive 95/46/EC). The CJEU ruled 
against Hungary in both cases. The reform of the judiciary was struck down on the basis 
of age discrimination (Case C-286/12, Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2012:687, 6 Novem-
ber 2012). By prematurely ending the term served by the supervisory authority for the 
protection of personal data, Hungary has also failed to fulfi l its obligations under the 
data protection directive (Case C-288/12 Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2014:237, 8 April 
2014).
54 Commission Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. Respect for 
and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 fi nal 15 Octo-
ber 2003, p. 4.
55 Vera van Hüllen & Tanja A. Börzel ‘The EU’s Governance Transfer: From External Promo-
tion to Internal Protection’ SFB-Governance Working Paper Series (2013) No. 56, p. 5.
56 Described by Barroso as ‘the nuclear option’, the mechanism has shown to be too politi-
cally sensitive to be used effectively. José Manuel Barroso ‘State of the Union Address 
2012’, SPEECH/12/596, 12 September 2012, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm.
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driven international actor. In line with its ‘missionary principle’57 anchored 
in Article 3(5) TEU, the EU is wont to make broad, sweeping statements 
on its ‘ethics of responsibility’58 towards other countries, such as those 
of the Laeken Declaration: ‘What is Europe’s role in this changed world? 
Does Europe not, now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play 
in the new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilizing role 
worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples?’59 
Similarly, the European Security Strategy espouses: ‘Europe should be 
ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a bet-
ter world. … Spreading good governance, supporting social and political 
reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule 
of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening 
the international order.’60 In the area of development cooperation the EU’s 
New European Consensus on Development states: ‘The EU and its Member 
State will promote the universal values of democracy, good governance, the 
rule of law and human rights for all, because they are preconditions for 
sustainable development and stability, across the full range of partnerships 
and instruments in all situations and in all countries, including through 
development action.’61
57 On the missionary principle in relation to the EU’s development cooperation policy see 
Morten Broberg ‘Don’t Mess with the Missionary Man! On the Principle of Coherence, 
the Missionary Principle and the European Union’s Development Policy’ in Paul James 
Cardwell (ed) EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era The Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser Press (2012), pp. 181-196; Morten Broberg ‘What is the Direction for the 
EU’s Development Cooperation After Lisbon? A Legal Examination’ 16 European Foreign 
Affairs Review (2011) pp. 539-557. On the missionary principle in relation to Article 3(5) 
TEU specifi cally, see Herlin-Karnell (2013), pp. 90-91; Konstadinides (2017), p. 67.
58 Sonia Lucarelli ‘Values, Principles, Identity and European Union Foreign Policy’ in Sonia 
Lucarelli & Ian Manners Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy London: 
Routledge (2006), p. 3; Lisbeth Aggestam ‘Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?’ 84 Inter-
national Affairs (2008), pp. 1-11. Also see the EU’s own statements on its ‘political and 
moral weight’ in external affairs. For example Commission Communication on the Euro-
pean Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratization in third countries, 
COM(2001) 252 fi nal, 8 May 2001.
59 Laeken Declaration on the Future of the Union, Presidency Conclusions, European Coun-
cil Laeken, 14-15 December 2001.
60 European Council ‘European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World’ 12 
December 2003.
61 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Mem-
ber States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission 
‘The New European Consensus on Development – Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’ 
OJ[2017] C210/1, pnt. 61.
 Also see the previous Consensus on Development, in which it was stated that ‘EU Part-
nership and dialogue with third countries will promote common values of: respect for 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender 
equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice.’ Joint Statement by the Council and the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, 
the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy, 
‘The European Consensus’, 22 November 2005, OJ[2006] C46/1.
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Such statements have led authors such as Manners, to construct the 
idea of ‘normative power Europe’.62 This idea suggests that the EU is 
constructed on a normative basis, which predisposes the Union to act in a 
normative way in its foreign policy.63 It argues that the EU’s value rhetoric 
is a performative act, which corresponds to its foreign interests and which 
shapes a collective understanding of its identity.64 Whereas it is not surpris-
ing that the EU’s identification in terms of its values65 is reflected in the 
external projection of itself, this idea goes one step further and proposes 
that the EU’s external self-representation says something about the constitu-
tive nature of the EU as a political, legal and social system.66 In other words, 
the way the rule of law is used in EU external rhetoric, informs us of the 
EU’s own identity and of the importance of the rule of law as a foundational 
value. However, while the external discourse indicates the EU’s willingness 
to frame its policies and action in terms of the rule of law, it does not con-
tribute substantively to the interpretation of the concept of the rule of law as 
such. It is a reflection of the importance the EU attaches to this value for its 
own legal order and informative for the dynamic nature of the EU’s process 
of identity construction.
To summarise, the rule of law as a foundational value serves a dual 
function: it is both a standard for the EU’s own conduct as well as that of the 
Member States, and a reason and legitimation for its external action.
3.1.2 The rule of law as a value ‘common to the Member States’
The importance of respect for the rule of law within each of the Member 
States cannot be overestimated; as will be shown below, it is a vital precon-
dition for the functioning of the EU legal order itself. In addition to this, 
it will be argued in this section that the specific fact that the rule of law is 
62 Ian Manners ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ 40 Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies (2002), pp. 235-258. Richard Whitman (ed) Normative Power Europe: 
Emperical and Theoretical Perspectives Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2011); Tuomas 
Forsberg ‘Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal-
type’ 49 Journal of Common Market Studies (2011). For a critical refl ection see Thomas Diez 
‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power Europe’ 33 
Millenium: Journal of International Studies (2005), pp. 613-636;
63 Manners (2002), p. 252.
64 Lucarelli (2006), p. 4.
65 On values, see Andrew Williams The Ethos of Europe: Values, Law and Justice in the EU 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2009); Christian Calliess ‘The Transnationaliza-
tion of Values by European Law 10 German Law Journal (2009), pp. 1367-1382.
66 See for example Helen Sjursen ‘The EU as a Normative Power: How can this be?’ 13 Jour-
nal of European Public Policy (2006), p. 235; Ester Herlin-Karnell ‘EU Values and the Shap-
ing of the International Legal Context’ in Fabian Amtenbrink & Dimitry Kochenov (eds) 
European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press (2013), pp. 89-107 at 91; Joseph H.H. Weiler ‘Deciphering the Political and Legal 
DNA of European Integration’ in Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis The Philosophical 
Foundations of European Union Law Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), pp. 137-158.
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described in Article 2 of the EU Treaty as a value common to the Member 
States, indicates that the national rule of law traditions not only safeguard 
the way the EU operates, they also inform the understanding of the rule 
of law as an EU foundational value. Moreover, it will be shown that the 
national rule of law traditions form a source for understanding the concept 
of the rule of law in the Union’s external relations.
The Union has increasingly phrased its integration narrative in terms 
of its values. To give a recent example, Commissioner Navracsics for 
Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, acknowledged the importance of 
the EU’s values as ‘the most powerful driver of integration’.67 Expressing 
the same sentiment in his 2017 State of the Union address, Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker stressed that ‘Europe is more than just the 
single market. More than money, more than a currency, more than the euro. 
It was always about values.’68 Amongst the EU’s values, the rule of law 
occupies a central position. As one of the EU’s foundational values (Article 
2 and Article 21(1) TEU)69, the rule of law is a standard both for the Union’s 
own conduct70 and for that of the Member States.71 Moreover, in the light 
of its acknowledged constitutive dimension for the EU’s own identity72 
the proper functioning of the rule of law within each of the Member States 
becomes of paramount importance, not only as a source of legitimacy for 
the EU’s own external conduct as a value-driven international actor,73 but 
also as a vital precondition for the functioning of the EU legal order itself.
Ensuring proper respect for the rule of law in the individual Member 
States is critical, particularly because of the potentially far-reaching conse-
67 Tibor Navracsics ‘The Value of Our Values’, keynote Speech at Hanns Seidel Foundation 
Conference on, New Societal Challenges and Europe’s Search for Identity, 30 Novem-
ber 2016, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/
navracsics/announcements/value-our-values_en.
68 Jean-Claude Juncker ‘State of the Union Address 2017’, SPEECH/17/3165, 13 September 
2017, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm.
69 Article 3(1) of the Partnership Instrument also makes a direct link between the EU’s own 
founding values and those same values as objectives of its external activities: ‘The Union 
seeks to promote, develop and consolidate the principles of democracy, equality, respect 
for human rights and the rule of law on which it is founded, by means of dialogue and coop-
eration with third countries.’ Regulation (EU) 234/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation 
with third countries, OJ[2014] L77/77.
70 See Commission Communication on A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of 
Law, COM(2014) 158 fi nal/2, 19 March 2014.
71 See for instance the pre-accession process which links progression towards accession, 
and thus to the status of Member State, to the applicant’s respect for the Union’s values. 
See for example the para 4 of the Preamble of Council Regulation (EC) 231/2014 estab-
lishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), [2014] OJ L77/11.
72 See for example Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C 415/05 P Kadi v Council [2008] ECR 
I-6351, para 285. See also Annex I of the Commission Communication on the EU Rule of 
Law Framework (COM(2014) 158 fi nal/2) in which the Commission refers to the rule of 
law as ‘a legally binding constitutional principle’.
73 Recently, see the EU Global Strategy (2016), para 3.5.
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quences for the EU itself when that respect fails. This is so, for two related 
reasons. First, the EU as a ‘Community of law’ is dependent on mutual 
recognition and mutual trust between the Member States. The ‘mutually 
interdependent legal relations’74 linking the EU and its Member States, 
and its Member States with each other, are premised on the existence of 
mutual trust between Member States in recognition of the Union’s shared 
values and respect for EU law.75 After all, it is at the domestic level that 
the Member States need to secure administrative and judicial implemen-
tation and compliance. In this way, mutual trust and subsequent mutual 
recognition are strongly tied to the duty of sincere cooperation enshrined 
in Article 4(3) TEU.76 The Commission has described mutual trust among 
the Member States and their respective legal systems as the foundation of 
the whole Union edifice.77 Within this structure, the rule of law is accorded 
a decisive place, for ‘[t]he way the rule of law is implemented at national 
level plays a key role in this respect. The confidence of all EU citizens and 
national authorities in the functioning of the rule of law … will only be built 
and maintained if the rule of law is observed in all Member States.’78
In the recent case Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de 
Contas,79 arguably the most important judgement on the rule of law and 
its meaning in the EU legal order since Les Verts, the Court weighed in 
on exactly this point: the relationship between the protection of the rule 
of law in the Member States, as found in Article 2 TEU, the principle of 
sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU), and the role of domestic courts 
74 Opinion 2/13 ECHR II EU:C:2006:81, para. 167.
75 Ibid., para. 168.
76 Carlos Closa ‘Reinforcing EU Monitoring and the Rule of Law. Normative Arguments, 
Institutional Proposals and the Procedural Limitations’ in Closa & Kochenov (2016), pp. 
15-35 at 17. Also see Commission Recommendation regarding the rule of law in Poland, 
C(2017) 5320 fi nal, 26 July 2017, pnt. 4 of the Preamble.
77 Commission Communication on A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, 
COM(2014) 158 fi nal/2, 19 March 2014, p.2.
78 Ibid., p.2.
79 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, EU:C:2018:117, 
27 February 2018. For comments see, Michał Krajewski ‘Associação Sindical Dos Juízes 
Portugueses: The Court of Justice and Athena’s Dilemma’ 3 European Papers (2018), pp. 
395-407 (European Forum, 30 May 2018); Pierre-Emmanuel Pignarre ‘Does the End Justi-
fy the Means?’ 27 June 2018, available at: https://rsiblog.blogactiv.eu/2018/06/27/does-
the-end-justify-the-means-by-pierre-emmanuel-pignarre/; Alessandra Silveira & Sophie 
Perez Fernandes ‘A Union Based on the Rule of Law Beyond the Scope of EU Law- The 
Guarantees Essential to Judicial Independence in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portu-
gueses’ 3 April 2018, available at: https://offi cialblogofunio.com/2018/04/03/a-union-
based-on-the-rule-of-law-beyond-the-scope-of-eu-law-the-guarantees-essential-to-judi-
cial-independence-in-associacao-sindical-dos-juizes-portugueses/; Laurent Pech ‘Rule 
of Law Backsliding in the EU: The Court of Justice to the Rescue? Some Thoughts on 
the ECJ Ruling in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses’ 13 March 2018, available 
at: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/03/rule-of-law-backsliding-in-eu-court-of.
html; Michal Ovádek ‘Has the CJEU just Reconfi gured the EU Constitutional Order?’ 28 
February 2018, available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/has-the-cjeu-just-reconfi gured-
the-eu-constitutional-order/.
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in the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law, 
referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. The Court was 
asked to pronounce on the question whether a 2014 Portuguese legislative 
measure temporarily reducing the remuneration of people working in 
public administration, including judges, infringed the principle of judicial 
independence. On the basis of a combined reading of the abovementioned 
Articles, the Court held that mutual trust between the Member States, and, 
in particular, their courts and tribunal, ‘is based on the fundamental premiss 
that Member States share a set of common values on which the European 
Union is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU.’80 Furthermore, Article 19 
TEU, ‘which gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law’,81 
entrusts a responsibility for ensuring judicial review in the EU legal order 
also to national courts and tribunals. Accordingly, the Member States, in line 
with the principle of sincere cooperation, have a duty to establish a system 
of legal remedies and procedures ensuring effective judicial review in the 
fields covered by EU law and the central place of domestic courts therein, 
since, ‘[t]he very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure 
compliance with EU law is of the very essence of the rule of law.’82 More-
over, the Court observed that in order for the EU legal system to operate 
efficiently and for individuals to benefit from effective judicial protection 
of their EU rights at the domestic level, it is essential the national courts are 
independent.83
The necessity of preserving mutual trust and the functioning of national 
courts has also been at the heart of the Commission’s efforts in address-
ing systemic threats to the rule of law in some of the Member States. As 
underlined by the Commission in its Recommendation of 20 December 2017 
regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, respect for the rule of law is not only 
a prerequisite for the protection of all the values listed in Article 2 TEU, it is 
also ‘a prerequisite for upholding all rights and obligations deriving from 
the Treaties and for establishing mutual trust of citizens, businesses and 
80 Case C-64/16, para. 30.
81 Ibid., para. 32.
82 Ibid., para. 36.
83 Ibid, paras. 40-42. For an example of what happens in practice when mutual trust is 
undermined because of doubt surrounding the rule of law in one of the Member States, 
see the Court’s judgment in Case C-216/18 PPU. The CJEU was asked to consider wheth-
er the rule of law crisis and the systemic defi ciencies in the Polish judicial system could 
justify the refusal of execution of a European Arrest Warrant issued by that Member 
State. The Court affi rmed the right of the referring Irish court to refuse to extradite if it 
fi nds a real risk to the person’s right to a fair trial because of a lack of judicial indepen-
dence. Case C-216/18 PPU LM, EU:C:2018:585, 25 July 2018. More recently, on October 4 
2018, a Dutch court refused to send a suspect back to Poland following a request on the 
basis of a European Arrest Warrant. Citing concerns over the changes made to the Polish 
judicial system and the lack of judicial independence, the court stated it will keep the 
request for surrender pending until the Polish authorities have replied to its questions, 
Rechtbank Amsterdam 4 October 2018, Case No. 13/751441-18, RK 18/3804.
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national authorities in the legal system of all other Member States.’84 Similarly, 
it is exactly these concerns about the effects of a serious breach of the rule of 
law by one of the Member States in relation to the interdependent relations 
between them, that underpinned the European Parliament’s resolution 
when it called on the Council to determine, pursuant Article 7(1) TEU, 
whether there has been a breach of Article 2 TEU in relation to Hungary. 
According to the resolution, any clear risk of a serious breach by a Member 
State of the EU’s core values ‘does not concern solely the individual Mem-
ber State where the risk materialises but also has an impact on the other 
Member States, on mutual trust between them and on the very nature of 
the Union….’85 Thus, upholding the rule of law in the Member States is not 
only indispensable for the functioning of the EU’s policies by buttressing 
mutual trust and mutual recognition that are vital for their success,86 but 
also underpins the whole of the EU project itself.
The second reason in relation to the specific importance of the rule of 
law at the domestic level of the Member States, revolves around the all-
84 Commission Recommendation of 20 December 2017 regarding the rule of law in Poland, 
complementary to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and 
(EU) 2017/1520, C(2017) 9050 fi nal, pnt. 41 [emphasis added].
85 Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to 
determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a 
clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded, 
(2017/2131(INL)), pnt. B, 4 July 2018.
86 As a prime policy example, justice and home affairs (JHA) should be mentioned, though 
which asylum policy and immigration, judicial, customs, and policy cooperation have 
become ‘areas of common interest’ (ex Article K.1 EU). The JHA envisaged establish-
ment of the area of freedom, security and justice, is based on the idea that national courts 
and administrations, as well as law enforcement authorities need to cooperate with one 
another, in particular by exchanging information and by mutually recognising judicial 
decisions in civil and criminal matters. According to the Commission’s EU Justice Agen-
da 2020 mutual trust in Member States between courts, administrations, citizens, legal 
practitioners, and judges ‘is the bedrock upon which EU justice policy should be built’ 
(COM(2014) 144 fi nal, 11 March 2014, p. 4). Mutual trust helps judicial authorities to rec-
ognise an enforce decisions and facilitates access to justice on equal terms between the 
Member States, which in turn will help with external challenges, including terrorism and 
other perceived threats to the internal security of the EU (COM(2014) 154 fi nal, 11 March 
2014, p. 13).  It furthermore ensures that EU instruments such as the European arrest 
warrant or the regulations on the confl ict of laws issues between Member States are effi -
ciently applied and relied on throughout the EU. A key requirement to achieving these 
objectives is the independence, quality and effi ciency of the judicial systems (including 
enforcement bodies), and thus, respect of the rule of law. Further see Olivier De Schutter 
‘The Role of Evaluation in Experimentalist Governance: Learning by Mentoring in the 
Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice’ in Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin (eds) Expe-
rimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2010), p. 262; Neil Walker ‘In Search of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice: A Constitutional Odyssey’ in Neil Walker (ed) Europe’s Area of Freedom, Secu-
rity and Justice Oxford: Oxford University Press (2004), p. 5; European Council ‘The Stock-
holm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens’ OJ[2010] 
C115/1, p. 12; Guidelines for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 2014-2020, Presi-
dency Conclusions Brussels European Council, 27 June 2014, p. 1
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affected principle.87 This principle reinforces the critical role of the rule 
of law at the national level by underlining the results of its erosion. The 
effects of the demise of the rule of law in a Member State are not only felt 
within that state but extend beyond its borders. Lack of rule of law in one 
state endangers the legitimacy of EU decision-making in a normative sense: 
every Member State, by virtue of their role in the European Council and 
the Council, at least indirectly participates in governing the lives of all the 
citizens of Europe.88 If one Member States changes its standards in relation 
to the rule of law, this affects the EU’s decisions as well. Moreover, since, 
as shown above, the whole structure of the Union is necessarily built on 
mutual trust, the underlying presumption must be that each Member State 
upholds the same rule of law, democracy, and governance standards.89 On 
this basis, it is clear that the mutual interdependence, created through the 
process of integration, implies that the erosion of the rule of law in a Mem-
ber State, through the all-affected principle, endangers the entire function-
ing of the EU itself, thus underscoring the importance of a functioning rule 
of law in each of the Member States.
Having established the importance of respect for the rule of law at the 
domestic level, the focus of this section now turns towards the instrumental 
function of the national rule of law traditions in understanding them as a 
source for the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law, both internally as 
in its external relations. Whereas Article 6(3) TEU requires the EU to rely 
on national traditions when interpreting fundamental rights,90 Article 2 
TEU simply states the fact that the values mentioned are ‘common to the 
Member States.’ This leaves the question open what the meaning and scope 
of application of the EU rule of law is and to what extent national concep-
tions can be helpful in supplying answers. The German and French versions 
use Rechtsstaatlichkeit, and état de droit respectively. However, while the 
semantic field of these expressions seems to be the same, the historical and 
conceptual specificity underlying the national traditions should not be over-
looked.91 Even if differences in conceptions within continental Europe were 
to be minimised, their conceptual equivalence is far from straightforward. 
Terminological differences epitomise the diversity of cultural contexts and 
87 On the all-effected principle generally, see David Owen ‘Constituting the Polity, Con-
stituting the Demos: On the Place of the All Affected Interests Principle in democratic 
Theory and in Resolving the Democratic Boundary Problem’ 5 Ethics & Global Politics 
(2012), pp. 129-152; Sofi a Näsström ‘The Challenge of the All-Affected Principle’ 59 Politi-
cal Studies (2011), pp. 116-134; Robert Goodin ‘Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and its 
Alternatives’ 35 Philosophy & Public Affairs, pp. 40-68.
88 Carlos Closa & Dimitry Kochenov ‘Reinforcement of the Rule of Law Oversight in the 
European Union: Key Options’ in Schroeder (2016), p. 177.
89 Carlos Closa ‘Reinforcing EU Monitoring of the Rule of Law’ in Closa & Kochenov (2016), 
pp. 18-19.
90 Article 6(3) TEU: Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of law.
91 See chapter 1 of the thesis.
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the contrast between the civil law and common law systems should offer 
enough preventive effect from considering the notions as simply synony-
mous.92 This semantic complexity characterises the whole historical span of 
rule of law traditions that cannot be detached from national cultures where 
it is actually used.
Some authors argue that the Union must respect the values of Article 2 
TEU because they are ‘common to the Member States’ as they are defined 
by what is common in them, thus relying on national constitutional tradi-
tions to offer a basis for determining what these principles mean in the EU 
context.93 Others maintain that, even though an EU definition of the rule 
of law should be guided and inspired by national understandings of the 
notion, both levels (EU – Member States) should be kept strictly separated 
because it is impossible to draw direct parallels between the national legal 
orders with respect to the precise meaning of the rule of law espoused by 
each system.94 The opposing point of view, which argues for the need of an 
autonomous EU concept since the way the rule of law or allied concepts are 
understood in their national setting cannot be determinative as these will 
be conditioned by a particular legal or historical context and may vary from 
state to state, is also present in the discourse.95
It is submitted that national constitutional conception of the rule of law, 
although not determinative on an individual basis for reasons outlined 
supra, do need to be taken into account and necessarily inform the EU inter-
pretation of the rule of law, providing its elements and benchmarks. While 
it is impossible to establish one unitary conception of the rule of law stem-
ming from all the Member States and acknowledging their national differ-
ences, the thesis takes it as a starting point the fact that there are generally 
some common characteristics of the rule of law in the Member States, which 
necessarily feed into the Treaty’s conception of the rule of law.96 As former 
Advocate General Jacobs pointed out, ‘the rule of law embodies certain val-
ues which seem, at least in Europe, widely accepted as essential to modern 
social and political life; and that we shall be able to identify some of those 
values.’97 Similarly, the Commission argued in its 2014 Communication on 
92 Danilo Zolo ‘The Rule of Law: A Critical Reappraisal’ in Pietro Costa & Danilo Zolo (eds) 
The Rule of Law. History, Theory and Criticism Dordrecht: Springer (2007), p. 3.
93 Amaryllis Verhoeven The European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional The-
ory The Hague: Kluwer Law International (2002), p. 322.
94 Kochenov (2009), p. 14-21.
95 Arnull (2002), p. 240.
96 On a similar point of view, see Konstadinides, who, in his quest to identify and con-
ceptualise the rule of law in the European Union in its internal dimension, has stated 
that ‘[t]hese formal [national] rule of law attributes which are historically embedded in 
the constitutional heritage of these Member States undermine any effort to conceptualise 
the EU rule of law as a universal European concept. Finding shared traits between the 
Member States that can be stretched in order to create a state of (pan-European) rule of 
law euphony without distorting those States’ legal heritage appears to be a more realistic 
option.’ Konstadinides (2017), p. 39.
97 Jacobs (2007), p. 8.
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the new internal EU Framework to strengthen the rule of law, in which it 
recognised the work of the CJEU, the ECHR, and the Council of Europe’s 
Venice Commission in articulating the principles and standards stemming 
from the rule of law in the constitutional traditions of the Member States, 
that these ‘define the core meaning of the rule of law as a common value of 
the EU in accordance with Article 2 TEU.’98
However, a further crucial nuance needs to be added, missing in the 
current debate. In any EU rule of law formulation, the level at which it 
is advanced and the function the Union attributes to it needs to be taken 
into account. As a foundational value, the rule of law functions within the 
context of the EU as a supranational organisation. Against this setting the 
Court relied on the value to pry open Article 173 EEC (Article 263 TFEU) 
and broaden the catalogue of annulment actions to include actions against 
measures adopted by the European Parliament intended to have legal 
effect vis-à-vis third parties,99 interpreting it mainly in procedural terms. 
In its external relations, however, the EU conception of the rule of law is 
advanced at the national level of states in its primary function of protec-
tion against arbitrariness, ensuring a secure environment in which human 
rights will be upheld.100 It is on that level and within that function that the 
national rule of law conceptualisations will be most useful in providing 
common elements and benchmarks. Therefore, any discussion on the notion 
of the rule of law in EU external relations must include an exposition of the 
national rule of law conceptions in the most prominent national rule of law 
traditions. It is an analysis of these and the demonstration of their common 
core as well as their subsequent interpretation and theoretical formulation 
in legal doctrine, which will comprise chapter 1 of the thesis.
In sum, it was shown that respect for and observance of the rule of law 
in the Member States is vital to the functioning of the EU legal order as a 
whole. Without this there can be no mutual trust which is necessary for the 
operation of all of the EU’s policies. Additionally, it was demonstrated that 
the national rule of law traditions provide the building blocks for the EU’s 
rule of law conceptualisation. It was argued that since the EU advances 
98 Commission Communication on A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, 
COM(2014) 158 fi nal/2, 19 March 2014, p. 4.
99 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. In Les Verts, 
the Court essentially formulated a combination of both judicial review and the individual 
right to judicial protection, which are ‘intrinsic components’ of the EU legal system pre-
serving the rule of law. See Koen Lenaerts ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the 
Judicial System of the European Union’ Common Market Law Review (2007) 44, p. 1626; 
Piet Jan Slot Editorial comments ‘The Rule of Law as the Backbone of the EU’ 44 Com-
mon Market Law Review (2007), pp. 875-881. According to Jacobs, ‘[t]he key to the notion 
of the rule of law is, (…) the reviewability of decisions of public authorities by indepen-
dent courts.’ Francis Jacobs The Sovereignty of Law: The European Way Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press (2007), p. 35. The Court itself called judicial review ‘a constitu-
tional guarantee forming part of the very foundations of the Community.’ Joined cases 
C-402/05P and C-415/05P Kadi v Council [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 290.
100 See chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis.
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the rule of law in its external relations at the national level, the rule of law 
conceptions in the Member States provide the elements and benchmarks 
which the Union uses in its external relations.
3.1.3 The rule of law as a benchmark in and objective of the EU’s external 
relations
In the EU’s external relations, the rule of law is used as a foreign policy 
objective (Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU) and as a benchmark to assess the 
actions and progress of (potential) candidate countries. It is a condition 
for membership (Article 49 TEU) and a condition for close(r) cooperation 
with the Union. The rule of law has come to increasingly permeate various 
instruments of EU external policies.101 Ever since the fifth paragraph of the 
Preamble to the Single European Act (1986) obliged the Member States to 
‘display the principles of democracy and compliance with the law and with 
human rights’, the Union has attributed an exportable quality to its values, 
and the rule of law among these, in its external action. This is clear not 
only from the evolution of the relevant Treaty provisions, but also from the 
development of its external policies, in particular development cooperation 
and enlargement.
The EU advances the rule of law in a variety of ways, in various combi-
nations simultaneously relying on technical and financial assistance instru-
ments, bilateral instruments, political dialogue, or by making it an essential 
element of the contractual relationship.102 As an illustration, three of these 
ways, namely, the political dialogue in the context of the Cotonou Agree-
ment, Regulation 231/2014, which provides for pre-accession assistance for 
candidate countries, and the inclusion of the rule of law as an element in a 
contractual essential elements clause, will be briefly discussed here in order 
to show some of the ways through which the EU relies on the rule of law in 
its external policies. The point here is merely to provide some examples in 
order to frame the discussion; detailed analysis of the relevant instruments 
will be undertaken in the respective case studies.
Political dialogues are a well-established practice103 of the EU in its rela-
tions with third countries. Based on the rationale that ‘[t]he most effective 
way of achieving change is a positive and constructive partnership with 
101 See for an example in relations to the European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s rela-
tions with the Ukraine, Burlyuk (2014).
102 Cremona (2011), pp. 292-293; Karen E. Smith ‘The Use of Political Conditionality in the 
EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?’ 3 European Foreign Affairs Review 
(1998), p. 256.
103 For criticism on the lack of positive developments stemming from this practice see, for 
example, European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2010 on the Annual Report 
on Human Rights in the World 2009 and the European Union’s policy in the matter, 
(2010/2202(INI)), paras. 21 and 157
24 The rule of law in EU external relations: An introduction 
governments, based on … support and encouragement’,104 the EU has 
focussed on dialogues primarily to promote respect for human rights, but 
also on issues linked to democracy and the rule of law. In fact, in the in 
2004 updated Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues with Third Coun-
tries, the rule of law is identified as one of the priority issues ‘which should 
be included on the agenda for every dialogue'.105 Some bilateral treaties 
include specific provisions to raise rule of law related issues in the context 
of the agreement. As an example, the Cotonou Agreement, which forms the 
framework for the EU’s relations with 79 countries from Africa, the Carib-
bean, and the Pacific (ACP), stresses the pivotal role of dialogue106 and com-
mits the parties to ‘regularly engage in comprehensive, balanced and deep 
dialogue’.107 More importantly, the dialogue is also tailored to encompass a 
regular assessment of the developments concerning the rule of law.108
Regulation 231/2014 (IPA II) is the instrument specifically designed for 
pre-accession assistance for (potential) candidate countries.109 Its general 
objective is to support the applicant countries in adopting and implement-
ing the political, institutional, legal, administrative, and economic reform 
required in order to comply with the Union’s values and to progressively 
align to the Union’s rules and standards, with a view to EU member-
ship.110 The strengthening of the rule of law is a specific objective of the 
Regulation,111 and from the list of thematic priorities listed in the annex it 
is apparent that the focus is on ‘[e]stablishing and promoting from an early 
stage the proper functioning of the institutions necessary in order to secure 
the rule of law.’112 The rest of the paragraph makes clear that the intended 
interventions in this area should be aimed in particular at establishing 
independent, accountable, and efficient judicial systems. Progress towards 
achievement of the objectives set out in the Regulation is monitored and 
assessed, with the possibility of rewarding individual countries for particu-
larly positive achievements.113
104 Commission Communication on The European Union’s role in promoting human rights 
and democratisation in third countries, COM(2001) 252 fi nal, 8 May 2001, p. 8.
105 EU guidelines on human rights dialogues with third countries – Update, p. 6, available at 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/fi les/eu_guidelines_on_human_rights_dialogues_
with_third_countries.pdf.
106 Article 2 Cotonou Agreement.
107 Article 8(1) Cotonou Agreement.
108 Article 8(4) Cotonou Agreement.
109 Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing an instrument for pre-accession assistance for the period 2014-2020, 
OJ[2014] L77/11. It replaced the IPA I Regulation, which covered the period 2007-2013, 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 establishing an instrument for pre-accession 
assistance (IPA), OJ[2006] L210/82.
110 Article 1 Regulation 231/2014.
111 Article 2 Regulation 231/2014.
112 Annex II under (b) Regulation 231/2014.
113 Article 14 Regulation 231/2014.
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Turning to the third example, since the 90s, the EU has progressively 
pushed for the systematic inclusion of an ‘essential elements clause’ in all 
of its agreements concluded with third countries.114 The clause marked the 
beginning of economic and political conditionality and became standard for 
bilateral association and cooperation agreements with other countries.115 As 
of 1995, inclusion of the clause is mandatory.116 Together with a suspension 
clause, which allows for the adoption of negative measures in cases on non-
compliance or abuse of one of the essential elements, this has given the rule 
of law, next to the protection of human rights and democratic principles, a 
prominent place in the EU’s bilateral instruments. For example, Article 9(2) 
of the Cotonou Agreement states:117
… The structure of government and the prerogatives of the different powers 
shall be founded on rule of law, which shall entail in particular effective and 
accessible means of legal redress, an independent legal system guaranteeing 
equality before the law and an executive that is fully subject to the law.
Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, which 
underpin the ACP-EU Partnership, shall underpin the domestic and inter-
national policies of the Parties and constitute the essential elements of this 
Agreement.
This brief excursion into three different instruments demonstrates that 
the EU actively promotes the rule of law in its external relations, in line 
with Articles 3(5) and 21(1) TEU. However, the instruments themselves 
do not provide much insight into the EU’s conception of the rule of law, 
let alone a comprehensive definition including minimum standards and 
benchmarks. For this reason, it is hard not to agree, for example, with the 
European Parliament when it called on the Council and the Commission 
to develop ‘specific quantifiable indices and benchmarks’ in relation to its 
political dialogues,118 for how else can the EU measure the effectiveness of 
its policies? Regarding the Union’s external action more generally, schol-
114 European Commission, Inventory of Agreements containing the Human Rights Clause, DG 
RELEX/B2 – Treaties Offi ce, 7 July 2011.
115 Der-Chin Horng ‘The Human Rights Clause in the European Union’s External Trade and 
Development Agreements’ European Law Journal 9 (2003) 5, pp. 677-701.
116 Commission Report on the Implementation of Measures intended to Promote Obser-
vance of Human Rights and Democratic Principles, COM(95) 191 fi nal, 22 July 1995, 
Annex 2; Council Conclusions ‘Human Rights Clauses in Community Agreements with 
Third Countries’, 1847th General Affairs Council, Luxembourg 29 May 1995.
117 Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, 
of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (Cotonou Agreement), OJ[2000] 
L317/3, revised in 2005, OJ[2005] L209/27, and 2010, OJ[2010] L287/04. The Agreement 
is revised every fi ve years.
118 European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2010 on the Annual Report on Human 
Rights in the World 2009 and the European Union’s policy in the matter, (2010/2202(INI)), 
para. 21.
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arly literature119 and reports by NGOs120 echo the Parliaments call. Thus, 
while the Union’s active engagement with the rule of law in its external 
relations is evident in both primary and secondary EU law as well as from 
its practice, a clear conceptualisation of the notion flowing from the legal 
framework is missing.
3.1.4 The rule of law as a guarantee for EU security
According to Article 21(2)(a) TEU, the Union’s objective to safeguard the 
rule of law as one of its values is linked to the protection of its fundamen-
tal interests, security, independence, and integrity. However, next to the 
Treaty’s setting out of the objective of the rule of law’s preservation through 
its external action, it also enounces the EU’s general external aims121 of the 
consolidation and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and the principles of international law (Article 21(2)(b) TEU), as well as 
the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and the strengthening of 
international security (Article 21(2)(c) TEU). Ever since the development 
and consolidation of the rule of law was a specific intention of the Union’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP, ex Article 11 EU), the EU has 
connected (some authors would say conflated122) the ‘progressive spread 
of the rule of law’ to issues such as security, stability, and the absence of 
corruption and organised crime.123 Furthermore, it has also increasingly 
come to recognise that internal and external aspects of EU security are 
intrinsically intertwined.124 Or, in the words of the 2016 Global Strategy, 
‘our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring 
119 See for example Wennerström (2007), chapter 5; Burlyuk (2014), pp. 26-46.
120 Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, stated in the organisation’s 
2011 World Report, that ‘[t]he [EU’s] failure to set clear, public benchmarks is itself evi-
dence of a lack of seriousness…’. Kenneth Roth ‘A Façade of Action: World Report 2011. 
Events of 2010.’ New York: Seven Stories Press (2011), p. 4.
121 See case Case C-130/10 Parliament v Council, EU:C:2012:472, 19 July 2012, para. 62. 
The case provides post-Lisbon insights into the question of the delineation of specifi c 
CFSP aims in terms of the EU’s foreign policy and issues of the Union’s security, and 
the Union’s external objectives more generally. For analysis, see Christophe Hillion ‘A 
Powerless Court? The European Court of Justice and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy’ in Marise Cremona & Anne Thies (eds) The European Court of Justice and External 
Relations Law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2013), pp. 47-70 at 58-65.
122 Konstadinides (2017), p. 146. On the confl ation of the rule of law and law and order 
generally, see Rachel Kleinfeld ‘Competing Defi nitions of the Rule of Law’ in Thomas 
Carothers (ed) Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad. In Search of Knowledge Washington: Carn-
egie Endowment for International Peace (2006), pp. 31-73 at 39-42.
123 European Council ‘European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World’ 12 
December 2003.
124 EU Global Strategy (2016), p. 14; Commission Communication on The EU internal Secu-
rity Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 fi nal, 22 
November 2010; Commission Communication on A strategy on the external dimension 
of the area of freedom, security and justice, COM(2005) 491 fi nal, 12 October 2005, p. 5.
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and surrounding regions.’125 Efficient border management is vital to fight 
cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, and illegal immigrants, and its 
potential links with terrorism. Security is fundamental to international busi-
ness transactions and to tackling cross-border crime.126
For the EU, the rule of law has a dual purpose, which is related to the 
value’s immediate connection to security and law and order objectives. 
First, a rule of law-based society is more stable, less sensitive to crime, and 
better able to protect the lives and property of its citizens domestically. 
Secondly, the assumption is that societies that place a high emphasis on law 
and order will more readily cooperate in order to adopt a common approach 
against foreign threats. This much is apparent from the Commission’s 
Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ), in which it is stated that societies based on the rule of law 
‘will be more effective in preventing domestic threats to their own security 
as well as more able and willing to cooperate against common international 
threats.’127 In addition to attributing this particular causal understanding of 
the rule of law, the EU has construed its notion of security in increasingly 
wide terms, clearly illustrated by the European Security Strategy, the Inter-
nal Security Strategy,128 and their follow-up reports.129 The latter set out 
the security challenges facing the Union, both internally and externally, in 
terms of terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. The 
policies covered by the AFSJ are relevant to almost all of these challenges.130
The way the notion of the rule of law is used by the Union in the 
context of the protection of its own values and security, unquestionably 
125 EU Global Strategy (2016), p. 14.
126 Commission Communication on A strategy on the external dimension of the area of free-
dom, security and justice, COM(2005) 491 fi nal, p. 4.
127 Ibid., p. 5.
128 Council ‘Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Secu-
rity Model’, 23 February 2010; Commission Communication on The EU internal Security 
Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 fi nal, 22 
November 2010.
129 On the European Security Strategy, see the Report on the Implementation of the Euro-
pean Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World, drafted under the 
responsibility of EU High Representative Solana and adopted by the European Council, 
Brussels, 11 December 2008. On the Internal Security Strategy, see Commission Commu-
nication on First annual report on the implementation of the EU Internal Security Strat-
egy, COM(2011) 790 fi nal, 25 November 2011; Commission Communication on Second 
report on the implementation of the EU Internal Security Strategy, COM(2013) 179 fi nal, 
10 April 2013; Commission Communication on The fi nal implementation report on the 
implementation of the EU Internal Security Strategy 2010-2014, COM(2014) 365 fi nal, 20 
June 2014.
130 Therefore, development in the area of the Internal Security Strategy is done so ‘with the 
guidance of the Stockholm Programme’, Commission Communication ‘The EU internal 
Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe’, COM(2010) 673 
fi nal, 22 November 2010, p. 2.
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demonstrates an instrumental approach,131 i.e. the rule of law is understood 
as a means to the realisation of security-related ends (without necessarily 
making explicit what the exact relationships are between the rule of law 
and those end goals, or how these will be achieved). Strengthening the rule 
of law is seen as a means to achieving social order, secure environments, 
and good governance, which in turn will make states and peoples better 
able to withstand criminal activity, better able to handle economic failure 
without this turning into a political problem or violent conflict, and better 
able to fight signs of corruption, abuse of power and lack of government 
accountability. Moreover, within the broader security context, the Global 
Strategy makes it clear that the EU applies a similar instrumental rule of 
law-approach to more economic goals, such as prosperity, increased invest-
ments, and trade. It is the assumption that these, in turn, will also help fos-
ter more stable and resilient societies.132 In this way, the consolidation and 
strengthening of the rule of law is seen as the main catalyst for stability and 
prosperity underlying the Union’s multi-dimensional approach to security 
in the wider world.133
This instrumental approach towards the rule of law is confirmed by 
the EU concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the context of Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations. According to the Council, 
SSR ‘seeks to increase the ability of a state to meet the range of both internal 
and external security needs in a manner consistent with democratic norms 
and sound principles of good governance, human rights, transparency and 
the rule of law. It concerns not only state stability and regime security of 
nations, but also the safety and well-being of their people.’134 CSDP action 
to support SSR is set up to contribute to the goal of reaching a situation 
where the security of a state is effectively organised, ensuring the protec-
tion of citizens through democratic oversight and well-functioning state 
institutions.135
The central function of the rule of law in CSDP missions was recognised 
by the 2000 Feira European Council, identifying strengthening of the rule 
of law as one of the four priority areas to enhance the Union’s capability in 
civilian aspects of crisis management.136 So far, three such missions have 
131 Walker (2009), p. 120. For a wide-ranging discussion of the growth of legal instrumental-
ism, see Brian Z. Tamanaha Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (2006).
132 EU Global Strategy, pp. 26-27.
133 Ibid., p. 28.
134 ‘EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform’, Doc. 12566/4/05 REV, 13 
October 2005, pnt. 17.
135 Ibid., pnt. 25.
136 The other three priority areas are: policing, strengthening civilian administration, and 
civil protection. ‘Study on concrete targets of civilian aspects of crisis management’, Pres-
idency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000, Appendix 
3.
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been carried out:137 in Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS),138 Iraq (EUJUST LEX),139 
and Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO).140 The three missions differ in scope and 
ambition. The mission in Georgia was of limited size, lasted for a year, and 
dealt mostly with guidance for criminal justice reform and support for plan-
ning of new legislation, such as a Criminal Procedure Code. The mandate 
for the operation in Iraq was completed by 31st December 2013. It focussed 
mostly on addressing the urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system 
through providing training for high and mid-level officials in senior man-
agement and criminal investigation.141
The EULEX mission in Kosovo has been set up to assist the judicial 
authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards 
sustainability and accountability, and in further developing multi-ethnic 
institutions, free from political interference.142 In order to fulfil its objec-
tives, the mission shall implement a number of measures related to a wide 
area, amongst others: monitoring of the competent institutions on all areas 
related to the wider rule of law; ensuring the maintenance and promotion 
of the rule of law, including public order and security; ensuring that cases 
of war crimes, terrorism, organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, 
financial/economic crimes, are properly investigated, prosecuted, adjudi-
cated and enforced; contributing to the fight against corruption, fraud and 
financial crime, and organised crime.143
To conclude, even though this section is far from comprehensive in its 
treatment of security issues in relation to the rule of law and the European 
Union, the various policy areas involved in the development of the EU’s 
security concept demonstrate that for the EU, the rule of law is vital for the 
protection of its own interests. It was shown that the Union has adopted 
an instrumental understanding of the rule of law; underlying its security 
policy is the assumption that by promoting the rule of law there will be 
economic prosperity, which in turn will foster stability and, thus, increase 
security. It was shown that for the Union, the surest way of improving its 
own security is through rule of law reform both abroad and at home.
137 For a detailed overview of all CSDP civilian missions see Panos Koutrakos The EU Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), pp. 133-182.
138 Council Joint Action 2004/532/CFSP of 28 June 2004 on the European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS, OJ[2004] L228/21.
139 Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 March 2005 on the European Union Integrated 
Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX, OJ[2005] L62/73.
140 Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, OJ[2008] L42/92.
141 Article 2, Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP, OJ[2005] L62/73.
142 Article 2, Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, OJ[2008] L42/92.
143 Article 3, Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, OJ[2008] L42/92.
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3.1.5 Focus of the thesis
Having discussed the four functions of the rule of law in the EU, it should 
be pointed out that there is an extent of overlap between them, whereby 
the second function, the rule of law as a common value found within all the 
Member States, fulfils a pivotal role. As it was shown, the existence of the 
rule of law within the constitutional traditions of the Member States ensures 
the functioning of the EU’s policies by guaranteeing the mutual legal inter-
dependence and mutual trust among its members, thereby underpinning 
the whole of the EU’s legal order. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that 
this function of the rule of law also fulfils a more instrumental purpose: 
the national traditions form the source for the EU’s claim to this value as 
a foundational one (the first function), and, subsequently, they are a point 
of reference for the Union’s own conceptualisation of the rule of law, par-
ticularly so when it comes to rule of law promotion in third countries. After 
all, the value which inspired the EU’s own creation and development as a 
democratic system of governance based on the law,144 can be legitimately 
exported to third parties145 (the third function). Indeed, this is shown by 
Article 21(1) TEU, in which the Treaty directly links the internal and exter-
nal dimension of the rule of law: the principles which have inspired the 
EU’s own creation, development and enlargement, are to be advanced in 
the wider world.
In addition to the close connections between the rule of law as a value 
common to the Member States on the one hand, and the rule of law as an 
EU foundational value and as a yardstick in its external relations on the 
other, obvious similarities can be identified between the latter (the third 
function) and the way the Union makes use of the rule of law in order to 
guarantee its own security (the fourth function). Not limited to it – placed as 
it is under the ‘General provisions on the Union’s external action’ (emphasis 
added), Article 21(2)(a)-(c) TEU reflects the text of the former provision on 
the specific aims of the CFSP.146 However, while this suggests, at least in 
relation to the aim of the consolidation of and support for the rule of law 
(Article 21(2)(b)TEU), an overlap of objectives of both rule of law functions, 
a distinction should be drawn. Where the third function is concerned with 
the particular aim of upholding and promoting (Article 3(5) TEU) and con-
solidating and supporting (Article 21(2)(b) TEU) the rule of law per se in the 
EU’s external relations in general, in the fourth function, the advancement 
of the rule of law is used to other ends, tied to security and ideals of law and 
144 Opinion 1/91 EEA Agreement [1991] ECR 6097, para. 1.
145 Konstadinides (2017), p. 77.
146 Leading Advocate General Bot to suggest that ‘action by the European Union on the 
international stage which pursues one or more of the objectives referred to in Article 21(2)
(a) to (c) TEU, in particular the objective of preserving peace and strengthening interna-
tional security, must be regarded as falling within the sphere of the CFSP.’ Opinion of 
Advocate General Bot in Case C-130/10 Parliament v Council, para. 64.
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order (both nationally, transnationally, and internationally), whereby those 
goals are often equated with rule of law promotion.
Turning back to the research question outlined above, i.e. the EU’s 
conceptualisation of the rule of law in its external relations, and, more par-
ticularly, the question whether, and if so to what extent, there is a difference 
between theory and practice, as well as the follow-up question whether a 
common EU rule of law concept is apparent in its practice, it is evident that 
the focus of the thesis lies squarely within the third rule of law function. 
However, at the same time, the study takes as its point of departure the 
national understandings of the rule of law (the second function) from which 
the building blocks for the EU’s understanding can be distilled. These com-
ponents and sub-components will then be analysed against the background 
of legal theory. This analytical framework will then be tested against the 
backdrop of two specific case studies: the EU’s development cooperation 
policy and enlargement policy.
3.2 Delineating the research field: the two case-studies
The delineation of the thesis to development cooperation and enlargement 
gives rise to two interlinked questions: why two case studies, and why these 
two case studies in particular? Case study research can bring an understand-
ing of a complex issue, emphasising detailed contextual analysis of a limited 
number of conditions and their relationships. It adds to and extends what is 
already known through previous research, in this case the abundant materi-
als and analyses related to the notion of the rule of law, both from the point 
of view of theory as well as that of practice. As indicated previously, on the 
intersection of the extensive rule of law and EU external relations literature, 
a detailed comparative contextual analysis of the EU’s conceptualisation of 
the rule of law as it is advanced through its external action is absent, nec-
essarily limiting the ensuing findings to the field from which they arose.
By way of contrast, this work tests its theoretical rule of law framework 
against two different case studies. This provides a sounder methodological 
basis for drawing more general conclusions about the external EU concept 
of the rule of law. Furthermore, existing research is limited to an ad hoc 
analysis of (few) documents, rather than on an in depth comprehensive 
study of all relevant material. In contrast, this works provides a detailed and 
in-depth analysis of all relevant material stemming from the inception of the 
relevant policy areas to current practice. By doing so, the thesis provides not 
only a comprehensive exposition of the topic, but also an insight into the 
possible evolution of the concept of the rule of law over time. Furthermore, 
the comparative approach allows for the drawing of conclusions about the 
possible contextual insight the EU might have attempting to strengthen 
the notion in these two external policy areas. In other words, does the EU 
promote the same interpretation of the concept in the two case studies, or 
does it allow for variations, thereby demonstrating a more nuanced under-
standing of the rule of law in its particular policies.
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A few words on the reasons underpinning the choice of these particular 
two case studies. Both have a long-standing connection to the rule of law, at 
the level of EU primary law and through its practice. Ever since its insertion 
in the Treaty, development cooperation has included the development of 
the rule of law specifically as one of its policy objectives (Article 177(2) EC; 
ex 130u EEC). In addition to this, the EU has turned to the rule of law as a 
condition for development cooperation, see, for example, the rule of law 
related provisions in the Cotonou Agreement, outlined above. In relation to 
enlargement, Article 49 TEU formally links EU membership to respect of the 
rule of law; a codification of existing practice before this link was explicitly 
recognised in the provision.147
In relation to the Union’s development cooperation policy, the reasons 
for inclusion are manifold. To start with, its development policy stretches 
back as far as the EU itself; the weight of colonial inheritance forced 
the Union from its very inception to deal in a common fashion with the 
countries and territories under the Member States’ respective national juris-
diction.148 Over time, the EU has built up a unique and impressive record 
of development cooperation activities. Currently, the EU and its Member 
States collectively are the world’s leading donor, providing over 50% of all 
global development aid.149 The EU has been steadfast in the acknowledge-
ment of its responsibility to take on the challenges posed by the eradica-
tion of poverty and sustainable development in the developing world.150 
Moreover, in addition to that more general goal, the Union has from early 
on indicated it wishes to use its place in the international arena as a vehicle 
for advocating the values it considers important, the rule of law included.151 
This also holds true for its development cooperation policy.152
147 Bruno de Witte & Gabriel N. Toggenburg ‘Human Rights and Membership of the Euro-
pean Union’ in Steve Peers & Angela Ward (eds) The European Union Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights Oxford: Hart Publishing (2004), pp. 59-82 at 60.
148 Enzo R. Grilli The European Community and the Developing Countries Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press (1993), p. 1.
149 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy_en.
150 Acknowledging its ‘moral’ obligation, the 2006 European Consensus on Development 
expresses: ‘The EU, both at its Member States and Community levels, is committed to 
meeting its responsibilities. Working together, the EU is an important force for positive 
change. The EU provides over half of the world’s aid and has committed to increase this 
assistance, together with its quality and effectiveness.’ Joint statement by the Council and 
the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, 
the European Parliament and the Commission on European Development Policy: ‘The 
European Consensus’ OJ[2006] C46/01, pnt. 2.
151 Karin Arts & Anna K. Dickson ‘EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol?’ 
in Karin Arts & Anna K. Dickson (eds) EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol 
Manchester: Manchester University Press (2009), pp. 1-16 at 1.
152 See for example a 1982 Commission Memorandum on the then Community’s develop-
ment policy: ‘Development policy is a cornerstone of European integration … Today it is 
a manifestation of Europe’s identity in the world at large and a major plank in the Com-
munity’s external policies generally.’ Commission Memorandum on the Community’s 
development policy, COM(82) 640 fi nal, 5 October 1982, p. 8.
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Recently, in the New European Consensus on Development, a joint 
statement by the EU institutions and the representatives of the governments 
of the Member States meeting within the Council, expressed that:
The EU and its Member State will promote the universal values of democracy, 
good governance, the rule of law and human rights for all, because they are 
preconditions for sustainable development and stability, across the full range 
of partnerships and instruments in all situations and in all countries, including 
through development action.153
Furthermore, the EU utilises in its development cooperation, next to 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements, a number of financial 
instruments, such as the European Instrument for Democracy & Human 
Rights (EIDHR),154 the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI),155 and 
the European Development Fund (EDF).156 Subsequently, this policy area 
provides a large variety of legal instruments that can be tested against the 
analytical framework. However, one of the most important reasons for the 
inclusion of this case study in the thesis lies in the existence of the ACP-EU 
Partnership Agreement, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 and concluded 
for a 20-year period from 2000-2020.157 It is the most comprehensive and 
sophisticated partnership between developing countries and the EU. It 
builds on the previous Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions and has been the 
framework for the EU’s relations with 79 countries from Africa, the Carib-
bean and the Pacific since 2000. Combining political dialogue with coopera-
tion on trade and development, the agreement is based on shared principles 
and values, including the rule of law. Designated by the Commission as ‘one 
of the most important facets of the European Union’s external activities’,158 
the EU-ACP relationship has been described in the literature as ‘the most 
153 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Mem-
ber States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Par-
liament ‘The New European Consensus on Development ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our 
Future’ OJ[2017] C210/1, pnt. 61.
154 Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing a fi nancing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide, 
OJ[2014] L77/85.
155 Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing a fi nancing instrument for development cooperation for the period 
2014-2020, OJ[2014] L77/44.
156 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 on the fi nancial regulation applicable 
to the 11th European Development Fund, OJ[2015] L58/17.
157 Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, 
of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (Cotonou Agreement), OJ[2000] 
L317/3, revised in 2005, OJ[2005] L209/27, and 2010, OJ[2010] L287/04.
158 Commission Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP coun-
tries on the Eve of the 21st Century – Challenges and Options for a New Partnership’ 
COM(96) 570 fi nal, 20 November 1996.
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important area of [value] promotion’,159 as well as ‘the most visible and 
important component of the EU development cooperation programme’.160 
Indeed, the highly institutionalised system of the EU-ACP relationship has 
formed the model for the Union’s relations with other third countries and 
regional areas and is thus exemplary for the EU’s development cooperation 
policy more generally.161 Moreover, it is also in the EU’s relations with the 
ACP countries that a distinctive EU approach to development policy is most 
apparent.162 Lastly, it should be mentioned that it is in the context of the 
Cotonou Agreement and in relation to its essential elements clause that the 
Commission has proffered one of its very sparse definitions of the rule of 
law.
Regarding the inclusion of the EU’s enlargement policy as the second 
case study, it should be stated that enlargement is one of the most advanced 
and successful163 areas of EU foreign policy.164 The development of the 
regulatory intensive (enhanced) pre-accession process with the documents 
related to the assessment of the rule of law as one of the political Copen-
hagen criteria, such as the opening, interim, and closing benchmarks and 
the annual country assessment reports, are a very rich and detailed source 
of information for the analysis of the EU’s conception of the rule of law. 
Furthermore, the evolving nature of the policy itself, through the rounds of 
enlargement that have occurred over time, gives an insight into the develop-
ment of the concept of the rule of law. More particularly, by focusing on this 
159 Gorm Rye Olsen ‘The European Union: An Ad Hoc Policy with a Low Priority’ in Peter 
Schraeder (ed) Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner 
(2002), pp. 131-145 at 138.
160 Arts & Dickson (2009), p. 1.
161 Charlotte Bretherton & John Vogler The European Union as a Global Actor London: Rout-
ledge (1999), p. 135; Karen E. Smith ‘The ACP in the European Union’s Network of 
Regional Relationships: Still Unique or Just One in the Crowd?’ in Karin Arts & Anna K. 
Dickson (eds) EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol Manchester: Manchester 
University Press (2009), pp. 60-79 at 60.
162 Bretherton & Vogler (1999), p. 135.
163 Report of Wim Kok to the European Commission ‘Enlarging the European Union. 
Achievements and Challenges’ European University Institute (2003), p. 66.
164 On the question whether enlargement can be considered an area of EU foreign policy, it 
should be said that while some authors, mostly from the fi eld of political science, have 
pointed to the fact that enlargement is ultimately a passing phase in a longer process 
which domesticates what were previously foreign relations, the commonly held opinion 
in scholarly literature is that is foreign policy nature is a given. See Christophe Hillion 
‘The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy’ Swedish Institute for Euro-
pean Policy Studies No. 6 (2010), p. 7; Marise Cremona ‘Enlargement: A Successful Instru-
ment of Foreign Policy?’ in Takis Tridimas & Paolisa Nebbia (eds) European Union Law for 
the Twenty-First Century: Volume 1. Rethinking the New Legal Order Oxford: Hart Publish-
ing (2004), pp. 397-413; Karen E. Smith & Helene Sjursen ‘Justifying EU Foreign Policy: 
The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement’ in Thomas Christiansen & Ben Tonra (eds) 
Rethinking EU Foreign Policy. Europe in Change Manchester: Manchester University Press 
(2004), pp. 126-141; Helene Sjursen ‘Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy: Transforming the EU’s External Policy?’ ARENA Working Papers No 18 (1998).
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highly developed area, it would be possible for example to identify whether 
and to what extent the concept of the rule of law has been informed by the 
problems following the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. Additionally, 
considering the fact that enlargement prepares applicant states for acces-
sion, and thus for the status of Member State, one would expect the EU to 
have a highly specific understanding of the (level of) rule of law it wants 
applicant states to achieve.
The inclusion of these two policy areas in the case studies and their 
particularities – developing and developed countries, weak states and 
highly developed aspirant Member States, to name a few – provide a sound 
methodological basis on which general conclusions about the EU external 
rule of law concept can be drawn.
4. Structure
This section will explain the structure of the thesis. The aim of Part I, 
consisting of chapters 1 and 2, will be to provide the rule of law analytical 
framework. As mentioned above, there is no definition of the rule of law in 
the EU Treaties. The only relevant reference is that the rule of law is a value 
‘common to the Member States’. Therefore, the traditions of the Member 
States form the point of departure for exploring the theoretical definition of 
the rule of law in chapter 1. For this purpose, the legal theories of the three 
major national legal systems (the German Rechtsstaat, the French état de 
droit, and the Anglo-Saxon rule of law) will be examined. It will be proven 
that although there is no common definition of the concept, a number of 
common elements can be identified. The next chapter (chapter 2) will then 
proceed to examine whether, and if so, to what extent, legal doctrine consid-
ers the same features crucial for the existence of the rule of law concept. It 
will be concluded that, indeed, the common elements found in the legal 
systems of the three Member States analysed, are also to be located in the 
literature, albeit the case that some elements have been given more attention 
than others.
Following this, and in order to facilitate the discussion in the case stud-
ies, Part I of the thesis will end with the introduction of the analytical frame-
work. It will be asserted that the elements can be categorised as follows: 
formal, procedural, and institutional – whereby formal elements are concerned 
with the predictability and determinacy of laws, procedural elements cover 
those related to the impartial administration of the law, and institutional 
elements are concerned with the institutional requirements for upholding 
the rule of law.
Against this backdrop, in Part II, the following two chapters will exam-
ine whether and to what extent the elements identified in the analytical 
framework can be found in the field of EU external relations. For this pur-
pose, the analytical framework will be tested against the background of two 
case studies, namely the EU’s development cooperation policy (chapter 3)
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and its enlargement policy (chapter 4). Chapters 3 and 4 will examine the 
development and use of the rule of law with detailed reference to the rel-
evant EU legal framework, instruments, and policy in the respective policy 
areas.
The final, and concluding, chapter of the thesis will then analyse the 
findings of the case studies in relation to the analytical framework. It will 
be argued that, while in theory there is an emphasis on the formal and 
procedural aspects of the rule of law, in practice, the EU accords weight 
primarily to the procedural and institutional aspects of the rule of law, 
conceptualising the rule of law strongly in terms of an anatomical approach 
of judicial reform – an aspect that is downplayed both in legal theory 
and at the national level. It will be claimed that the divergence between 
the analytical framework and the findings in the case studies reflects the 
discrepancy between the stages of development of the legal systems the 
concept originates from and the legal systems to which it is supposed to 
apply. While the theoretical definition comes from legal systems that are 
highly developed, and therefore the institutional aspect is implicitly inher-
ent to their conceptualisations of the rule of law and the procedural aspects 
build on a long tradition, in practice the legal systems of the third states 
lack the prerequisite institutional and procedural foundations for the rule of 
law. Thus, in practice the emphasis is on the development of those aspects 
that do not feature prominently in relation to the notion as expounded by 
legal doctrine. Additionally, it will be asserted that these findings can be 
further explained on the basis of the methodologies underlying both the 
EU’s development cooperation policy as well as the enlargement policy. 
The assessment of progress strongly relies on benchmarks and indicators 
against which developments can be measured. It will be claimed that, while 
this is to some extent necessary, it also prioritises ‘measurable elements’ 
over others. Finally, it will be argued that the EU frequently conflates its 
instrumental use of the rule of law in order to achieve self-serving security 
related ends, with rule of law reform in third countries, both in the context 
of development cooperation as well as in enlargement.
5. Contribution to legal scholarship
The framework, structure, and analysis of this thesis offer an original per-
spective to the growing debate concerning the rule of law in EU external 
relations. More particularly, the contribution of the present thesis is twofold. 
First, it answers the question of how the EU conceptualises the rule of law 
in two core fields of its external relations. As discussed above, this has been 
identified as an important gap in the literature, and the thesis aims to fill 
this gap. Secondly, by doing so, the thesis feeds into two distinct debates 
that touch upon the rule of law: the debate pertaining to the EU’s identity 
as a global normative power, and the emerging debate on the EU’s internal 
rule of law.
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The EU’s identity as a global actor is firmly anchored in a distinct nor-
mative and political agenda.165 Apart from an economic power, the Union 
has consistently portrayed itself as a virtuous normative power committed 
to the promotion of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights, both 
internally and externally. In recent years the use by the EU of its economic 
clout as a tool, in order to export its standards and values (including the rule 
of law), has gained much scholarly attention.166 However, the discussion 
has proceeded largely along theoretical lines, and it has been acknowledged 
that the lack of evidence as to what the EU actually does on the ground 
leaves little room for scholars to make accurate statements about what kind 
of power the EU actually is.167 By providing a clear picture of what the EU 
understands as ‘rule of law’ in its reform activities in the fields of develop-
ment cooperation and enlargement, the thesis furnishes concrete evidence 
in order to assess what kind of normative power the Union really is. This 
could be used in the context of this debate in order to further investigate 
whether, and if so, to what extent, there is a gap between EU identity rheto-
ric and actual practice.
In relation to the second debate, ever since the European Commission’s 
Communication on the new EU framework to strengthen the rule of law,168 
a significant body of literature has materialised analysing the concrete 
legal bases and instrument the EU may avail of enforcing the rule of law 
internally.169 The current debate is mostly limited to the pitfalls of internal 
rule of law oversight mechanisms,170 leaving the role of the Union’s pre-
accession process in the emerging systemic threat to the rule of law largely 
unexplored. However, in reality the consolidation of the rule of law in new 
Member States is supposed to occur at a much earlier stage, i.e. during the 
pre-accession process. By highlighting the pitfalls of the rule of law defini-
tion in enlargement, the thesis raises the question as to whether the current 
165 Guy Harpaz & Eyal Rubinson ‘The Interface between Trade, Law and Politics and the 
Erosion of Normative Power Europe: Comment on Brita’ 35 European Law Review (2010), 
pp. 551-570. Further, see Burlyuk (2014); Cremona (2011); Aggestam (2008); Lucarelli 
(2006); Marise Cremona ‘The Union as a Global Actor: Roles, Models and Identity’ 41 
Common Market Law Review (2004), pp. 553-573.
166 See for example Jan Wouters, Axel Marx, Dylan Geraets & Bregt Natens (eds) Global 
Governance through Trade. EU Policies and Approaches Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2015)
167 Chad Damro ‘Market Power Europe and New EU Trade Policies’ in Jan Wouters, Axel 
Marx, Dylan Geraets & Bregt Natens (eds) Global Governance through Trade. EU Policies and 
Approaches Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2015), pp. 19-42 at 21.
168 Commission Communication on A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, 
COM(2014) 158 fi nal/2, 19 March 2014.
169 Recently, see Konstadinides (2017); Kochenov (2017); Schroeder (2016); Closa and Koche-
nov (2016); Barbou des Places (2016); Kochenov and Pech (2015); Douglas-Scott (2015), 
pp. 51-66; Bogdandy and Ioannidis (2014).
170 See for example Kochenov & Bárd (2018); Hillion (2016), p. 59; Closa and Kochenov 
(2016), pp. 173-196.
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value crises could partially relate to the ways in which the EU attempts to 
consolidate the rule of law in the applicant States through its enlargement 
policy; an aspect of the debate that has been hitherto largely overlooked.
6. Methodology
This thesis will describe the rule of concept within the context of two case 
studies in the field of EU external relations: development cooperation and 
the Union’s accession policy, from the very first enlargement round until 
Croatia’s enlargement in July 2013 and the ongoing monitoring of the cur-
rent candidate countries, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey, as well as the potential candidate 
countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.
The undertaken research relies heavily on two types of source material. 
For the theoretical chapter, the main sources come from academic literature. 
While there is an abundance of theoretical material on the rule of law in 
general, there is less in existence on the rule of law in connection to the EU, 
although this seems to be growing at a steady pace, reflecting the increased 
importance of the topic. For the case studies, the research is based on the 
relevant documents produced by the EU institutions, such as Conclusions 
of the Council and the European Council, Commission Communications 
and monitoring reports, Country and regional Strategy Papers, reports and 
resolutions of the European Parliament, as well as Accession Partnerships 
and European Partnerships, and Agreements.
A final note on terminology. The Treaties refer to the rule of law both as 
a value (Article 2 TEU) and as a principle (the TEU Preamble), even within 
the same provision (Article 21 TEU, also see the Preamble of the EU Charter 
on Fundamental Rights). Interestingly, since the Lisbon revision, the rule 
of law has changed from a foundational principle (Article 6 EU), into a 
foundational value (Article 2 TEU). Considering this term change, Von Bog-
dandy makes the appealing argument that the tenets laid down in Article 2 
TEU, although denoted as values, are to be understood as legal norms and 
founding principles. And since the values of Article 2 TEU produce legal 
consequences, as demonstrated by Articles 7 and 49 TEU, they are legal 
norms and thus principles.171 In a nutshell, values can be characterised as 
ethical convictions of a given society: ‘Everything social actors appreciate, 
appraise, wish to obtain, recommend, set up or propose as an ideal, can 
be considered as a value.’172 Every value has an object, i.e. that which is 
valued, and can be qualified by a judgment as valuable or as good or bad, 
171 Armin von Bogdandy ‘Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal 
Sketch’ 16 European Law Journal (2010), pp. 95-111 at 106.
172 Daphna Oyserman ‘Sociology of Values’ in Smelser & Baltes (eds) International Encyclope-
dia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (2001), p. 16153.
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desirable or not. Values are often bound together, interdependent and might 
be difficult to separate. The more a value is deeply rooted, the more it takes 
a central place in the system. If on the one hand values make up the back-
ground of the value-system of the lawmakers, principles belong to the field 
of the law itself.
There are many possible ways of characterising principles: as legal 
norms, as general legal norms, or as standards upon which legal rules 
should be based. Underlying this is the idea of principles providing stan-
dardised manners of behaviour for subjects of law. Principles give the 
reasons for arguing in a certain direction, without necessitating a particular 
decision. Intersecting principles must be resolved on their relative weight, 
their importance. The difference between values and principles lies in the 
fact that values sustaining a legal system have their origin in either social 
or political discourse and might therefore have a different scope. As such, 
values and principles constitute different categories, with the former operat-
ing as meta-norms in relation to the latter.
If values are understood as the identity-constitutive dimension of 
the Union, principles can be taken as indicative of an ‘activation’ of the 
common values in the Union’s external relations.173 Thus, in the various 
external policies and actions, foundational values take the shape as prin-
ciples, revealing the more active aspect.174 Values say something about the 
moral, cultural and political underpinnings of a polity, putting them into 
practice gives them the characteristic of guiding principles. A value refers to 
a particular idea that is cherished and grounded in the identity of a specific 
community.175 In that sense it can be seen that the mention of safeguarding 
of values in the second paragraph of Article 21 TEU, refers to the safeguard-
ing of the Union’s own identity, independence and security. Values can 
173 Fernandez Esteban distinguishes between values and principles on the grounds that a 
value is of a more indeterminate confi guration, whereas principles possess a more con-
fi ned structure, which makes them more suitable for the creation of legal rules through 
judicial adjudication. Maria Louisa Fernandez Esteban The Rule of Law in the European 
Constitution The Hague: Kluwer Law International (1999), pp. 38-39.
174 The background of Article 21 TEU is particularly interesting in this regard. During the 
European Convention in 2002, the Working Group on External Action VII under the 
heading ‘Principles and Objectives of EU External Action’ (CONV 459/02), recommend-
ed the text of the provisions, solely referring to values in the fi rst and second paragraph. 
The Draft constitutional Treaty used both principles and values in paragraph 1 (‘the prin-
ciples which have inspired its own creation’, and ‘the Union shall seek to develop rela-
tions and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global 
organisations, which share these values’) and values in paragraph 2. In the version of the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty, after editorial and legal adjustments by the Working Party 
of IGC Legal Experts (CIG 50/03), the reference to values in the second half of the fi rst 
paragraph had been altered to ‘these principles’, preserving internal consistency in the 
Article. See further Cremona (2004), pp. 4-6.
175 Helen Sjursen & Karen E. Smith ‘Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning 
EU Enlargement’ Arena Working Paper WP01/1, p. 3.
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be promoted across the Union’s own borders, but the shape in which this 
promotional action takes place is by virtue of principles, as the same Article 
mentions in paragraph 1.176
176 The TEU follows mostly the same reasoning, starting in the Preamble with a mention of 
the Union’s values in the context of the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of 
Europe, while subsequently mentioning the attachment to the principles (both including 
the rule of law). Whereas Article 2 TEU lists the EU’s foundational values, Article 3 TEU 
seems to deviate from the value/principle set up. However, Article 3(1) TEU with the 
reference of to the promotion of peace, values and the well-being of the Union’s citizens, 
can easily be read in the light of the EU’s internal objectives, especially when considering 
that paragraph 5 relates to the Union’s relation with the wider world, while still referring 
to the internal values. The same logic can be applied to Article 21 TEU, where paragraph 
2(a) refers to the safeguarding of the Union’s own internal values and interests and both 
paragraphs 1 and 2(b) mention the role of the principles in the EU’s external relations.
Part I

1 The common core of the rule of law: 
the concept in the most prominent 
legal systems of the EU
1. Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to determine whether, and to what extent, the 
European Union has adopted a coherent ‘rule of law’ concept in its external 
relations through two case studies, namely development cooperation and 
enlargement. However, from the outset, some sort of explanation of what 
the rule of law is, or should be, needs to be provided in order for any mean-
ingful analysis and comparison to take place. As pointed out in the intro-
duction, the EU Treaties do not provide a definition of the rule of law, nor 
lay down any applicable standards. The Treaty on European Union does, 
however, provide a foothold for further enquiry, by stating that the rule of 
law is a value ‘common to the Member States’.1 It follows from this that the 
national constitutional conceptions necessarily inform the EU’s interpreta-
tion of the rule of law. This proposition is further supported by the fact that, 
tasked by the Member States to promote and consolidate the rule of law in 
its external relations,2 the Union sets the rule of law as a standard, not at the 
1 Article 2 TEU.
2 Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU.
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international level,3 but at the national level of states.4 Thus, since the rule 
of law originally developed to be applied to and within states5 as an ideal 
for legal systems,6 examining the common rule of law features should start 
at the national level.
Accordingly, the primary focus of this chapter is to elucidate the com-
mon core of the concept of the rule of law by comparing the three most 
prominent European legal systems,7 namely the German Rechtsstaat, the 
3 For the rule of law as a standard for international legal systems see for example Geert 
De Baere, Anna-Louise Chané & Jan Wouters ‘Assessing the Contribution of the Interna-
tional Judiciary to the Rule of Law: Elements of a Roadmap’ Working Paper Leuven Centre 
for Global Governance Studies No. 157 (2015); Ian Hurd ‘Three Models of the International 
Rule of Law’ 23 Revista de Filosofi a Eidos (2015), pp. 37-48; Michael Zürn, André Nollkaem-
per & Randall Peerenboom (eds) Rule of Law Dynamics. In an Era of International and Trans-
national Governance Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2014); James Crawford 
Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law The Hague: Hague Academy of 
international Law (2014), pp. 342-371; Jeremy Waldron ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the 
Benefi t of the International Rule of Law’ 22 European Journal of International Law (2011), 
pp. 315-343; Stéphane Beaulac ‘The Rule of Law in International Law Today’ in Gianluigi 
Palombella & Neil Walker Relocating the Rule of Law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2009), pp. 
197-223; Simon Chesterman ‘”I’ll Take Manhattan”: The International Rule of Law and 
the United Nations Security Council’ 1 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2009), pp. 67-73; 
André Nollkaemper ‘The Internationalized Rule of Law’ 1 Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 
(2009), pp. 74-78; Simon Chesterman ‘An International Rule of Law?' 56 American Journal 
of Comparative Law (2008), pp. 331-362; Philip Allott Towards the International Rule of Law 
London: Cameron May (2005); Terry Nardin ‘Theorising the International Rule of Law’ 
34 Review of International Studies (2004), pp. 385-401; Andrea Bianchi ‘Ad Hocism and the 
Rule of Law’ 13 European Journal of International Law (2002), pp. 263-272; Ian Brownlie The 
Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Uni-
ted Nations The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1998); Arthur Watts ‘The International Rule of 
Law’ 36 German Yearbook of International Law (1993), pp. 15-45.
4 Amichai Magen ‘The Rule of Law and its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope’ 
45 Stanford Journal of International Law (2009), pp. 51-115 at 70-71.
5 Jan Wouters & Matthieu Burnay ‘The International Rule of Law: European and Asian 
Perspectives’ 2 Revue Belge de Droit International (2013), pp. 299-306 at 299.
6 Crawford (2014), p. 342.
7 Laurent Pech ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union’ 
Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 4, p. 22. Most other legal systems in the EU can be traced 
back in some way to these three. Eric Carpano État de Droit et Droits Européen Paris: 
L’Harmattan (2005), pp. 26-29.
 See for more comparative studies James R. Silkenat, James E. Hickey & Peter D. Baren-
boim (eds) The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal State (Rechtsstaat) Dordrecht: 
Springer (2014); Danilo Zolo ‘The Rule of Law: A Critical Reappraisal’ in Pietro Costa 
& Danilo Zolo (eds) The Rule of Law. History, Theory and Criticism Dordrecht: Springer 
(2007) pp. 3-71; Michel Rosenfeld ‘The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional 
Democracy’ 74 Southern California Law Review (2001), pp. 1307-1351; Rainer Grote ‘Rule of 
law, Rechtsstaat, and Etat de Droit. The Origins of the Different National Traditions and 
the Prospects for their Convergence in the Light of Recent Constitutional Developments’ 
in Christian Starck (ed) Constitutionalism, Universalism and Democracy – A Comparative 
Analysis Baden-Baden: Nomos (1999), pp. 269-306; Jacques-Yvan Morin, ‘The Rule of Law 
and the Rechtsstaat Concept: A Comparison’ in Edward McWhinney, Jereld Zaslove and 
Werner Wolf (eds) Federalism-in-the Making: Contemporary Canadian and German Constituti-
onalism, National and Transnational The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1992), pp. 60-85.
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French état de droit, and the Anglo-Saxon rule of law. By examining these 
three national rule of law conceptions the chapter attempts to answer the 
question whether different national conceptualisations of the rule of law 
share common elements that will enable the assumption that there is a 
common core of the concept throughout the Member States. A number 
of authors contend that the rule of law can only be understood in its his-
torical and institutional context, and that separated from this, the notion is 
merely an empty shell.8 By way of contrast to this point of view, it will be 
demonstrated that the rule of law has a common core that is shared by the 
three Member States. It follows from this that, while it cannot be refuted 
that as a constitutional principle the rule of law may have different features 
and manifestations depending on the shape and structure of a particular 
society,9 the rule of law is a meta-concept with common features that is pres-
ent in many modern states. The term meta-concept is used here to denote 
the idea that there is a common underlying core to the notion that can be 
found in each one of its many diverging manifestations, irrespective of the 
political, legal, and economic values of a country concerned.10
In this light, this chapter asserts that the rule of law in Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom has four common features. First, the rule of law 
has been introduced in each Member State as a solution to address two 
interrelated problems: the need to restrain governmental power and the 
need to ensure individual liberty.
Secondly, it will be demonstrated that the Rechtsstaat, état de droit, and 
the Anglo-Saxon rule of law are all underpinned by the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers as a means to ensuring that the judiciary remains outside 
the sphere of influence of both the executive and legislative branches of 
government. It will be shown that, although there are variations in the man-
ner in which the checks and balances between the judicial, legislative, and 
executive branches are organised, based on historical developments and the 
difference between the British common law and the two continental legal 
systems, all three ensure at a minimum judicial independence.
Thirdly, it will be argued that the three legal systems share a common 
substantive core, namely the principle of legality. More particularly, it will 
be asserted that legality provides requirements both for the government – to 
act on the basis of law, and for the validity of law itself.
8 Lautenbach (2013), pp. 18-19; Jacques Chevallier L’État de Droit Paris: Montchrestien 
(2003), p. 52; Gerhard Casper ‘Rule of Law? Whose Law?’ CDDRL Working Papers (2004) 
No. 10, p. 4.
9 Randall Peerenboom China’s Long March Towards Rule of Law Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press (2002), p. 131; Jacques-Yvan Morin ‘The Rule of Law and the Rechtsstaat 
Concept: A Comparison’ in Edward McWhinney, Jerald Zaslove & Werner Wolf Fede-
ralism-in-the Making: Contemporary Canadian and German Constitutionalism, National and 
Transnational Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff (1992), p. 60.
10 See also Dimitry Kochenov EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International (2008), pp. 108-109.
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Fourthly, this chapter will finish by demonstrating that the rule of law 
is safeguarded in similar ways mainly through the mechanism of judicial 
review, as a check to the ensure that government has kept within the bound-
aries of the law. On this basis, it will be concluded that even though most 
scholars explore the concept in relation to a particular national structure, 
four common features can be identified, building a common core.
A caveat should be added here. It should be noted that the purpose of 
the present chapter is not to provide an exhaustive overview of the intricate 
constitutional structures of the Member States under examination. The 
focus will be on demonstrating the commonality of the four features of the 
rule of law in the three Member States. Historical developments will be pro-
vided in order to frame the discussion and explain national particularities 
only where this is deemed necessary.
2. The rule of law adopted as a solution to common problems: 
restraint of power and preservation of individual liberty
This section will show that the national notions of the rule of law were 
developed in the three Member States of the European Union as a solution 
to common problems that emerged with the birth of sovereignty and the 
formation of the modern state. Modern constitutional development has 
been driven by a dynamic between power and liberty. Since the powers 
of government have become increasingly extensive, liberty can only be 
maintained by ensuring that these powers are confined, channelled and 
checked.11 Accordingly, in the three national conceptions, the rule of law is 
relied on to address the problem of how to restrain power in order to ensure 
individual liberty. Thus, the rule of law is relied on in order to restrict gov-
ernmental rule by maintaining that governmental rule should take place on 
the basis of law, and, moreover, be itself bound by it.
This way of curbing power is not only addressed by modern day con-
ceptions of the rule of law. On the contrary, as the writings of Plato and 
Aristotle demonstrate, the idea of the rule on the basis of law has ancient 
roots in political thought, where it appeared as a rule of restraint on the 
exercise of political power by subjecting the latter to law and ensuring that 
it was bound thereby.12 However, in the modern day state the concept of 
the rule of law finds its basis in liberal ideology, rather than on the idea that 
the control of state power is necessary in order to curb the often-unbridled 
11 Martin Loughlin Foundations of Public Law Oxford: Oxford University Press (2010), p. 313.
12 Ricardo Gosalbo Bono ‘The Signifi cance of the Rule of Law and its Implications for the 
European Union and the United States’ 72 University of Pittsburgh Law Review (2010), pp. 
229-360 at 232.
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rule13 of aristocratic oligarchies, democracy, or tyranny.14 Indeed, at the core 
of liberalism lies individual liberty,15 which means that, as long as individu-
als do not deprive others of their liberty or impede their efforts to obtain it, 
the pursuit of ones own freedom is the highest aim.16
Plato discussed the virtue of rule by means of law and stated that ‘[w]
here the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, 
the collapse of the state … is not far off; but if law is the master of the 
government and the government is its slave, then the situation is full of 
promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the gods shower on a state.’17 
In a similar vein, Aristotle argued that the rule of law is preferable to that 
of any individual; the latter should be made only guardians and ministers 
of the law.18 Moreover, he advocated rule under law in order to avoid the 
risks of corruption and abuse connected to the concentration of power 
in government.19 However, in contrast to Plato and Aristotle, who were 
mainly concerned with how to use law in order to avoid popular tyranny 
in a democracy,20 historical developments in the three Member States saw 
the emergence of the idea of the rule of law as a means of protecting the 
freedom of individuals from the absolute power of the ruler. Even though 
influential philosophers such as Cicero, who stated that a king who does not 
abide by the law is ‘the foulest and most repellent creature imaginable’,21 
and Aquinas, who argued that law is a certain ‘ordinance of reason for the 
common good, made by him who has care of the community,’22 further 
affirmed the rule of law ideal, this development only took place after the 
Middle Ages. The latter saw the emergence of the absolute powers of the 
king whereby the few restrictions placed on royal sovereignty were merely 
13 T.R.S. Allan ‘Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutional-
ism’ 44 Cambridge Law Journal (1985), pp. 111-143 at 111.
14 See book VIII of Plato’s Republic in which he discusses fi ve types of regimes (aristocracy, 
timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny) whereby, apart from the fi rst category 
of aristocracy under the rule of the philosopher king for whom law can be an obstacle 
standing in the way of justice, all other regimes need on rely on law in order to prevent 
the escalation of power. Plato The Republic (transl. R.E. Allen) New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press (2006). Accordingly, Hart argued that the law of the city state not only exists to 
secure that men have the opportunity to lead a morally good life, but, more importantly, 
to see that they do. H.L.A. Hart ‘Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality’ in 
H.L.A. Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy Oxford: Oxford University Press (1983), 
pp. 248-262 at 262.
15 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’ 37 Philosophical Quarterly (1987), 
pp. 127-150 at 127.
16 John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Writings Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(1989), p. 16.
17 Plato The Laws (transl. Trevor J. Saunders) London: Penguin (1970), p. 174.
18 Aristotle Politics (transl. Benjamin Jowett) Kitchener: Batoche Books (1999), p. 77.
19 Aristotle (1999), p. 78.
20 Gosalbo Bono (2010), p. 234.
21 Cicero The Republic and The Laws (transl. Niall Rudd) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(1998), book III, at 150.
22 Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica, Treatise on Law, question 90: ‘Of the Essence of Law’.
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derived from natural or divine law.23 Thus, it was not surprising that, 
underpinned by the dominant writings of, amongst others, Kant, Rousseau, 
Montesquieu, and Locke, the conceptual understanding of the rule of law 
developed with the aim of controlling governmental power for the protec-
tion of the individual.
The idea that the law binds the ruler him/herself found its early expres-
sion in England. According to Locke, the power of government, ‘being only 
for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure,’24 
should be kept within bounds. The way to do this is through law.25 As 
early as 1610, the English courts determined that the King did not have the 
power to change the law unilaterally; he himself must also obey to the law 
of the land.26 Changes to the law of the land were dependent on the con-
sent and interests of Parliament. It was primarily the common law, which 
protected the liberties of the people against arbitrary rule, administered by 
the courts.27 In this way, the rights and liberties of the citizens were at the 
heart of the British form of government, underpinned by the powers and 
privileges of Parliament, and formed the limitations to the King’s preroga-
tives.28 Through access to courts the three ‘primary rights’ of all citizens, i.e. 
personal security, personal liberty, and private property, could be protected 
and maintained.29 This was affirmed by Dicey in his seminal work on the 
Study on the Law of the Constitution, where he wrote that: ‘The rule of law … 
may be used as a formula for expressing the fact that with us the laws of the 
constitution … are not the source but the consequence of the rights of the 
individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts.’30
The rule of law as a solution to the problem of unbridled governmental 
rule in order to protect individual liberties is equally found in the Ger-
23 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan New York: Oxford University Press (1996); Jean Bodin Six 
Books of the Commonwealth (transl. M.J. Tooley) Oxford: Balckwell’s Political Texts (1955); 
Julian H. Franklin Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press (1973).
24 John Locke Second Treatise of Government Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 
(1980), section 137. In contrast to this understanding, and stretching the connection 
between the core ideal of the rule of law and rule by law to its thinnest, is the view 
favoured by Hobbes, that the law-maker cannot be limited by the law, since ‘he that is 
bound to himself only, is not bound.’ Thomas Hobbes Leviathan New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press (1996), chapter XXVI ‘Of civil laws’, section 2.
25 According to the idea of supremacy of law, the government is to act according to stand-
ing law, since ‘[w]here-ever law ends, tyranny begins.’ Locke (1980), section 202. On 
supremacy of law see generally John Dickinson Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of 
Law Clark, New Hersey: The Lawbook Exchange (2006); Allan (1985).
26 Case of Proclamations 77 ER 1352, (1611) 12 Co Rep 74.
27 Edward Coke The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1642) (R.H. Helmholz 
& Bernard D. Reams eds, William S. Hein Co. (1986), p. 50.
28 William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England; Volume I (1765) Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press (1979), pp. 130-135.
29 Blackstone (1979), p. 136.
30 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law if the Constitution Houndmills: Mac-
millan (1959), p. 190.
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man Rechtsstaat and in the French état de droit. However, in contrast to the 
Anglo-Saxon understanding of the rule of law, instead of relying primarily 
on the role of courts and the law of the land in order to achieve this aim, 
the continental notions of the rule of law developed along the lines of a 
constitutional approach, with an emphasis on liberty and its preservation 
by the constitution and the legislature.31 For instance, in Germany, the 
doctrinal attempt32 to domesticate the power of the monarchical state by 
restricting their exercise to the protection of life, liberty, and property of 
individuals relied heavily on the works of Kant,33 who advocated the idea 
that a state governed by the laws of justice protected the freedom, equal-
ity, and autonomy of its citizens.34  Citizens who, either directly or via their 
representatives, are involved in the making of those laws, which they have 
to also observe as members of society.35 It is clear that Kant’s main concern 
was the protection of individual autonomy, by using state laws the purpose 
of which was securing individual liberty and property.
Furthermore, Kant’s writings were of great influence up until the first 
half of the nineteenth century. Basing himself on Kant’s thought, Von 
Mohl, credited with popularising the term Rechtsstaat, juxtaposed the 
notion with that of the police state and defined the former on the basis of 
three elements.36 First, he rejected the idea that political order is divinely 
ordained – hitherto the main legitimation for monarchical power; state 
order by way of a government was the product of the aims of free, equal 
31 Loughlin (2010), p. 317.
32 German professor Von Mohl is credited with popularising the term Rechtsstaat and ele-
vating it to the status of doctrine, see Robert von Mohl Das Staatsrecht des Königsreichs 
Württemberg Tübingen: Laupp (1829).
33 Rainer Grote The German Rechtsstaat in a Comparative Perspective’ in J.R. Silkenat, J.E. 
Juckey Jr & P.D. Barenboim (eds) The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal Sta-
te (Rechtsstaat) Heidelberg: Springer (2014), pp. 193-207 at 194. See Immanuel Kant Die 
Metaphysik der Sitten (1797), translated as The Metaphysics of Morals in The Cambridge Edi-
tion of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy (transl. Mary Gregor) Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (1996), section 6:256.
34 ‘Der bürgerliche Zustand also, bloß als rechtlicher Zustand betrachtet, ist auf folgende 
Prinzipien a priori gegründet:
1.  Die Freiheit jedes Gliedes der Sozietät, als Menschen.
2.  Die Gleichheit desselben mit jedem anderen, als Untertan.
3.  Die Selbständigkeit jedes Gliedes eines gemeinen Wesens, als Bürgers.’ 
Immanual Kant Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht 
in der Praxis II: Vom Verhältnis der Theorie zur Praxis im Staatsrecht (Gegen Hobbes) (1793) 
Berlin: Holzinger (2014), p. 46. Also see Gosalbo Bono (2010), p. 229. For more on Kant’s 
concept of the state see for example Wolfgang Kersting ‘Kant’s Concept of the State’ in 
Howard Williams (ed) Essay’s on Kant’s Political Philosophy Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press (1992); Jeremy Waldron ‘Kant’s Theory of the State’ in Pauline Kleingeld (ed) 
Towards Perpetual Peace and Other Writings in Politics, Peace and History. Immanuel Kant 
New Haven: Yale University Press (2006).
35 Immanual Kant Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber 
nicht in der Praxis II: Vom Verhältnis der Theorie zur Praxis im Staatsrecht Gegen Hobbes 
(1793) Berlin: Holzinger (2014), pp. 46–48.
36 Von Mohl (1829).
50 Part I
and rational individuals.37 Secondly, to this end, government must be 
directed towards securing the property and liberty of the citizens. Thirdly, 
more generally, according to Von Mohl, the state should be organised on the 
basis of the principles of a responsible government, judicial independence, 
rule by means of law, and the recognition of basic liberties.38 Thus, with 
its origins in Kant’s writing, the Rechtsstaat was limited to the purpose of 
securing individual liberty and private property as the material basis for 
individual autonomy, thereby rejecting the far-reaching policing powers 
that the monarchical state had claimed.39 In this way, safeguarding the liber-
ties of the individual informed the Rechtsstaat’s reliance on law as a means 
of restricting governmental power with a particular aim.
Similar to the original development of the Rechtsstaat in Germany, 
France also struggled with the transition of power from monarchical rule to 
a state that protects its citizens. Aided by the writings of philosophers of the 
Enlightenment period such as Voltaire and Rousseau,40 the French Revolu-
tion at the end of the eighteenth century brought enough political change in 
order to transfer traditional sovereignty from the monarch to a new entity, 
the French citizens.41 Accordingly, it was the people who, acting through 
their representatives, ruled the country on the basis of laws that expressed 
the general will.42 This form of government relied heavily on the works of 
Rousseau, according to whom laws voted for by the people had infallible 
qualities.43 He equated the rule of law with rule in accordance with the will 
of the people and understood the supremacy of law as the supremacy of 
Parliament,44 since all laws of Parliament, regardless of their outcome, were 
an expression of the will of the people. For this reason, law as expression of 
the general will could not in any way infringe upon the liberties of citizens 
as the mere generality of its will excluded any arbitrary action.
However, Rousseau’s writings did not satisfactorily address the ques-
tion of the restraint of power.45 Indeed, by the late-nineteenth century a 
37 This echoed Kant’s idea that individuals should be subject to no laws other than those 
which they have chosen to give themselves, Kant (2014), pp. 46–48.
38 As synthesised by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde ‘The Origin and Development of the 
Concept of the Rechtsstaat’ in his State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and 
Constitutional Law (transl. J.A. Underwood) New York: Berg (1991), pp. 47–70.
39 Grote (2014), p. 195.
40 Jean-Jacques Rousseau Du Contrat Social (1762) Paris: Union Générale d’Éditions (1963).
41 According to Article 3 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the 
new entity was the ‘nation’, a concept used to convey the sovereignty of the French citi-
zens: Le principe de toute Souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la Nation. Nul corps, 
nul individu ne peut exercer d’autorité qui n’en émane expressément.
42 Article 6 of the Declaration: La Loi est l’expression de la volonté générale. Tous 
les Citoyens ont droit de concourir personnellement, ou par leurs Représentants, 
à sa formation. Also see François Furet & Mona Ozouf (eds) A Critical Dictionary
of the French Revolution Cambridge: Belknap Press (1989), p. 313.
43 Rousseau (1963), book 2, chapters 1 and 6.
44 Chevallier (2003), p. 37 et seq.
45 Grote (1999), p. 304.
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discussion had started in French legal theory on how the exercise of state 
powers could be made subject to law. To this end, Carré de Malberg, one 
of the leading French constitutional scholars of that time, pitched the idea 
of the état de droit. He proposed an understanding of the rule of law which 
submitted all powers, including the legislative powers of Parliament, to the 
law. In contrast to the political conception according to which administra-
tive authority was in all cases to be subordinated to the legislative organ, 
and could thus only act in execution of, or on concession of, the law (état 
legal),46 the idea of état de droit was designed to protect the individual rights 
and liberties of the citizens against the tyranny of the majority and the 
potential arbitrariness of the state.47 Thus, the notion of état de droit aimed 
to subject legislation to constitutional rules.48 In this way, the idea of état 
de droit sought to supply authoritative norms that not only determined the 
relationship between the administration and the individual, but which also 
conditioned the exercise of legislative power.49
This section examined the development of national notions of the 
rule of law in the three Member States as a solution to common problems 
that came about with the emergence of the modern state and the demise 
of monarchical rule. It was shown that, in all three states, the rule of law 
developed in order to address the common problem of the balance between 
the restraint of power and individual liberty. It was demonstrated that the 
rule of law means both the restriction of governmental power on the basis 
of law as well as the political understanding that the government is itself 
also bound by the law. In particular, it was asserted that the rule of law 
developed as a means of protecting the individual from arbitrary power. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the national notions of Rechtsstaat, état de 
droit, and Anglo-Saxon rule of law, were born out of the same need, namely 
to restrain government authority in order to safeguard individual liberty.
3. The common underpinnings of the rule of law: 
separation of powers as a means of ensuring judicial 
independence
In this section it will be demonstrated that the aforementioned common 
solutions of the rule of law in the three national legal systems are under-
pinned by the doctrine of the separation of powers. It will be argued that, 
in the modern state, the separation of powers is the necessary corollary of 
46 Alain Laquièze ‘État de Droit and National Sovereignty in France’ in Petro Costa & Danilo 
Zolo (eds) The Rule of Law: History, Theory, and Criticism Dordrecht: Springer (2007), p. 266.
47 Raymond Carré de Malberg Contribution à la Théorie Générale de l’État vol. I Paris: Libraire 
de la Société du Recueil Sirey (1920), pp. 492-493.
48 Carré de Malberg (1920), pp. 490-492.
49 Marie-Joëlle Redor De l’État Légal à l’État de Droit: L’Évolution des Conceptions de la Doc-
trine Publiciste Française 1879-1914 Paris: Economica (1992), pp. 294-316; Loughlin (2010), 
p. 323.
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the rule of law requirement that the government is bound by the law. Of 
course, the institutional arrangements by which the separation of powers 
with various checks and balances is achieved in each of the Member States 
under examination differs, and the different historical context within which 
the doctrine was developed can account for such differences. However, it 
will be asserted that this will not detract from the fact that the need for 
the separation of powers in order to guarantee judicial independence is a 
common feature underpinning the rule of law in all three countries.
Historically, attempts to ensure that monarchical authority was 
restricted by law were based on natural and divine law and had to rely 
on cultural understanding,50 practice,51 and expectations.52 However, in 
the modern nation state it is generally accepted that other ways had to be 
found to guarantee governmental rule through law, and, more importantly, 
that the government itself was bound by law. For this reason, the doctrine 
of the separation of powers has developed to ensure that the power of the 
sovereign is divided into different component parts, whereby certain parts 
of government bind other parts of government to the law.53 In particular, it 
is commonly accepted that the ability to restrain the ways in which power 
is exercised needs to be institutionalised through the separation of pow-
ers.54 In this way, the separation of powers provides a system of checks and 
balances under which each branch impinges upon another and in turn is 
impinged upon.55 Consequently, a form of the separation of powers neces-
sarily underpins the rule of law, and is indeed vital to the effective func-
tioning of the latter.56 In particular, since ‘le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir’,57 
a functional separation of powers ensures that power cannot be exercised 
arbitrarily because those who enact general rules are not the same as those 
executing the same rules. However, the degree of separation required is an 
50 Under Germanic law, for example, it was understood that the law applied to everyone, 
including the rulers. In medieval times, the belief was that everyone operated within the 
restraints of natural or divine law. Harold J. Berman Law and Revolution. The Formation of 
the Western Legal Tradition Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1983).
51 For an overview of the various ways by which rulers could be bound by the law in the 
pre-modern period see Brian Z. Tamanaha ‘The History and Elements of the Rule of Law’ 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2012), pp. 232-247 at 237-239.
52 Andre Tunc ‘The Royal Will and the Rule of Law’ in Arthur Sutherland (ed) Government 
Under Law Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1956), pp. 404-406.
53 Tamanaha (2012), p. 240. For the historical aspects of the development of the doctrine see 
for example Sharon Krause ‘The Spirit of Separate Powers in Montesquieu’ 62 The Review 
of Politics (2000), pp. 231-265; William B. Gwyn The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An 
Analysis of the Doctrine from its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1965).
54 Martin Krygier ‘The Rule of Law: Legality, Teleology, Sociology’ in Gianluigi Palombella 
& Neil Walker (eds) Relocating the Rule of Law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2009), pp. 51-79 at 
59.
55 Gwyn (1965), p. 120.
56 The complete Works of M. de Montesquieu: The Spirit of Laws London: Evans (1777), Book II, 
chapter 6.; Locke (1980).
57 Montesquieu (1777), p. 300.
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area of uncertainty; complete separation is impossible.58 An examination of 
the three legal regimes at issue will show that, indeed, they share common 
underpinnings, and that their various institutional arrangements all fall 
under the doctrine.59
Heavily influenced by the writings of Montesquieu and against the 
background of the French Revolution, the 1789 Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen introduced the separation of powers in France in 
relation to constitutional government and the protection of rights. Hence, 
Article 16 of the Declaration reads that: ‘Any society in which the guarantee 
of rights is not assured or the separation of powers is not established, has 
no constitution.’ Accordingly, in order to ensure the protection of rights 
and liberty, the legislative, executive, and judicial power must be kept 
separate.60
However, the French development of the doctrine faced two particular 
features: the particular importance of parliamentary sovereignty since it 
represented the volonté générale – the will of the people, the very thing état de 
droit aimed to protect; and the traditional distrust of the judiciary because of 
its negative role prior to the revolution.61 The idea of judicial bodies modi-
fying the will of the elected legislature, and therefore the sovereign will of 
the people whom the legislature represents, was rejected as a distortion of 
the democratic process and the rule of law.62 Hence, revolutionary thought 
prohibited judges from meddling in the exercise of legislative power. As a 
consequence, encroachment upon the administration was excluded by ways 
of entrusting the decision of administrative controversies to the administra-
tive bodies themselves.
This is also the reason behind the fact that the judicial activities of the 
Council of State (Conseil d’État), created at the end of the eighteenth century, 
were severely limited in practice.63 It would be only at the end of the nine-
teenth century that this Court started to extend its control beyond formal 
and procedural requirements to the substance of administrative measures.64 
By then, the earlier necessity to shield the use of administrative preroga-
tive from judicial scrutiny had diminished and the Council’s purpose was 
to regulate and limit the exercise of power by administrative bodies in the 
58 Geoffrey Marshall Constitutional Theory Oxford: Clarendon Press (1971), pp. 124-126; 
Hans Kelsen General Theory of Law and State (transl. A. Wedberg) Clark, New Jersey: The 
Lawbook Exchange (2007), p. 269.
59 Gwyn (1965), p. 128.
60 Montesquieu (1777), p. 199.
61 Chevallier (2003), p. 66; Jeremy Jennings ‘From “Imperial State” to “État de Droit”: Ben-
jamin Constant, Blandine Kriegel and the Reform of the French Constitution’ 44 Political 
Studies (1996), pp. 488-504 at 490.
62 Laurent Pech ‘Rule of Law in France’ in Randall Peerenboom (ed) Asian Discourses of Rule 
of Law. Theories and Implementation of rule of law in twelve Asian Countries, France and the 
U.S. London: Routledge (2004), pp. 79-112 at 84.
63 Grote (1999), pp. 292-293.
64 L. Neville Brown & John S. Bell French Administrative Law Oxford: Oxford University 
Press (2003), p. 239 et seq.
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interests of society, whose needs the administration was deemed to serve.65 
Nonetheless, the real control of constitutionality of parliamentary laws by 
the judiciary was only instituted during the Fifth Republic.66
After the First and Second World Wars it became clear that the ascen-
dancy of the executive branch of government meant that the powers of 
parliament had to be curtailed and the role of the executive strengthened.67 
For this reason, a Constitutional Court (Conseil Constitutionnel) was created, 
primarily to oversee the legislative branch of government, which has to 
make sure that Parliament does not overstep its constitutionally defined 
competences, for example by passing laws which unduly interfere with the 
prerogatives of the executive.68
Like état de droit in France, the Rechtsstaat in Germany is anchored in 
the doctrine of the separation of powers. For historical reasons,69 from the 
perspective of the state, the doctrine of the Rechtsstaat precluded the pos-
sibility of the primacy of law over the state.70 Following from this was a 
separation of the political structure from the legal system, which alone must 
guarantee, independently of the political structure, liberty and security.71 
With the strong state in place, law and legislation could find their genuine 
force only where there was a judicial authority robust enough for their 
realisation.72 Thus, the Rechtsstaat presupposes a form of separation of pow-
ers with priority given to the safeguarding of the legal system performed 
by the judiciary and a wide scope of judicial powers of review,73 as will 
be discussed further below in the section on the rule of law’s safeguarding 
mechanisms.
Similar to Germany, the United Kingdom puts strong emphasis on the 
independence of the judicial branch. Judicial review of executive action is 
a core feature of the legal system.74 Like Blackstone advocated, there is a 
‘distinct and separate existence of the judicial power in a peculiar body of 
65 Pech, (2004), p. 84; Chevallier (2003), p. 34; Grote (1999), p. 284.
66 The Fifth Republic is the current constitution of France, introduced 4 October 1958.
67 John Bell French Constitutional Law Oxford: Clarendon Press (1992), p. 78 et seq.
68 Christian Dadomo & Susan Farran The French Legal System London: Sweet & Maxwell 
(1993), pp. 108-109; Bell (1992), p. 27; Grote (1999), p. 294.
69 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde ‘Entstehung und Wandel des Rechtsstaatsbegriffs’ in Ernst-
Wolfgang Böckenförde Recht, Staat, Freiheit Frankfurt am Mein: Suhrkamp (1991), pp. 
143-169 at 146.
70 Neil MacCormick ‘Der Rechtsstaat und die rule of law’ 39 Juristen Zeitung (1984),
pp. 65-70 at 68.
71 Franz Neumann Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (1980) p. 204.
72 Gustavo Gozzi ‘Rechtsstaat and Individual Rights in German Constitutional History’ in 
Pietro Costa & Danilo Zolo (eds) The Rule of Law. History, Theory and Criticism Dordrecht: 
Springer (2007), pp. 237-259 at 246.
73 Reinhold Zippelius & Thomas Würthenberger Deutsches Staatsrecht Munich: C.H. Beck 
(2008), pp. 111-112.
74 See generally Anthony Wilfred Bradley ‘The Constitutional Position of the Judiciary’ in: 
David Feldman (ed) English Public Law Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 281-
313.
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men…separated from both the legislative and the executive power’.75 As 
has been shown above, the separation of powers in France also emphasises 
the independence of the judiciary branch. More recently judicial indepen-
dence was strengthened by the 2005 Constitutional Reform Act, establishing 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, thereby ending the judicial 
function of the House of Lords and moving even closer to a constitutional 
separation between legislative and judicial powers.76
Because of the emphasis on parliamentary sovereignty, there is, how-
ever, a weaker institutional separation of the legislative and executive 
branches.77 The executive does not possess any autonomous law-making 
powers and can only act on the basis of common law or by way of statu-
tory authorisation.78 There is still no clear separation between Parliament 
and government, as all ministers are required to be a member of one of the 
houses of Parliament.79 For historical reasons, since the common law pro-
tects individual liberty, there was never a need to create public law instru-
ments in order to impose limits on the exercise of political or administrative 
power.80 The appropriate remedy was found in the uniform application 
of ordinary rules to any infringement of the law, whether perpetrated by 
government officials or individuals.81
In sum, this section examined the common underpinnings of the rule of 
law in the three legal systems at issue. It was demonstrated that in order to 
fulfil one of the core requirements of the rule of law, namely, that a govern-
ment itself is bound by the law, a form of separation of powers is indispens-
able. Furthermore, it was asserted that although the three legal systems 
have differing institutional arrangements in relation to the separation of the 
judicial, legislative, and executive branches of government, all three rely on 
some form of the separation of powers in order to ensure the rule of law. In 
particular, it was shown that these variations can be explained on the basis 
of particularities linked to the historical developments in all three Member 
States.
75 William Blackstone, The English Constitution 7th ed, 1984, 10, quoted in Allan (1985).
76 Catherine Fairbairn & Sally Broadbridge ‘The Constitutional Reform Bill: A Supreme 
Court for the United Kingdom and Judicial Appointments’ House of Commons research 
paper No. 06 (2005), available at: www.parliament.uk/briefi ng-papers/RP05-06.pdf.
77 Cheryl Saunders ‘Separation of Powers and the Judicial branch’ 11 Judicial Review (2006), 
pp. 337-347 at 341; William Wade & Christopher Forsyth Administrative Law Oxford: 
Oxford University Press (2009), p. 731; Paul Craig ‘Fundamental Principles of Adminis-
trative Law in Relation to Basic Principles of Constitutional Law’ in David Feldman (ed) 
English Public Law Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 593-613 at 610.
78 Grote (1999), p. 297.
79 Lukas Prakke ‘The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ in Lukas 
Prakke & Constantijn Kortmann (eds) Constitutional Law of the 15 EU Member States 
Deventer: Kluwer (2004), pp. 861-927 at 878.
80 Grote (1999), p. 275.
81 See the works of Dicey, who argued that ‘It means … equality before the law, or the equal 
subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary law 
courts.’ Dicey (1959), p. 190.
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4. The common substance of the rule of law: 
the element of legality
In the previous sections, it was established that the rule of law has been 
introduced in the three states as a means of addressing the problem of 
arbitrary power with the aim of protecting individual liberty. Furthermore, 
it was shown that in order to bind governmental rule to law it is vital to 
introduce some form of separation of powers in the organisation of govern-
ment. Against this background, this section asserts that the legal systems of 
the three Member States share a further common element in their particular 
understanding of the rule of law, namely, the principle of legality. It will be 
shown that that legality is a corollary of the fact that the rule of law limits 
power by demanding that governments govern though law. More par-
ticularly, it will be claimed that legality operates in two similar ways in the 
three legal systems: on the one hand, it sets requirements for government 
in its relation to its laws and on the other hand, it provides criteria for the 
validity of law itself. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that the principle of 
legality in the Rechtsstaat, état de droit, as well as in the Anglo-Saxon rule of 
law, necessarily presupposes that governmental power is divided over all 
branches of government.
The pre-war notion of the Rechtsstaat is the clearest example of the 
understanding of the rule of law as the principle of legality.82 As argued 
above, the Kantian liberal approach provided the background against which 
individuals have rights by virtue of their humanity and which therefore 
impose limitations on the authority of the state.83 However, the latter-half 
of the nineteenth century saw a rise of legal positivism as the leading para-
digm in constitutional theory and the dominant method of German legal 
scholarship, which gradually undermined the material interpretation of the 
idea of the Rechtsstaat.84 As a result, the Kantian approach was rejected in 
favour of a more statist conception of rights,85 whereby rights are created 
as a product of legislative action. Thus, the power to establish individual 
rights belonged solely to the legislator and could therefore be limited or 
taken away.86 Furthermore, within this ‘purely juridical concept’,87 the 
Rechtsstaat had little to do with the purposes of the state but was increas-
82 Stefan Martini ‘Die Pluralität von Rule-of-Law-Konzeptionen in Europa und das Prinzip 
einer europäischen Rule of Law’ in Matthias Kötter & Gunnar Folke Schuppert (eds) 
Normative Pluralität ordnen: Rechtsbegriffe, Normenkollisionen und Rule of Law in Kontexten 
dies- und jenseits des Staates Baden-Baden: Nomos (2009), pp. 303-344 at 308-309.
83 Loughlin (2010), p. 320.
84 Grote (2014), p. 195. Also see the works of two of the greatest proponents of German 
legal positivism at the time, Rudolf von Jhering Der Zweck im Recht  Leipzich: Breitkopf & 
Härtel (1877)and Georg Jellinek Algemeine Staatslehre Berlin: Häring (1914).
85 Klaus Stern Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Munich: C.H. Beck (1984), pp. 
768-774.
86 Stern (1984), p. 771; Grote (2014), p. 195; Grote (1999), pp. 285-288.
87 Loughlin (2010), p. 321.
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ingly concerned with the methods and means of its realisation. Moreover, 
since legality, as a set of formal requirements for the validity of law itself, 
provided no specific substantive normative standard, the emphasis came to 
be on the development of general principles of administrative law which 
would provide citizens with a sufficient measure of protection against 
abuse of power by administrative authorities.88 Of course, the abuse of the 
concept by the National Socialist regime demonstrated that the positivistic 
theories failed to take into account the potential arbitrary use of legislative 
power. Where the Rechtsstaat afforded protection through law and through 
the imposition of the requirement that the state acts through the promulga-
tion and implementation of laws, rather than through mere deployment of 
the will of the monarch,89 legality provided no assurances that those laws 
would be fair. Consequently, as argued by Kelsen,90 the pre-war notion of 
the Rechtsstaat came to be synonymous with ‘law of the state’ which placed 
high emphasis on the principle of legality and which was characterised by 
a purely technical and formal concept of law, detached from ethical and 
political content.91 In other words, if law is clear, ascertainable, and non-
retrospective, its validity was considered irrespective of its content.
However, as all efforts to conceive of the Rechtsstaat in purely formal 
terms were discredited by the experiences of the National Socialist regime, 
in the context of the framing of a new constitution for the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the 1949 Basic Law rejected a purely positivist conception of 
the Rechtsstaat.92Accordingly, in the Basic Law, legality was complemented 
by substantive principles to which all state activity had to conform.93 In this 
manner, the constitution subordinated positive legality to entrenched sub-
stantive principles and values. With the resurrection of the idea of rights as 
a limit to state interference with individual liberty, it was recognised that the 
enjoyment of these rights might also require positive measures by the state 
in order to create the minimum conditions indispensible for the exercise 
88 Ernst Wolfgan Böckenforde Recht, Staat, Freiheit Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp (1991), pp. 
153-154.
89 Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink ‘Introduction: Constitutional Crisis’ in Arthur J. 
Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink (eds) Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis Berkeley: University 
of California Press (2000), pp. 5-6; Michel Rosenfeld ‘The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy 
of Constitutional Democracy’ Southern California Law Review 74 (2001), pp. 1307-1351 at 
1326.
90 Hans Kelsen Pure Theory of Law Ney Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange (2002), pp. 279-319.
Kelsen was supported by the infl uential writings of Schmitt and Koellreutter, see for 
example Carl Schmitt ‘Was Bedeutet der Streit um den Rechtsstaat’ Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Staatswissenschaft / Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 95 (1935), 
pp. 189-201; Otto Koellreutter Deutsches Verfassungsrecht, ein Grundriss Berlin: Junker & 
Dünnhaupt (1936).
91 Gosalbo-Bono (2010), p. 243; Grote (1999), p. 280.
92 Loughlin (2010), p. 321.
93 Grote (1999), p. 285.
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of individual rights. This gave rise to the idea of the sozialer Rechtsstaat,94 
which was recognised in Article 28(1) of the Basic Law: ‘The constitutional 
order in the states must conform to the principles of the republican, demo-
cratic and social state under the rule of law.’95
In Germany’s current legal system, the principle of legality is explicitly 
enshrined in Article 20(3) of the Basic Law, which determines that the leg-
islature is bound by the constitution, and the executive and the judiciary 
by the law.96 Thus, the provision embodies the idea of legality on the level 
of government. In addition, Article 80 delimits the delegation of legislative 
powers to the executive since statutory authorisation is needed in which the 
conditions for its exercise are narrowly defined.97 Legality is complemented 
by the respect for and the protection of the unamenable constitutional 
value98 of dignity of man as the guiding principle of all state action.99 The 
protection of individual dignity has been recognised by the Federal Consti-
tutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; further FCC) as the supreme value 
of the constitutional order.100 The pre-war positivist approach, which put 
the creation of rights within the purview of the legislator, is superseded by 
paragraph 2 of Article 1, which acknowledges the ‘inviolable and inalien-
able human rights as the basis of every community, of peace, and of justice 
94 Jörg Müller-Volbehr ‘Der soziale Rechtsstaat im System des Grundgesetzes’ Juristen-
zeitung (1984), pp. 6-13 at 6.
95 Article 28(1) GG: Die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung in den Ländern muß den Grund-
sätzen des republikanischen, demokratischen und sozialen Rechtsstaates im Sinne 
dieses Grundgesetzes entsprechen. A similar homogeneity rule is included in rela-
tion to the European Union, as Article 23 provides that ‘… Germany shall participate 
in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social, 
and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that 
guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afford-
ed by [the] Basic Law.’ Article 23(1) GG: Zur Verwirklichung eines vereinten Europas 
wirkt die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der Entwicklung der Europäischen Union 
mit, die demokratischen, rechtsstaatlichen, sozialen und föderativen Grundsätzen und
dem Grundsatz der Subsidiarität verpflichtet ist und einen diesem Grundgesetz im 
wesentlichen vergleichbaren Grundrechtsschutz gewährleistet.
96 Article 20(3) GG: Die Gesetzgebung ist an die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung, die vollzie-
hende Gewalt und die Rechtsprechung sind an Gesetz und Recht gebunden.
97 Article 80(1) GG: Durch Gesetz können die Bundesregierung, ein Bundesminister oder 
die Landesregierungen ermächtigt werden, Rechtsverordnungen zu erlassen. Dabei 
müssen Inhalt, Zweck und Ausmaß der erteilten Ermächtigung im Gesetze bestimmt 
werden. Die Rechtsgrundlage ist in der Verordnung anzugeben. Ist durch Gesetz vor-
gesehen, daß eine Ermächtigung weiter übertragen werden kann, so bedarf es zur Über-
tragung der Ermächtigung einer Rechtsverordnung.
98 According to Article 79 amendments to Article 1-20 are inadmissible in any circumstance, 
save the adoption of a new constitution.
99 Article 1(1) GG: Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen 
ist Verpfl ichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt.
100 See for example BVerfGE 12, 45; 1 BvL 21/60, 20 December 1960; BVerfG 30, 1; 2 BvF 1/69, 
2 BvR 629/68 and 308/69, 7 July 1970;
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in the world.’101 In this way, the extra-legal character of the rights – they 
exist irrespective of their official recognition by the state – is recognised.102 
Moreover, the centrality of fundamental rights in the constitution is further 
highlighted by the fact that they are binding not only on administrative 
bodies and the judiciary, but also on the parliament itself in the exercise 
of its legislative powers (Article 1(3) Basic Law). Restrictions of rights are 
possible – to the extent that such a restriction is by or pursuant to law, that 
such law applies generally, and specifies the affected rights (Article 19(1) 
Basic Law).103 However, in no case may any branch of government encroach 
upon the essence of a basic right (Article 19(2) Basic Law).104
In the French legal system, the substance of the rule of law is also syn-
onymous with the principle of legality. Similar to its role in the German 
system, legality limits the state’s law-making powers in a mostly formal 
sense, and sets requirements for the quality of laws.105 Additionally, the 
discussion in France has focussed on legality as a demand for a hierarchy 
of legal sources, whereby law has to comply with the constitution or the 
general principles recognised therein.106 The French legal system makes 
a distinction between governmental regulations and parliamentary laws. 
Reflecting the volonté generale, the will of the people, parliamentary laws 
are of hierarchically higher order than regulations. However, the parliament 
is prohibited from legislating in certain areas of law where the executive 
has a monopoly on regulating.107 To counter this, regulations must always 
conform to general principles of law.108 Since the expression of the volonté 
générale is found in particular in the constitution, all laws must conform to 
this. Accordingly, the constitution forms the apex in the hierarchy of laws.109
101 Article 1(2) GG: Das Deutsche Volk bekennt sich darum zu unverletzlichen und 
unveräußerlichen Menschenrechten als Grundlage jeder menschlichen Gemeinschaft, 
des Friedens und der Gerechtigkeit in der Welt.
102 Christian Starck ‘Entwicklung der Grundrechte in Deutschland’ in Ulrich Immenga (ed) 
Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsentwicklung Göttingen: Schwarz (1980), pp. 89-105 at 100.
103 Article 19(1) GG: Soweit nach diesem Grundgesetz ein Grundrecht durch Gesetz oder auf 
Grund eines Gesetzes eingeschränkt werden kann, muß das Gesetz allgemein und nicht 
nur für den Einzelfall gelten. Außerdem muß das Gesetz das Grundrecht unter Angabe 
des Artikels nennen.
104 Article 19(2) GG: In keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet 
werden.
105 Both the Conseil Constitutionnel and the Court de Cassation have developed formal stan-
dards that require laws to be for example intelligible and accessible. See Chevallier 
(2003), p. 101.
106 On this discussion in general see André-Jean Arnaud Dictionnaire Encyclopedique de 
Theorie et Sociologie de Droit Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (1993).
107 Jean Rivero & Jean Waline (eds) Droit Administratif Paris: Dalloz (2006), pp. 251-252.
108 Ibid., pp. 254-255.
109 On the discussion of the place of international treaties, and particularly the status of EU 
law, in this order see in general Chevallier (2003), p. 109; Rivero & Waline (2006), p. 273.
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Similar to France, the particular understanding of parliament has influ-
enced the British understanding of the substance of the rule of law. Accord-
ingly, the principle of legality in the United Kingdom has to be understood 
against the particular backdrop of common law and the sovereignty of 
parliament. The latter means that in the exercise of its legislative power, 
the parliament itself is not bound by any higher law.110 Furthermore, no 
parliament can bind a future parliament, and since statutes are no different, 
formally speaking, from any other piece of legislation they can be repealed 
by a later act of parliament.111 Thus, the parliament has the right to make 
or abolish any law, and no other institution, organ or individual has the 
right to ignore parliamentary legislation.112 According to this, when acting 
in partnership, the parliament and the courts are the sources of law within 
the British constitution.113
Against this background of parliament’s legal sovereignty, legality in 
the UK context connotes the idea that rights and constitutional principles 
recognised by the common law will not be treated as overridden by par-
liamentary statute unless by express language or by clear and necessary 
implication.114 Moreover, all acts of government that affect individual rights 
and duties must be shown to have strict legal pedigree,115 which means that 
power may only be exercised by the authority upon which it is conferred – 
which in most cases is, directly, or indirectly, the parliament.116
On the basis of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the parlia-
ment’s range of legislative regulation is so wide that the interpretation of 
statutes has long been at the centre of legal argument. Accordingly, where 
constitutional principles can be established or rights have been recognised, 
statutory interpretation will be moulded around them.117 Furthermore, on 
the basis of the principle of legality, courts have a duty to review whether 
public authority wielding statutory power has acted ultra vires. This means 
that the right in question in a particular case cannot be abrogated by the 
state, save by specific provision by an Act of Parliament or by regulations to 
110 Dicey (1959), p. 192.
111 Emilio Santoro ‘The Rule of Law and the “Liberties of the English”: The Interpretation of 
Albert Venn Dicey’ in Petro Costa & Danilo Zolo (eds) The Rule of Law: History, Theory, and 
Criticism Dordrecht: Springer (2007), pp. 160-169.
112 Santoro (2007), p. 163.
113 Loughlin (2010), p. 315. In the continental traditions, the state is both the source of law 
and its subject, see Kaarlo Tuori ‘The Common Core of the Rule of Law and the Rechtssta-
at’ contribution to the conference on ‘The Rule of Law as a Practical Concept’ of the Euro-
pean Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 2 March 2012 Lan-
caster House, London. Available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/
CDL(2013)016-e.aspx.
114 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Simms, [2000] 2 AC 115.
115 Wade & Forsyth (2009), p. 17.
116 Lautenbach (2013), p. 25; Wade & Forsyth (2009), p. 259
117 Philip Sales ‘A comparison of the Principle of Legality and Section 3 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998’ paper delivered at the Statute Law Society Conference, Belfast (2008), p. 4.
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which main legislation has specifically conferred the power to abrogate.118 
Ultra vires review includes both formal grounds, such as illegality and 
excess of power, as well as substantive grounds, such as the principle of 
reasonableness.119
In this section, it was demonstrated that legality is a shared element 
of all three legal systems. The demand that the administration acts on the 
basis of law, and, moreover, is bound by it, is present in all of them. As 
such, the principle is intimately connected to the rule of law’s objectives. 
Moreover, it was shown that legality provides requirements for the quality 
and validity of law itself, another demand the three Member States have in 
common. Furthermore, it was asserted that in the three legal systems, legal-
ity presupposes some form of separation of powers, since it is addressed to 
both the legislature and the judiciary as it sets criteria for both law-making 
and judicial review.
5. The common mechanism for safeguarding the rule of law: 
judicial review
As demonstrated in the previous section, legality presupposes judicial 
review, since it is the judiciary that controls in individual cases whether 
or not the legislature has kept within the boundaries provided for by law. 
In this section, it will be demonstrated that all three legal systems rely on 
judicial review as a safeguarding mechanism for upholding and ensuring 
the rule of law and see it as one of the main ways in relation to the rule of 
law through which power can be checked and balanced.
Germany has a strong tradition of judicial review before the World 
Wars, and even more so after. Strongly advocated by Kelsen at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, it was the understanding of Nazi-rule as a 
failure of democratic government that led to a post-war stress on law and 
basic rights.120 Correspondingly, a strong system of judicial review to safe-
guard the parliamentary political system was emphasised. In order to attain 
this, Germany has set up many administrative courts and an elaborate 
system of legal protection against abuse of power by the administrative 
authorities.121 Under Article 19(4) of the Basic Law, individuals whose 
rights have allegedly been violated by public authority have recourse to 
court. Within this system, the Federal Constitutional Court is tasked with 
maintaining the constitution and the protection of rights. Accordingly, it is 
118 R v Lord Chancellor ex parte Witham [1998] QB 575 (DC).
119 Anthony Bradley, Keith Ewing & Christopher Knight Constitutional and Administrative 
Law Harlow: Pearson Education (2014), p. 698; Wade & Forsyth (2009), pp. 259-262.
120 Christophe Möllers ‘Scope and Legitimacy of Judicial Review in German Constitutional 
Law - the Court versus the Political Process’ in Hermann Pünder & Christian Waldhoff 
Debates in German Public Law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2014), pp. 3-26 at 5.
121 Klaus Stern Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Munich: Beck (1984), p. 839.
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the court of last instance in fundamental rights cases (Article 93(1) sub 4a 
Basic Law). As ordinary courts do not have jurisdiction to declare legislative 
measures enacted by Parliament unconstitutional,122 parliamentary statutes 
need to be attacked directly before the FCC. Moreover, the Basic Law pro-
vides standards for judicial independence (Articles 92, 95, 97 Basic Law) 
and access to judicial review (Article 19(4) Basic Law).
As it was demonstrated above, in contrast to Germany, France has 
had a traditionally distrustful relationship with the judiciary, which has 
initially impeded the development of judicial review. From a historical 
point of view, the lack of strong constitutional safeguarding mechanisms 
is explained by the fact that the French revolution was directed primarily 
against private oppression, such as the remnants of the feudal system and 
the power and privileges of the church, which were protected by the judicial 
class,123 rather than against abuse of public power. Therefore, the outcome 
of the revolution, while it did include a constitution, emphasised mainly 
the importance of individual rights and the introduced a civil code based 
on the principles of equality, the personal and economic autonomy of the 
individual, and ownership and freedom from alienation of property.124
However, strong control of constitutionality of parliamentary laws by 
ways of constitutional review was finally instituted during the Fifth Repub-
lic. A Constitutional Court (Conseil Constitutionnel) was created, primarily to 
oversee the legislative branch of government, which has to make sure that 
Parliament does not overstep its constitutionally defined competences.125 
Its competence was strengthened by a 1971 landmark case, in which the 
Constitutional Council extended its review of constitutionality to the sub-
stance of parliamentary statutes on the basis of the Preamble of the Consti-
tution in which reference is made both to the Declaration and the Preamble 
of the 1946 Constitution;126 both texts entrenched civil and political rights, 
and socio-economic rights.127 In this way, the Council qualified the rights 
provisions contained in these instruments as legally binding principles. Fur-
thermore, basing itself on the principe de légalité, the Council affirmed that 
all organs of the state, including the legislature, are bound by the principles 
122 Articles 93(1) sub 2a and 100(1) GG.
123 Martin A. Rogoff ‘A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the United States’ 
Maine Law Review 49 (1997), pp. 21-83 at 23.
124 Rogoff (1997), p. 24.
125 Christian Dadomo & Susan Farran The French Legal System London: Sweet & Maxwell 
(1993), pp. 108-109; Bell (1992), p. 27; Grote (1999), p. 294.
126 Decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel no. 71-44 DC of 16 July 1971. Also see Chevallier 
(2003), p. 85.
127 A non-written source - the Fundamental Principles recognized by the Statutes of the 
Republic (Principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la Ré publique) was added to these 
two texts to complete the ‘Block of constitutionality’ (Bloc de constitutionnalité ), Xavier 
Philippe ‘Constitutional review in France: The Extended Role of the Conseil Constitu-
tionnel through the New Priority Preliminary Rulings Procedure’ 53 Annales Universitatis 
Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando (2012), pp. 65-94 at 66.
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and rules of constitutional rank.128 However, up until the 2008 constitu-
tional amendment, the powers of constitutional review by the Council were 
confined to the legislative and certain other measures of Parliament.129 Its 
authority was thus restricted to the control of Parliamentary statutes, after 
their adoption, but before promulgation, upon referral by elected politi-
cians.130 A statute, once it had entered into force, was immune to review 
by any court under French law. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Council 
was limited to abstract review; it did not receive referrals of constitutional 
questions from the judiciary, nor could individuals appeal to it directly.131 
Following the amendment, ex post review has been introduced, whereby the 
Council may consider whether a legislative provision that is already in force 
violates the rights and freedoms under the Constitution, acting on referral 
by the Conseil d’État or the Cour de Cassation.132 Accordingly, individuals, 
within the framework of a court case, are allowed to challenge the constitu-
tionality of statutory provisions infringing their fundamental rights.
In the previous section it was asserted that the principle of legality, the 
core element of the rule of law in all three legal systems, has a particular 
understanding in the United Kingdom informed by the sovereignty of 
parliament. It was also demonstrated that the principle of legality presup-
poses a form of judicial review. Under UK common law it is even stated 
that when there is no remedy, there is no right;133 an adage to indicate the 
importance of ordinary courts in upholding the law of the land. However, 
unsurprisingly considering the importance of the doctrine, judicial review 
in the United Kingdom is heavily influenced by parliamentary sovereign-
ty.134 Nonetheless, since the country has become a member of the European 
Union, the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty has been somewhat 
restricted. Under the 1972 European Communities Act, which incorporates 
both the Treaties and secondary legislation into British domestic law, Brit-
ish authorities are obliged to give precedence to EU law over conflicting 
domestic law.135 As shown by the Factortame litigation, national courts have 
accepted the supremacy of EU law over national legislation, even in cases 
where the provisions held to be incompatible with EU law are contained in 
an Act of Parliament.136 As long as Parliament does not expressly indicate 
128 Decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel no. 81-132 of 16 January 1982, para.18; Decision 
no. 82-137 of February 1982, para. 3.
129 Philippe (2012), p. 70.
130 Alec Stone Sweet ‘The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe’ 5 Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law (2007), pp. 69-92 at 71.
131 Rivero & Waline (2006), p. 255.
132 Article 61 of the French Constitution.
133 Dicey (1959), p. 199.
134 Wade & Forsyth (2009), pp. 21-23; Francis Jacobs The Sovereignty of Law. The European Way 
Cambridge University Press (2007), p. 7.
135 See section 2(1) and 2(4) of the European Communities Act.
136 Factortame Ltd. v Secretary of State for Transport [1990] 2 AC 85; Factortame Ltd. v Secretary of 
State for Transport No. 2 [1991] 1 All ER 70. See also Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca (eds) 
EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials Oxford: Oxford University Press (2008), pp. 366-367.
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its will to derogate from EU legislation, and thus to repeal the European 
Communities Act, national courts will not apply statutory provisions which, 
according to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, are not consistent with Britain’s 
obligations under EU law.137 Thus, the doctrine of parliamentary sover-
eignty is in some ways limited, although parliament itself still holds that 
the supremacy of EU law is based on its (the parliament’s) own intention.138
Additionally, the adoption of the 1998 Human Rights Act, whereby the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) is given effect in domestic 
law, has limited parliamentary sovereignty in some ways, by instituting 
a form of abstract review of legislation, under which the legislature must 
indicate the compatibility of new legislation with the ECHR.139 However, in 
relation to judicial review of compatibility of domestic law with the ECHR, 
the last word is still reserved for parliament.140 Whereas ordinary courts 
can review the compatibility of legislation with the Convention, in relation 
to acts of parliament this form of judicial review is reserved for higher 
courts.141 Subsequently, if domestic law is found to be incompatible, a par-
liamentary act cannot be declared null and void. Instead the judiciary can 
merely issue a declaration of incompatibility,142 on the basis of which the 
parliament can use its discretionary power to decide to amend or uphold 
the disputed act.143
In sum, in this section it was shown that the rule of law and its core ele-
ment of legality require safeguard mechanisms. Judicial review, and, in the 
case of the continental concepts of Rechtsstaat and état de droit, constitutional 
review, safeguard the rule of law in all three Member States. It was also 
demonstrated that the manner in which the judiciary branch of government 
and judicial review is organised differs considerably, whereby the latter, in 
the case of the United Kingdom, has been significantly strengthened under 
the influence of European law.
6. Conclusions
In this chapter is was examined, whether, and to what extent, the rule of law 
in the German Rechtsstaat, the French état de droit, and the Anglo-Saxon rule 
of law have some common core elements. It was shown that the three legal 
systems have adopted the rule of law as a solution to the common problem 
of the need to restrain governmental power with the aim of the protection 
137 Factortame Ltd. v Secretary of State for Transport No. 2 [1991] 1 All ER 70.
138 Gordon Anthony UK Public Law and European Law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2002), pp. 
77-92.
139 Section 19 of the Human Rights Act.
140 Section 4(2) of the Human Rights Act; Jacobs (2007), p. 25.
141 Wade & Forsyth (2009), p. 144.
142 Ibid., p. 144; Gosalbo-Bono (2010), pp. 258-259.
143 Adam Tomkins Public Law Oxford: Oxford University Press (2003), p. 122.
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of the individual. In order to address the control of power and to ensure 
that the government not only rules on the basis of law, but is also bound 
by it, it was argued that all three traditions require a form of the functional 
separation of powers, whereby, at a minimum, the judiciary is accorded a 
large amount of independence in relation to the legislative and executive 
branches of government.
The chapter continued by asserting that in Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom, legality forms the rule of law’s common substance. 
More particularly, it was demonstrated that legality provides requirements 
both for the legislature in relation to the law it produces, as well as for 
the validity of law itself. Moreover, it was shown that the rule of law, in 
order to achieve its aims, requires safeguarding mechanisms in the form 
of judicial review. On the basis of the foregoing, it can be concluded that 
even though many authors have argued that ‘la manière d’appréhender 
ces concepts peut varier sensiblement d’une société à l’autre, d’une époque 
à l’autre, d’une doctrine à l’autre,’144 the rule of law in the three Member 
States clearly has a common core, consisting of the four features discussed 
above. Against this background, the next chapter will focus on the question 
whether, and to what extent, these features are verified in legal doctrine. In 
this way, it can be ascertained whether the four core features established 
above are indeed considered to be pivotal to the rule of law. Moreover, it 
can be determined if the elements are considered to be of equal importance 
or whether some are deserving of more attention and why.
144 Carpano (2005), p. 23.

2 The common elements of the rule of law 
in legal theory
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that the rule of law is a 
concept with a core that is ‘common to the Member States’. Indeed, it was 
demonstrated that rule of law serves in the examined states as a restraint of 
power and is seen as the means to buttressing the preservation of individual 
liberties. The Rechtsstaat, the état de droit and the Anglo-Saxon rule of law all 
demand that the administration acts on the basis, and within the restraints, 
of the law. Moreover, the rule of law’s element of legality is considered 
to provide various requirements for the validity and quality of law and 
legal rules. Similarly, it was shown that in the three legal systems, legal-
ity presupposes a form of the separation of powers, since it is addressed 
to the judiciary and the legislature as it sets separate criteria for each of 
them. Furthermore, it was asserted that within the separation of powers, the 
three legal systems demonstrate a particular emphasis on the guarantees 
for judicial independence. It is this particular focus, that also explains the 
observation that judicial review is found as the common mechanism for 
safeguarding the rule of law.
In this chapter, these elements will be further tested against legal theory, 
in order to establish whether, and to what extent, legal doctrine considers 
the same four features established above crucial for the existence of the 
rule of law concept. More particularly, since there exists a close connection 
between the conceptualisation of the rule of law in these Member States and 
the development of the discussion in legal scholarship (with philosophers 
such as Dicey, Rousseau, and Locke contributing to the articulation of both), 
the chapter will focus on examining to what extent the identified rule of law 
elements are attributed the same weight in the doctrine as in the constitu-
tional traditions of the three Member States.
The chapter begins by asserting that in legal theory the rule of law is 
first and foremost understood as a way of restraining power – indeed, not 
only does the rule of law require that rulers govern on the basis of law, 
the concept presupposes that the government is itself bound by it. Next, it 
is established that the rule of law’s conceptual purpose comports with the 
way it is understood in the three Member States. The chapter continues by 
arguing that legal doctrine confirms that the core element of the rule of law 
comprises the principle of legality. More particularly, it is shown that legal 
doctrine gives prominence to this element, with scholars such as Fuller and 
Raz having fleshed out this principle by formulating a number of qualita-
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tive formal requirements through which law can attain its aforementioned 
purpose. It is maintained that there is general agreement that in all legal 
systems most of these criteria can only be fulfilled to a certain degree and, 
thus, they cannot all be fully realised at the same time. However, the chap-
ter highlights that the question of minimum thresholds of these elements is 
insufficiently answered by the doctrine.
In relation to the rule of law’s institutional underpinnings, it is further 
shown that legal theory also relies on the separation of powers as a means 
of ensuring judicial independence. Just as in the Member States, in theory, 
the principle of legality presupposes at the very minimum some form of a 
functional separation of powers, since its requirements are directed at the 
three different branches of government. More particularly, it is argued that, 
in relation to the rule of law’s theoretical understanding, the debate on the 
separation of powers revolves around the legal system and its judiciary 
branch. It is asserted that this can be explained by virtue of the fact that law 
belongs to a legal system, and that any discussion on the nature and quality 
of law, inevitably involves an exploration of this system. It is shown that, 
within this discussion, there is a noticeable emphasis on the core element of 
judicial independence.
The chapter concludes by asserting that legal theory confirms judicial 
review as the essential mechanism for safeguarding the rule of law. It is 
demonstrated that the principle of legality requires that executive action 
be justified in law and, subsequently, that the judiciary is tasked with safe-
guarding the rule of law through judicial review of governmental acts that 
are deemed unlawful. More particularly, it is shown that both legal theory 
and the national rule of law conceptualisations distinguish between judicial 
review of executive action and legislation.
On the basis of the analysis of the theoretical understanding of the rule 
of law, it will be concluded that, even though legal theory is concerned with 
the extrapolation of a more generic definition of the rule of law as a way 
to understanding the notion’s general nature and purpose,1 it confirms the 
four features (purpose, substance, institutional underpinning, and safe-
guarding mechanism) found in the three Member States, albeit with a an 
emphasis on some rule of law elements over others.
2. The purpose of the rule of law: restraint of power 
and the protection of individual liberty
Taking their cue from the historical context in which the concept developed, 
legal philosophers understand the rule of law as a means of restraining, if 
not actually taming,2 power, in a manner similar to the Rechtsstaat, état de 
1 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott Law after Modernity Oxford: Hart Publishing (2013), p. 219.
2 Amichai Magen ‘The Rule of Law and its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope’ 
45 Stanford Journal of International Law (2009), pp. 51-115 at 60.
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droit, and the Anglo-Saxon rule of law. As Dicey stated in relation to the 
latter: ‘The rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based 
on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary 
powers of constraint.’3 This idea of restraint of government power is further 
supported in the writings of numerous legal scholars, as demonstrated, 
for example by Hayek’s interpretation of the rule of law: ‘Stripped of all 
technicalities, this means that government in all its actions is bound by 
rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to 
foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in 
given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge.’4 Thus, as seen in the practice of the three Member States, the 
rule of law means not only ruling on the basis of law, or ‘rule by law’, but it 
also presupposes that the government is itself bound by it.5
Moreover, in the aforementioned definition provided by Hayek, the pro-
tection of individual liberty, espoused by Locke,6 Rousseau,7 and Hobbes8 
within the context of the development of the national conceptions of the 
rule of law, is similarly accorded a prominent place. However, where on the 
national level individual liberty is understood as the protection of citizens 
against undue interference, whereby the emphasis is on the constraint of 
those wielding the power, in legal theory, stress is put on the individual and 
their development. Accordingly, as demonstrated by Hayek's definition, 
individual liberty is understood as the freedom to act outside of the con-
straints of the law. In this way, the purpose of the rule of law is to set bound-
aries in the understanding that outside of those, there is the freedom to 
pursue one’s activities. Thus, the rule of law in legal theory requires that the 
law by which governments purport to rule should be such that it can guide 
human conduct,9 and offer a basis for legitimate expectations, or predict-
ability, which brings with it a feeling of security.10 In other words, according 
to legal theory, a legal system underpinned by the rule of law is grounded 
in an understanding of the obligations of the state vis-à-vis the citizens 
and among themselves, on the basis of which citizens have the legitimate 
3 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution Houndmills: Mac-
millan (1959), p. 188.
4 Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1994), p. 80. 
See also Fuller ‘The purpose I have attributed to the institution of law is a modest and 
sober one, that of subjecting human conduct to the guidance and control of general rules.’ 
Lon Fuller The Morality of Law New Haven: Yale University Press (1969 revised edition), 
p. 146.
5 See chapter 1, section 2.
6 John Locke Second Treatise of Government Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 
(1980), section 202.
7 Jean-Jacques Rousseau Du Contrat Social (1762) Paris: Union Générale d’Éditions (1963), 
book 2
8 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan New York: Oxford University Press (1996).
9 Joseph Raz The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality Oxford: Clarendon Press 
(1979), pp. 212-214; Hayek (1994), p. 80; Fuller (1969), p. 146.
10 John Rawls A Theory of Justice Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1979), p. 238.
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expectations that the law will constrain other citizens and officials of state 
in ways that they can predict.11 In this way, legal theory accords the rule of 
law the same purpose as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, with 
the slight difference that the protection of individual liberty is not so much 
understood as the protection of rights from governmental interference, but, 
rather, as the freedom individuals have to live their own lives, guided by 
the boundaries of the law.
3. The core substance of the rule of law: legality
In this section, it will be demonstrated that legal doctrine understands the 
principle of legality as the core element of the rule of law, in ways similar 
to the national conceptions of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. 
It will be asserted that in legal theory legality is also considered as a means 
of attaining the rule of law’s purpose of restraint of power by law. More 
particularly, it will be shown that much of the discussion in legal theory 
revolves around this rule of law element with a number of scholars having 
formulated both formal and procedural requirements for the validity of law 
itself and for law to be able to guide human conduct. It will be demon-
strated that together with Fuller12 and Raz,13 as the major reference points 
of the theoretical discussion,14 other legal philosophers such as Finnis,15 
MacCormick,16 and Waldron,17 all share the view that there are certain fea-
tures the law must possess in order to successfully fulfil its function as law 
and for the rule of law to effectively protect citizens and guide individual 
behaviour. Since the list of eight requirements compiled by Fuller has been 
the most influential,18 this section will take these as its point of departure 
for providing an insight into the requirements of legality in legal theory.
11 Martin Krygier ‘Rule of Law’ in Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes (eds) International Ency-
clopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences New York: Elsevier (2001), pp. 13404-13408 at 
13406.
12 Fuller (1969), mainly chapter 2.
13 Raz (1979), mainly chapter 11.
14 Gianluigi Palombella ‘The Rule of Law and an Institutional Ideal’ in Leonardo Morlino 
& Gianluigi Palombella (eds) The Rule of Law and Democracy, Inquiring into Internal and 
External Issues Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff (2010), pp. 1-37 at 26.
15 John Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights Oxford: Clarendon Press (1980), pp. 270-276.
16 Neil MacCormick ‘Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals’ in Robert P. 
George (ed) Natural Law Theory Oxford: Oxford University Press (1992), pp. 105-133 at 
121-125.
17 Jeremy Waldron ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ 43 Georgia Law Review (2008), pp. 
1-61.
18 This is confi rmed by the fact that all legal philosophers, and many more, have frequently 
engaged with Fuller’s work on this issue. See, amongst others, H.L.A. Hart ‘Review of 
the Morality of Law’ 78 Harvard Law Review (1965), pp. 1281-1296; Ronald Dworkin ‘The 
Elusive Morality of Law’ 10 Villanova Law Review (1965), pp. 631-639.
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3.1 Fuller’s legality requirements
If the rule of law is to attain its purpose of restraint of power by law, it is 
not sufficient simply to have laws passed in the correct legal manner. After 
all, law is to also guide one’s conduct in order to plan one’s life. It is from 
this that legal philosophers have deduced a number of specific attributes 
that laws should have in order for them to be in compliance with the rule of 
law.19 Accordingly, Fuller submits eight requirements for the validity of law: 
(1) laws must be general, (2) promulgated and made available to the public, 
(3) non-retroactive, (4) clear and understandable, (5) non-contradictory, (6) 
only require action that subjects are capable of performing, (7) relatively 
stable, and (8) there must be congruence between the rules as announced 
and their actual application.20
The first requirement of generality has two separate aspects: the sub-
jects addressed by the law’s norm and the law’s norm itself.21 In relation to 
the first aspect, it is clear that law can address both particular individuals 
and groups of people. A rule addresses its subjects mostly by identifying 
a general feature that sets them apart, which is connected to what the rule 
prescribes; the purpose of a specific law will be defeated if it does not 
address itself to the relevant subjects.22 Closely linked to this is the notion of 
equality before the law,23 since generality, at least to some extent, serves as 
a safeguard against favouritism and partiality and ensures equal treatment 
of those that subscribe to the same general feature.24 When the law favours 
or disfavours a certain class or group of people, surely it may only do so 
19 See for example Brian Z. Tamanaha ‘A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law’ in Gianluigi 
Palombella & Neil Walker (eds) Relocating the Rule of Law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2009), 
pp. 3-15 at 10-11.
20 Fuller (1969), p. 33-94.
21 Georg H. von Wright Norm and Action. A Logical Enquiry New York: Routledge (1963), 
chapters 1 and 3; Andrei Marmor ‘The Rule of Law and its Limits’ USC Public Policy 
Research Paper No. 16 (2003), pp. 11.
22 Richard A. Posner ‘Corrective Justice’ in Christopher B. Grey (ed) The Philosophy of Law 
New York: Garland Publishing (1999), pp. 163-165.
23 H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012), p. 161; Dicey 
(1959), p. 193.
24 Andrei Marmor Positive Law and Objective Values Oxford: Oxford University Press (2002), 
pp. 147-152.
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on the basis of general reasons that warrant differential treatment,25 such 
as in the case of racial or religious minorities.26 Thus, the requirement of 
generality is addressed not only to the legislature, but also to the judiciary 
and necessarily includes the requirement of judicial impartiality.
The second aspect of generality is that of the law’s norm. The law can 
prescribe the performance of a particular action or omission thereof, or it 
can stipulate a general act. The more general the norm, however, the less 
it is able to actually guide individual conduct, and the greater the judicial 
discretion in applying and interpreting it.27 The law’s generality is thus a 
matter of degree. Marmor makes the interesting argument that, while some 
authors argue that this type of generality raises concerns in the context of 
the rule of law, these types of legal norms are rarely left to their general 
and/or possibly vague form;28 the specification of their content is handed to 
institutions, like administrative agencies and courts. In present day societ-
ies, where law has become very detailed due to an increase in governmental 
tasks,29 the legislature is often justified in leaving its specification to quali-
fied agencies and to courts. After all, the rule of law requires that the law be 
such that it can actually guide human conduct; it is indifferent about who 
25 Hayek subscribes to the view that according the rule of law, individuals should be treated 
equally under general laws, without regard to their particular qualities or circumstances, 
even though such complete equality might lead to unattainable and undesirable results. 
He had a bone to pick with the notions of substantive equality and distributive justice, 
because, if distributive justice contains the notion that there should be a fair allocation 
of goods in society, this can only be addressed through substantive equality, for unfair 
distribution often leads to unequal situations which would need to be addressed by tak-
ing the inequalities into consideration. According to Hayek, however, the problem is that 
‘in spite of many ingenious attempts … no entirely satisfactory criterion has been found 
that would always tell us what kind of classifi cation is compatible with equality before 
the law.’ For this reason, the rule of law produces economic inequality, which however, 
‘is not designed to affect particular people in a particular way.’ Friedrich A. Hayek The 
Constitution of Liberty Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1960), pp. 209-232; Fried-
rich A. Hayek The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law Cairo: Bank of Egypt (1955), p. 36. Sub-
stantive equality is the notion that equality requires treating differently situated people 
differently in order to account for the inequality in their situations, thus requiring the 
articulation of principles through which courts can determine whether the application of 
a rule to a person is compatible with the application of a different rule to another person. 
See for example Eduard Vierdag The Concept of Discrimination in International Law The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1973).
26 Rachel Kleinfeld 'Competing Defi nitions of the Rule of Law’ in Thomas Carothers (ed) 
Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad. In Search of Knowledge Washington: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace (2006), pp. 31-73 at 38-39.
27 Marmor (2003), pp. 15-16.
28 Ibid., p. 17.
29 Jacques Chevallier L’État de Droit Paris: Montchrestien (2003), p. 98; Henry S. Richardson 
‘Administrative Policy-Making: Rule of Law or Bureaucracy?’ in David Dyzenhaus (ed) 
Recrafting the Rule of Law. The Limits of Legal Order Oxford: Hart Publishing (1999), pp. 309-
330 at 309; Edward Rubin ‘Law and Legislation in the Administrative State’ Columbia Law 
Review (1989), pp. 369-426 at 395.
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decides what has to be done, whether it is the legislature, an administrative 
agency, or the courts.
The second requirement of promulgation stems from the obvious fact 
that a law, if it is to guide human conduct, needs to be made publicly avail-
able. Accordingly, this public aspect is an essential feature of its normativ-
ity, for a norm cannot provide a reason for action or abstention unless its 
subjects are aware of its existence and regard it as such.30 However, the 
extent of promulgation depends on its purpose.31 From a purely functional 
perspective, only those parts of the law need to be made public to those 
addressees whose behaviour it purports to regulate: agencies, individual 
subjects, to name a few. However, if, from a political perspective, critical 
debate and public scrutiny of the law are also valued, its promulgation 
needs to be much wider.32 Nonetheless, for law to guide conduct, only 
functional promulgation seems to be required by the rule of law.
Non-retroactivity of law, Fuller’s third requirement, can be understood 
both from a functional perspective – human conduct cannot be guided 
retroactively33 – and from a moral perspective – criminalising behaviour 
retroactively is an affront to human freedom and conflicts with legal certain-
ty.34 Legal practice shows that there are two exceptions to this requirement, 
in the form of a court overruling a previous precedent,35 or by distinguish-
ing cases36 – a legal method by which a judge can find that the material 
facts of a case are sufficiently different from a previous decision to warrant 
a different outcome.37 De facto these judicial actions have a retroactive effect, 
30 Gilbert Bailey ‘The Promulgation of Law’ 36 American Political Science Review (1941), pp. 
1059-1084 at 1059-1061.
31 Marmor, (2003), p. 22; Raz (1979), p. 215.
32 According to Fuller, ‘[i]t is the virtue of a legal order conscientiously constructed and 
administered that it exposes to public scrutiny the rules by which it acts.’ Fuller (1969), p. 
158. See also on the value of critical appraisal see for example the second chapter of John 
Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Writings Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1989).
33 According to Hayek, laws’ predictability - prospective laws give rise to legitimate expec-
tations - is a central function of the rule of law, since predictable, effi cient legal system 
allows businesses to plan, enables law-abiding citizens and businesses to stay on the cor-
rect side of the law, and provides some level of deterrence against criminal acts. If a legal 
system is predictable, it is a viable means for solving disputes. See Kleinfeld (2006), p. 42.
34 This last idea requires some nuance: the German courts found, both after the defeat of 
the national socialist regime and after the 1989 collapse of the Berlin wall in the cases 
concerning the wall-shootings, that in both cases the positive law of the legal system at 
the time could not be deemed to be legally valid because it offended against fundamental 
principles of justice and the rule of law. See for the latter case BVerfGE 95, 96; 2 BvR 1851, 
1853, 1875 and 1852/94, 24 October 1996 and Robert Alexy ‘A Defence of Radbruch’s For-
mula’ in David Dyzenhaus (ed) Recrafting the Rule of Law. The Limits of Legal Order Oxford: 
Hart Publishing (1999), pp. 15-39 at 15.
35 Raz (1979), pp. 185-189. On the question of retroactive effects of judicial law-making in 
areas of settled case law see Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press (1978), p. 82.
36 Raz (1979), pp. 189-192.
37 See generally James L. Montrose ‘Distinguishing Cases and the Limits of Ratio Deciden-
di’ 19 The Modern Law Review (1956), pp. 525-530.
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at the very least for the litigants involved.38 However, even though it can 
be argued that the introduction of legal changes is best left to the legislator, 
flexibility in the application of the law is equally desirable if law is to func-
tion as an effective tool of social control.39 Thus, this requirement places as 
much emphasis on the legislative branch of government, as it does on the 
judicial branch.
The fourth requirement that rules need to be clear and understandable 
is just that: those who need to understand the law should be able to do so. 
This implies that laws are sufficiently precise, a criterion, which, however, is 
a matter of degree. After all, clarity of law can also denote rigidity, a feature 
heavily criticised by scholars pointing out the difference between law-in-
the-books and law-in-action.40 Nonetheless, it is generally understood in 
legal theory that the required precision of the law depends on the existence 
of commonly accepted standards, which might have a level of obscurity, but 
which have been established on the basis of judicial practice.41
The fifth requirement establishes that laws may not contradict each 
other. This entails that the legislature has an obligation to endeavour not 
to include conflicting provisions within a single law, nor to enact a law that 
negates a provision, or even objective, of another law. Moreover, the require-
ment of non-contradiction also acts on a more abstract level of coherence, 
that of the legal system with its moral-political underpinnings.42 Accord-
ingly, Dworkin has argued that law is morally incoherent if its underlying 
justifications and the various prescriptions cannot be subsumed under 
one coherent moral theory.43 However, he was well aware of the fact that 
the laws’ moral soundness had to be balanced against the legal system’s 
integrity, thereby allowing for the rectification of possible past mistakes.44 
Thus, this requirement has to be balanced against the functioning of the 
legal system as a whole.
Fuller ’s sixth and seventh requirement – laws may not require the 
impossible and ought to be stable – are straightforward. Law cannot guide 
behaviour if it prescribes an impossible course of action. While it can be 
38 Raz (1979), p. 198.
39 Marmor (2003), p. 32. Fuller (1969), pp. 51-62.
40 Mauro Zamboni Law and Politics: A Dilemma for Contemporary Legal Theory Berlin: Spring-
er (2008), pp. 88-89; Karl Llewellyn ‘Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean 
Pound’ 44 Harvard Law Review (1931), pp. 1222-1264 at 1237; Roscoe Pound ‘Law in Books 
and Law in Action’ 44 American Law Review (1910), pp. 12-36.  See also Fuller, who argued 
that the ossifi cation of laws would make them essentially dysfunctional. Fuller (1969), 
pp. 60-62.
41 Geranne Lautenbach The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human Rights 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), p. 39.
42 Ronald Dworkin Law’s Empire Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1986), pp. 176-224.
43 Marmor (2003) p. 36.
44 Dworkin (1986), pp. 65-72. For Raz’s opinion on this particular point see Joseph Raz ‘The 
Relevance of Coherence’ 72 Boston University Law Review (1992), pp. 273-321. For the 
questionability of the argument on moral coherence in light of current pluralist societies, 
see John Rawls Political Liberalism New York: Columbia University Press (2005), pp. 11-14.
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argued that there is a nuance in the word ‘impossible’ – does Fuller mean 
actual physical impossibility, basic considerations of cost-effectiveness, or 
do conscientious objections also qualify? – it is a given that the law should 
prescribe general guidelines with which individuals have to be able to 
comply. How else is the rule of law to guide individuals’ behaviour? The 
requirement of stability is again one of degree.45 When law changes too fre-
quently its guiding function is under pressure, however, as argued above, 
ossification of law is not to be preferred either.
The eighth and final requirement prescribes the congruence between 
rules and their application. For law to function properly various law 
enforcement agencies and the judiciary must apply it, while simultane-
ously preventing a discrepancy between the rules as declared and as they 
are actually administered.46 Only if deviations from the rules are treated as 
such, can rules guide human conduct and will individuals stick to the rules. 
For this reason, application mechanisms are of crucial importance. How-
ever, even though according to the doctrine of the separation of powers this 
task is chiefly entrusted to the judiciary – thereby placing the responsibility 
of the law’s correct application in practised hands, it makes the correction of 
abuse dependent upon the willingness and (more often than not) financial 
abilities of the affected party to litigate a case.47
It should be noted that these requirements say nothing about how laws 
are made – by democratic process or other – and say nothing about the 
substantive standards the law must satisfy. These requirements, however, 
provide benchmarks for legal systems in order to regulate both private coer-
cion and violence among citizens themselves, as well as government action. 
Thus, the rule of law as legality is essentially a negative value involving a 
formal delimitation of government action so that the power of every author-
ity is exercised in accordance with law. By forcing public authority to follow 
legal forms and, as it will be demonstrated further below, legal procedures, 
law operates to reduce the possibility of government to excessively coerce 
or unreasonably interfere with the life, liberty, and property of citizens.48
3.2 Further fleshing out of legality’s requirements
As outlined above, Fuller has given an elaborate and sophisticated account 
of legality, setting quality requirements to law. He has outlined eight 
requirements of legality, that need to be fulfilled at least to a substantial 
degree in order for the rule of law to fulfil its primary function of guiding 
the behaviour of citizens. On the basis of this list a number of other eminent 
legal philosophers have compiled and outlined their own thoughts on the 
45 Fuller (1969), pp. 70-79.
46 Ibid., p. 81.
47 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
48 Ivor Jennings The Law and the Constitution London: University of London Press (1959), pp. 
45-66.
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rule of law.49 In The Authority of Law, Raz, starting from the same premise 
of law’s capability of guiding the behaviour of its subjects,50 outlines simi-
lar requirements:51 laws should be prospective, open and clear; relatively 
stable; and the making of particular laws should be guided by open, stable, 
clear, and general rules.52 In the same vein, MacCormick includes prom-
ulgation, generality, stability, and non-retroactivity as the requirements for 
law to properly function as law.53 This set of requirements, also found in the 
works of Hayek54 and Unger,55 is generally regarded as standard statements 
of the dominant formal versions of the principle of legality within the rule 
of law.56
However, the exact number of requirements of legality and their pre-
cise content has remained undecided and open for discussion. What if a 
legal system does not meet all requirements as indicated in Fuller’s list? 
Would this lead to the conclusion that there is no rule of law at all? It seems 
that there is some confusion on this point in the literature, not in the least 
because of Fuller’s statement on what he termed, the ‘inner morality of law’ 
in combination with the requirements he outlined. Fuller argued that his 
eight legality requirements constitute the inner morality of law, in the sense 
that they are intrinsic to the law itself; compliance with all requirements 
leads to fair laws. It is a ‘morality’ because it provides standards for evalu-
ating official conduct. Fuller furthermore emphasised that the principles 
underlying legality are so profound that deviation or lack of one of them 
would not merely result in a bad system of law, but it would result in some-
thing that can not properly be called a legal system at all.57
The confusion lies in the fact that morality is easily equated with more 
substantive principles such as justice. However, this cannot have been 
49 See, for authors not mentioned in the text, for example Fallon, who argues for the follow-
ing fi ve principles: the capacity of legal rules, standards or principles to guide people in 
the conduct of their affairs (1), effi cacy (the law should actually guide people) (2), stabil-
ity (the law should be reasonably stable in order to facilitate planning and coordinated 
action over time) (3), supremacy of legal authority (the law should rule offi cials, includ-
ing judges, as well as ordinary citizens) (4), impartial justice (courts should be available 
to enforce the law and should employ fair procedure) (5). Richard Fallon ‘”The Rule of 
Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ 97 Columbia Law Review (1997), pp. 1-56 
at 8-9. Also see Robert S. Summers ‘The Principles of the Rule of Law’ 74 Notre Dame Law 
Review (1999), pp. 1691-1712.
50 Raz (1979), pp. 214.
51 Unlike Fuller’s universal claim on the nature of laws, Raz’s non-exhaustive list is pre-
sented as context dependent, in so far as these principles ‘depend for their validity or 
importance on the particular circumstances of different societies.’ Raz (1979), p. 214.
52 Ibid., pp. 210-229
53 Neil MacCormick ‘Der Rechtsstaat und die Rule of Law’ 39 Juristenzeitung (1984), pp. 
65-70 at 68.
54 Hayek (1960); Hayek (1994).
55 Robert Unger Law in Modern Society New York: The Free Press (1976), pp. 176-181.
56 Brian Z. Tamanaha On the Rule of Law. History, Politics, Theory Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (2004), p. 93.
57 Fuller (1969), p. 39.
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the intended outcome of Fuller’s analysis of legality since he himself has 
insisted that in presenting the analysis of law’s inner morality, legality is 
‘over a wide range of issues, indifferent toward the substantive aims of law 
and is ready to serve a variety of such aims with equal efficacy.’58 Lyons has 
criticised Fuller’s use of the term ‘morality’ as misleading, since none of 
the eight requirements have a regular connection to substantive principles. 
Instead, according to Lyons, Fuller’s requirements concern the effectiveness 
of law.59 This conclusion is also supported by Dworkin, who has noted that 
‘[f]ailure to produce a law is not in itself a moral fault.’60 Accordingly, if 
Fuller’s requirements are viewed along the lines of effectiveness, it can be 
argued that failure to satisfy one of them, does not necessarily lead to a 
negative result, it will just be a less effective legal system. This argument is 
furthermore supported by Raz’s writings. According to Raz, there is little 
point in enumerating a definitive list of legality’s requirements, since many 
requirements depend for their validity on the particular circumstances of 
the different societies.61 Thus, it is enough to articulate some common ele-
ments of legality, which might occur in any combination, at any given point 
in time. Such a flexible approach in relation to legality and to the rule of law 
is preferable, especially considering the various ways in which legal sys-
tems are organised,62 but also because of the specific nature of some areas 
of law.63 With regard to criminal law, for example, legality’s requirements 
are especially important, since government interference has a very strong 
impact on individuals’ lives in this particular area. Thus, it is not surprising 
that the requirement of non-retroactivity is a central tenet of criminal law 
and codified in most national and international legal systems.64
However, after having established that most legal scholars agree on 
the formal elements of the rule of law – generality, promulgation, clarity, 
stability, non-retroactivity, non-contradictory – one question still remains 
on the table. In the previous section it was argued that fulfilment of the 
requirements mentioned is considered to be a matter of degree. If this is 
accepted, what then is the minimum threshold for their realisation? It seems 
58 Ibid., p. 153.
59 David Lyons Ethics and the Rule of Law Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1984), 
p. 77.
60 Ronald Dworkin ‘Philosophy, Morality, and Law - Observations Prompted by Professor 
Fuller’s Novel Claim’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1965) 113, pp. 668-690 at 675.
61 Raz (1979), pp. 214-218.
62 According to Palombella, the requirements for the validity of law can be matched at dif-
ferent times and in different contexts by a variety of institutional arrangements. Palom-
bella (2010), p. 31.
63 Fuller (1969), p. 93.
64 Dov Jacobs ‘International Criminal Law’ in Jörg Kammerhofer & Jean D’Aspremont (eds) 
International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (2014), pp. 451-474; Kenneth S. Gallant The Principle of Legality in International and 
Comparative Criminal Law Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2009), p. 241.
78 Part I
that most scholars have refrained from addressing this issue,65 or when 
they do address it, they have only managed to vaguely sketch the outlines 
of a minimum threshold.66 Mostly, the literature has identified rule of law 
elements in an inarticulate way as, for example, ‘fairly generalised’ rule 
through law, a ‘substantial amount’ of legal predictability, or ‘widespread’ 
adherence to the principle that no one is above the law.67 However, the 
question of thresholds still remains.
Consider for example the requirements of generality. In the modern day 
state, law has increasingly become detailed and, oftentimes, technical. This 
is due to the rise of the administrative welfare state, which has seen the pro-
liferation of sub-governmental bodies and has called for more government 
interference resulting in specific regulations.68 Moreover, as the executive 
power has progressively acquired law-making power,69 next to those of 
the parliament, the requirement of generality has become increasingly con-
cerned with questions of the scope and extent of delegation of law-making 
power to that branch of government. This brings with it the problem of 
discretionary powers:70 legality requires laws to be general, but at the same 
time, modern-day society leaves law-making and its application to adminis-
trative agencies,71 who apply discretion in deciding how to apply the law in 
a specific case.72 However, not only does such discretionary power appear 
to run counter to the idea of law’s generality, it also potentially counteracts 
law’s predictability. What, then, should the minimum level of generality 
be? Maybe Raz offers the clearest solution. He recognises the importance of 
generality, while at the same time acknowledging that a legal system must 
also have more specific rules. Thus, the requirement of generality does not 
imply that all laws must be general in nature. Rather, it is the making of 
more particular rules that should be guided by more general ones.73
In sum, it has been demonstrated that legal theory, like the rule of law 
in its national manifestations, recognises legality as the rule of law’s central 
element. It has been shown that, in order to fulfil the rule of law’s primary 
65 See for exceptions for example Adriaan Bedner ‘An Elementary Approach to the Rule 
of Law’ 2 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2010), pp. 48-74 and the work undertaken by 
Randall Peerenboom.
66 For a notable exception combining both a conceptual and benchmark approach see Nico-
las Hachez & Jan Wouters ‘Promoting the Rule of Law: A Benchmark Approach’ LCGGS 
Working Paper No. 105 (2013)
67 Michel Rosenfeld ‘The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy’ 74 
Southern California Law Review (2001), pp. 1307-1351 at 1313.
68 Edward L. Rubin, ‘Law and Legislation in the Administrative State’ 89 Columbia Law 
Review (1989), pp. 369-426 at 395.
69 Rubin (1989), p. 391.
70 Eoin Carolan The New Separation of Powers. A Theory for the Modern State Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (209), p. 119.
71 Brian Z. Tamanaha ‘The History and Elements of the Rule of Law’ Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies (2012), pp. 232-247 at 242.
72 MacCormick (1984), p. 68.
73 Raz (1979), pp. 215-216.
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function of guiding the behaviour of citizens, scholars have formulated a 
number of requirements and qualifications for the validity of law. More 
particularly, it has been asserted that most of the requirements mentioned 
by Fuller have been confirmed by similar accounts of legality of other legal 
philosophers. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that there is general 
agreement on the fact that most of the requirements can only be fulfilled to 
a certain degree and on the fact that not all of them need to be fully realised 
at the same time. Thus, it was shown that according to legal doctrine, it 
is enough to articulate legality’s elements, in the understanding that they 
can occur in any combination in a particular society, at any given point in 
time. However, it was also demonstrated that the question of minimum 
thresholds, or, in other words, the question what the minimum conditions 
are for each particular requirement, has not been sufficiently answered by 
legal theory.
4. The institutional underpinnings of the rule of law: 
emphasis on the legal system and judicial independence
The focus of this section will be to demonstrate that in legal doctrine, 
the rule of law’s core element of legality is underpinned by a form of the 
separation of powers, in ways similar to the national conceptions of the rule 
of law. More particularly, it will be asserted that since the requirements of 
legality address the three different branches of government, this common 
element of the rule of law thus presupposes some functional separation of 
governmental power. However, it will be demonstrated that legal scholars 
have restricted their analysis almost exclusively to the judicial branch. It 
will be shown that this is the consequence of the fact that the discussion on 
the rule of law concentrates on the question of the nature and validity of 
law, including the aforementioned requirements of legality. With this comes 
the belief that one of the further defining features of law is that it functions 
in an institutionalised legal system. It will be shown that, following this 
point of view, legal theory has emphasised the legal system and the norm-
applying institutions within it.
From the above exposé of the rule of law’s core principle of legality it has 
become clear that legality is understood as having both a systemic as well as 
an adjudicative dimension. Along the lines of the latter, legality is promoted 
by courts that enforce rights of individuals on the basis of past political 
decisions by the legislature and/or executive. This will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section. Along the lines of the former, legality, in 
its function as a power-restraining mechanism, is served by the existence 
of tools, judicial and non-judicial alike, that check undue governmental 
interference74 Accordingly, legality’s requirements are directed at the dif-
74 Dimitrios Kyritsis Shared Authority. Courts and Legislatures in Legal Theory Oxford: Hart 
Publishing (2015), p. 105.
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ferent branches of government, and thus, imply some form of functional 
separation of power.
For example, clarity and stability are directed at the legislature as 
norm-creator, since these requirements are concerned with the form law 
should take. To the extent that the executive has rule-making power, the 
requirements of legality that determine the validity of law should also be 
taken into account.75 As already demonstrated above, the requirement of 
generality is directed at both the legislature and the judiciary, as it is con-
cerned with the subject that are addressed by the norm and the way the 
norm is subsequently applied by norm-applying institutions such as courts 
and tribunals. Furthermore, both the executive and the judiciary should 
heed Fuller’s eighth requirement, which demands congruence between 
the law and official acts.76 It not only requires that administrative power 
should adhere to the law, it also demands that the judiciary prevent abuse 
of the law through acts of government. Legality, thus, also requires some 
form of judicial review. On the basis of the foregoing, it is proven that the 
systemic dimension of legality is supported by the doctrine of the separa-
tion of powers, both through considerations pertaining to the proper divi-
sion of government power – government power is divided on the basis of 
certain institutional arrangements, and through considerations pertaining 
to checks and balances – institutional mechanisms that monitor the exercise 
of government power in order to prevent abuse. In this way, the rule of 
law – in the form of the principle of legality – is underpinned by the separa-
tion of powers in the same way, and for the same reasons, as the notion is 
buttressed in the Rechtsstaat, état de droit, and the Anglo-Saxon rule of law.
However, in light of the fact that in legal doctrine the rule of law debate 
is concentrated on the requirements for legality and the validity of law, it 
is not surprising that, for its institutional underpinnings, the discussion 
focuses mostly on the functioning of the system in which the law is applied: 
the legal system.77 The court-centric emphasis of the debate,78 in combina-
tion with attention being paid to the norm-creating institutions,79 has come 
at the expense – and almost total exclusion – of the role of the executive.80 
75 Lautenbach (2013), p. 42.
76 Fuller (1969), p. 81.
77 After all, Finnis has argued that the rule of law is ‘the name commonly given to a state 
of affairs in which a legal system is legally in good shape.’ John Finnis Natural Law and 
Natural Rights Oxford: Clarendon Press (1980), p. 270. Further see Joseph Raz ‘The Insti-
tutional Nature of Law’ 38 The Modern Law Review (1975), pp. 489-503; Hart (2012). Also 
see Dicey (1959), pp. 195-196; Joseph Raz The Concept of a Legal System Oxford: Clarendon 
Press (1970).
78 Richard Bellamy (ed) The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers Dartmouth: Ashgate 
(2010), p. xi.
79 For a good example of theoretical interest in the nature and purpose of legislative intent 
see Richard Ekins The Nature of Legislative Intent Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012).
80 On legal theory’s neglect of the executive branch of government see Peter Cane ‘Public 
Law in The Concept of Law’ 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2013), pp. 649-674.
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For, by understanding the rule of law as legality and by focussing on the 
question of what ‘law’ is and what its features consist of, legal scholars 
privilege the judicial perspective.81 More particularly, legal scholars are 
in agreement that the rule of law is supported by judicial independence, 
thereby echoing the emphasis put thereon in the national conceptions.82
Judicial independence has been considered paramount historically, 
through the works of Locke and Montesquieu. According to the former, 
established laws with the right to appeal to independent judges are essen-
tial to a civilised society, since ‘[w]ant of a common judge with authority, 
puts all men in a state of nature.’83 As already demonstrated above,84 Mon-
tesquieu argued in favour of an independent judiciary branch because, if 
the judiciary power were not separate from the legislative and executive, 
the life and liberty of individuals would be exposed to arbitrary control 
or exposed to oppression.85 Raz also considered ‘independent courts’ an 
element of the requirements of the rule of law.86 After all, citizens can only 
be guided by the law if the courts apply it correctly and independently 
from the interests of both the government and the parties in the dispute. 
Furthermore, for the law to rule, it must be respected and followed, both 
by those in power as well as individuals. In many ways, the judiciary con-
trols this aspect of the concept, in its role as ‘guardian of the law’ on the 
basis of its ‘objectified position of neutrality’.87 Since, without impartiality 
and independence of judges, adjudication could not exist.88 Thus, judicial 
81 Kyritsis (2015), p. 115; Hart (2012); Hans Kelsen General Theory of Law and State (transl. A. 
Wedberg) Clark, New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange (1999); Hans Kelsen Pure Theory of 
Law Ney Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange (2002); Finnis (1980); Dworkin (1978); Geoffrey 
MacCormack ‘“Law” and “Legal System”’42 The Modern Law Review (1979), pp. 285-290; 
Raz (1970); Jeremy Bentham Of Laws in General (H.L.A. Hart ed) London: The Athlone 
Press (1970); John Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined New York: The Noon-
day Press (1954).
82 Raz (1979), pp. 214-215.
83 Locke (1980), section 19.
84 See section 2.2.
85 Montesquieu (1777), Book II, Chapt. 3.
86 Raz (1979), p. 216.
87 Tamanaha (2012), p. 244. See, for the counter-argument Kyritsis, who writes that: ‘Con-
versely, it is not necessarily the case that judicial enforcement is always preferable or even 
particularly effective. We should not forget that, despite their independence, courts are 
not external to the political regime. They have particular features, strengths and weak-
nesses, and in light of those they interact with the other state institutions in certain ways 
and not others. This does not mean that it is never warranted for them to take on the 
other branches of government. But it does mean that whether they should will vary. 
Although in some areas separation of powers will dictate that an issue be decided by a 
court of law – criminal charges are a good example –, in others it will encourage institu-
tional cooperation, competition and checks and balances without need for judicial inter-
vention.’ Kyritsis (2015), p. 115.
88 Robert S. Summers ‘Legal Institutions in Professor H.L.A. Hart’s Concept of Law’ 75 
Notre Dame Law Review (2000), pp. 1807-1828 at 1814.
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independence is a necessary element in order to uphold the integrity of the 
judicial process and the integrity of the law.89
Furthermore, legal theory is in agreement on the fact that the separation 
of powers, and thus, also, judicial independence, requires formal organisa-
tion.90 However, even though it cannot be effectively implemented ‘merely 
as an agreed and solemnly declared desideratum’,91 there is no commonly 
agreed-on institutional design.92 Considering the differences between com-
mon law and civil law systems, and the variations within these,93 this is 
not surprising. It means that in relation to its institutional underpinnings, 
the rule of law allows for a great many institutional alternative arrange-
ments. This conclusion is further reinforced by the multiple institutional 
semantics94 of the concept of judicial independence:95 it may refer to the 
89 Anthony Bradley, Keith Ewing & Christopher Knight Constitutional and Administrative 
Law Harlow: Pearson Education (2014), p. 370.
90 Krygier (2001), p. 13404.
91 Summers (2000), p. 1814.
92 Krygier (2001), p. 13404.
93 In their article on judicial independence in comparative perspective, Helmke and Rosen-
bluth differentiate between two types of institutional explanations for judicial indepen-
dence: historical legacy, as in common law systems, and a-historical delegative models, 
in which politicians have reasons to tie their own hands vis-à-vis an independent judi-
ciary, commonly found in civil law systems. Accordingly, common law countries charge 
courts with developing and interpreting a body of case law that supplements statutory 
law, with trained judges who can think about and create the bridges between pieces of 
legislation. In civil law countries independence is ensured through intentional institu-
tional walls against political intervention in judicial decisions. Gretchen Helmke & Fran-
ces Rosenbluth ‘Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in Comparative 
Perspective’ 66 Annual Review of Political Science (2009), pp. 345-366 at 349.
94 Peter Russell ‘Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence’ in Peter Russell & 
David O’Brien Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy London: University Press of 
Virginia (2001), pp. 1-24 at 1.
95 There are a great number of studies on the concept of judicial independence. However, 
such studies are usually undertaken within the fi eld of political science rather than legal 
theory, and focus on the concept itself in a given polity or on its development within 
the context of democratisation, rather than its exact relation with the rule of law. See for 
example Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth (eds) The Culture of Judicial Independence. 
Conceptual Foundations and Practical Challenges Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff (2012); Dan-
iela Piana ‘Beyond Judicial Independence: Rule of law and Judicial Accountabilities in 
Assessing Democratic Quality’ in Leonardo Morlino & Gianluigi Palombella Rule of Law 
and Democracy Leiden: Brill Publishing (2010), pp. 65-89; Tomaz Wardynski & Magda-
lena Niziolek (eds) Independence of the Judiciary and Legal Profession as Foundations of the 
Rule of Law: Contemporary Challenges Warsaw: LexisNexis (2009); Gretchen Helmke & 
Frances Rosenbluth ‘Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in Compara-
tive Perspective’ 12 Annual Review of Political Science (2009), pp. 345-366; Bernd Hayo & 
Stefan Voigt ‘Explaining de facto Judicial Independence’ 27 International Review of Law 
and Economics (2007), pp. 269-290; Markus Zimmer ‘Judicial Independence in Central and 
Eastern Europe: The Institutional Context’ 14 Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International 
Law (2006-07), pp. 53-87; John E. Finn ‘The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence in 
Newly Democratic Regimes’ 13 The Good Society (2004), pp. 12-16; Shimon Shetreet & 
Jules Deschênes (eds) Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff (1985).
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institutional conditions under which judges adjudicate; it can relate to the 
behavioural independence of individual judges; it might refer to the degree 
to which judges are autonomous within courts; or it may be associated with 
the degree to which judicial institutions are separated from the executive 
and legislative branches of government.96 However, it is apparent that in 
order to be free from extraneous pressures and independent from all author-
ity save that of the law, there are rules that need to be present across all legal 
systems. These include, amongst others, rules concerning the method of 
appointing judges, their security of tenure, and budget autonomy.97 Thus, 
differences in relation to the organisation of the judiciary and the extent of 
its powers to review governmental acts are all compatible with the rule of 
law.
In sum, it was shown that the requirements of legality presuppose some 
form of a functional separation of powers, since they are directed at the 
three different branches of government. Furthermore, it was demonstrated 
that within the discussion on the separation of powers in legal theory, the 
debate revolves around the judiciary branch and the legal system. It was 
asserted that this can be explained by virtue of the fact that law necessarily 
belongs to a legal system, and that any discussion on legality and the nature 
and quality of law, will inevitably involve an exploration of its institution-
alisation. More particularly, it was shown that there is a noticeable emphasis 
on the element of judicial independence. Individual behaviour can only be 
guided by law – the prime purpose of the rule of law next to the restraint 
of power – if independent courts correctly apply it. It follows from this 
that judicial independence is a crucial element for the law to be respected, 
and, thus, for the law to rule. It was demonstrated that in this respect, the 
doctrine of the separation of powers underpins the rule of law in much the 
same way as it is relied on in the three conceptualisations of the rule of law 
in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
5. The safeguarding mechanisms of the rule of law: 
judicial review and other procedural elements
In the previous section mention was made of judicial review as a require-
ment which flows from legality, since the latter not only demands that 
the administration adheres to the law, but also commands the judiciary to 
prevent abuse of the law through its powers of review. Thus, legal theory 
is concerned with providing safeguards for the rule of law in ways similar 
to the three national conceptions, discussed in the previous chapter. It was 
also demonstrated that the judicial-centric focus of the rule of law-debate 
in legal theory is explained by the fact that if one wants to know about the 
content of the law, it is natural to turn to those institutions and the officials 
96 Russell (2001), pp. 2-24.
97 Raz (1979), p. 216; Helmke & Rosenbluth (2009), p. 349.
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within them whose job it is to interpret it.98 From the outset, it should be 
made clear that the aim of this section is not to provide an in depth analysis 
of the areas of the debate on judicial review in both common and civil law 
systems – and all their variations – since this would go far beyond the ambit 
of the present study.99 Rather, the purpose of this section is to show that in 
legal doctrine there is agreement on the fact that at least marginal judicial 
review of both executive action and legislation, is a necessary component 
for upholding the rule of law. It will be demonstrated that the doctrine 
of the separation of powers sets certain limits to review of the executive, 
preventing judicial scrutiny of certain more political acts of government. 
In relation to judicial review of legislation, it will be asserted that the judi-
ciary’s powers can be limited due to democratic concerns, even though it 
will be shown that formal legality and formal democracy are, in some ways, 
mutually reinforcing concepts. More particularly, it will be demonstrated 
that legal doctrine, just as the Rechtsstaat, état de droit, and the Anglo-Saxon 
rule of law, requires at least some form of judicial review of legislation in 
order to safeguard individual rights. As a final point, a number of review-
related procedural rule of law elements, such as access to court, and fair and 
impartial hearings will be highlighted.
It merits attention at this point that, as demonstrated in section 2 of the 
present chapter, since ‘the rule of law is preferable to that of any individual’, 
the idea of rule on the basis of law follows the Aristotelian adage of ‘govern-
ment of law, not men’.100 It can be recalled that at the core of the notion lies 
the conviction that law provides the most secure means of protection both 
from arbitrary government involvement and from other individuals.101 In 
this sense, according to Allan, the law is a bulwark between the governing 
and the governed, shielding the individual from hostile discrimination on 
98 Dworkin (1986), p. 413.
99 For analyses of judicial review see Harry Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell et al. De Smith’s Judicial 
Review London: Sweet & Maxwell (2014); Trevor R.S. Allan ‘Judicial Deference and Judi-
cial Review’ 127 Law Quarterly Review (2011), pp. 96-117; Christopher Forsyth et al. Effec-
tive Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2010); Jeremy Waldron ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ 115 The Yale Law 
Journal (2006), pp. 1346-1406; Trevor R.S. Allan ‘The Constitutional Foundation of Judi-
cial Review: Conceptual Conundrum or Interpretive Inquiry?’ 61 Cambridge Law Journal 
(2002), pp. 87-125; Mark Elliot The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review Oxford: 
Hart Publishing (2001); Christopher Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution 
Oxford: Hart Publishing (2000); Paul Craig ‘Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial 
Review’ 57 The Cambridge Law Journal (1998), pp. 63-90; John Laws ‘Illegality, the Problem 
of Jurisdiction’ in Michael Supperstone & James Goudie (eds) Judicial Review London: 
Butterworths (1997), 4.12-4.16; Christopher Forsyth ‘Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The 
Ultra Vires Doctrine, Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review’ 55 The Cambridge 
Law Journal (1996), pp. 122-140.
100 Aristotle Politics (transl. by Benjamin Jowett) Kitchener: Batoche Books (1999), p. 76.
101 In his Politics Aristotle famously wrote that ‘[h]e who bids the law rule may be deemed to 
bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; 
for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are 
the best of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire.’ Aristotle (1999), p. 77.
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the part of those with political power.102 Legal liberty exists when citizens 
understand and follow the law. This is what Hayek meant when he wrote 
that when citizens obey the law, in the sense of general abstract rules laid 
down irrespective of their application to them, they are not subject to 
another man’s will and are therefore free.103 In line with the requirement of 
legality, actions of the executive branch of government should be justified 
in law. It might also be recalled that, in relation to the Anglo-Saxon rule of 
law, Dicey stressed that ‘every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is 
subject to the ordinary land of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary tribunals.’104 Thus, in order to ensure the rule of law’s aims 
and purposes,105 the judiciary has been tasked to review governmental acts 
that are deemed unlawful.
Judicial bodies ensure that public bodies do not misuse or abuse the 
powers invested in them. Judicial review thus plays a key role in ensuring 
that the executive only acts in accordance with promulgated laws – that 
public officials properly implement the instructions of the legislature – and 
that a society is therefore based on the rule of law.106 Judicial review is not 
concerned with the end result of the decision made by the public body; 
it is merely concerned with determining whether or not the right proce-
dures were followed in arriving at the decision.107 Whereas the principle 
of legality requires that public activity be submitted to judicial control, the 
doctrine of the separation of powers prevents judicial review of each and 
every act of government. Fundamental political decisions, for example, 
are prevented from judicial scrutiny, as this belongs firmly to the sphere 
of executive action. However, the rise of the administrative state and the 
ensuing amount of legislation as well as the heightened involvement of the 
executive branch, has led to a more prominent role for courts, described 
by Cappeletti as ‘the ‘third giant’ to control the mastodon legislator and 
the leviathan administrator’.108 This rise to prominence has come accom-
panied by a renewed debate on the limits of judicial review.109 The answer 
to the question about how far the powers of the judiciary should reach in 
102 Trevor R.S. Allan ‘Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitu-
tionalism’ 44 The Cambridge Law Journal (1985), pp. 111-143 at 113.
103 Hayek (1960), p. 153.
104 Dicey (1959). p. 202.
105 Mark Elliot ‘The Ultra Vires Doctrine in a Constitutional Setting: Still the Central Princi-
ple of Administrative Law’ in Christopher Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution 
Oxford: Hart Publishing (2000), pp. 83-110 at 85-87.
106 See generally David Dyzenhaus ‘Form and Substance in the Rule of Law: A Democratic 
Justifi cation for Judicial Review’ in Christopher Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Con-
stitution Oxford: Hart Publishing (2000), pp. 141-172.
107 John Laws ‘Judicial Review and the Meaning of Laws’ in Christopher Forsyth (ed) Judi-
cial Review and the Constitution Oxford: Hart Publishing (2000), pp. 173-190, p. 173
108 Mauro Cappelletti The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective Oxford: Clarendon Press 
(1989), p. 19.
109 See for example Trevor R.S. Allan ‘Deference, Defi ance, and Doctrine: Defi ning the Limits 
of Judicial Review’ 60 University of Toronto Law Journal (2010), pp. 41-59.
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relation to those of the executive depends on the specific form given to the 
separation of powers in a particular polity; conformity to the rule of law 
by ensuring judicial review of acts of the executive remains therefore one 
of degree.110 However, according to the influential writing of philosophers 
such as Bingham, Waldron, and Allan, the rule of law requires that the judi-
ciary can review actions of public bodies at least in a marginal sense.111 On 
the basis of the foregoing, it is evident that legal theory considers judicial 
review of executive action to be a sine qua non condition for upholding and 
guaranteeing the rule of law; it is one of the checks and balances of the 
separation of powers. This understanding of judicial review as a safeguard 
to the rule of law is in line with its function in the national legal systems.112 
As it was shown in the previous chapter, the Rechtsstaat, état de droit, and the 
Anglo-Saxon rule of law, require judicial review as a tool for upholding the 
rule of law
The link between the rule of law and judicial review of legislation, 
and, more specifically, statutory legislation,113 is, however, less tenable and 
raises democratic concerns. Parliamentary laws are rooted in a democratic 
legitimacy the judiciary, however independent, will always lack. To have 
unelected officials rule on laws made by representatives of the people is, 
from a democratic perspective, problematic. Judicial review of legislation 
thus sits at the heart of the juxtaposition between rule of law and democ-
racy, for, as Forsyth has noted, ‘to shift the ultimate constitutional power 
from the hands of the elected representatives into [the judges’] own hands 
has to be offensive to the democratic heart.’114
Interestingly, democracy and legality are mutually reinforcing concepts. 
Since formal democracy informs the process through which laws are 
framed, this, in and of itself, contributes to the requirements of formal legal-
ity. In this way, formal democracy aids the rule of law’s purpose of control 
of power. Vice versa, for democracy to be effective, it relies on legality and 
the institutional underpinning of the separation of powers.115 To put it dif-
ferently, without formal legality, democracy can be circumvented (officials 
can undercut the law), whereas without democracy, formal legality loses 
its legitimacy (the law has not been determined by legitimate means).116 
110 Allan (1985), p. 113.
111 Tom Bingham The Rule of Law London: Penguin Books (2010), p. 61; Lautenbach (2013), 
p. 42; Waldron (2006), p. 1354; Allan (1985), p. 114.
112 See to this point also the comparative study on judicial review of executive action in 
many of the EU Member States, Susana Galera (ed) Judicial Review. A Comparative Analysis 
inside the European Legal System Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing (2010).
113 Waldron (2006), p. 1353; Raz (1979), p. 217.
114 Christopher Forsyth ‘Heat and Light: A Plea for Reconciliation’ in Christopher Forsyth 
(ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution Oxford: Hart Publishing (2000), pp. 393-409 at 394.
115 John C. Reitz ‘Export of the Rule of Law’ 13 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 
(2003), pp. 429-486 at 443.
116 Tamanaha (2004), p. 99.
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However, according to scholars such as Allan, whereas courts should loy-
ally enforce the legitimate requirements of statutes, at the same time, they 
should defend and enforce the fundamental principles of law, especially 
those defining constitutional rights.117
There are a variety of practices that can be grouped under the head-
ing of judicial review of legislation, each dealing with the tension between 
democratic principles and the rule of law in their own particular way, 
thereby shifting the balance towards the one or the other.118 Thus, in a sys-
tem of strong judicial review, courts have the authority to decline to apply 
a statute in a particular case, or modify its effects to make its application in 
conformity with human rights.119 By contrast, in a system of weaker judicial 
review, courts may scrutinise legislation for conformity with human rights, 
but they may not decline to apply it.120 The type of judicial review will 
furthermore depend on the place of individual rights in the constitutional 
system (written or not); a posteriori review – which takes place in the context 
of a particular case, and ex ante review – whereby a specifically set up con-
stitutional court conducts an abstract assessment of legislation in the final 
stages of its enactment; and the existence of specialised courts.121 Given the 
existing varieties, it would go beyond the scope of the present study to give 
a detailed account of the theoretical and practical implications of judicial 
review of legislation in all of them.122 The point here is merely to indicate 
that, according to the literature, irrespective of democratic concerns setting 
certain limits to the judiciary’s powers of review, in order to fulfil the rule of 
law ideal, at least a weak form of judicial review of legislation is necessary. 
For this reason, legal theory confirms the existing practices of review in the 
three Member States discussed previously.
In conclusion to this section, it should be pointed out that, according 
to the literature, the rule of law demands a number of related additional 
requirements. The judiciary’s task of judicial review and the application 
of the law brings with it questions of institutional access. This issue was 
highlighted by Dicey, when he stated that ‘where there is no remedy, there 
is no right’.123 Moreover, since in a complex and political society no system 
117 Allan (2010), p. 41.
118 For the role of the principle of ultra vires in the bridging of the gap between democratic 
and rule of law related concerns (especially in the United Kingdom) see, amongst oth-
ers, the work undertaken by Forsyth, Elliot, Craig, and Allan mentioned in this section, 
and particularly Christopher Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution Oxford: Hart 
Publishing (2000).
119 Mauro Cappelletti & John Clarke Adams ‘Judicial Review of Legislation: European Ante-
cedents and Adaptations’ 79 Harvard Law Review (1966), pp. 1207-1224 at 1222.
120 Waldron (2006), p. 1356.
121 Ibid., pp. 1354-1359.
122 Generally, see Harry Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell et al. De Smith’s Judicial Review London: Sweet 
& Maxwell (2014); Trevor R.S. Allan ‘Judicial Deference and Judicial Review’ 127 Law 
Quarterly Review (2011), pp. 96-117; Forsyth et al. (2010); Waldron (2006); Allan (2002).
123 Albert V. Dicey Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during 
the Nineteenth Century London: Macmillan (1914), p. 487.
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of law can be so perfectly drafted (or judge-made), as to leave no room for 
dispute, access to court as a provision for resolution of disputes is indis-
pensable.124 Judicial bodies stand as mediators between the government 
and its citizens, seeking to ensure that any powers claimed by the executive 
are properly authorised and that individuals can safely rely on the relevant 
laws in formulating their plans and deciding on the scope of their liber-
ties.125 Accordingly, accessibility of courts is of crucial importance to the 
rule of law in order to ensure that the rule of law’s legality requirements can 
be effectuated. On a more practical note some further sub-requirements are 
distinguished in legal theory, such as the absence of long delays and exces-
sive costs, since these may effectively turn law to a dead letter and frustrate 
one’s ability to be guided by the law.126
In addition to access to courts, in order for the judiciary to fulfil its func-
tion under the rule of law, it must apply minimum procedural principles 
of fairness and impartiality.127 Principles, in the words of Hart, that are 
‘designed to secure that the law is applied to all those and only to those who 
are alike in the relevant respect marked out by the law itself.’128 Thus, open 
and fair hearings, absence of bias and the like, are essential to the correct 
application of the law, and therefore part and parcel of the rule of law.129 It 
should be recalled that it was already shown that the requirement of equal-
ity before the law is inherent in the requirement of generality, discussed 
above.130
To this list of procedural rule of law elements – designed to ensure that 
the ‘legal machinery’ of enforcing the law should not deprive it of its abil-
ity to guide through distorted enforcement – Raz has included one further 
requirement, namely, that the discretion of the crime-preventing agencies 
should not be allowed to pervert the law.131 Due to the aforementioned 
court-centric focus of most legal scholars, the role and importance of other 
parties involved in the legal system have been largely ignored. However, 
not only judges can subvert the law, the actions of police and prosecuting 
authorities are equally a part of the legal system and corruptible. Prosecu-
tors are as much under pressure in high profile cases as other officers of 
the court. Moreover, if the police were allowed to steer its crime prevention 
124 Elliot (2000), p. 103; Fuller (1969), p. 56.
125 This point was stressed by Lord Diplock in the case Black-Clawson Ltd. v Papierwerke 
A.G. where he held that ‘[t]he acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle 
requires that a citizen, before committing himself to any course of action, should be able 
to know in advance what are the legal consequences that will fl ow from it. Where those 
consequences are regulated by a statute the source of that knowledge is what the statute 
says.’ Black-Clawson Ltd. v Papierwerke A.G. [1975] A.C. 591, 613G.
126 Raz (1979), p. 217.
127 Wade & Forsyth (2009), p. 402.
128 Hart (2012), p. 160.
129 Raz (1979), p. 217.
130 See section 3.1.
131 Raz (1979), pp. 217-218.
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efforts in a certain direction, or to only detect certain crimes or prosecute 
certain classes of people, that would certainly be against the idea of the rule 
of law.
In sum, it was demonstrated that, according to legal scholarship, at 
least marginal judicial review of executive action and of legislation is an 
essential element for safeguarding the rule of law. It was asserted that the 
legality requires that executive action should be justified in law and that 
the judiciary has subsequently be tasked with safeguarding the rule of law 
through judicial review of governmental acts that are deemed unlawful. It 
was furthermore shown that judicial review of executive action, as well as 
judicial review of legislation encounter limitations set by the doctrine of the 
separation of powers and democratic concerns, respectively. Furthermore, it 
was asserted that the element of judicial review has given rise to a number 
of related procedural rule of law elements, such as access to courts and 
principles of impartiality and fairness. Moreover, it was highlighted that 
individuals should be protected from distorted enforcement by the other 
forces in the legal system, such as the police and the prosecutor.
6. Conclusions
In this chapter it was examined whether, and to what extent, the rule of 
law’s four common features found in the Rechtsstaat, état de droit, and the 
Anglo-Saxon rule of law, comport with the way the notion is understood 
in legal theory. It was shown that with regard to the rule of law’s purpose, 
substance, institutional underpinning, and safeguarding mechanisms, 
the doctrine mirrors to a large extent the way the notion is understood at 
the national level. More particularly, it was established that the theoreti-
cal understanding of the rule of law allows for a number of elemental and 
institutional variations. It was shown that in legal theory, the rule of law’s 
main purpose is to restrain power and to protect individual liberty, thereby 
allowing individuals to plan and shape their own lives, guided by the 
boundaries of the law.
The chapter continued by pointing out the fact that legal scholarship 
has focussed on the notion’s core element of legality by enquiring into its 
requirements. It was demonstrated that for the principle to operate, not all 
of these requirements need to be fully realised all the time. Similarly, the 
way the rule of law is underpinned by the separation of power may dif-
fer, as long as, at a minimum, judicial independence is guaranteed. Finally, 
it was established that the element of judicial review is the mechanisms 
through which the rule of law is best safeguarded. More particularly, it was 
shown that legal theory identifies judicial review of executive action and of 
legislation, which, for the rule of law to function, should both exist at least 
in a marginal sense.

 General Conclusions to Part I: 
the analytical framework for the 
case studies
In the first chapter of the thesis it was established that four common ele-
ments of the rule of law in the three most influential national traditions of 
Rechtsstaat, état de droit, and the Anglo-Saxon rule of law, can be elucidated: 
a common purpose (restraint of power and protection of the individual); a 
core substance (the principle of legality); a common institutional underpin-
ning through a functional understanding of the doctrine of the separation 
of powers (with emphasis on judicial independence); and a common safe-
guarding mechanism (a form of judicial review of both executive action and 
legislation). In the second chapter, these four elements were tested against 
legal theory in order to establish whether, and to what extent, legal doctrine 
considers these elements crucial for the existence of the rule of law concept. 
In that chapter it was demonstrated that these elements are indeed con-
firmed by the doctrine, albeit with a different emphasis. More particularly, 
it was shown that legal theory has fleshed out these criteria in more detail. 
Confirming restraint of power with a view to allowing individuals their 
freedom, guided by the parameters set by the law as the notion’s purpose, 
legal scholars have long debated qualitative requirements for the validity 
of law, such as clarity, stability, generality, and prospectivity. It was asserted 
that the literature agrees that for the principle of legality to operate, not all 
requirements can be fully realised all the time, nor need they be. However, 
legal scholars have provided an insufficient answer to the question of a 
minimum threshold for each requirement.
In relation to the doctrine of the separation of powers, it was dem-
onstrated that legal theory allows for national variations, as long as, at a 
minimum, there is a functional separation of powers, which guarantees 
judicial independence. Finally, it was established that the principle of legal-
ity and the separation of powers rely on the mechanism of judicial review 
in order to safeguard the rule of law. More particularly, it was shown that 
the judiciary’s power is itself checked; judicial review of executive action 
finds its limitations in the separation of powers – not all executive action 
falls within the scope of judicial review, and judicial review of legislation 
can be limited on the basis of democratic concerns – to what extent can the 
judiciary have the last word over parliamentary legislation expressing the 
will of the peoples? It was shown that the doctrine confirms that the rule of 
law requires some form of judicial review of both but does not provide an 
institutional design: national variations are allowed.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis it is submitted that the concept 
of the rule of law is as much about the formal qualities that characterise the 
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norms as it is about procedural requirements for their impartial administra-
tion.1 It calls for institutional underpinnings by way of separation of powers 
as a way of realising judicial independence, and safeguarding mechanisms 
based on judicial review. The rule of law is undermined when the institu-
tions that are embodied with these safeguards are interfered with; clear 
norms are not sufficient when they are not properly administrated.
On the basis of the foregoing, three categories of elements that com-
prise the concept of the rule of law may be discerned: formal, procedural, 
and institutional. To the first category of formal law elements belong the 
aforementioned requirements connected to legality, concerned with the 
predictability and determinacy of the laws themselves: laws should be clear, 
stable, general, public, prospective, understandable, and non-contradictory, 
in order to facilitate predictability and security. To the second category of 
procedural requirements belong the elements that are concerned with the 
impartial administration of the law. This concerns the safeguarding mecha-
nism of judicial review of both executive action and legislation, and issues 
such as due process, fairness, access to court, and enforcement. Procedural 
elements of the rule of law require that, however formally virtuous they 
may be, rules must be applied in a way that is procedurally just.2 To the 
third category belong the institutional arrangements underpinning the rule 
of law: some form of the separation of powers with a particular emphasis 
on the legal system and judicial independence. In this category, also the 
position of other parties in the legal system, such as prosecutors, police, and 
lawyers, can be addressed.
Formal requirements:
concerned with the 
predictability and 
determinacy of laws 
(legality)
Procedural requirements:
concerned with the 
administration of the law 
Institutional requirements:
Safeguarding mechanisms 
underpinning the rule of 
law
For a framework such as that in the present study, a more detailed subdivi-
sion is not necessary. It was shown that in all three categories variations are 
possible. Moreover, considering the policy areas in the next part and the 
countries they cover, variations are apparent from the outset. A too detailed 
rule of law framework will be too rigid and not reflective of the different 
historical context and current developments of the society to which it is 
applied. The proposed framework will allow for minor variations while at 
the same time leaving space for a more detailed approach per category if 
such turns out to be the case. For these reasons, it enables the analysis to 
1 Waldron (2008), pp. 3-61 at 6-7.
2 Jeremy Waldron ‘The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure’ in James E. Flem-
ing (ed) Getting to the Rule of Law New York: New York University Press (2011), pp. 3-31; 
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Matthew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast ‘The Rule of Law 
Unplugged’ 59 Emory Law Journal (2010), pp. 1455-1494 at 1470-1471.
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focus on two linked, but separate issues. First, it allows the present author 
to draw conclusions about the relative weight of the categories and their 
elements in relation to each other. Secondly, it makes it possible to establish 
whether or not elements are missing from the framework, thus indicat-
ing a divergent approach to the concept of the rule of law as it has been 
established in the previous chapters. Against this background, in the second 
part of this thesis, the focus turns towards the rule of law in the practice of 





3 The EU’s conceptualisation of the rule 
of law in its development cooperation 
practice
1. Introduction
In the introduction, it was demonstrated that the importance of the 
strengthening of the rule of law has been acknowledged in the Treaty on 
European Union and at the policy level. Indeed, for the area of development 
cooperation, the EU has recognised the rule of law both as an ‘indispensable 
element’1 of, and a ‘necessary prerequisite’2 for, sustainable development; 
without this ‘basic pillar of our policy’,3 ‘no lasting development progress 
is possible.’4 Surely, in light of this, one might have expected the EU to pro-
vide a clear conceptualisation in order to guide the principle’s consolidation 
in developing countries. The present chapter purports to examine whether, 
and if so to what extent, the EU has fleshed out its rule of law definition 
in its development cooperation policy and subsequent practice. More par-
ticularly, the analytical framework established in chapters 1 and 2, which 
includes the formal, procedural, and institutional rule of law elements 
identified previously, will be tested against both the EU’s development 
cooperation policy and its long-standing practice in this policy area.
To this end, the chapter begins by providing a brief introduction into the 
area of development cooperation. Following this, the EU’s ‘toolbox’ for rule 
of law promotion in development cooperation will be explored in order to 
provide the background against which the analysis of the different elements 
can take place. The chapter continues by examining the three categories 
of rule of law elements for the purpose of ascertaining whether these ele-
ments are validated by the EU’s policy framework and its practice. It will 
be argued that the formal element of legality and the procedural element of 
judicial review have largely remained underdeveloped. In contrast, it will 
be demonstrated that the procedural element of access to justice, and the 
1 Resolution of the European Parliament on the EU-Africa Strategy: a Boost for Develop-
ment, (2017/2083(INI)), 24 October 2017, pnt. 16.
2 Commission Communication on Towards a global partnership for sustainable develop-
ment, COM(2002) 82 fi nal, 13 February 2002, p. 15; Commission Communication on The 
European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third coun-
tries, COM(2001) 252 fi nal, 8 May 2001, p. 4.
3 Council Conclusions ‘Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for 
Change’ 3166th Foreign Affairs Council, 14 May 2012, pnt. 6.
4 Commission Communication on From Cairo to Lisbon – the EU-Africa Strategic Partner-
ship, COM(2007) 357 fi nal, 27 June 2007, p. 4.
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institutional element of judicial independence appear as core elements of 
the EU’s rule of law definition. However, it will be asserted that this promi-
nence has not resulted in detailed and clear guidance on the notion for its 
implementation at the national level in developing countries. On this basis, 
the chapter argues that the Union has merely developed a cursory concep-
tualisation of the ‘rule of law’ in the field of development cooperation.
Against this background, the chapter will then concentrate on the gen-
eral findings that follow from the exploration of the rule of law elements in 
these three categories, with a view to establishing the weight attributed to 
each one in practice. It will be claimed that, in the absence of the formal ele-
ment of legality, the EU’s understanding of the rule of law mainly revolves 
around the institutional element of judicial reform. In fact, it will be asserted 
that the EU’s institutional approach towards its rule of law definition is so 
pervasive as to have infiltrated also a number of its procedural elements. 
Having ascertained this, the chapter will continue by explaining this (seem-
ingly monolithic) approach on the basis of the practical characteristics of the 
policy area itself and the influence of the notions of good governance and 
security sector reform on the area of development cooperation. The chapter 
will conclude by addressing some issues that arise from the EU’s methodol-
ogy in this policy area. It will be shown that in relation to some of the rule 
of law elements which will be identified below, the EU relies on various lists 
of indicators compiled by other organisations. More particularly, it will be 
asserted that without clear articulation of a comprehensive rule of law defi-
nition and the underlying elements, the Union’s cherry-picking approach 
towards indicators has led to a blurring of conceptual boundaries. Thus, 
it will be demonstrated that, instead of bringing clarity, this methodology 
brings its own drawbacks in relation to the Union’s rule of law definition.
Some remarks on methodology must be provided here. The EU’s 
obligations set out in the Cotonou Agreement, the bilateral agreements, 
and the financial instruments underlying development cooperation, are 
implemented through successive programming cycles. The main output 
from the geographic and thematic programming process are multiannual 
and national country and regional programming documents in which the 
priority sectors and areas for EU support and the related financial alloca-
tions available for each partner country or region are identified. In these, the 
particular country’s/region’s needs and constraints are described,5 while 
making sure that EU support is in line with the EU’s policies as established 
5 From the most recent programming instructions see the Instructions for the Program-
ming of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI) 2014-2020 of 15 May 2012, issued by the European External Action Ser-
vice and the European Commission’s EuropeAid.
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in the European Consensus on Development6 and the Agenda for Change,7 
and their successor, the New European Consensus on Development.8
For the purpose of this thesis, i.e. the examination of the external policy 
area of development cooperation in order to extract the EU’s rule of law 
conceptualisation from the EU’s legal and strategic framework regarding 
this policy area and its practice, the way in which the European Develop-
ment Fund (EDF) and the financial instruments such as the Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI)9 and the European Instrument for Democ-
racy & Human Rights (EIDHR)10 are implemented at the regional and 
national levels through the programming cycles, is relevant for the follow-
ing two reasons. First, the streamlined programming procedure of allocation 
of funds as outlined in the legal framework,11 as well as the complementary 
internationally agreed to international aid effectiveness agenda,12 men-
tioned further below, means that the margin of discretion of the Commis-
sion in the implementation of the instruments is largely reduced.13 As a 
consequence, the policy guidelines are usually directly translated through 
the various programming steps into the multiannual and annual planning 
programmes, and should provide, in particular, measurable objectives and 
benchmarks. Accordingly, as these programme documents contain evidence 
of what is understood by the rule of law in the EU’s practice in the field of 
development cooperation, these necessarily need to be taken into account.
Secondly, it may be argued that the determination in terms of procedure 
and, particularly, substance, reduces the scope of influence of the beneficiary 
countries, giving credence to the fact that the implementation of aid is done 
on the basis of EU driven conceptualisations of the underlying principles of 
6 Joint statement of the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Mem-
ber States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on 
European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’, OJ [2006] C46/1.
7 Commission Communication on Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an 
Agenda for Change, COM(2011) 637 fi nal, 13 October 2011.
8 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Mem-
ber States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission 
‘The New European Consensus on Development – Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’ 
OJ[2017] C210/1.
9 Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing a fi nancing instrument for development cooperation for the period 
2014-2020, OJ[2014] L77/44.
10 Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2014 establishing a fi nancing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide, 
OJ[2014] L77/85.
11 In general, programming takes place in three steps. To start the process, the Commission 
draws up a country or regional strategy paper (Article 11(2) DCI) followed by multian-
nual indicative programmes for geographic programmes and/or thematic programmes.
12 The Commission’s implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda is guided, to a large 
extent, by the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 6 of 2007 on the effective-
ness of technical assistance in the context of capacity development.
13 Martina Spernbauer EU Peacebuilding in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Legality and Accountability 
The Hague: Brill (2014), p. 149.
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human rights protection, democracy, and the rule of law. As the literature 
points out, the involvement of beneficiary countries in the programming 
and implementation levels amounts to little more than an attempt at pro-
viding a procedural framework for their involvement; it certainly does not 
lead to participatory rights.14 Even though local-ownership is highlighted 
in both the international15 and EU16 development frameworks, this has 
often been attacked for being donor-driven,17 and there is evidence that 
EU policy priorities supersede those of the beneficiary countries.18 Further-
more, whereas programming documents for geographic programmes under 
the DCI ‘shall be based, to the extent possible, on a dialogue between the 
Union, the Member States and the partner country or region concerned’ the 
parameters for such a relationship are not specified in the instrument.19 It is 
the Commission that shall ‘provide a coherent framework for development 
cooperation between the Union and [a] partner country or region’ since it 
alone draws up and adopts the country strategy papers,20 and there is no 
prior process of formal approval by the beneficiary country. Cooperation 
under the EIDHR is even more one-sided, as ‘[s]trategy paper shall set out 
the Union’s strategy for its assistance … based on the Union’s priorities’.21 
Accordingly, and for the reasons outlined above, this thesis will rely on the 
legal and strategic frameworks as well as these programming documents in 
order to extricate the EU’s definition of the rule of law in its development 
cooperation.
14 Alisa Herrero, Anna Knoll, Cecilia Gregersen & Willy Kokolo ‘Implementing the Agenda 
for Change. An Independent Analysis of the 11th EDF Programming’ European Centre 
for Development Policy Management Discussion Paper, No. 180 (2015), pp. 7-8; Spernbauer 
(2014), p. 150.
15 See, for example, the OECD’s Busan Partnership for effective development cooperation 
of 2011, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf.
16 Commission Communication on Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an 
Agenda for Change, COM(2011) 637 fi nal, 13 October 2011, p. 5.
17 See the work of Hartman, Buiter, and Easterly. Simon Hartmann ‘The (Conceptual) Flaws 
of the new EU Development Agenda from a Political Economy Perspective, or Why 
Change is Problematic for a Donor Drive Development Policy’ ÖFSE Working Paper No. 
35 (2012); Simon Hartmann ‘Good Governance and Ownership: A Mismatch in the New 
EU Development Policy Agenda’ ÖFSE Policy Note No 3 (2012); Willem Buiter ‘Country 
Ownership: A Term Whose Time has Gone Out’ Development in Practice (2004) 17, pp. 
647-652; William Easterly ‘The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in 
Foreign Aid’ Journal of Policy reform (2002) 5, pp. 223-250.
18 Herrero et al. (2015), p. xiii.
19 Article 11(1) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
20 Article 11(2) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
21 Article 5(1) Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
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2. The rule of law and its relation to EU development cooperation: 
EU policy and the toolbox for rule of law promotion
Before delving into the case study, it is imperative to clearly elucidate the 
relationship between the rule of law and the EU’s development cooperation 
policy and the legal and practical framework within which this association 
is shaped. Therefore, by way of introduction to the subject matter, this 
section will provide the background against which the examination of the 
EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in this particular external policy 
area will take place. It will be demonstrated that the EU’s policy of develop-
ment cooperation takes place within an international framework shaped in 
particular by the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). It will be shown that this interna-
tional framework not only establishes goals and sets out guidelines through 
which it influences development policies of donors, and thus also of the EU, 
it also acknowledges the necessity of the rule of law for development. More 
particularly, it will be demonstrated that this perception on the role of the 
rule of law for development cooperation has trickled down to the Union’s 
own policy level. Following this, the focus will turn to the rule of law in the 
EU development cooperation’s legal framework. From this perspective, the 
EU’s most prominent cooperation framework, the Cotonou Agreement, will 
be examined, followed by the various other treaties and financial instru-
ments through which the rule of law is advanced. It will be asserted that the 
promotion of the rule of law, through cooperation activities with the aim of 
strengthening and consolidation the notion, has come to occupy a central 
place as both an objective and condition of EU development cooperation. 
This overview of the legal ‘toolbox’ the EU has at its disposal for the rule 
of law is necessary in order to facilitate the reader’s understanding of the 
analysis and discussion of the Union’s conceptualisation of the rule of law 
in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter.
2.1 The policy framework
As with any international donor organisation, the EU’s development coop-
eration policy takes place within the broad confines of the criteria for official 
development assistance established by the Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) of the OECD,22 and of what has been agreed to within the UN 
22 The DAC has established criteria for offi cial development aid in order to be able to moni-
tor the aid fl ows across the world. For the Financial period 2014-2020, the EU’s aim is to 
ensure that at least 90% of its overall external assistance be counted as offi cial develop-
ment aid (ODA). See Article 1(3) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on 
the implementation of the 11th EDF Development Fund.




development agenda:23 the Millennium Declaration with the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs)24 that expired at the end of 2015,25 and its 
follow-up, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs).26 The rule of law is introduced in both 
the Millennium Declaration and in the 2030 Agenda as a prerequisite for 
sustainable development including economic growth and the eradication 
and poverty.27 Indeed, it is recognised that it is necessary ‘to build peaceful, 
just and inclusive societies that provide equal access to justice and that are 
based on respect for human rights (including the right to development), 
23 For the EU position in the build-up to the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development see Commission Communication on A decent life for all: ending poverty 
and giving the world a sustainable future, COM(2013) 92 fi nal, 27 February 2013; Coun-
cil Conclusions ‘The Overarching post-2015 Agenda’, General Affairs Council, Doc. 
11559/13, 25 June 2013; Council Conclusions ‘Financing poverty eradication and sus-
tainable development beyond 2015’, Foreign Affairs Doc. 17553/13, 12 December 2013; 
Commission Communication on A decent life for all: from vision to collective action’, 
COM(2014) 335, 2 June 2014; Council Conclusions ‘A transformative post-2015 Agenda’, 
Doc. 16827/14, 16 December 2014; Commission Communication on A global partnership 
for poverty eradication and sustainable development after 2015, COM(2015) 44 fi nal, 
5 February 2015; Council Conclusions ‘A new global partnership for poverty eradication 
and sustainable development after 2015’, Doc. 9241/15, 26 May 2015.
24 General Assembly Resolution 55/2 ‘UN Millennium Declaration’, A/55/L.2, 8 Septem-
ber 2000.
25 For a critical examination of the EU’s contribution to the MDGs, see for example Mirjam 
van Reisen (ed) ‘The EU’s Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals. Poverty 
Eradication: From Rhetoric to Results?’ Alliance2015 (2008).
26 General Assembly Resolution 70/1 ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development’, A/70/L.1, 25 September 2015. It should be noted that the 2030 
Agenda is accompanied by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda which sets out the global 
framework for fi nancing development post-2015 (General Assembly Resolution 69/313 
‘Addis Ababa Action Agenda global framework for fi nancing development post-2015’, 
A/69/L.82, 27 July 2015) and complemented by the Sendai Framework on Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (General Assembly Resolution 69/283 ‘Sendai Framework 
on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030’, A/69/L.67, 3 June 2015) and the legally binding 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change (UNTS Regist. No. I-54113, 12 December 2015).
27 UN Millennium Declaration, pnts. 9 and 24; 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
pnts. 8 and 9. It has been much criticised that, in contrast to the Millennium Declaration, 
the eight MDGs do not refer to the rule of law. This has, to some extent, been amended 
by the SDGs. The 16th goal is to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable 
development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclu-
sive institutions at all levels.’ Within this broad goal, target 16.3 is to ‘promote the rule 
of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all.’ 
While the inclusion of the rule of law in the Development Goals is deemed to be a step 
forward, the formulation of this 16th goal in relation to the target seems to be contradic-
tory, since it places the rule of law and access to justice the wrong way around. From a 
conceptual perspective, access to justice is the narrower concept, the promotion of which 
can contribute to the overall strengthening of the broader concept of the rule of law. For 
further criticism see Julinda Beqiraj & Lawrence McNamara ‘The Rule of Law and Access 
to Justice in the post-2015 Development Agenda’ Bingham Centre Working Paper No. 4 
(2014); United Nations Development program ‘Rule of Law and Development – Integrat-
ing the Rule of Law in the post-2015 Development Framework, Issue brief (2013).
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on effective rule of law and good governance at all levels and on transpar-
ent, effective and accountable institutions.’28 This international framework 
influences the broader composition EU’s development cooperation policy 
in general. While the EU itself is not a member of the UN,29 all its Member 
States are, and the two organisations have a close working relationship.30 
As the EU’s High Representative Mogherini declared at a Security Council 
meeting on 9 May 2017, ‘[t]he European way is also the United Nations’ 
way. This explains why all our actions, all our initiatives are always taken 
in full coordination and partnership with the UN.’31 The EU has firmly 
anchored its own development policy to Agenda 2030; the June 2017 New 
European Consensus on Development is the Union’s response to the 2030 
Agenda and frames its implementation for the EU and its Member States.32 
Thus, irrespective of the voluntary character of the 2030 Agenda, the EU has 
adopted a blueprint which aligns its development policy with the broader 
international framework. More particularly, the international framework 
has implications for the allocation of aid,33 such as a commitment to the 
use of specific indicators, and principles such as the promotion of national 
ownership, and a result-oriented focus. Accordingly, the international aid 
28 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, pnt. 35.
29 Regulated by Resolution A/65/276, the EU’s participation in the work of the UN has 
been upgraded in 2011 from observer status to observer with enhanced status on the 
basis of which the Union is allowed to present common positions, make interventions, 
present proposals and participate in the general debate each September. General Assem-
bly Resolution 65/276 ‘Participation of the European Union in the work of the United 
Nations’, A/65/L.64/Rev.1, 3 May 2011.
30 The 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy espouses 
the EU’s commitment to supporting the work of the UN: ‘Guided by the values on which 
it is founded, the EU is committed to a global order based on international law, includ-
ing the principles of the UN Charter… This commitment translates into an aspiration to 
transform rather than simply preserve the existing system. The EU will strive for a strong 
UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinat-
ed responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors.’ 
For more specifi c cooperation goals for the period September 2017 – September 2018 see 
the ‘EU priorities at the United Nations and the 72nd United Nations General Assembly’ 
adopted by the Council on 17 July 2017, Doc. 11332/17.
31 Statement by High Representative Frederica Mogherini at the United Nations Security 
Council: Cooperation between the UN and the EU, 9 May 2017, available at: http://eu-
un.europa.eu/statement-hrvp-mogherini-united-nations-security-council-cooperation-
un-eu/.
32 New European Consensus on Development ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’ (2017).
33 The OECD Paris Declaration of 2005, followed by the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 
and the Busan Partnership for effective development cooperation of 2012, and the follow-
up Addis Ababa Action Agenda of 2015 provide the blueprint for both the strengthening 
of the delivery of assistance by donors as well as improving the utilisation of assistance 
by partner countries.
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effectiveness agenda establishes the global framework for the delivery of 
assistance to which the European Union must also subscribe.34
At the level of EU Treaty law, the rule of law has been closely linked to 
development cooperation since the inclusion of the policy35 in the Treaty 
with the Maastricht revision.36 First as an objective of development coopera-
tion mentioned in the Treaty Article on the policy itself (Article 177(2) EC; ex 
130u EEC), subsequently, since the Lisbon Treaty, as a horizontal objective 
of the whole of the EU’s external action, including development (Article 21 
TEU). In the EU’s policy framework the significance of the rule of law, not 
only as an objective but also as a condition for development cooperation, 
can be traced far back to early concerns over grave infringements of human 
rights. Fuelled by the persistent occurrences of human rights violations both 
internally (the authoritarian regimes in Greece, Spain, and Portugal), and in 
the wider world,37 human rights and democracy considerations gradually 
became elements of the EU’s external policy.38 As practice showed that EU 
assistance did not lead to the desired results in a number of developing 
34 The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, endorsed in November 
2011 by the development partners attending the fourth high-level forum on aid effective-
ness, sets a set of common principles for achieving the following four goals: ownership of 
development priorities by developing countries; focus on results; inclusive development 
partnerships; transparency and accountability.
35 Article 4(4) TFEU specifi es the competence of the EU to take measures in the fi eld of 
development cooperation. It is a parallel competence that does not affect the ability of 
the Member States to implement their own cooperation policies. Nonetheless, Article 210 
TFEU obligates both parties to coordinate their policies.
36 Prior to the Treaty of Maastricht, development cooperation activities were based on 
Article 308 EC (ex Article 235 EEC; now Article 352 TFEU) as the policy developed as a 
by-product of the EU’s two other express external policies, i.e. the common commercial 
policy and association, and as a supplement to the development cooperation policies of 
the Member States. See Article 1 of the Implementing Convention on the Association of 
the Overseas Countries and Territories with the Community, 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS 
3. For an analysis of the Court’s case law delineating development from the other two 
policy areas see for example Marise Cremona ‘External Relations and External Compe-
tence: The Emergence of Integrated Policy’ in Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca (eds) The 
Evolution of EU Law Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 217-268; Morten Broberg 
& Rass Holdgaard ‘EU External Action in the Field of Development Cooperation Policy’ 
6 Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (2014).
37 As an example, in the 70s, aid to Uganda on the basis of Lomé I was suspended in the 
basis of human rights violations committed by the government of Idi Amin. In legal 
terms, this suspension was problematic, considering the already promised development 
aid, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the lack of a suspension clause in the agree-
ment. All aid was scrutinised by the Commission, but a substantial amount was to con-
tinue to fl ow provided it was used to benefi t the needs of the population, not that of the 
government. However, trade relations continued and payments under the STABEX funds 
were made. See Elena Fierro The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (2003), pp. 43-47.
38 By way of comparison, see the Council’s 1975 statement on political cooperation in which 
the Member States observed that, while EU assistance was predicated on the existence 
of a democratic government, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
states would be observed.
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countries in political turmoil with dire human rights records,39 conditional-
ity was introduced in development cooperation policy by linking human 
rights concerns to aid.40 After de facto application in practice, this idea was 
introduced at the policy level in a 1986 ‘Statement on human rights’ by the 
EU Foreign Ministers who stated that:
Expressions of concern at violations of such rights cannot be considered inter-
ference in the domestic affairs of a State … Respect for human rights is an impor-
tant element in relations between third countries and the Europe of the Twelve 
… The Foreign Ministers affirm that in the development of their relations with 
non-member States as well as in the administration of aid the European Commu-
nity and its Member States will continue to promote fundamental rights so that 
individuals and peoples will actually enjoy to the full their economic, social and 
cultural rights and their civil and political rights.41
An examination of various statements, Council resolutions and Commis-
sion communications shows that almost simultaneously with concerns 
regarding human rights, respect for democracy and the rule of law were 
introduced. Accordingly, the 1991 Commission Communication on human 
rights, democracy and development cooperation policy discusses the rule 
of law, albeit under the heading of the objective of human rights protection. 
‘Where relations with developing countries are concerned, the Community 
will give priority to fundamental human rights … The rule of law, which 
requires that governments guarantee the enjoyment of human rights, 
primarily through an independent judiciary, is a particularly significant 
39 As pointed out in a number of EU declarations in the fi rst half of the 90s, for example the 
European Council’s ‘Declaration on Human Rights’ (Annex V of the Presidency Conclu-
sions, European Council Luxembourg, 28-29 June 1991) or the Resolution of the Coun-
cil and of the Member States meeting in the Council on Human rights, Democracy and 
Development of 28 November 1991. Also see Commission Communication on Human 
rights, democracy and development cooperation policy, SEC(91) 61 fi nal, 25 March 1991. 
For literature on how the EU responded to human rights violations in countries that were 
profi ting from development aid in the context of Lomé I, see generally Karin Arts ‘Imple-
menting the Right to Development. An Analysis of European Community Development 
and Human Rights Policies’ in Peter Baehr, Lalaine Sadiwa & Jacqueline Smith (eds) Year-
book on Human Rights in Developing Countries 1996 The Hague: Kluwer Law International 
(1996), pp. 37-71; Laura Garnick & Carol Cosgrove Twitchett ‘Human Rights and a Suc-
cessor to the Lomé Convention’ 6 International Relations (1979), pp. 540-557.
40 Up till the 70s, the European Community’s policy was based on the belief that develop-
ment was a precondition of respect for human rights rather than vice versa. Lorand Bar-
tels ‘The Application of Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s Trade Agreements and 
Other Trade Arrangements with Third Countries’ European Parliament Policy Department 
External Policies (2008), p. 2.
41 Statement on Human Rights by the Foreign Ministers of the European Community, meet-
ing in the framework of European political cooperation and of the Council, 21 July 1986, 
EC Bull no. 7/8, at 2.4.4. Also see the European Council ‘Declaration on Human Rights’ 
of 29 June 1991, Annex V of the Presidency Conclusions, European Council Luxembourg, 
28-29 June 1991.
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indicator.’42 Following this, the Council and the Member States, while 
stating that respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the existence of 
democratic institutions are the basis for equitable development, formulated 
concrete guidelines and procedures for an external policy based on the 
aforementioned values.43 Whereas a more extensive description is given of 
measures in relation to human rights and democracy, regarding the rule of 
law the account is rather limited. Nonetheless conditionality is introduced 
through active support for ‘the strengthening of the rule of law, including 
the strengthening of the judiciary, the administration of justice, crime pre-
vention and the treatment of offenders’, with the possibility of increased 
assistance to developing countries in which substantive positive changes 
have taken place.44
It is clear from the EU’s policy framework on development cooperation 
that this connection is further emphasised. The Commission’s Communica-
tion on development of 2000 identifies the rule of law, together with good 
governance, as one of six priority areas for activities for development aid,45 
and describes the principle as a ‘key element in ensuring social peace and 
stability as well as economic growth’46 – all essential requirements for 
development. The three subsequent strategic documents on development 
cooperation, the 2006 European Consensus on Development,47 2011 Agenda 
for Change,48 and the 2017 New European Consensus on Development49 
in which the EU has identified its prime concerns for the policy, equally 
highlight the indispensability of the rule of law.50 Indeed, according to the 
Commission in its Green Paper on ‘increasing the impact of EU develop-
ment policy’ without, amongst others, the rule of law, ‘the effect of aid pro-
grammes will have a limited effect and ensuring high impact cooperation 
will always be extremely difficult.’51
42 Commission Communication on Human rights, democracy and development coopera-
tion policy, SEC(91) 61 fi nal, 25 March 1991, p. 6.
43 Resolution of the Council and of the Member States meeting in the Council on human 
rights, democracy and development, 28 November 1991, Bull EC 11-1991, 2.3.1.
44 Ibid., para. 4.
45 Commission Communication on The European Community’s Development Policy, 
COM(2000) 212, 26 April 2000, p. 27.
46 Ibid., p. 27.
47 Joint statement of the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Mem-
ber States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on 
European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’, OJ [2006] C46/1.
48 Commission Communication on Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an 
Agenda for Change, COM(2011) 637 fi nal, 13 October 2011.
49 New European Consensus on Development ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’ (2017).
50 See for example the New European Consensus on Development (2017), p. 32; COM(2011) 
637 fi nal, p. 5.
51 European Commission Green Paper ‘EU development policy in support of inclusive 
growth and sustainable development – Increasing the impact of EU development policy’ 
COM(2010) 629 fi nal, 10 November 2010, p. 7.
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2.2 The EU’s toolbox for rule of law promotion in development 
cooperation
The EU’s toolbox for rule of law promotion in the area of development coop-
eration is broad in range and includes measures that can be of a legislative or 
non-legislative nature. The EU’s main instrument for developmental activi-
ties is the EU-ACP mixed Agreement,52 signed in 2000 in Cotonou,53 which 
forms the legal framework for relations with 79 African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific (ACP) states, including 39 of the world’s 49 least developed coun-
tries.54  The rule of law is manifest in the Agreement in a number of ways. 
First, it is one of the three essential elements of the agreement (Article 9
Cotonou),55 next to respect for human rights and democratic principles, 
with good governance as a so-called fundamental element of the Agree-
ment, the violation of which can give rise to the consultation procedure of 
Article 96 Cotonou. Secondly, the rule of law is one of the topics of political 
dialogue (Article 8 Cotonou), and, thirdly, its development and strengthen-
ing is a crosscutting issue across all areas of cooperation (Article 33(1)(c) 
Cotonou). Next to the Cotonou Agreement, development takes place on 
the basis of the full panoply of bilateral and multilateral policy framing 
52 The Cotonou agreement builds on four previous Lomé Conventions. Over the years, 
each new association agreement has widened both the number of developing countries 
covered and the scope of the EU’s cooperation with them. The fi rst Lomé Convention 
entered into force in 1975 (Lomé I Convention, OJ [1976] L25/2), the second in 1981 
(Lomé II Convention, OJ [1980] L347/1), the third 1986 (Lomé III Convention, OJ [1986] 
L86/3), and the fourth in 1990 (Lomé IV Convention, OJ [1991] L229/3. The Lomé IV 
Convention was revised and signed on Mauritius in 1995 (Lomé IVbis), OJ [1998] L156/3.
53 In contrast to the much shorter lifespan of the Lomé Conventions of fi ve years, the Coto-
nou Agreement has been concluded for 20 years. It has been revised twice, in 2005 and 
2020. Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacifi c 
Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, 
of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (Cotonou Agreement), OJ[2000] 
L317/3, revised in 2005, OJ[2005] L209/27, and 2010, OJ[2010] L287/04.
54 The wave of decolonisation of the 50s and 60s created a new geopolitical situation to 
which the then-existing regime under Part IV of the Treaty (Articles 131-136a EEC) could 
no longer apply. Arguably, the main difference between the Treaty’s provisions of Part IV 
and the international agreements was that the former regulation the Union’s relationship 
with ‘dependent’ countries, whereas the latter was negotiated between equally sovereign 
states. Morten Broberg & Rass Holdgaard ‘EU External Action in the Field of Develop-
ment Cooperation Policy’ 6 Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (2014), p. 12.
 On the relationship between the EU and its former colonies see for example Karin Arts 
Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International (2000), p. 99; Enzo Grilli The European Community and 
the Developing Countries Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1993), p. 15.
55 An essential elements clause declares the principles mentioned therein to be ‘essential 
to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the Treaty’, Article 30(3)(b) Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Vienna 23 May 1969. According to Article 
60 VCLT the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or 
purpose of the treaty constitutes a material breach that may justify the termination or 
suspension of the Treaty.
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agreements with countries and regions of Latin America, Asia, Central Asia, 
and the Middle East, as well as various forms of regional cooperation.56 
Respect for the rule of law is both an essential element and one of the aims 
of cooperation of a small number of these agreements.57
The development cooperation policy is further shaped by the European 
Development Fund (EDF) and a number of external financial assistance 
instruments, including, for the purposes of the present chapter, the Devel-
opment Cooperation Instrument (DCI),58 and the Instrument for the Pro-
motion of Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide (EIDHR).59 The EDF 
supports the implementation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and 
is the main instrument for providing support to the ACP countries. Even 
though it falls outside the remit of the EU budget, its in-country implemen-
tation is regulated by the Commission.60 According to Regulation 2015/323 
on the financial regulation applicable to the 11th EDF, budget support is pro-
vided to the ACP states in order to promote democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law, to support sustainable and inclusive economic growth and 
to eradicate poverty.61 Any decision to provide financial support shall be 
based on the budget support policies agreed to by the EU and a clear set of 
eligibility criteria. According to Article 39 of the Regulation, one of the key 
determinants of such a decision shall be an assessment of the commitment, 
record and progress of the ACP states with regard to democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law.
56 See for example Commission Communication on Barcelona Process: Union for the Medi-
terranean, COM(2008) 319 fi nal, 20 May 2008; Interregional Framework Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Southern Common Market and its Party States, of the other part (EU-MERCO-
SUR), OJ[1996] L69/4; Commission Communication on A new partnership with South 
East Asia, COM(2003) 399 fi nal, 9 July 2003. Furthermore, the EU has concluded interna-
tional agreements with countries of the Southern Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and the 
Caucasus.
57 See for example the Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the 
Republic of Chile, OJ [2002] L352/3; the Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooper-
ation between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of South Africa, of the other part, OJ [1999] L311/3; the Framework Agreement 
on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of 
the one part, and Mongolia, of the other part, OJ[2012] L134/4.
 Exceptionally, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the countries of Cen-
tral Asia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, 
include the development and/or strengthening of the rule of law as one of the aims of 
cooperation, without however, having inserted respect for the principle in the essential 
elements clause. See for example the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establish-
ing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, of the other part, OJ [1999], L229/3.
58 Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
59 Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
60 Article 3 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 
11th European Development Fund, OJ[2015]  L58/1.
61 Article 39 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 on the fi nancial regulation 
applicable to the 11th European Development Fund, OJ[2015] L58/17.
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The so-called ‘backbone’62 of financial cooperation with developing 
countries other than ACP states,63 the DCI, states in its preamble that the 
promotion of the rule of law is ‘essential for the development of partner 
countries’ and should be a mainstreaming issue in the Union’s development 
policy, particularly in programming and in agreements with partner coun-
tries.64 Accordingly, following the language of the Lisbon Treaty, next to the 
primary objective of the reduction and eradication of poverty, cooperation 
under the Regulation shall contribute to consolidating and supporting the 
rule of law, as well as democracy, human rights, good governance, and the 
relevant principles of international law.65 Furthermore, Article 5 stipulates 
that, in line with the European Consensus and the subsequent agreed modi-
fications thereto, geographic programmes of cooperation under the DCI 
shall cover, amongst others, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.66
Assistance under the EIDHR is designed to address global, regional, 
national, and local human rights, democratisation, and rule of law issues in 
partnership with civil society organisations. The Regulation’s objective of 
the ‘development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and 
of respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms’ is set within the 
framework of the European Consensus, the Agenda for Change, and the EU 
Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 
adopted by the Council on 25 June 2012.67 According to Article 2, the scope 
of assistance has essentially four aims, further divided into specific aims. 
Particularly relevant for the present purposes is the first objective,68 namely 
the enhancement of democracy and the process of democratisation, inter alia 
through the reinforcement of the rule of law, promoting the independence 
62 Commission Strategy Document for Regional Programming for Asia 2007-2013, 31 May 
2007, p. 8.
63 According to Article 1 of the DCI Regulation, geographic programmes on the basis of the 
DCI shall be aimed at developing countries that are included in the list of recipients of 
ODA, except for signatories of the EU-ACP Agreement that are eligible for EDF funding, 
and countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (Regulation (EU) No 
232/2014) or the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (Regulation (EU) No 231/2014). 
ACP countries may, however, be included under the thematic programmes, see Article 
1(1)(b) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
64 Consideration 7 Preamble Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
65 Article 2(1)(b)(ii) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014. Cf. Article 3(7) Regulation (EU) No 
233/2014.
66 Article 5(3)(a)(i) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
67 Consideration 7 Preamble Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
68 Next to the other objectives of the promotion and protection of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms as proclaimed in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
other international and regional instruments, as well as the enhancement of electoral 
processes and institutions, the third objective of the strengthening of the international 
framework for the protection of human rights, justice, gender equality, and democracy, 
also refers to the rule of law. This objective, however, is concerned with the support for 
other international and regional instruments concerning the rule of law, and is, as such, 
not relevant for the present examination of the EU’s own defi nition of the rule of law.
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of the judiciary and of the legislature, supporting and evaluating legal and 
institutional reforms and their implementation.69
3. Rule of law elements in the EU’s practice of development 
cooperation
In this part of the chapter the EU’s practice in development cooperation will 
be tested against the analytical framework on the rule of law, established in 
Part I of the thesis. In chapter 1 and 2, it was demonstrated that the element 
of legality is recognised as the core substance of the rule of law by both the 
national conceptions of the rule of law and legal theory. In order to fulfil 
the rule of law’s primary function of guiding the behaviour of citizens, and, 
thus, providing predictability and security, it was shown in chapter 2 that 
various scholars have steadily debated the qualifications for the validity of 
law, such as generality, clarity, and stability, its non-retroactive and non-
contradictory nature, as well as its promulgation. Following this, it was 
argued that legality encapsulates all those requirements that are concerned 
with the formal qualities that characterise norms; in other words, all those 
elements that are concerned with the predictability and determinacy of the 
laws themselves.
Furthermore, it was also demonstrated that next to formal elements, 
procedural elements play an important role in any definition of the rule 
of law. For, however formally virtuous laws might be, for the rule of law 
to exist, rules must be applied and enforced in a way that is procedur-
ally just.70 Thus, after it was concluded in chapter 1 on the concept in the 
three most prominent legal systems of the EU that judiciary organs have 
been tasked with safeguarding the rule of law through judicial review of 
governmental acts that are deemed unlawful, it was shown in chapter 2, 
that legal theory enriches the understanding of the rule of law element of 
judicial review to give rise to a number of related procedural rule of law 
elements, such as the principles of impartiality and fairness, and access 
to court. Furthermore, chapters 1 and 2 have one argument in common, 
namely the claim that variations in organisation of these elements can occur. 
Therefore, even though the intensity of judicial review of legislation may 
vary depending on historical, societal, and political differences, at the very 
minimum, the rule of law requires weak judicial review whereby courts 
may scrutinise legislation for conformity with human rights.71 Addition-
ally, not only the manner of application of the law was highlighted, also the 
element of enforcement of the law was brought to the fore. Consequently, 
69 Article 1(a)(ii) Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
70 See the contribution of both Jeremy Waldron ‘The Rule of Law and the Importance of 
Procedure’ and Robin West ‘The Limits of Process’ in James E. Fleming (ed) Getting to the 
Rule of Law New York: New York University Press (2011).
71 See chapter 2, section 5.
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it was argued at the end of Part I that all the aforementioned elements that 
are concerned with the impartial administration, application, and enforce-
ment of the law, are part of the category of procedural rule of law elements.
Finally, it was shown in the first chapter that a state functioning under 
the rule of law requires some form of the separation of powers accompanied 
by a system of checks and balances. From the examination of the national 
rule of law traditions, it became apparent that there are many ways through 
which the separation of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of 
government can be achieved; the form depends mostly on historical circum-
stances. Subsequently, in chapter 2, on the rule of law in legal theory, it was 
asserted that since the requirements of legality address the three different 
branches of government, it presupposes some functional separation of 
governmental powers. However, it was further asserted that legal schol-
ars have restricted their discussion almost exclusively to the position and 
role of the judicial branch, and more particularly, to the notion of judicial 
independence. Against this backdrop, it was argued at the end of Part I, 
that the third category of the analytical framework should consist of the 
institutional elements underpinning the rule of law. This section will follow 
the structure outlined in the analytical framework, therefore, section 3.1 will 
focus on formal elements, section 3.2 on procedural elements, and section 3.3 
on institutional rule of law elements.
3.1 Formal elements of the rule of law
It is the analysis of the EU’s practice in its development cooperation policy 
in relation to the principle of legality and its requirements that the present 
section is concerned with. The main argument advanced here is that, in 
contrast to legality’s pivotal position in the national and theoretical concep-
tualisations of the rule of law,72 the importance of legality for the Union’s 
definition of the rule of law is negligible. It will be argued that the analysis 
of the legal framework and of the development policy related documents 
shows the emphasis put by the EU on the procedural and institutional aspects 
of the rule of law over formal ones. To this end, the section is divided into 
three subsections. Subsection one will focus on fleshing out the definition 
of the rule of law in the specific context of the Cotonou Partnership Agree-
ment and the place of legality therein. Since, as shown in the introductory 
chapter, the Cotonou Agreement is the most elaborate and advanced legal 
framework of the EU’s development cooperation policy, it is a fitting start to 
the analysis. It will be shown that the definition of the rule of law provided 
in the Agreement, and in the EU’s explanatory documents thereof, is partial 
to conceptual confusion and neglect. More particularly, the Agreement 
72 One only needs to recall Fuller’s and Raz’s extensive exposés on the matter, as analysed 
in chapter 2.
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accords legality very little importance. Subsection two will then proceed 
by testing the emerging picture against the broader legal framework of 
development cooperation. The argument is that this framework confirms 
the ACP’s preference for a rule of law definition in terms of procedural and 
institutional elements and that the principle of legality appears to be largely 
absent. Subsection three tests this tentative conclusion against the bench-
marks relating to the rule of law at the programming level. This analysis 
confirms that on the one hand, a transparent legal framework is deemed to 
be an important aspect underlying the rule of law. However, on the other 
hand, the benchmarks indicate that the EU’s cooperation programmes are 
confronted with situations in which general as well as more specific laws 
are absent. Development aid is thus primarily concerned with the primary 
step of the adoption of laws rather than with the specific requirements per-
taining to the quality of laws.
3.1.1 The lack of legality in the definition of the rule of law as an essential element 
in the Cotonou Agreement
The EU’s main legal framework for development cooperation, the Cotonou 
Agreement,73 places the rule of law at the centre of cooperation by including 
the notion as one of the three essential element of the agreement.74 In addi-
tion to this, it also sets up a detailed process of political dialogue around the 
essential elements.75 The purpose of the dialogue is two-fold; on the one 
hand it is to pre-empt situations in which a party to the agreement might 
deem it justified to activate the non-execution clause,76 on the other hand 
the dialogue is meant to facilitate the joint development and assessment 
of ‘specific benchmarks or targets with regard to human rights, democratic 
principles and the rule of law within the parameters of internationally 
agreed standards and norms.’77 Annex VII of the Agreement, setting out 
the objectives and procedures of the Dialogue, provides no further defini-
tion of the rule of law, leaving the question open which rule of law related 
‘internationally agreed standards and norms’ should be taken into account. 
The list of Conventions mentioned in the Preamble provides no help on the 
73 Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, 
of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (Cotonou Agreement), OJ[2000] 
L317/3, revised in 2005, OJ[2005] L209/27, and 2010, OJ[2010] L287/04.
74 Article 9 Cotonou Agreement.
75 See Article 8 and Annex VII Cotonou Agreement.
76 Article 96 Cotonou Agreement.
77 Articles 8(4) and 2(2) Annex VII Cotonou Agreement.
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topic either.78 Whereas these Conventions quite clearly give the framework 
for human rights, only a few of them make references to the rule of law, and 
none of them provide a standard or definition. Moreover, reporting on these 
political dialogues is not public and information and research on its content 
is limited – particularly in the case of the rule of law.79 Thus, the issue of the 
EU’s definition of the rule of law applicable to the political dialogue with 
the ACP countries remains, in the words of a study requested on the topic 
by the European Parliament, ‘somewhat of a black box.’80
Some limited guidance can be found in the essential elements clause 
itself and some further Articles in the EU-ACP Agreement.81 Article 9 states 
that: ‘The structure of government and the prerogatives of the different 
powers shall be founded on rule of law, which shall entail in particular 
effective and accessible means of legal redress, an independent legal system 
guaranteeing equality before the law and an executive that is fully subject 
to the law.’ In this formulation it is not difficult to recognise such procedural 
rule of law elements as accessible justice and more institutional elements 
like the separation of powers in combination with judicial independence. 
This procedural and institutional approach towards the rule of law is rein-
forced further on in the Agreement. According to the cross-cutting theme 
of institutional development and capacity building, cooperation should 
78 The 7th and 8th consideration of the Preamble provide and overview of the following 
Conventions: the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the conclusions of the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, the Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Dis-
crimination against Women, the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms 
of Racial Discrimination, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the other instruments of 
international humanitarian law, the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless 
persons, the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
New York Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights.
79 The existing studies in this context focus mainly on the promotion of human rights. See 
for example Jean Bossuyt, Camilla Rocca & Brecht Lein ‘Political Dialogue on Human 
Rights under Article 8 of the Cotonou Convention’ study requested by the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Development, EXPO/B/DEVE/2013/31 (2014); Clara Por-
tela ‘Political Dialogue and Human Right in the Framework of the Cotonou Agreement’ 
Research Collection School of Social Sciences (2007); Jan Wouters et al. ‘EU Human Rights 
Dialogues – Current Situation, Outstanding Issues and Resources’ Leuven Centre for Glo-
bal Governance Studies, policy brief No. 1 (2007).
80 Bossuyt, Rocca & Lein (2014), p. 17. The European Parliament has, on more than one 
occasion, called for ‘specifi c quantifi able indices and benchmarks in order to measure the 
effectiveness’ of political dialogues in order to ‘avoid any repeated failures’. European 
Parliament resolution on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2009 and the 
European Union’s policy in the matter, (2010/2202(INI)), 16 December 2010, paras. 21, 58.
81 The European Parliament has called for more clarity on the standards applicable in essen-
tial elements clauses, see, for example, European Parliament resolution on the human 
rights and democracy clause in European Union agreements (2005/2057(INI)), 14 Febru-
ary 2006, pnt. 12.
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pay systematic attention to institutional aspects and in this context, ‘shall 
support the effort of the ACP States to develop and strengthen structures, 
institutions, and procedures’ that help to ‘develop and strengthen the rule 
of law; and improve access to justice, while guaranteeing the professional-
ism and independence of judicial systems.’82 It is clear that the rule of law in 
the context of the agreement leans heavily towards the separation of powers 
and is geared towards the proper functioning and accessibility of the legal 
system, without considerations for requirements concerning the validity of 
law itself. Evidently, what seems to be lacking from these definitions of the 
rule of law provided in the Cotonou Agreement is a reference to legality; the 
formal element of the rule of law that concerns the quality of norms.83
The lack of formal rule of law elements in the Cotonou Agreement’s 
legal framework is also evident in the Commission’s single Communication 
specifically related to the EU-ACP relations and the rule of law.84 Aimed 
at creating a ‘shared, practical and operational understanding’85 of the 
elements of the essential elements clause,86 including the rule of law, the 
Communication refrained from providing a list of internationally agreed 
standards the EU could commit to. Instead, the following definition of the 
rule of law is provided:
The primacy of the law is a fundamental principle of any democratic system 
seeking to foster and promote rights, whether civil and political or economic, 
social and cultural. This entails means of recourse enabling individual citizens 
to defend their rights. The principle of placing limitations on the power of the 
State is best served by a representative government drawing its authority from 
the sovereignty of the people. The principle must shape the structure of the State 
and the prerogatives of the various powers.87
82 Article 33 Cotonou Agreement.
83 The argument could be made that equality before the law is of course an inherent element 
of the requirement of law’s generality, one of Fuller’s normative requirements. However, 
the focus of the defi nition of the rule of law provided in Article 9, is squarely on the insti-
tutional and procedural aspects of the rule of law – an independent court that applies the 
law equally to the citizens before it, irrespective of status or political position.
84 Commission Communication on Democratisation, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and good governance: the challenges of the partnership between the European 
Union and the ACP States, COM(1998) 146 fi nal, 12 march 1998.
85 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
86 The Communication was written in the context of the Cotonou Agreement’s precursor, 
the Lomé IVbis Convention. Since the essential elements have remained the same in the 
Cotonou Agreement and the Commission has not provided an updated Communication 
in relation to the latter Agreement, it is submitted that the Communication remains valid 
for the Cotonou Agreement’s essential elements.
87 Commission Communication on Democratisation, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and good governance: the challenges of the partnership between the European 
Union and the ACP States, COM(1998) 146 fi nal, 12 march 1998, p. 4.
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Interestingly, at first sight, this definition seems to be more about the protec-
tion of human rights and democracy or democratic representation as the 
political constellation of choice, rather than the rule of law. According to 
this definition, state power finds its limitations in democracy, instead of the 
general principle of legality through which state action is confined to what 
is prescribed by law. What it does demonstrate in relation to the rule of law, 
however, is suggestive of the same institutional approach also seen in the 
Agreement. It touches on states being able to effectively provide access to 
courts for individuals in order to defend their various rights and limitations 
of state power through the separation of power, including a system of checks 
and balances. Again, there is little to nothing on the quality of law itself.
The examples, provided in the Communication’s section on the rule 
of law and what the concept requires at a practical level, further confirm 
the Commission’s chosen approach. In relation to the rule of law, the EU’s 
development policy should provide, amongst others, an independent judi-
ciary, accessible means of judicial recourse, a prison system respecting the 
human persons within it, and a police force at the service of the law.88 None 
of these include a reference to the requirements of legality – the conditions 
for the validity of law – or even to legality in its general, positive, under-
standing, that of the requirement that law functions as a precondition for 
the exercise of any administrative power. The main focus of the examples 
provided is institutional, on the legal system in its broad sense, including the 
judiciary, the police, and prisons, as well as procedural, with the demand for 
effective access to justice.
In sum, it can be deduced from the foregoing analysis that the principle 
of legality and its requirements as the rule of law’s formal elements do not 
seem to be included in the EU’s understanding of the rule of law in the 
EU-ACP relations and in this respect the Cotonou Agreement leaves much 
to be desired. These findings give rise to two further questions: first, to 
what extent do other relevant agreements underlying the Union’s broader 
development policy and EU secondary legislation confirm this conclusion, 
and secondly, descending along the lines of the EU’s implementation of its 
development policy at regional and country level, do the related documents 
bring any clarity to this convoluted picture?
3.1.2 The lack of legality in the broader development context: confirmation 
of the emerging picture?
As mentioned previously,89 the rule of law does not put in a frequent 
appearance as an essential element of cooperation agreements. When it 
88 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
89 In section 2.2.
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does,90 it is usually also advanced as an objective of cooperation, although 
there are agreements where it is mentioned as the latter, but it is not 
included as a component of the essential elements clause.91 Examples of 
agreements where the notion is included as both an essential element and as 
an objective are, amongst others, the EC-South Africa Agreement on Trade, 
Development and Cooperation,92 the Political Dialogue and Cooperation 
Agreement with various countries in Latin America,93 and the EU-Korea 
Framework Agreement.94
Whereas guidance has been provided for the (framework of) inter-
pretation of human rights, and to a lesser extent democracy/democratic 
principles, in the essential elements clauses since the formal inception of the 
clause in 1995,95 guidance for explication of the notion rule of law in these 
clauses is far less prevalent.96 In contrast to the Cotonou Agreement with its 
elaborate essential elements clause – in fact it is the most detailed essential 
elements clause of all of the EU’s external agreements97 – the other clauses 
make mention of the rule of law without putting flesh on the notion’s bones. 
90 There is a slight dissimilarity in how the rule of law is referenced as an essential ele-
ment. Whereas the Lomé IVbis Convention and the Cotonou Agreement both empha-
sise ‘respect for the rule of law’, most other essential elements clauses make mention of 
‘respect for the principle of the rule of law’. Only in the EU-South Africa Agreement on 
Trade, Development and Cooperation ‘respect of the principles of the rule of law’ consti-
tutes an essential element of the cooperation.
91 See for example the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan. In the former, the rule of law is mentioned as an explicit objective of coopera-
tion (Article 1), while both refer to the rule of law in the title on cooperation on matters 
relating to democracy and human rights (Article 68 and 66, respectively).
92 Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European Community 
and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part, 
OJ [1999] L311/3.
93 Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and 
its Member States, of the one part, and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, of the other part, OJ [2014] L111/6.
94 Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, OJ [2013] L20/2.
95 See Commission Communication on The inclusion of respect for democratic prin-
ciples and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries, 
COM(1995) 216 fi nal, 23 May 1995 as well as Commission Communication on the Euro-
pean Union and the external dimension of human rights policy: from Rome to Maastricht 
and beyond, COM(1995) 567, 22 November 1995.
96 The Communication ‘from Rome to Maastricht and beyond’ provides the following 
meagre indication of an EU rule of law defi nition by way of priority areas of activity in 
relation to the notion: ‘promoting and consolidating the rule of law by supporting and 
strengthening the independence of the judiciary (exercise of justice, treatment of offend-
ers, crime prevention), supporting the activities of parliaments and other democratically 
elected bodies, and supporting institutional and legislative reforms.’ Commission Com-
munication on the European Union and the external dimension of human rights policy: 
from Rome to Maastricht and beyond, COM(95) 567, 22 November 1995, pnt. 34.
97 Nicolas Hachez ‘Essential Elements Clauses in EU Trade Agreements Making Trade 
Work in a Way that Helps Human Rights?’ Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
Working Paper No. 158 (2015), pp. 10-11.
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This is left to the political dialogue,98 and, to some extent at least, to the 
provisions on cooperation in the body of the agreement. Thus, the EU-Korea 
Framework Agreement mentions the rule of law in relation to its activities 
in the area of justice, freedom, and security. In their cooperation in this area, 
‘the Parties shall attach particular importance to the promotion of the rule 
of law, including the independence of the judiciary, access to justice, and 
the right to a fair trial.’99 By emphasising access to justice and judicial inde-
pendence, the agreements speak about institutional and procedural elements. 
Thus, similar to the Cotonou Agreement, the emphasis is on these elements, 
rather than on legality.
Cooperation provisions in other agreements further corroborate this 
argument. For example, the EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment, mirrors the same commitments regarding the rule of law as men-
tioned in the EU-Korea Framework Agreement, and adds that ‘[t]he Parties 
will cooperate to further develop the functioning of institutions in areas 
of law enforcement and the administration of justice including capacity 
building.’100 The EU’s Cooperation Agreement with Latin America states 
that in the field of human rights, democracy, and good governance, areas 
of cooperation will be strengthening of the rule of law and reinforcing the 
independence and efficiency of judicial systems.101
Moreover, not only is the formal element of legality absent from the 
Agreements, it is also lacking in the explanation on the rule of law pro-
vided by the EU’s development funding instruments and the EDF. Both the 
EU’s main funding instrument, the DCI, and the EDF clearly emphasise 
the importance of the rule of law for the EU’s development cooperation 
activities. Thus, under the Regulation, ‘[r]espect for human rights, funda-
mental freedoms, the promotion of the rule of law, democratic principles 
… are essential for the development of partner countries, and those issues 
should be mainstreamed in the Union’s development policy, particularly 
98 For example, see the Association Agreement with Chile in which it is stated in Article 
12(2) that: ‘The main objective of the political dialogue between the Parties is the pro-
motion, dissemination, further development and common defence of democratic values, 
such as the respect for human rights, the freedom of the individual and the principles 
of the rule of law as the foundation of a democratic society.’ Agreement establishing an 
association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Republic of Chile, of the other part, OJ [2002] L352/3.
99 Article 30 of the EU-Korea Framework Agreement, OJ [2013] L20/2.
100 Article 102 of the EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, OJ 2012] L204/20.
101 Article 8 of the EU-Latin America Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, OJ 
[2014] L111/6.
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in the programming and in agreements with partner countries.’102 In 
order to do this, consolidating and supporting the rule of law is made an 
objective of cooperation,103 specifically in geographic programmes of the 
DCI.104 In the area of cooperation of human rights, democracy, and good 
governance, the Union wishes to ensure the ‘strengthening of the rule of 
law and the independence of judicial and protection systems and ensuring 
unhindered and equal access of justice for all.’105 In the sections on specific 
areas of regional cooperation the rule of law is mentioned in combination 
with ‘well-functioning institutions’,106 the ‘transparency of the judicial 
process’,107 and ‘justice and security sector reform’,108 which means that the 
102 Consideration 7 Preamble of Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 [italics added]. Whether 
or not the rule of law is a ‘mainstreaming’ issue is contentious. According to the 2006 
Consensus on Development, building on the Commission Communication on The Euro-
pean Union’s role on promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries 
(COM(2001) 252 fi nal), some issues require a mainstreaming approach because they 
‘touch on general principles applicable to all initiatives and demand a multisectoral 
response.’ The following cross-cutting issues for mainstreaming are indicated in the Con-
sensus: the promotion of human rights, gender equality, democracy, good governance, 
children’s rights and indigenous peoples, environmental sustainability and combating 
HIV/AIDS. European Consensus in Development, pnts. 100-101. The 2006 DCI identifi ed 
the same cross-cutting issues while stating that in addition, ‘particular attention shall be 
given to strengthening the rule of law, improving access to justice and supporting civil 
society, as well as promoting dialogue, participation and reconciliation, and institution-
building.’ Obviously, this is a way to bypass the clearly exhaustive list of cross-cutting 
issues in the Consensus and to highlight the importance of the principle of the rule of law 
for development cooperation, Article 3(3) Regulation 1905/2006.
 Against this background, the revised 2014 DCI proclaims in its preamble the promotion 
of the rule of law as a cross-cutting issue that is to be mainstreamed. However, Article 3 
refers back to the cross-cutting issues as defi ned in the European Consensus, while add-
ing three other issues such as confl ict prevention and climate change. To this list of cross-
cutting issues, the Regulation then adds a number of previously unidentifi ed issues: 
‘[t]he cross-cutting issues referred to in the fi rst subparagraph shall be understood to 
encompass the following dimensions, to which specifi c attention shall be given where 
circumstances so require: non-discrimination, ... the rule of law, capacity building for 
parliaments and civil society, and the promotion of dialogue, participation and recon-
ciliation, as well as institution building, including at local and regional level.’ Article 3(3) 
Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
 On the importance of the European Consensus of Development for the scope of EU 
development cooperation see the Philippines Partnership and Cooperation Framework Agree-
ment Case. Case C-377/12 Commission v Council, EU:C:2014:1903, 11 June 2014. For com-
mentary see for example Broberg & Holdgaard (2014), pp. 43-47.
103 Article 1(2)(b)(ii) 11th EDF implementation Regulation (EU) 2015/322. Article 2(1)(ii) 
Regulation (EU) No 233/2014. Whereas more than twice as often mention is made of the 
rule of law in the revised 2014 DCI as opposed to the previous 2006 DCI, substantively, 
nothing has been added.
104 Article 5(3)(a)(i) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
105 Annex I A(I)(a)(ii) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
106 Annex I B(IV)(c) Regulation(EU) No 233/2014.
107 Annex I B(V)(a) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
108 Annex I B(III)(1)(f) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
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emphasis is again on institutional and procedural aspects of the rule of law 
rather than on formal ones.
The definition of the rule of law provided in the financing instrument 
for democracy and human rights worldwide (EIDHR) concentrates on the 
same institutional and procedural elements mentioned above, while at the 
same time slightly shifting its focus towards the rule of law’s role for the 
protection of human rights. Accordingly, the scope of the Regulation cov-
ers the strengthening of the rule of law, including the independence of the 
judiciary, access to justice, and legal and institutional reforms. However, in 
addition, it includes the independence of the legislature, as well as support 
for national human rights institutions.109 Similarly, one of the previous 
versions of the EIDHR Regulation mentions support for humane prison 
systems, for constitutional and legislative reform, and for initiatives to abol-
ish the death penalty.110
This enumeration reflects the Council’s view that the three notions of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law are mutually reinforcing,111 
and that democratic control and the separation of powers are essential to 
sustain an independent judiciary and the rule of law, which in turn are 
required for effective protection of human rights.112 None of this, however, 
influences the above discussion on the lack of legality as an element of the 
rule of law in the EU’s definition of the notion. The question that remains is 
whether, and if so to what extent, this conclusion is validated by an analy-
sis of the benchmarks the EU employs in the context of the programming 
cycles of the European Development Fund (EDF) and its funding instru-
ments, such as the DCI.
3.1.3 Legality as a benchmark in development cooperation: further confirmation 
of the lack of formal elements in the EU’s rule of law definition
What picture emerges of the formal element of the rule of law in the pro-
gramming documents related to the European Development Funds and the 
other funding instruments? A baffling one. On the one hand, in contrast to 
the above discussion, indications can be found that attest to the fact that 
some of legality’s requirements are, at least to some extent, considered to 
109 Article 2(1)(a)(ii) Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
110 Article 2(2)(a) Regulation 975/1999 of 29 April 1999 laying down the requirements for the 
implementation of development co-operation operations which contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that 
of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Interestingly, the Regulation’s 
direct precursor, Regulation 1889/2006, is much more limited in its scope regarding the 
rule of law. Thus, according to Article 2(1)(a)(ii), strengthening of the rule of law pertains 
to promoting the independence of the judiciary, encouraging and evaluating legal and 
institutional reforms, and promoting access to justice.
111 Council Conclusions ‘Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations’, 2974th External 
Relations Council, Doc. 16081/09, 18 November 2009.
112 Consideration 11 Preamble Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
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be part of the rule of law. However, on the other hand, direct references to 
legality are almost entirely absent from the examined documents used in 
the programming of country and regional development aid.
According to one of the early general frameworks for country strategy 
papers (CSPs), analysis in the CSPs should consider the political situation in 
a particular country, including information on the rule of law.113 Regarding 
the latter, a non-exhaustive list is provided including an independent and 
effective judiciary, a transparent legal framework, equality of all citizens 
before the law, police and public administration subject to the law, and 
enforcement of contractual obligations.114 In relation to the elements of the 
rule of law identified in the previous two sections, the definition under these 
instruments has been widened to include the performance of the police and 
public administration. However, a novel element has been added, that of 
a ‘transparent legal framework’. Notwithstanding the absence of further 
elaboration in the framework, it is plain that the establishment of an appro-
priate and effective legal framework is a prerequisite for an environment in 
which development aid can be effective.115 A transparent legal framework 
is characterised by clear and accessible rules and by efficient procedures 
for their application, creating predictability and openness, helping guard 
against arbitrary decisions or actions. Therefore, this element has clear 
overlap with the requirements of legality, such as clear, stable, general, and 
promulgated laws. Unfortunately, later programming guides do not include 
an analysis of this issue,116 and, thus, provide no further confirmation on 
this rule of law element.
Examination of the various reports of the programming cycles under 
the EDF and the funding instruments, such as the DCI, shows that hardly 
any attention is paid to the formal elements of the rule of law other than 
a few very general references to ‘improving the legal and regulatory 
113 Commission Staff Working Paper on Community Co-Operation: Framework for Country 
Strategy Papers, SEC(2000) 1049.
114 Ibid., p. 6.
115 See for example the Commission Green Paper on EU development policy in support of 
inclusive growth and sustainable development – Increasing the impact of EU develop-
ment policy, COM(2010) 629 fi nal, 10 November 2010, pp. 8-9; Commission Communica-
tion on A decent life for all, COM(2013) 92 fi nal, 27 February 2013, p. 13.
116 One of the few exceptions to this is the 2006 Programming Fiche on ‘Rule of law – the 
parliaments’ meant to guide strategy papers. A defi nition of the rule of law is provided, 
which includes ‘legality’ – without further explication. In the EDF context, another exam-
ple is provided by the Working document from the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assem-
bly on the ‘Respect for the Rule of Law and the Role of an Impartial and Independent 
Judiciary’ of 10 April 2013. In it, the Assembly gives its thoughts on factors infl uencing 
the respect for the rule of law and they make a reference to the World Bank and OECD 
defi nition of the rule of law: ‘Institutions such as the World Bank or the OECD identify 
a fair, impartial, and accessible justice system and a representative government as key 
elements of the rule of law: an independent, effi cient, and accessible judicial and legal 
systems, with a government that applies fair and equitable laws equally, consistently, 
coherently, and prospectively to its entire people.’ In the last sentence, some of legality’s 
requirements seem to make an appearance, even if the phrasing is a bit unclear.
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framework’.117 In many cases the discussion in the reports is more about 
the absence of laws and the need for the adoption of specific laws118 or 
their general revision,119 or revision in order to make them compatible with 
international treaties.120 In Malawi the situation was so dire that one of the 
rule of law related activities ‘responding to a major need’ was the ‘starting 
up of printing of Malawi laws’.121 In the latest round of National Indicative 
Programmes (2014-2020) relating to the 11th EDF and Multiannual Indica-
tive Programmes (2014-2020) under the DCI, there is even less.122 Moreover, 
against the background of the discussion of the notion of legality in the 
Commission Communication in relation to the essential elements of the 
Cotonou agreement in the previous section, it is noteworthy that legality 
very rarely appears in relation to the rule of law.
3.1.4 Conclusions
The picture that emerges from the analysis presented above regarding 
the principle of legality as a core element of the rule of law is perplexing. 
Whereas it was shown in chapter 1 that the concepts of the Rechtsstaat, état 
de droit and the Anglo-Saxon rule of law consider legality as their central 
element, guiding their national concept’s practical application on the qual-
ity of law and legislation, it is clear that in the EU’s rule of law definition 
in development cooperation, the formal element of legality is not included. 
117 Malawi Joint Annual Report 2008, p. 22. See also the Report from the Commission on 
The implementation of measures intended to promote observance of human rights and 
democratic principles in external relation for 1996-1999, COM(2000) 726 fi nal 14 Novem-
ber 2000, p. 12; and its 1995 counterpart Commission Report on the implementation of 
measures intended to promote observance of human rights and democratic principles 
(for 1995), COM(1996) 672 fi nal, 17 January 1996, pp. 8-9.
118 See for example the Regional Multiannual Indicative Programme of Central Asia 2014-
2020, which includes as one of the rule of law related focal areas: ‘support to develop-
ment of the legal framework: Constitutional Law and/or the Administrative Law and/or 
Criminal Law’, pp. 4-5.
119 See for example the Viet Nam Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 9.
120 See for example the Bolivia Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 3; Botswana 
Joint Annual Report 2008, p. 26; Belize Joint Annual Report 2008, p. 30; Mozambique Joint 
Annual Report 2006, p. 30; Suriname Joint Annual Report 2005, p. 7; Malawi Joint Annual 
Report 2002, pp. 37-38. See further the fi rst Action Plan (2008-2010) for the implementa-
tion of the Africa -EU Strategic Partnership, as endorsed by the Africa-EU Ministerial 
Troika, 31 October 2007, p. 11
121 Malawi Joint Annual Report 2008, p. 19. Also see the support programme for the rule of 
law in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has, amongst others, as its objective, the 
publication and distribution of major legal texts, see Commission Staff Working Docu-
ment Accompanying the Communication on ‘Governance in the European Consensus 
on Development: towards a harmonized approach with the European Union’ SEC(2006) 
1020, 30 August 2006, p. 5.
122 An example is the Bolivia Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020, in which some 
aspects of the quality of legislation are mentioned in passing in relation to the sectoral 
focus areas of justice sector reform; Bolivia Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-
2020, p. 3.
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Despite some occasional haphazard references throughout various devel-
opment policy related documents, legality, or sub-elements thereof, does 
not feature in the different agreements, reports, strategy papers, NIP’s and 
MIP’s. Instead, careful scrutiny has shown that the EU has adopted an 
interpretation of the rule of law, both in its relations with the ACP coun-
tries as well as in the broader development cooperation context, that leans 
heavily on procedural and institutional elements, such as access to justice and 
judicial independence, respectively. The next sections will continue with an 
exploration of these in relation to the EU’s definition of the rule of law in 
development cooperation.
3.2 Procedural elements of the rule of law
In the present section, the focus will be on the procedural elements of the rule 
of law. Three arguments will be presented here. First, it will be shown that 
in contrast to the weight accorded to the element of judicial review in both 
the national rule of law traditions and legal theory, in development coop-
eration this element is mostly absent. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that 
the Union has refrained from providing a blueprint on how to best organise 
judicial review, instead concentrating on the outcome of the process, i.e. 
a legislature that takes constitutional human rights into account and an 
executive bound by the law. Secondly, it will be asserted that the procedural 
element of access to court is interpreted broadly and is, thus, better caught 
by the idea of access to justice. It will be demonstrated that the centrality 
of this element in the present category is apparent from the examination 
of the strategic documents and the legal framework. However, it will be 
argued that whereas the element of accessible justice is omnipresent, the 
concomitant elements of fair trial and due process have not received similar 
attention. Thirdly, the focus will turn to the enforcement of the rule of law. 
It will be argued that the EU focuses mainly on two issues: the efficiency of 
enforcement in general, and the human rights aspects of enforcement by the 
police and in the prison system. More specifically, it will be asserted that the 
EU’s definition of this rule of law element is not advanced beyond a general 
call for improvement and compliance with human rights standards.
3.2.1 The absent element of judicial review
In chapters 1 and 2 it was established that judicial review is an essential 
element of the rule of law since it is one of the means through which abuse 
of the law by the legislative and executive branches of government can be 
prevented. More particularly, it was argued that, on the one hand, at least 
marginal judicial review of both executive action and legislation is a neces-
sary component for upholding the rule of law. On the other hand, it was 
demonstrated that the doctrine of the separation of powers sets limits to 
review of the executive, for reasons of political discretion. In relation to 
judicial review of legislation, it was asserted that the judiciary’s powers can 
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be limited due to democratic concerns – the law being an expression of the 
will of the peoples through their elected representatives. Following this, it 
was established that underlying this argumentation is an acknowledgement 
of the many different ways through which judicial review can be organised.
Against this background, it is remarkable to see that judicial review, as 
a procedural element of the EU’s definition of the rule of law in develop-
ment cooperation, has not been fleshed out in detail. Whereas the strategic 
and legal frameworks on development cooperation stress the importance 
of the existence of the judiciary, its accessibility, and, more specifically, the 
necessity of judicial independence, the role and powers of the judiciary bod-
ies seem to occupy only a very marginal space. The Cotonou Agreement 
alludes to judicial control by virtue of the fact that it mentions in its defini-
tion of the rule of law as an essential element ‘an executive that is fully 
subject to the law’.123 However, it makes no mention of any form of judicial 
review of legislation. Neither the 2014 DCI nor the EIDHR Regulation go in 
their description of the scope of rule of law cooperation beyond institutional 
reforms, judicial independence, and access to justice.124
The ‘Programming Fiche on the Rule of law – The judicial system within 
the broader justice sector context’ provides another good example of this 
approach whereby some elements pertaining to judicial review are men-
tioned, but the notion itself is left out. It gives the following definition of the 
rule of law:
The rule of law implies legality, regularity and consistency in the enforcement of 
the democratic order. It requires that the process of law-making be transparent 
and itself guided by law. All exercise of public authority must be regulated by 
and consistent with the constitution and the law. An independent judiciary to 
which all persons have free recourse must control the interpretation and applica-
tion of laws. The rule of law is violated if arbitrary decisions are taken by public 
authorities.125
From this definition, it is understood that the rule of law demands that 
law-making and the exercise of public authority are checked for their con-
sistency with the constitution and the law by the judiciary. Thus, it can be 
inferred that judicial review is a necessary requirement for the rule of law to 
be upheld. However, the triteness of the statement is telling. The definition 
supplies very little context for any deduction of how the EU understands 
judicial review to function: it provides nothing on the operation of consti-
tutional or administrative courts and it fails to present a blueprint of the 
(minimum) level of control of the constitutionality of parliamentary laws. In 
123 Article 9(2) Cotonou Agreement.
124 Cf. Annex I(A)(I) of Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 and Article 2(1)(a)(ii) of Regulation 
(EU) No 235/2014.
125 Programming Guide for Strategy Papers, Programming Fiche on Rule of Law – The judi-
cial system within the broader justice sector context (2009), p. 1.
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fact, it can be questioned whether the EU has even considered the procedural 
workings of this aspect of the rule of law at all. In the same paragraph in 
the Programming Fiche there is an attempt to make the rule of law more 
‘operational’, by providing the elements a country must possess when it 
‘operates under the rule of law’:
[A] legislature that enacts laws which respect the constitution and human rights; 
and independent judiciary; effective and accessible legal services; a legal system 
guaranteeing equality before the law; a prison system respecting human dignity; 
a police force at the service of the law; an effective executive which is capable of 
enforcing the law and establishing the social and economic conditions necessary 
for life in society, and which is itself subject to the law.126
Whereas these elements are undoubtedly valid components of any rule of 
law definition, they are mostly portrayed as separate building blocks; the 
focus is on each of these elements separately. However, for the rule of law 
to be truly operational, it would not be beyond expectation to assume that 
attention must be paid to such elements as judicial review, which function 
at the interplay between these separate elements. Needless to say, for the 
rule of law to function, a country needs to possess a legislature, which 
respects the constitution and human rights. However, it also needs to have 
a judiciary capable of controlling, and thereby ensuring, that the legislature 
adheres to this commandment. Similarly, the executive should be subject to 
the law, for it is this that prevents the abuse of power. However, the scrutiny 
of these restraints falls to the judiciary. Moreover, demanding judiciary 
independence will not achieve the automatic effect of effective judicial 
review, as both are very different issues, requiring a different approach. 
Nonetheless, this is informative of the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of 
law in that it suggests that the Union has adopted an approach whereby it 
has drawn up a (non-exhaustive) list of separate rule of law components, 
while, at the same time, mainly focussing on institutional (i.e. an indepen-
dent judiciary and a competent police force) and some procedural (i.e. access 
to justice) elements.
Interestingly, this approach whereby the focus is on separate elements 
is also reflected in practice. None of the reports or indicative programmes 
discuss judicial review per se. Some elements are mentioned, whereby 
the main focus is on reforming the Constitution in order to comply with 
international human rights standards, such as in the most recent Bolivia 
Multiannual Indicative Programme.127 In contrast to the appeal made in the 
aforementioned Programming Fiche on the rule of law, which states that the 
EU’s response strategy ‘should approach the reforms in the judicial system 
in a holistic way’, it appears that a compartmentalised, element-specific, 
126 Programming Fiche on Rule of Law – The judicial system within the broader justice sec-
tor context (2009), p. 1.
127 Bolivia Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 3.
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approach is applied in practice. This means that the so-called silo-effect,128 
whereby there is a lack of cross-sectoral synergy and support, even applies 
within a sector, namely the sector of rule of law reform. Instead of focussing 
on the judiciary’s function in relation to the rule of law, i.e. judicial review, 
the separate elements, as outlined above, are addressed.
This approach is exacerbated by the institutional lens through which 
most rule of law strengthening efforts are regarded. For example, in its 
analysis of the judicial sector in South Sudan, the Action Fiche provides a 
description of the various applicable laws to the sector, as well as an over-
view of the arrangement of the judicial sector, referring to such elements 
as the three-tiered court system, the lack of resources, infrastructure and 
trained judges.129 Apart from the element of access to justice, discussed 
hereafter, the functioning (other than in terms of effectiveness/case backlog) 
and role of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law are not fleshed out at 
all. Other reports and strategy papers reflect a similar pattern.130 Already 
briefly touched upon, the focus will next turn to the procedural element of 
access to justice.
3.2.2 The omnipresent element of access to justice
3.2.2.1 The EU’s broad interpretation of access to justice
On the basis of the examination of the policy documents underlying the 
various aspects of the EU’s development cooperation the conclusion must 
be drawn that the element of access to justice is widely mentioned. From 
the 1998 Commission Communication on the definition of the rule of law 
in the context of the ACP countries131 already mentioned in section 3.1, to 
the European Parliament’s Resolution on the post-2015 development frame-
work132 and the Council Conclusions on the same topic,133 all highlight the 
128 The ‘silo-effect’ is a long-recognised problem in, inter alia, the fi eld of development coop-
eration whereby reform efforts are approach in a sectoral manner without regard for 
possible synergies with other sectors. The EU has acknowledged the risks and problems 
associated with the silo-effect in its development cooperation policy, see for example the 
Action Fiche for Strengthening the Rule of Law, Access to Justice and Democratic Gov-
ernance in South Sudan (2013), p. 5. For an analysis in relation to the UNDP see Joao 
Sobreiro Sigora, Corina Nassif Avellar & Cristal Carneiro Ribeiro (eds) International Empo-
werment in the International Legal System: Towards Development through Freedom Brasilia: Art 
Letras (2012), pp. 43-44.
129 Action Fiche for Strengthening the Rule of Law, Access to Justice and Democratic Gover-
nance in South Sudan (2013), pp. 3-4.
130 Possible explanations for this approach will be discussed in the General fi ndings in sec-
tion 4.
131 Commission Communication on Democratisation, the Rule of Law, Respect for Human 
Rights and Good Governance: The Challenges of the Partnership between the European 
Union and the ACP States, COM(98) 146 fi nal, 12 March 1998.
132 European Parliament Resolution on the EU and the global development framework after 
2015, (2014/2143(INI)), 17 November 2014, pnt. 29.
133 Council Conclusions ‘A new global partnership for poverty eradication and sustainable 
development after 2015’, Doc. 9241/15, 26 May 2015.
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importance of accessible means of legal redress. It is mentioned in various 
development related contexts such as governance134 and sustainable change 
in transitional societies.135 This emphasis can be explained by the EU’s con-
comitant external objective of human rights protection. For, access to justice 
offers as its main purpose ‘means of recourse enabling individual citizens to 
defend their rights’136 in conjunction with the emancipation of marginalised 
and vulnerable groups such as women, children, and minorities.137
It is noteworthy that the EU emphasises the broad understanding of 
‘access to justice’ over mere ‘access to court’. Indeed, the statements stress 
the importance of individuals’ right to legal recourse to both state and non-
state institutions; to the legal institutions, but also to more traditional and 
religious justice systems. Indeed, at the strategic level, there are copious 
references to ‘access to justice’,138 in various forms: ‘effective and accessible 
means of legal recourse’,139 ‘effective access to legal redress’,140 ‘access 
for all to an independent justice system’,141 or ‘better access for citizens to 
security and justice services’.142 In fact, access to justice has risen to such 
prominence that it has become a focal point of the international commu-
nity’s agenda on development for the coming years: the UN 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development identifies ‘access to justice for all’ as one of 
134 See for example Commission Staff Working Paper on Supporting Democratic Gover-
nance through the Governance Initiative: A Review and the Way Forward, SEC(2009) 58, 
19 January 2009, pp. 3-4; Commission Communication on Governance in the European 
Consensus on Development – Towards a Harmonised Approach within the European 
Union, COM(2006) 421 fi nal, 30 October 2006, p. 5.
135 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative on EU Support for 
Sustainable Change in Transition Societies, JOIN(2012) 27 fi nal, 3 October 2012, p. 5.
136 Commission Communication on Democratisation, the Rule of Law, Respect for 
Human Rights and Good Governance: The Challenges of the Partnership between 
the European Union and the ACP States, COM(98) 146 final, 12 March 1998, p. 4. 
The same reasoning is acknowledged in the EIDHR Communications, which fre-
quently state that an accessible independent judiciary and the rule of law are 
required for effective protection of human rights. See Commission Communica-
tion on Thematic Programme for the Promotion of democracy and human rights 
worldwide under the future Financial Perspectives (2007-2013), COM(2006) 23, 25 
January 2006, p. 4; Commission Communication on The implementation of mea-
sures intended to promote observance of human rights and democratic principles 
in external relations for 1996-1999, COM(2000) 726 final, 14 November 2000, p. 12.
137 See for example the Annual Action Plan 2015 and the attached Action Document for 
strengthening government capacities for sustainable development in Afghanistan, p. 11.
138 See for example the European Consensus on Development (2006), pnt 86.
139 Commission Communication on Democratisation, the Rule of Law, Respect for Human 
Rights and Good Governance: The Challenges of the Partnership between the European 
Union and the ACP States, COM(98) 146 fi nal, 12 March 1998, p. 4.
140 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication on Gover-
nance in the European Consensus on Development, SEC(2006) 1020, p. 5.
141 Commission Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Develop-
ment – Towards a harmonized approach within the European Union, COM(2006) 421 
fi nal, 30 August 2006, p. 5.
142 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative on EU support for 
sustainable change in transition societies, JOIN(2012) 27 fi nal, 3 October 2012, pp. 7-8.
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its development goals for the coming decades.143 Also at the EU level, next 
to its inclusion in the New European Consensus on Development,144 the 
Council has recognised its particular importance and called it an ‘essential 
means of implementation of the [UN] agenda and an important objective 
in itself.’145 Moreover, access to justice has particularly come to the fore as 
a corollary of the EU’s recent introduction of the so-called ‘rights based 
approach’ to development, through which the Union strengthens its efforts 
to assist its partner countries in implementing their human rights obliga-
tions.146 This means, ‘promoting in particular the right to universal and 
non-discriminatory access to basic services …justice and the rule of law, and 
with a focus on poor and vulnerable groups.’147 However, it is interesting to 
note that with this heightened attention for access to justice, a concomitant 
stressing of the rule of law related issue of a fair trial has not materialised 
with the same level of intensity. Scattered references to ‘fair judgements’148 
143 See Sustainable Development Goal No. 16.3.
144 New European Consensus on Development (2017), pnt. 63.
145 Council Conclusions ‘A new global partnership for poverty eradication and sustainable 
development after 2015’, pnt. 11.
146 In a ‘Tool-Box’ explaining the rights based approach in more detail, the Commission has 
highlighted that the intrinsic rationale behind the approach ‘is to move development 
cooperation beyond voluntary cooperation and into the mandatory realm of law.’ Ideally, 
according to the same document, this means that justice reform programmes avoid focus-
sing exclusively on capacity-building within the judiciary without taking into account 
the access of the end-users to the justice system. Commission Staff Working Document on 
Tool-Box – A Rights-based Approach, Encompassing All Human Rights for EU Develop-
ment Cooperation, SWD(2014) 152 fi nal, 30 April 2014, p. 6. Also see Council Conclusions 
‘Action Plan on human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019’ Doc. 10897/15, 20 July 2015; 
Council Conclusions ‘A rights-based approach to development cooperation, encompass-
ing all human rights’, Foreign Affairs Council, 19 May 2014; EU Strategic Framework and 
Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, Doc. 11855/12, 25 June 2012, p. 2.
147 Council Conclusions ‘Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for 
Change’ 3166th Foreign Affairs Council, 14 May 2012, pnt. 7.
 The importance of access to justice for vulnerable groups is highlighted in many reports, 
such as in the Action Document for the support to institutional strengthening in the 
framework of the new constitution in Zimbabwe in which the diffi cult position of wom-
en and their justice accessibility plight is highlighted: ‘Women in Zimbabwe attained 
majority status in 1982 after the passing of the Legal Age of Majority act. Although they 
have equal access to the justice system on paper, in reality access is different as it depends 
on the individual’s fi nancial capacity and women have lesser access to resources than 
men. Although the legal framework on gender-based violence (GBV) is relatively strong, 
GBV levels are very high in Zimbabwe with 68% of women having experienced some 
form of GBV in their lifetime and 46% of men admitting to perpetrating some form of 
violence against women in their lifetime. Women are reluctant to report GBV for the 
following reasons: fear of isolation from their families, cultural norms which condone 
domestic violence, religion, limited knowledge of the law, delays in the legal system and 
economic dependence on male partners.’ Action Document for the Support to Institu-
tional Strengthening in the Framework of the New Constitution, Annex of the Commis-
sion Decision in the fi eld of governance in favour of Zimbabwe (2015), p. 3.
148 See for example the Viet Nam Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 11.
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and ‘due process’149 can certainly be found through the various documents, 
however, this appears to come more as an afterthought than as a focal point 
of rule of law promotion.150
As already briefly touched upon in the discussion on the rule of law’s 
element of legality in the context of the Cotonou Agreement above, ensur-
ing access to justice is not only a policy concern, it is also a legal obligation. 
According to Article 9 Cotonou, the essential element rule of law shall entail 
in particular ‘effective and accessible means of legal redress.’ More particu-
larly, Article 33 adds to this by setting the improvement of access to justice 
as a specific objective of development cooperation in the EU-ACP context. 
Similar obligations are found in some of the other agreements.151 Likewise, 
both the Development Cooperation Instrument and the EIDHR Regulation 
present access to justice as a specific objective of cooperation.152
Having established the importance of access to justice as an element of 
the rule of law both as a policy objective and as a legal obligation, the ques-
tion remains what the EU understands by this notion. From the above-men-
tioned references two components of access to justice are apparent: access 
149 The Governance Handbook briefl y discusses the ‘observation of due process’ by way of 
three guiding questions: Are parties treated equally?; Are there rules and procedures for 
ensuring that a fair hearing of the issue will take place?; Will the public be able to observe 
court proceedings in accordance with international norms? ‘Handbook on Promoting 
Good Governance in EC Development and Cooperation’ EuropeAid (2004), p. 61. See 
also See for example Commission Communication on A decent life for all: from vision to 
collective action, COM(2014) 335, 2 June 2014, p. 11.
150 Interestingly, the EU-Korea Framework Agreement and the EU-Iraq PCA are a bit more 
forthcoming on this aspect and at least mention the right to a fair trial in conjunction 
with the independence of the judiciary and access to justice (Article 30 of the EU-Korea 
Framework Agreement and Article 102 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement). 
This is, however, done in the context of the cooperation in the area of justice, freedom and 
security, wherein the EU has undertaken work towards achieving minimum standards of 
procedural rights, particularly in criminal proceedings. See the Stockholm Programme 
and the Council’s Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights in criminal proceedings. 
European Council ‘The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting citizens’ OJ[2010] C115/1; Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on 
a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in crimi-
nal proceedings, OJ[2009] C295/1.
151 See for example Article 102 of the EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement or 
Article 30 on cooperation in the fi eld of the rule of law of the EU-South Korea Framework 
Agreement.
152 EU cooperation activities in the geographic programmes of the DCI comprise ‘ensuring 
unhindered and equal access to justice for all’, see Annex I section A(I)(a)(ii) of Regula-
tion (EU) No 233/2014. In the previous version of the DCI, Regulation 1905/2006, access 
to justice was presented in the body of the Regulation, together with the rule of law, see 
Article 3(3) on mainstreaming issues and Article 5(2)(f) on geographic programmes. 
According to Article 2(1)(a)(ii) of Regulation (EU) No 235/2014, EU assistance shall 
focus, inter alia on the promoting access to justice.
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to justice should be both effective and available to all in equal measure.153 
This bifurcated approach is supported, inter alia, by reference document 
No. 15 of the Tools and Method Series on ‘Support to Justice and the Rule 
of Law’.154 In that report, it is pointed out that access to justice can be taken 
apart in order to distinguish three core objectives: empowerment of rights 
holders to access and utilise state and non-state institutions for claiming a 
right, obtaining redress, or settling a dispute; empowering rights holders 
to effectively demand necessary reforms of those institutions they consider 
relevant; and, strengthening the capacity of relevant institutions to deliver 
justice.155 A similar two- or three-pronged approach is often reflected in the 
programming documents. For example, in the 2013 Action Fiche on the rule 
of law and access to justice in South Sudan, the objective of cooperation is, 
inter alia, capacity building of both the courts and the customary courts, 
including the training of staff, as well as the increase of public awareness 
and understanding of their rights of access to justice.156
Moreover, this focus on both the procedural/institutional side as well 
as on the emancipatory service-delivery aspect of access for all individuals, 
is reflected in the fourth of five guiding working principles through which 
the Commission has proposed to implement the ‘rights based approach’ of 
development cooperation, that of ‘accountability and access to the rule of 
law’.157 Indeed, since it is the responsibility of the state to ‘respect, protect 
and fulfil human rights’, it is therefore essential ‘that accessible transpar-
ent, and effective mechanisms of accountability exist’. This principle, thus, 
demands that ‘legal services are accessible to target groups in terms of pro-
cedures, training programmes and paralegal advisory service.’ However, 
stressing the importance of the emancipatory component, ‘for accountabil-
ity to be effective, it also needs to be demanded.’158
153 See for example Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Commission 
Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Development: towards a 
harmonized approach with the European Union, SEC(2006) 1020 fi nal, 30 August 2006, 
p. 5 and the Programming Guide for Strategy Papers on ‘The Rule of Law – The judicial 
system within the broader justice sector context’ (2009), p. 1, in which both elements are 
clearly discernible.
154 Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 15 on ‘Support of Justice and the Rule 
of Law’ EuropeAid (2013).
 Launched by EuropeAid in 2007, the ‘Tools and Methods series’ aims to structure the pre-
sentation of the methodological documents produced at the various thematic units. Such 
reference documents are intended to give operational guidance on the implementation of 
European aid and present best practices.
155 Reference Document No. 15 on ‘Support of Justice and the Rule of Law’, p. 14.
156 Action Fiche for Strengthening the Rule of Law, Access to Justice and Democratic Gover-
nance in South Sudan, Annex I (2013), p. 10.
157 Commission Staff Working Document on Tool-Box – A rights-based approach, encom-
passing all human rights for EU Development Cooperation, SWD(2014) 152 fi nal, 30 
April 2014.
158 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
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According to the Reference document on ‘Support of Justice and the 
Rule of Law’ and the Indicator Guidance Note on Rule of Law & Justice,159 
the following issues should inter alia be considered regarding the accessibil-
ity of the judiciary: the length and cost of proceedings, fees to obtain access 
to court, access to information, availability of free legal assistance, quality 
of free legal assistance to the most vulnerable, availability of interpreters, 
the role of civil society and oversight bodies, alternative dispute resolution, 
traditional justice mechanisms, and religious authorities.160 Thus, it appears 
that increasingly attention is paid to the primary justice needs and perspec-
tives of vulnerable people or marginalized groups and the obstacles they 
encounter in seeking justice.161 Accordingly, it appears that on the issue of 
access to justice, the documents have adopted a service-delivery perspective 
focused on the practical implementation of this element of the rule of law; 
ensuring that people living in poverty are empowered to utilise reform of 
those (non-)state institutions that are most relevant for them in obtaining 
justice.162
3.2.2.2 The EU’s nuanced interpretation of access to justice
In the previous section, it was shown that the EU has adopted a broad 
interpretation of ‘access to justice’ over its narrower counterpart ‘access to 
court’. Moreover, in this section it is argued that in relation to this rule of 
law element, the Union has also demonstrated a more nuanced interpreta-
tion when it comes to the inclusion of traditional, customary, or religious 
justice mechanisms.163 Next to ensuring access to justice for indigenous 
people, which is an obligation following from the UN Declaration on the 
159 Sector Indicator Guidance for Programming – Sector Indicator Guidance Note – Rule of 
Law & Justice, EuropeAid (2013), pp. 14-18.
160 Reference Document No. 15 on ‘Support of Justice and the Rule of Law’, p. 14; Sector 
Indicator Guidance Note – Rule of Law & Justice, EuropeAid (2013), pp. 14-18 at 16. Cf. 
the section on the Reinforcement of the Rule of Law and the Administration of Justice in 
the ‘Handbook on Promoting Good Governance in EC Development and Cooperation’ 
EuropeAid (2004), pp. 57-62 at 59.
161 Cf. for example the Multiannual Indicative Programme of Kyrgyz Republic 2014-2020, 
p. 20; Multiannual Indicative Programme for the Philippines 2014-2020, p. 22; Action 
Fiche for strengthening the rule of law, access to justice and democratic governance in 
South Sudan (2013), p. 11; Multiannual Indicative Programme Nepal 2014-2020, p. 9; Pro-
gramme Indicatif National Mauritanie 2014-2020, p. 39; National Indicative Programme 
Sierra Leone 2014-2020, p. 21.
162 Reference Document No. 15 on ‘Support of Justice and the Rule of Law’, p. 13.
163 These justice systems are not uniform and have their own particularities. Where tradi-
tional and customary justice systems are often informal, carried out orally, and undocu-
mented, religious justice can be part of both formal and informal justice systems, is often 
hierarchical, well structured, and well documented. For more on these distinctions see 
Reference document No. 15 ‘Support to Justice and the Rule of Law (2012), pp. 41-43.
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Rights of Indigenous Peoples,164 the EU’s understanding of this element 
also clearly encompasses the more traditional/religious/customary means 
through which access to justice can be guaranteed. Against the background 
of the national rule of law traditions discussed in chapter 1, these mecha-
nisms form a new aspect of this rule of law element, not, to this extent, 
found in the three developed countries discussed. Furthermore, the EU 
has displayed a rather nuanced approach towards these more local means 
of ensuring access to justice which often seemingly clash with some of the 
other identified rule of law elements.
Traditional/religious/customary laws’ prescriptions may collide with 
internationally agreed standards, particularly when it comes to gender 
equality. Moreover, the rules of procedure and/or normative principles 
underlying this judicial approach are difficult to access, rarely codified, 
strongly influenced by socio-cultural factors and mores and therefore not 
predictable and verifiable. What is more, jurisdiction is often given to 
traditional leaders who have other administrative and/or executive func-
tions within the community165 – the mixing of which is obviously incon-
sistent with the rule of law’s element of separation of powers. According 
to the Programming Fiche on the Rule of Law – The judicial system, this 
situation ‘will only change in the long term and should be approached in 
a balanced way.’166 This exactly puts the finger on a salient point. The rule 
of law requires access to justice (broadly interpreted) but at the same time 
also predictable and verifiable procedures and the dispersion of justice 
in accordance with human rights,167 while respecting the separation of 
powers, and, more particularly, judicial independence. This dichotomy is 
only reconcilable in the long term with development aid targeted at both 
elements, whereby the emphasis should gradually shift from the provision 
of traditional, customary, non-state forms of access to justice in least devel-
oped and low-income countries to more regulated access through the state 
judicial system in more developed upper middle-income countries.168
164 The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 61/295 on 13 September 2007 states in Article 34 that indigenous peoples have 
the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their dis-
tinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and legal systems or cus-
toms, in accordance with human rights standards.
165 Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 9 on ‘Support for Justice Reform in 
ACP Countries’ EuropeAid (2010), p. 16.
166 Programming Guide for Strategy Papers on ‘The Rule of Law – The judicial system with-
in the broader justice sector context’ (2009), p. 2.
167 On the connection between the application of human/fundamental rights and the jus-
tice sector see for example the Programming Guide for Strategy Papers ‘Democracy and 
Human Rights’ (2006), p. 3.
168 In recent years, the Commission has started to fund studies concerning informal justice 
systems and the advantages and disadvantages of legal pluralism. See Reference Docu-
ment No. 15 on ‘Support of Justice and the Rule of Law’ (2012), p. 43. Generally, see Brian 
Z. Tamanaha, Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock (eds) Legal Pluralism and Development: 
Scholars and Practitioners in Dialogue Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2012).
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From one of the reviews of its past experiences which offers guidance 
for the Union’s future development cooperation programmes it is apparent 
that the EU is very much aware of the obstacles that these forms of access 
to justice pose to the rule of law.169 Furthermore, the exploration of the 
programming documents across the various multiannual financial frame-
works confirms that the EU in its development cooperation policy has in 
fact adopted, under both the EDF and the DCI, a dual approach whereby 
traditional forms are supported alongside initiatives to strengthening state-
provided access to justice. To give just two examples, the 2015 Action Plan 
for Laos allocates a substantial amount of aid in order to address the gap 
that at the village level most citizens do not have alternatives to customary 
justice solutions in combination with an attempt to implement domestic 
human rights obligations.170 The assistance programme has a two-pronged 
approach, whereby, on the one hand, technical assistance is provided to the 
ministry and educational institutions responsible for placing law students 
in village and district mediation, and legal advice structures and the raising 
of legal awareness among the population through the support of media-
tion units and law students is supported on the other hand.171 Similarly, 
the National Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for Fiji provides that a clear 
understanding of the role of specific public offices, such as the judiciary 
and the legal aid commission ‘are paramount in ensuring that law and 
justice prevail and citizens fully exercise their rights and responsibilities.’ 
Accordingly, ‘EU support to Access to Justice will help ensure that the Fijian 
public is aware of its rights and can action them through the relevant state 
mechanisms.’172 Consequently, the expected result of this objective is the 
improvement of access to justice for all citizens, including those having dif-
ficulties in accessing justice, whereby access is defined as having access to 
state-regulated Legal Aid Commission services.
3.2.3 Enforcement of the rule of law
Next, the focus turns to the subsequent issue of enforcement. While its 
presence is not as ubiquitous as access to justice, enforcement merits some 
attention as a separate rule of law element. The examination shows that two 
main issues are highlighted: first, efficiency of enforcement in general and, 
secondly, the human rights aspects of enforcement by the police and the 
prison system. For example, the Commission Communication on the rule 
169 Reference Document No. 15 on ‘Support of Justice and the Rule of Law’, pp. 41-42.
170 Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 
2015 Part 2 and Annual Action Programme 2016 Part 1 for Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic – Action document for ‘Citizen engagement for good governance, accountabil-
ity and rule of law’.
171 Annex 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 
2015 Part 2 and Annual Action Programme 2016 Part 1 for Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, p. 13.
172 Fiji National Indicative Programme for the period 2014-2020, p. 11.
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of law as an essential element in the context of the ACP countries provides 
the following rule of law examples in relation to this issue: a prison system 
respecting the human person; a policy force at the service of the law; and an 
effective executive enforcing the law.173
Furthermore, in the programme guide for strategy papers on the rule 
of law – the judicial system, a number of ‘entry-point’ questions in relation 
to enforcement of court decisions and the penitentiary are provided that 
can be used in order to analyse that part of the rule of law in any given 
country. These are concerned with, amongst others, the fair and effective 
enforcement of court judgments, whether or not the level of enforcement 
is independent from external forces, to what extent a probation system 
is in place, whether alternative sentences to detention exist and function 
properly, and whether imprisonment is used for discriminatory purposes or 
detention conditions comply with international standards.174
However, examination of the many programming documents shows 
that, even though enforcement clearly fulfils an important function in rela-
tion to the rule of law, the programmes and action plans do not go much 
further than stress the need for general improvement175 and compliance 
with human rights standards.176 The same holds for detention conditions. 
Regardless of the fact that this is an issue that is high on the agenda and, 
moreover, a specific objective of cooperation in a number of countries,177 
the EU more often than not stops at simply stressing the necessity of better 
conditions.178 Next to this, many reports stress the need for capacity build-
ing of the various parties involved in the justice sector, first and foremost 
the police force.179 This however, is the institutional side of the element of 
enforcement and the justice sector in general, which is, inter alia, the subject 
of examination in the next section.
173 Commission Communication on Democratisation, the Rule of Law, Respect for Human 
Rights and Good Governance: The Challenges of the Partnership between the European 
Union and the ACP States, COM(98) 146 fi nal, 12 March 1998, p. 4. Also see Commission 
Communication on ‘The European Union’s role in promoting human rights and democ-
ratisation in third countries’ COM(2001) 252 fi nal, 8 May 2001, p. 10.
174 Programming Guide for Strategy Papers ‘Rule of law – the judicial system within the 
broader justice sector’ (2009), p. 4. Cf. the Governance Handbook (2004).
175 See for example the Multiannual Indicative Programme Pakistan 2014-2020, p. 28; Multi-
annual Indicative Programme for Viet Nam 2014-2020, p. 21.
176 See for example the Multiannual Indicative Programme for the Philippines 2014-2020, 
p. 22.
177 See for example specifi c objective 4 ‘improvement detention conditions (prisoners receive 
better educational and working opportunities in prisons) of focal sector 1 on the rule of 
law in the Multiannual Indicative Programme of the Kyrgyz Republic 2014-2020, p. 20; 
National Indicative Programme of Malawi 2014-2020, p. 36; Programme Indicatif Nation-
al 2014-2020 Congo, p. 38
178 See for example the National Indicative Programme Jamaica 2014-2020, p. 13.
179 See for example the Joint Annual Report of Belize of 2003 in which it is stressed on p. 7 
that the police department has been making ‘improvements to combat crime, including 
recruiting of additional police, upgrading of police stations and substations, the construc-
tion of new stations, and the upgrading of the vehicle fl eet.’
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3.2.4 Conclusions
This section focussed on procedural elements of the rule of law. It was dem-
onstrated that the element of judicial review, in contrast to its central posi-
tion as one of the elements through which the rule of law is safeguarded, 
has not been attributed the same importance in the EU’s rule of law defini-
tion in development cooperation. Furthermore, it can be concluded that, as 
a ‘fundamental principle of the rule of law’,180 many of the EU’s develop-
ment programmes are geared towards access to justice. Its importance is 
recognised both at the strategic level, in the legal framework, and at the 
level of implementation. It was shown that access to justice is interpreted 
broadly because of the EU’s concomitant external objective of the protection 
of human rights, since, the more accessible state and non-state institutions 
are for legal redress, the more justice delivery and the protection of human 
rights can be supported. It was, however, also pointed out that access to jus-
tice via traditional, religious, and/or customary means often has an inher-
ent dichotomy whereby access to justice has to be weighed against obscure, 
unclear, and sometimes unknown procedures – endangering inter alia the 
rule of law related principle of predictability. Finally, in relation to the ele-
ment of enforcement, it was argued that while enforcement is accorded an 
important role in the justice system, as an element of the rule of law it has 
not been fleshed out in detail. More particularly, it was demonstrated the 
EU’s definition does not stretch beyond a general call for the improvement 
of effective enforcement in combination with the need for more compliance 
with human rights standards. In the following section, the focus will turn to 
the institutional elements of the rule of law.
3.3 Institutional elements of the rule of law
This section will focus on the analysis of the EU’s practice in order to verify 
the third category of institutional elements of the analytical framework 
established in chapters 1 and 2. It will be argued that the analysis of the rel-
evant strategic documents, as well as of the legal framework, demonstrates 
that the EU has adopted a noticeably institutional understanding of the rule 
of law. More particularly, it will be demonstrated that the Union equates 
its definition of the rule of law with that of rule of law reform and capac-
ity building of the justice sector. It will be asserted that this institutional 
approach is reflected both in the legal framework and in the EU’s strategic 
documents underlying its development cooperation policy. Moreover, it 
will be shown that the separation of powers, the notion by which means 
the power of government is detained and the rule of law buttressed in the 
national legal orders, it is barely touched upon at the strategic level, even 
though its importance is emphasised in the legal framework, notably in the 
180 Fiji National Indicative Programme for the period 2014-2020, p. 15.
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Cotonou Agreement. Instead, it will be demonstrated that one of its main 
elements, namely judicial independence, is at the forefront at all levels 
(legal, strategic, as well as practical). Subsequently, turning to the notion of 
judicial independence, it will be demonstrated that it is unsatisfactorily and 
incompletely defined, for reasons that will be explained below.
3.3.1 The ubiquitous institutional understanding of the rule of law: 
rule of law as institutional reform
From the outset, it can be established that, from the moment the rule of 
law made its appearance in EU development cooperation, the Union’s rule 
of law definition has been heavily geared towards institutional elements, 
by way of reform and capacity building of the justice sector. To give three 
examples, the Commission, discussing the prospects for closer partnership 
with Latin America in 1995, identified, as one of its priorities in the rela-
tionship, the consolidation of the rule of law ‘by increasing the efficiency 
and role of the legislative, judicial, police and human rights institutions.’181 
Similarly, one of the early Communications on the EU’s external dimension 
of its human rights policy proposed the promotion of the rule of law by 
supporting and strengthening the independence of the judiciary, support-
ing the activities of parliaments, and supporting institutional and legislative 
reforms.182 What is more, the rule of law’s first appearance as an essential 
element – in the Lomé IVbis Convention of 1995 – was accompanied by the 
support for institutional reform measures ‘with a view to democratization 
and the rule of law’ as a specific objective of cooperation.183 An objective 
that is reiterated in the Cotonou Agreement,184 and a number of other 
external agreements,185 as shown above in section 3.1. Similar institutional-
181 Commission Communication on The European Union and Latin America – The present 
situation and prospects for closer partnership 1996-2000, COM(1995) 495 fi nal, 23 Octo-
ber 1995, p. 14 [emphasis added].
182 Commission Communication on ‘The European Union and the external dimension of 
human rights policy: from Rome to Maastricht and beyond’ COM(1995) 567, 22 Novem-
ber 1995, p. 10 [emphasis added].
183 Articles 5 and 224(m) Lomé IVbis Convention.
184 Article 33(1)(c) Cotonou Agreement provides that ‘[c]ooperation shall pay systemic atten-
tion to institutional aspects and in this context, shall support the efforts of the ACP States 
to develop and strengthen structures, institutions and procedures that help to develop 
and strengthen the rule of law; and improve access to justice, while guaranteeing the 
professionalism and independence of the judicial systems.’ [emphasis added].
185 See for example the Association Agreement with Chile in which in the general objectives 
of Article 16(1)(a) it is stated that the parties shall establish close cooperation aimed at 
strengthening the institutional capacity to underpin the rule of law; Agreement establish-
ing an association between the EC and the Republic of Chile, OJ [2002] L352/3. Cf. Article 
53 of the EU-Mongolia Framework Agreement, which also discusses the improvement 
of the legal and institutional framework, and the reinforcement of the judiciary system; 
Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union 
and its Member States, of the one part, and Mongolia, of the other part, OJ[2012] L134/4.
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based definitions of the rule of law can also be found in the Development 
Cooperation Instrument186 and the EIDHR Regulation.187
This institutional focus is reflected in the four strategic policy docu-
ments underlying the EU’s overall development policy. Thus, the 2000 
Communication on EU development policy presents six priority areas for 
development aid, the sixth of which reads: ‘Institutional capacity-building, 
good governance and the rule of law.’188 Likewise, the 2006 European Con-
sensus on Development states that reform of the judicial system is ‘essential 
to building country-driven reform programmes … and an institutional envi-
ronment that upholds human rights, democratic principles and the rule of 
law.’189 The Agenda for Change echoed the same sentiments and provides 
that EU action should focus on the functioning of institutions, the rule of 
law and judicial systems.190 The institutional focus is reiterated in the New 
Consensus on Development in which the rule of law is explicitly tied to 
judicial reform and institutional capacity building.191 The institutional 
emphasis’ wide geographical spread is also apparent as can be surmised 
from the EU’s regional cooperation programmes. From Latin America, 
already mentioned above,192 to Central Asia,193 Asia,194 and the regions on 
the African continent.195
Moreover, defining the rule of law by way of institutional reform of the 
legal system constitutes the pivotal point of a number of different policies 
in their nexus with development cooperation. To briefly touch upon some 
of the areas of intersection, it appears in relation to conflict prevention 
whereby EU instruments should be geared more toward support for ‘the 
building of stable institutions and the rule of law’ in order to strengthen 
186 See Article 5(2)(f) Regulation 1905/2006 and Article 3(3) and Annex I(B)(IV)(c) on coop-
eration with Central Asia of Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
187 See Article 2(1)(a)(ii) of Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
188 Commission Communication on The European Community’s development Policy, 
COM(2000) 212 fi nal, 26 April 2000, p. 27. See also the Joint Statement by the Council and 
the Commission on the European Community’s Development Policy of 10 November 
2000, pnt. 13 [emphasis added].
189 European Consensus on Development (2006), pnt. 86 [emphasis added].
190 Agenda for Change, COM(2011) 637, 13 October 2011, p. 6.
191 New European Consensus on Development (2017), p. 32.
192 See for more examples the Multiannual Regional Indicative Programme for Latin Ameri-
ca 2014-2020, p. 3; Regional Strategy Paper and Programming document for Latin Amer-
ica 2007-2013, p. 13.
193 See Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia, pp. 6 
and 18; Regional Strategy for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013; Region-
al Multiannual Indicative Programme Central Asia 2014-2020.
194 See for example the Regional Programming for Asia 2007-2013, p. 6.
195 See for example the Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa of 14 November 2011; the 
Regional Action Plan on the Horn of Africa 2015-2020; Joint Communication of the Com-
mission and the High Representative on The Strategic Framework for the Great Lakes 
Region, JOIN(2013) 23 fi nal, 19 June 2013
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the efforts deployed to prevent conflict.196 Also, on the crossroads of 
governance and development cooperation, the strengthening of rule of 
law institutions spearheads the EU’s aid efforts. Accordingly, the Council 
recommends that the EU should address governance issues ‘as a practical 
concept’ which relates to the functioning of political, administrative, eco-
nomic and social systems built on the rule of law, with particular attention 
paid to institutions and a professional and independent judiciary system.197 
Similarly, in the security-development nexus the institutional elements of 
the EU’s rule of law definition take up a central position. For example, after 
establishing the connection between security and development,198 the 2003 
European Security Strategy stresses the importance of strong state institu-
tions for the rule of law and social order in relation to development and 
secure environments.199 In the same vein, institutional rule of law reform 
196 Commission Communication on Confl ict prevention, COM(2001) 211, 11 April 2001, 
p. 29. See also the Commission’s checklist for the root causes of confl ict of 2000, which, 
under the heading of the rule of law, checks inter alia how strong the judicial system is, 
available at: http://www.ceipaz.org/images/contenido/European%20Commission%20
Check-list%20for%20Root%20Causes%20of%20Confl ict_ENG.pdf.
197 Council Conclusions ‘Governance in the context of development cooperation’, Doc. 
14773/03, 13 November 2003. See also Commission Communication on Governance and 
Development, COM(2003) 615 fi nal, 20 October 2003, p. 7; and the Commission’s Report 
on The EU support for democratic governance, with a focus on the governance initiative, 
COM(2013) 403 fi nal, 11 June 2013.
198 According to the Commission ‘there can be no development without peace and secu-
rity; and no peace and security without development’, Commission Communication on 
Policy Coherence for Development – Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millen-
nium Development Goals, COM(2005) 134 fi nal, 12 April 2005, p. 4. Security ‘is the fi rst 
condition for development’ (European Security Strategy (2003), p. 13) and ‘key to region-
al stability, poverty reduction and confl ict prevention’, Commission Communication on 
Governance and Development, COM(2003) 615 fi nal, 20 October 2003, p. 7. Moreover, ‘[r]
eforming the security sector in post-confl ict environments is critical to the consolidation 
of peace and for promoting poverty reduction. Only where legitimate State authority is 
expanded through the rule of law and good governance will countries be prevented from 
relapsing into confl ict and losing development achievements’, Statement on behalf of the 
European Union by Pedro Serrano, delegation of the EU to the United Nations, New 
York, 29 June 2010.
 In turn, development is recognised as a precondition for peace and security. For these 
reasons, ‘the EU will continue to work to ensure that international security concerns are 
dealt with in synergy with support to development and good governance so as to achieve 
a coherent policy mix’ (Council Conclusions, 2622nd External Relations Council, Doc. 
12724/04, 22-23 November 2004, p. 27). The fragility of developing, confl ict-prone states 
is to be addressed ‘through governance reforms, the rule of law, anti-corruption mea-
sures and the building of viable state institution’ (European Consensus on Development 
(2006), pnt. 20).
199 European Security Strategy (2003), p. 4.
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is highlighted in relation to situations of fragility200 and in transitional 
societies.201
The EU provides a multifaceted rationale for its institutional under-
standing of the rule of law. According to the Union, ‘[i]t is generally 
recognised that the lack of institutional capacity and institutional control 
of the use of public funds are a fundamental obstacle to sustainable 
development.’202 Furthermore, from the perspective of the effectiveness 
of the EU’s own development policy, the Union invests ‘in the building of 
impartial institutions bound by the rule of law to ensure that the reforms 
undertaken are also implemented in practice.’203 Moreover, in the context 
of the protection of human rights, the EU intends to step up ‘the creation 
and development of an independent judiciary, thus making a sustainable 
contribution to the establishment of structures based on the rule of law 
and international human rights standards.’204 Additionally, in relation to 
the security-development nexus, abuse of power, weak institutions, and 
conflict corrode states from within, often bringing about the collapse of state 
institutions.205 Failed states have insufficient operation and strategic capaci-
ties in the wider security, law enforcement, and judicial sectors to control 
the territory, to ensure human security, to prevent and respond to security 
threats, and to enforce the law.206 Therefore, supporting the rule of law and 
its institutions in order to fight threats and handle terrorism and organised 
crime in a more efficient and specialised manner in order to ensure state 
control, is, according to the EU, one of the best means of creating stability.207
On the basis of the foregoing, it can be argued that the EU, for a large 
part, defines the rule of law by its institutional attributes. The reform of rule 
of law related institutions, particularly the judiciary, is seen not as a means 
of strengthening the formal and procedural elements of the rule of law, but 
as a measurable element in itself. In a way, the rule of law is equated to 
200 See for example Commission Communication on Towards an EU response to situations 
of fragility – engaging in diffi cult environments for sustainable development, stabil-
ity and peace, COM(2007) 643 fi nal, 25 October 2007, p. 5 and the subsequent Council 
Conclusions ‘An EU response to situations of fragility’, 2831st External Relation Council, 
19-20 November 2007.
201 Joint Communication by the Commission and the High Representative on EU support 
for sustainable change in transition societies, JOIN(2012) 27 fi nal, 3 October 2012.
202 Commission Communication on The European Community’s Development Policy,
COM(2000) 212, 26 April 2000, p. 24. Also see European Parliament Report with 
recommendation to the Commission on EU donor coordination on development aid, 15 
November 2013 (2013/2057(INL)), pnt. 8.
203 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative on EU Support for 
Sustainable Change in Transition Societies, JOIN(2012) 27 fi nal, 3 October 2012, p. 5.
204 ‘The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership’ adopted by the Council, Doc. 
10113/07, 31 May 2007, p. 7.
205 European Security Strategy (2003), p. 9.
206 EU External Action Service Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (2011), 
p. 3.
207 EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (2011), p. 7.
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legal reform, judicial reform, and to the reform of specific institutions of 
the justice sector such as the police. Furthermore, within this general rule 
of law related institutional focus, the elements of judicial independence 
and, to a lesser extent, the separation of powers, are very much put on the 
foreground of the EU’s institutionally motivated rule of law definition.
3.3.2 The lack of specificity in the element of the separation of powers
At the strategic level, the EU barely touches upon the separation of powers 
per se, instead adducing the one element thereof, the importance of judicial 
independence.208 However, some rudimentary indications of the necessity 
of the separation of powers for the rule of law can be pinpointed in the pol-
icy’s legal framework. In its definition of the rule of law as an essential ele-
ment of cooperation, the Cotonou Agreement provides that the structure of 
government and the prerogatives of the different powers shall be founded 
on the rule of law, ‘which shall entail in particular … an independent legal 
system guaranteeing equality before the law and an executive that is fully 
subject to the law’.209 Subsequently, in the Commissions clarification of the 
essential elements, it stated that the rule of law must shape the structure of 
the State and the prerogatives of the various powers.210 At a minimum, this 
separation of powers curbs the power of the state and relates specifically to 
legislative and judiciary independence from the executive and the effective 
exercise of the three powers.211 Based on this narrow definition, cooperation 
activities under the EDF can thus cover in principle a number of issues in 
order to ensure that the rule of law is underpinned by the separation of 
powers. The EIDHR and DCI Regulations offer less on the separation of 
powers focussing instead on judicial independence, with the DCI allowing 
for the strengthening of the rule of law and judicial independence under 
the geographic programmes,212 and, similarly, the EIDHR Regulation 
208 For example, where the EU’s three strategic documents on its development cooperation – 
the 2000 Communication, the European Consensus on Development, and the Agenda for 
Change – highlight the importance of the rule of law for sustainable development with 
an emphasis on the strengthening of institutions and access to justice, nothing is included 
on the separation of powers.
209 Article 9 Cotonou Agreement. See also Article 33(1)(c) which provides that the coopera-
tion on the Cotonou Agreement shall pay systematic attention to institutional aspects and 
shall support the ACP states in their efforts to develop and strengthen structures, institu-
tions and procedures that help to, inter alia, develop and strengthen the rule of law while 
guaranteeing the professionalism and independence of the judicial system.
210 Commission Communication on Democratisation, the Rule of Law, Respect for Human 
Rights and Good Governance: The Challenges of the Partnership between the European 
Union and the ACP States, COM(98) 146 fi nal, 12 March 1998, p. 4.
211 Ibid., p. 6.
212 See Annex I, under A(I)(a)ii) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
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authorising the promotion of the independence of the judiciary and of the 
legislature.213
From this analysis, it would seem that the element of the separation of 
powers in the EU’s definition of the rule of law has taken the same approach 
as highlighted in chapters 1 and 2. It should be recalled that it was asserted 
in chapter 1 that all three national rule of law traditions require a form 
of separation of powers in order to ensure that the government is bound 
by the law. However, it was concluded that, for historic reasons, national 
particularities in the institutional arrangements of the separation of the 
judicial, legislative, and executive branches occur, allowing for a variety of 
ways through which the principle can be shaped. Subsequently, in chapter 
2, it was argued that, even though legal theory’s exposition on the rule of 
law attests to the importance of the separation of powers underpinning 
the notion in ways similar to the national conceptions, legal scholars have 
restricted their analysis almost exclusively to the role and function of the 
judicial branch, and, more particularly, the notion of judicial independence. 
While the importance of the separation of powers is undisputed, it is 
judicial independence that the legal and policy frameworks mainly focus 
on. In the light of the fact that the EU has followed the same approach, the 
analysis will now turn to the Union’s practice, in order to establish whether 
the notion has been fleshed out in more detail.
From the examination of the relevant documents it is clear that, as a 
start, the focus has been heavily on institutional capacity building of the 
justice sector as a whole – courts, judges, prosecutors, police, and detention 
centres, rather than on the separation of powers. For, properly functioning 
institutions need to be in existence before the interrelationships between the 
three branches and the mechanisms of checks and balances come into play. 
This much is also acknowledged in the various reports. For example, in the 
Joint Annual Report on Angola of 2003 it is pointed out that the machinery 
of the judicial sector needs to be sufficiently up to standard if it is to apply 
the body of laws that are being reformed and modernised.214 However, 
most reports and country strategy papers paint a picture of under-resourced 
institutions and a lack of basic facilities and services in the justice sector. For 
example, the 2005 Antigua Joint Annual Report discusses the unsatisfactory 
conditions under which the police have operated over the years, such as 
the lack of physical stations, cars, and a trained police force.215 The 2005 
213 Article 2(1)(a)(ii) Regulation (EU) No 235/2014. The promotion of the independence of 
the legislature is an addition to the scope of rule of law cooperation activities in relation 
to preceding EIDHR Regulation 1889/2006.
214 Angola Joint Annual Report (2003), p. 9. See also the Belize Joint Annual Report (2003), 
p. 7.
215 Antigua Joint Annual Report (2005), p. 8; Ghana Joint Annual Report (2003), p. 6; Carib-
bean Regional Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme 2008-2013, p. 15. See also for 
example the Bangladesh Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p. 3, in which the problems 
of performance of the police is discussed in light of the fact that they are ‘under-resourced 
in terms of pay, manpower and forensic training.’
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Mozambique Joint Annual Report points to the problems related to over-
crowded prisons and low maintenance.216 In relation to the judiciary itself, 
both the lack of general217 as well as specialised courts218 and of trained 
staff is highlighted across. For example, the judicial system in Suriname is 
described as being in jeopardy in 2005 in light of the continuing difficulties 
in processing criminal cases due to a shortage of judges,219 and the fact that 
the President of the Court of Justice and the Attorney General had still not 
been appointed for the past year.220 The Sierra Leone Report of the same 
year talks of weaknesses of the judiciary, in terms of logistics, mobility, basic 
infrastructure, and training as a ‘major and overriding challenge’.221
Against this background of under-resourced judicial institutions, the 
separation of powers is limited to a discussion on the existence, or absence, 
of judicial independence. For example, the Botswana Report of 2004 links 
the separation of the three branches to the functioning of the legal system 
and the effective independence of the ombudsman.222 Similarly, the 2007 
Mozambique Report provides that ‘[t]he independence of high-level insti-
tutions that check on executive and legislative powers has been up-held 
significantly with far-reaching decision of the Constitutional Council and 
also from the Administrative court that were duly respected and imple-
mented. These developments clearly indicate that the consolidation process 
of the rule of law at top level is progressing.’223 A number of reports offer an 
account of the respect and implementation by the government of politically 
sensitive court judgments in order to demonstrate the country’s compli-
ance with the separation of powers and the rule of law.224 In contrast, it is 
stated in the 9th EDF country strategy paper on Gambia, and reiterated by a 
216 Mozambique Joint Annual Report (2005), p. 8.
217 See for example the Belize Joint Annual Report (2008), p. 30, in which the problems relat-
ed to the brief residence of the Court of Appeal is discussed. See also the Gambia Joint 
Annual Report (2008), p. 4, which underlines the diffi culties of deconcentrated courts to 
the regions, as well as the Haiti Joint Annual Report (2006), p. 2.
218 See for example the Botswana Joint Annual Report (2008), p. 26, which highlights the 
need for a small claims court.
219 See also for example the Sierra Leone Joint Annual Report (2005), p. 4 in which it is stated 
that notwithstanding the improved court infrastructure, ‘insuffi cient numbers of judges, 
magistrates, public defenders, and prosecutors continue to result in huge backlogs.’
220 Suriname Joint Annual report (2005), p. 7.
221 Sierra Leone Joint Annual Report (2005), p. 3; Sierra Leone Joint Annual Report (2006), 
p. 4.
222 The Report provides that ‘[g]overnment, civil service and judiciary are effectively sepa-
rated. The legal system functions well. The Offi ce of the Ombudsman demonstrates inde-
pendence effectiveness. [sic]’ Botswana Joint Annual Report (2004), p. 9.
223 Mozambique Joint Annual Report (2007), p. 3.
224 See for example the 2006 Botswana Joint Annual Report in which the case of the ethnic 
minority group of the Basarwa (San) and the governments immediate implementation of 
the ruling is described in order to demonstrate the existence of the rule of law. The his-
toric Court case of the Basarwa against the government is available at: http://www.safl ii.
org/bw/cases/BWHC/2006/1.html.
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number of other reports,225 that even though it is laid down in the Constitu-
tion, in the exercise of their judicial functions the courts, judges, and other 
holders of judicial office shall be independent and shall be subject only to 
the Constitution and law, the judiciary is subject to the pressures of the 
executive.226 The fact that this interference by the executive is unwarranted 
is confirmed by a number of other reports.227
Considering the EU’s relative lack of emphasis on the separation of 
powers per se, in particular in relation to the role of the executive, it is rather 
surprising that in the consultation procedure under Article 96 of the Coto-
nou Convention (ex Article 366a of the Lomé IVbis Convention), the lack of 
a ‘genuine separation of powers’228 is often presented as one of the lacunae 
that need to be addressed by a country in order to end the procedure. It is 
difficult to isolate the individual criteria on the basis of which consultations 
are opened or concluded, since the EU institutions do not need to specify 
the reasons for opening of the procedure, as mention of a violation of the 
essential elements clause in general is enough to trigger it. However, the 
frequency with which the separation of powers is mentioned in the Council 
Conclusions and Decisions concerning the opening an/or conclusions of 
consultations is noteworthy and testifies to the fact that the EU considers 
the separation of powers an element of its rule of law definition, although 
its approach is somewhat intermittent and non-specific.229 Thus, the EU, 
while recognising the importance of the separation of powers for the rule 
of law, does not itself offer a detailed blueprint on specific sub-elements 
that should be included in the notion, other than guarantees for judicial 
independence. This leaves the final question on the definition of the notion 
of judicial independence as a focal point of the institutional elements of the 
rule of law, to be answered.
225 See for example the Uganda National Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 13.
226 Gambia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2007, p. 7.
227 See for example the Ghana Country Strategy Paper 2002-2007, p. 11 and the Botswana 
Country Strategy Paper 2002-2007, p. 4.
228 See for example the Explanatory Memorandum attached to the Commission’s Proposal 
for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of consultations with the Republic of 
Guinea-Bissau under Article 366a of the fourth ACP-EU Convention, COM(1999) 491 
fi nal, 12 November 1999, p. 3.
229 See for example the Council Decision 2001/510/EC of 25 June 2011 concluding con-
sultations with Côte d’Ivoire under Article 96 of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement 
(OJ[2001] L183/38), in which, in relation to the coup d’état in Côte d’Ivoire of 1999, the 
Union addresses the importance of an independent judiciary ‘ensured not only by the 
non-involvement of the executive in its operation, but also by the neutrality of the court 
bodies.’  Further see the Council Conclusions ‘Consultation with the ACP side concern-
ing Zimbabwe pursuant to Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement of 11 January 2002’, 
2409th General Affairs Council, Doc. 5243/02, 18-19 February 2002; Council Decision 
2007/642/EC of 1 October 2007 on the conclusion of consultation with the Republic of 
the Fiji Islands under Article 96 of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement and Article 37 of 
the Development Cooperation Instrument, OJ[2007] L260/15.
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3.3.3 The bias towards the element of judicial independence and the problems 
associated with the ambiguous concept of judicial accountability
As argued in chapter 2, the particular importance of judicial independence 
follows from the principle of legality, which presupposes that governments 
and public officials must act in accordance with the law and within the lim-
its set by the law.230 Moreover, at the 56th session of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, the EU Presidency reiterated that the independence of the 
judiciary and the legal profession are ‘fundamental prerequisites for the pro-
tection of human rights.’231 Furthermore, as demonstrated above, judicial 
independence fulfils a pivotal role for the separation of powers to function 
effectively. For these reasons, judicial independence certainly is the central 
institutional rule of law element, similar to the pivotal role allotted to access 
to justice in the category of procedural rule of law elements. Its ubiquitous 
presence is apparent from both the policy and the legal framework. As a 
result, most, if not all, multiannual and/or national indicative programmes 
refer to some form of judicial independence, or a sub-element of it, as an 
objective of cooperation.232 Often, judicial independence is mentioned as 
the single objective of rule of law reform, as, for example, the European 
Parliament has systematically done in its Annual Report on Human Rights 
and Democracy in the World.233 Closer examination, however, reveals an 
EU approach that is haphazard and one-sided in its understanding of the 
notion of judicial independence.
To start with, the EU has provided guidance for programming in the 
area of judicial independence. In the EU’s Sector Indicator Guidance for 
Programming, the specific objective of ‘ensured judicial independence and 
integrity’ is split into five components: 1. Tenure and mode of appoint-
ment (guaranteed tenure, mode of selection and role of the executive in the 
appointment); 2. Discipline (protection of judges from arbitrary removal or 
punishment and disciplinary action); 3. Respect of decision (protection of 
courts from undue criticism and pressures); 4. Public perception of judi-
cial independence (belief of the population that judges are able to make 
decisions free from direct or indirect interference by politicians); 5. Bribes 
230 EU Annual Report on Human Rights 1998-1999, adopted by the Council in October 1999, 
at pnt. 39; Report from the Commission on The Implementation of measures intended to 
promote observance of human rights and democratic principles in external relations for 
1996-1999, COM(2000) 726 fi nal, 14 November 2000, pp.12-13.
231 Statement of the EU Presidency at the 56th UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 
‘Independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors and the indepen-
dence of lawyers’, E/CN.4/RES/2000/42.
232 See for example the Philippines Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 5.
233 See for example European Parliament Report on the Annual Report on Human Rights 
and Democracy in the World 2016 and the European Union’s Policy on the Matter, 
(2017/2122(INI)), 27 November 2017, pnt. 36; European Parliament Report on the Annual 
Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2014 and the European Union’s 
Policy on the Matter, (2015/2229(INI)), 30 November 2015, pnt. 137.
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to judges, prosecutors, or court personnel (belief of the population that 
people can avoid conviction or receive a more lenient sentence through 
bribery).234 Evidently, at first sight, the first four indicators relate to judicial 
independence, whereas the last one relates to integrity. The provided indica-
tors on independence are concerned with, on the one hand, the objective 
independence of the individual judge (professionalism and protection), 
and, on the other hand, the subjective independence of the judiciary (how is 
the judiciary perceived by the population). However, whereas it would be 
expected that at a minimum a number of indicators would be included on 
the objective independence of the judiciary as a whole, these are absent.
From the footnote included in the guidance note, it is apparent that 
this enumeration stems from the United Nations Rule of Law Indicators;235 
an instrument drawn up in order to monitor changes in the performance 
and fundamental characteristics of criminal justice institutions in conflict 
and post-conflict situations.236 Indeed, this UN list provides four out of the 
five components under the similar title of ‘integrity and independence’237 
(the third component, respect of decision is not included). This particular 
‘basket’, however, is part of a structural set-up in which the indicators are 
grouped under three institutions (police, judicial system, and prisons), with 
four dimensions each (performance; integrity, transparency and account-
ability; treatment of vulnerable groups; and capacity). Thus, the particular 
indicators relating to judicial independence fall within the dimension of 
integrity, transparency and accountability, under the broader heading of 
the judicial system. According to the EU’s Guidance Note, however, the 
Union has split judicial independence from the enhanced transparency and 
accountability of court operations, as evidenced by a number of other indi-
cators provided in the Note, such as public access to criminal trials, publicly 
available reports on court spending, and the possibility of investigation of 
misconduct. It appears, therefore, that where the UN indicators see judicial 
independence as part of the larger question of accountability of court opera-
tions, the EU, on the face of it, seems to have taken a more binary approach, 
distinguishing between judicial independence (of individual judges) and 
the accountable operation of the judiciary.
As already stated at the start of this section, the argument here is that 
the Union’s conceptualisation of judicial independence is far from clear; a 
234 Sector Indicator Guidance for Programming – Sector Indicator Guidance Note – Rule of 
Law & Justice, EuropeAid (2013), pp. 15-16.
235 ‘Ibid., pp. 16-18. The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators are available at: http://www.
un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2011/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf.
236 Ibid., p. v.
237 The specifi c indicators are further backed up by other standards, such as the Basic Prin-
ciples on the Independence of the Judiciary (endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 
40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985) and the Universal Charter 
of the Judge (from the International Association of Judges), available at www.iaj-ium.org. 
See the United Nations Rule of Law Indicators – Implementation Guide and Project Tools 
(2011), pp. 69-73.
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structured approach whereby a distinction is made between judicial inde-
pendence of the judiciary as a whole in combination with safeguards for the 
independence of individual judges is absent. It is apparent from the analy-
sis of various other guidance notes that the EU has failed to adopt a clear 
definition of judicial independence with a corresponding set of indicators, 
instead proffering different sub-elements of judicial independence on the 
basis of a host of different indicators throughout its programming guides. 
For example, the 2009 Programming Fiche on ‘Rule of Law – The judicial 
system within the broader justice sector context’ briefly mentions judicial 
independence in combination with the separation of powers. It discusses 
the necessity of a clear constitutional, legal and administrative framework 
of independence describing the competencies of institutions and actors in 
the administration of justice and the respective jurisdictions between them, 
as well as judicial impartiality.238 Further on in the guide, wage structures, 
systems for recruitment and promotion, and initial and ongoing training 
of judicial staff – all elements that may contribute to independence – are 
also considered, but only in the context of national institutional reform 
strategies. The Programming Fiche provides an extensive list of ‘useful 
links for further information’, such as the indicators drawn up by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,239 the UN 
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,240 the International 
Principles on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and 
Prosecutors of the International Commission of Jurists,241 and the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct.242 To this list, the EU’s Good Governance 
Handbook243 adds the indicators of the Guidance for promoting judicial 
independence and impartiality of USAID.244 However, many national and 
238 Programming Guide for Strategy Papers, Programming Fiche on Rule of Law – The judi-
cial system within the broader justice sector context’ (2009), p. 3.
239 The indicators and reports are available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Judicia-
ry/Pages/Annual.aspx.
240 These principles, formulated in 1985 to assist Member States in their task of securing and 
promoting the independence of the judiciary, are available at: http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx.
241 This ‘practitioners guide’ of (2007) aims to ‘provide practical insight on the use of inter-
national principles on the independence and accountability of judges, lawyers and pros-
ecutors.’ It is available at: http://icj2.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/
Principles-independence-lawyers-publication-2007.pdf.
242 Available at: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Banga-
lore_principles.pdf.
243 The Handbook includes a reference to judicial independence in the context of the effi cien-
cy of the system of justice, See Governance Handbook on Promoting Good Governance 
in EC Development and Co-operation (2004), pp. 59-62.
244 Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacm007.pdf.
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multiannual indicative programmes245 make use of the indicators of the 
World Bank’s World Governance Indicator Reports.246
It goes beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse the overlaps and dif-
ferences between these various indicators and their underlying conceptu-
alisations of judicial independence. Nonetheless, against the background of 
the Union’s approach on the matter, three issues are noteworthy. First, the 
programming documents demonstrate preciously little of an EU conceptu-
alisation of judicial independence, rarely going beyond simply mentioning 
the need for judicial independence as such without further explanation. 
For example, a number of country strategy papers allude to judicial inde-
pendence – often the lack thereof – in the context of an overview of their 
political situation, with no further clarification or even factual description 
of the country’s current state of play in that area.247 Some reports discuss 
the objective criteria for the independence of individual judges, including 
such issues as the nomination, removal, sanctions, promotion, and salary,248 
while a large number of others merely focus on proper training for judges, 
prosecutors, and lawyers.249 This means that it is hard to identify a discern-
ible emphasis on any of the diverse aspects of judicial independence. It is 
remarkable, however, that neither the earlier reports and papers nor the 
more recent ones go into judicial independence of the judiciary as a whole. 
Any discussion on the organisation of the autonomy of the judiciary, of the 
funding of judicial institutions, or of the independent management of court 
systems seems to be absent. Thus, while there is a lot of focus on judicial 
independence, the EU’s conceptualisation of it seems to be limited to some 
elements of the independence of judges. Secondly, the programming docu-
ments connected to the 2014-2020 multiannual financial cycle, seem to make 
very limited use of any of the suggested indicators and their underlying 
ideas on judicial independence.250 Independence is often mentioned as 
an expected result, but rarely attributed specific indicators from the ones 
shown above on the basis of which the EU’s conceptualisation could be 
245 See for example the Lesotho National Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 25.
246 The Worldwide Governance Indicator Project reports aggregate and individual gover-
nance indicators for 215 economies since 1996. It includes six dimensions of governance: 
Voice and accountability; Political stability and absence of violence; Government effec-
tiveness; Regulatory quality; Rule of law; and Control of corruption. These aggregate 
indicators combine the views of a large number of citizens, enterprise, and expert survey 
respondents in industrial and developing countries, and are drawn from thirty individ-
ual data sources produced by a variety of institutions, think tanks, NGO’s, international 
organisations, and private sector fi rms. The rule of law related indicators are available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
247 See for example Timor-Leste Country Strategy Paper 2008-2013, p. 10; Indonesia Country 
Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p. 6; Pakistan Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p. 7.
248 See for example the Congo Kinshasa Joint Annual Report (2007), p. 11.
249 See for example Liberia Joint Annual Report (2007); Malawi Joint Annual Report (2002), 
p. 38; Rwanda Joint Annual Report (2007), p. 11; Zambia Country Strategy Paper and 
National Indicative Programme 2008-2013, p. 40.
250 Apart from the aforementioned World Governance Indicators.
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gleaned.251 Thirdly, it seems that, in contrast to the EU’s binary approach 
explained above, judicial independence is actually seen in terms of the 
accountability and transparency of the institutions of the broader justice 
sector.252 This approach, however, is not without its pitfalls.
Judicial independence and judicial accountability, although intertwined 
and mutually reinforcing, are not the same. As shown in chapter 2, judicial 
independence stems from the need for impartial adjudication in all cases 
with a judge who is unaffected by differences of power between litigating 
parties. Subsequently, the citizens’ ability to have confidence in impartial 
adjudication proves the certainty that their rights will be protected. Judicial 
accountability, conversely, has to do with ‘the responsibility to demon-
strate to society the use to which judicial independence has been put.’253 
In the context of good governance, accountability of institutional action 
has increasingly come to the forefront,254 with, for example, the Cotonou 
Agreement specifying good governance as the ‘transparent and account-
able management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for 
the purposes of equitable and sustainable development.’255 Accordingly, 
it entails ‘clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authori-
ties, transparent and accountable institutions.’256 However, a number of 
judiciaries in developing countries still have great difficulty establishing the 
independence of the judiciary as a whole as well as of individual judges 
from control of the executives, legislatures, political parties, and/or non-
governmental elites, as shown previously in the section on the separation 
of powers. In such circumstances, the demand for judicial accountability 
can muddle the reform efforts for independence. Whereas the reasons for 
this demand are quite obvious – the zest for judicial independence has 
come hand in hand with the fear of too much independence; inscrutable 
procedures and the roles of courts in invalidating new laws and policies 
have led to questions about the accountability of institutions in the judicial 
251 For an exception see the Bolivia MIP in which judicial independence as an expected result 
is linked to the subjective indicator of the citizen’s perception of the judicial system mea-
sured by the % of citizens who trust they will have a fair trial. Bolivia Multiannual Indica-
tive Programme 2014-2020, p. 18.
252 See for example Lesotho National Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 25; Zimbabwe 
National Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 19; Ghana National Indicative Programme 
2014-2020, p. 30; Nigeria National Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 32; Afghanistan 
Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 22; Niger Programme Indicatif Nation-
al 2014-2020, p. 30.
253 European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, Independence and Accountability of the 
Judiciary – ENCJ Report 2013-2014, 13 July 2014, p. 13.
254 In support of this see Commission Communication on Governance and Development, 
COM(2003) 615 fi nal, 20 October 2003, and Commission Communication on Governance 
in the European Consensus on Development – Towards a harmonised approach within 
the European Union, COM(2006) 421 fi nal, 30 August 2006.
255 Article 9(3) Cotonou Agreement.
256 Article 9(3) Cotonou Agreement.
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sector257 – it is necessary to keep a conceptual boundary between the two. 
For, even though transparency and accountability certainly add positively 
to the subjective views on the institutions by the populace and the judiciary 
itself,258 and, thus, to subjective independence, ‘[e]xcellent performance 
cannot, of course, … replace formal safeguards.’259 Therefore, even if it is 
undoubtedly important for institutions to behave in an accountable and 
transparent manner, part of the definition of judicial independence and the 
rule of law per se it is not. Furthermore, and adding to the already existing 
conceptual opacity, there is a tendency to assume agreement on the meaning 
of the term accountability, as with independence itself – which, as a concept, 
is far more developed – so that it is rarely explicitly defined.260
Yet, this is exactly what the EU does seem to promote. Against the back-
ground of strengthened conditionality of the EU’s values, including the rule 
of law, put forward by the Agenda for Change and the Budget for Europe 
2020 Communications,261 the lack of a clear conceptualisation of judicial 
independence, especially in combination with the outlined approach 
towards the ambiguous concept of judicial accountability, is problematic 
from the perspective of legal certainty. However, while legally problematic, 
this approach could be explained on the basis of its practical expediency 
in the context of development cooperation policy. After all, ‘due to the 
inherently different operating contexts across countries’, it is, according to 
EuropeAid, ‘not possible to provide an exhaustive list of sector indicators 
which cover every possible situation in a meaningful way.’262 Thus, offering 
a handful of sub-elements of the rule of law’s element of judicial indepen-
dence might be a convenient way to cover the diversity of all possible exist-
ing national situations. However, while national requirements play a role 
257 Linn Hammergren ‘Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: The Shifting Bal-
ance in Reform Goals’ Offi ce of Democracy and Governance USAID Guidance of Promo-
ting Judicial Independence and Impartiality (2002), pp. 149-157 at 149.
258 The ENCJ Report 2013-2014 distinguishes between three indicators of subjective inde-
pendence: independence as seen by society in general; independence as perceived by 
court users; and independence as perceived by judges.
259 European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, Independence and Accountability of the 
Judiciary – ENCJ Report 2013-2014, 13 July 2014, p. 9.
260 The ENCJ 2013-2014 Report on Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary is an 
exception with its practical approach towards both concepts.
261 See Commission Staff Working Paper on A Budget for Europe 2020: the current system 
of funding, the challenges ahead, the results of stakeholders consultation and different 
options on the main horizontal and sectoral issues, SEC(2011) 868 fi nal, 29 June 2011, 
p. 205. According to Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on 
the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund, ‘[t]he Union will adapt its 
assistance through dynamic, result-oriented and country-specifi c measures … according 
to the country’s situation and commitment and progress with regard to issues such as 
good governance, human rights, democracy, rule of law and its ability to conduct reforms 
and to meet the demands and needs of its peoples.
262 Sector Indicator Guidance for Programming – Sector Indicator Guidance Note – Rule of 
Law & Justice, EuropeAid (2013), p. 1
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and as a matter of course need to be considered,263 this does not negate the 
fact that at least a minimum definition could have been considered nor the 
more obvious fact that at the strategic level the EU’s definition of judicial 
independence is incomplete, haphazard, and unclear.
3.3.4 Conclusions
This section explored the question to what extent the EU’s legal framework 
and practice confirmed the institutional rule of law elements established 
in the previous chapters. It was demonstrated that the EU has identified 
the rule of law in terms of reform of rule of law institutions, thereby estab-
lishing such reform as a measurable element in itself. In other words, this 
section has shown that the Union conceptualises the rule of law by way of 
the strengthening of rule of law related institutions. Following this, it was 
asserted that the Union indeed recognises the significance of the separa-
tion of powers and, more specifically, of judicial independence – verifying 
those elements of the framework. However, it was furthermore argued that 
for both notions the attempt at conceptualisation has been haphazard and 
incomplete. In relation to the separation of powers it was demonstrated 
that while the EU’s legal framework would allow for detailed guidelines 
on the way the three powers of government are balanced and checked 
against each other, very little direction is provided by way of more specific 
requirement. Furthermore, it was asserted that the exception to this is the 
judiciary branch and the element of judicial independence. The omnipres-
ent nature of this rule of law component has, however, not led to a detailed 
blueprint outlining the minimum level of judicial independence expected. 
Instead it was shown that the EU has opted for an approach that leans 
heavily on certain aspects of judicial independence, such as requirements 
for the independence of individual judges, much to the detriment of others, 
such as certain preconditions in order to safeguard the independence of the 
judiciary as a whole.
263 The Reference Document on ‘Support to Justice and the Rule of Law’ goes as far as stating 
that ‘[t]he fi nal goal for initiatives carried out according to this strategy should always be 
capacity development and sustainable results. This cannot be donor (supply) driven, and 
it cannot be based on donor objectives. Further, it cannot be based purely on a gaps anal-
ysis, which identifi es interventions through focus on the weaknesses in national systems 
and capacities, without taking full advantage of existing strengths and the advantages 
of their mobilisation. Instead, the assistance process must start with a determination of 
what the partner country requires in the way of services, whether it is feasible to deliver 
these services, how this can be achieved, what the partner country can do by itself, what 
the partner country cannot do by itself, and why this is the case.’ However, the impor-
tance of clear defi nitions of what is required by the donor is apparent from the fact that 
‘there may be a difference between what national counterparts want and what they really 
need.’ ‘Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 15 on ‘Support to Justice and 
the Rule of Law’ EuropeAid (2012), p. 54.
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3.4 Interim conclusions
This part of the chapter tested the analytical framework of rule of law ele-
ments, as established in Part I of the thesis, against the EU’s legal frame-
work and practice in the area of development cooperation. For each of the 
three categories the question was examined whether, and if so to what 
extent, the elements established previously were reflected in practice. It 
was shown that the formal element of legality, which lies at the heart of the 
rule of law debate of legal scholars, does not occupy a similar place in the 
conceptualisation of the rule of law in the EU’s development cooperation 
policy. Furthermore, it was asserted that the procedural element of judicial 
review, one of the central elements in the national traditions through which 
the rule of law is safeguarded, has not been fleshed out in a corresponding 
manner in development cooperation. In contrast, it was demonstrated that 
the centrality of the element of access to justice has been recognised at the 
strategic level, in the legal framework, and at the level of implementation. 
However, it was also highlighted that access to justice via traditional, reli-
gious or customary means often contravenes rule of law related principles, 
such as clarity and predictability. In relation to the procedural element of 
enforcement, it was argued that, even though it is an acknowledged means 
through which the rule of law is applied in practice, it has not been fleshed 
out in sufficient detail. Lastly, it was demonstrated that the EU in its devel-
opment cooperation policy perceives the rule of law mainly in terms of 
institutional elements. This means that the rule of law is conceptualised by 
way of reform of rule of law related institutions such as courts, policy, and 
detention centres. Furthermore, it was shown that judicial independence, as 
the main component of the separation of powers, has been acknowledged 
as a central element through which the rule of law is buttressed, as it has 
been recognised in both the national traditions and in legal theory.
4. General findings
Having tested the theoretical rule of law framework and its three categories 
of formal, procedural, and institutional rule of law elements against the 
legal and policy framework of the EU’s development cooperation, in this 
section the general findings will be discussed. More particularly, these are 
the findings that transcend the categories of the analytical framework, as the 
individual elements have been analysed in the previous section. The gen-
eral findings are concerned with the relative weight of the three categories 
examined as well as the overall picture of the definition of the rule of law in 
this policy area. It will be argued that the EU applies a rule of law definition 
in its development cooperation policy in which procedural and institutional 
elements are given precedence over formal ones. More particularly, it will 
be shown that whereas it is apparent from the legal and strategic frame-
work that such procedural elements as judicial review and enforcement are 
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part and parcel of the Union’s rule of law concept, the examination of the 
programming documents indicates that a rather institutional understanding 
permeates these elements. In fact, it will be demonstrated that the institu-
tional element of judicial reform strongly underpins both the procedural 
and institutional elements making up the EU’s understanding of the rule of 
law in this policy area.
The chapter will continue by offering two explanations for this. First, 
it will be demonstrated that the international framework of development 
cooperation within which the EU’s policy is situated, emphasises an insti-
tutional rule of law approach, mostly for reasons of a practical nature hav-
ing to do with the effective distribution of development aid. Secondly, the 
prominence accorded to the institutional understanding of the rule of law 
can be further explained by the impact of two related policy areas, namely 
good governance and security sector reform. It will be argued that the rise 
of both areas has, for reasons explained below, turned the focus of the EU’s 
development cooperation policy to issues of institutional capacity-building 
and reform of the justice sector. The section will finish by pointing out some 
definitional problems related to the Union’s indiscriminate use of indica-
tor lists used and produced by other organisations. It will be asserted that 
although the use of indicators is standard methodology in a development 
policy based, the haphazard way the EU has made use of these indicator 
lists betrays a lack of a comprehensive definition of several rule of law ele-
ments discussed throughout this chapter.
4.1 The EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in development 
cooperation: a strong institutional understanding
The above analysis has made it clear that the notion of the rule of law is 
attributed a central place in the EU’s development cooperation policy. At the 
strategic level, i.e. in the various Council Conclusions, Commission Com-
munications, Declarations, and Staff Working Papers related to EU develop-
ment cooperation, the rule of law is emphasised as a value that needs to be 
‘strengthened’, ‘consolidated’, and ‘spread’.264 However, is was also shown 
that neither the New European Consensus on Development nor the previ-
ous Consensus on Development and its Agenda for Change elaborate on the 
notion, and many Regional or Country Strategy Paper do not go much beyond 
statements such as ‘[m]uch remains to be done … to pave the way for a genu-
ine rule of law.’265 Thus, the many programming documents were examined 
in order to be able to extract the EU’s rule of law definition from practice.
Turning to the EU’s definition of the rule of law in relation to the three 
categories of the framework which was tested against the Union’s develop-
ment cooperation policy, it is apparent from the examination undertaken 
264 Commission Communication on Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced 
Partnerships, COM(2001) 469 fi nal, 4 September 2001, p. 28.
265 West Africa Regional Strategy Paper 2008-2013, p. 12.
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in section 3, that more weight is attributed to rule of law elements of the 
second and third categories, i.e. elements that are procedural and institutional 
in nature. In relation to the first category of formal rule of law elements, it 
was shown that the distinct lack of legality as part of the rule of law in the 
legal framework and the funding instruments underpinning the develop-
ment cooperation policy, is, unsurprisingly, mirrored in the programming 
documents. With some exceptions,266 legality, or requirements related to 
the transparency of the legal framework and/or the quality of laws, rarely 
appear in the rule of law related benchmarks.
In relation to the three procedural rule of law elements identified in 
section 3.2, judicial review, access to justice, and enforcement, the follow-
ing two general findings can be observed. Firstly, the element of access 
to justice runs as a red thread throughout the reports. As demonstrated, 
this emphasis can be explained by the fact that promoting access to justice 
is a specific objective of the EU-ACP cooperation as well as the financing 
instruments,267 in combination with the Commission’s introduction of the 
rights based approach in the development cooperation policy, which, in the 
context of the support given to the justice systems, stresses the facilitation 
of access to justice for all end-users of that same system.268 As asserted in 
section 3.2.2, the EU has adopted a broad understanding of access to justice 
that goes beyond access to court to also include access via more traditional, 
religious and/or customary means. More particularly, in the light of the fact 
that these means oftentimes may run counter to such rule of law elements 
as the separation of powers, predictability, and judicial independence, it 
was shown that the Union has demonstrated a conceptualisation that takes 
these concerns on board.269 Since its paramount goal is access to justice for 
even the most impoverished, disadvantaged, and remotely located, the pro-
gramming documents show that it facilitates the non-state forms of access 
in various developing countries, while at the same time ensuring that, over 
time, the emphasis shifts towards more regulated forms.
Secondly, in relation to the other two elements, judicial review and 
enforcement, the EU’s conceptualisation of either element has something 
in common. Even though both elements are clearly procedural in nature – 
having to do with the impartial administration of the law – the EU views 
both elements through a noticeably institutional lens. In relation to judicial 
review, it was asserted that, instead of focussing on the role and powers of 
the judiciary and how these are improved/set up in order to prevent abuse 
of power by the other two branches, the Union fails to articulate how the 
judiciary is to check and control, and within what limits, the legislature and 
266 See section 3.1.3.
267 Annex I section A(I)(a)(ii) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014; Article 2(1)(a)(ii) Regulation 
(EU) No 235/2014.
268 Council Conclusions ‘Action Plan on human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019’ Doc. 
10897/15, 20 July 2015, pp. 8, 22.
269 See section 3.2.2.2.
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the executive. As was argued in the relevant section,270 such an articula-
tion would have to clearly set out ideas on the separation of powers, the 
interplay and the balance of powers between the three branches, as well as 
the specific powers and functions of the judiciary. However, it was shown 
that the EU’s ideas on this rule of law element do not seem to go beyond the 
mention of judicial independence and a focus on various elements related 
to judicial reform more generally, such as infrastructure and the training 
of individual judges. Similarly, in relation to the element of enforcement, 
which should deal with the efficiency and human rights aspects of the 
implementation and execution of judgments, it was demonstrated that, 
while the Union conceptualises this element in its strategic documents in 
terms of, amongst others, fair enforcement of courts judgments and an 
effective probation system, 271 the programming documents mostly stress 
the need for capacity building. This means that enforcement is looked at in 
terms of inter alia the existence of police cars, computers, and the state of 
prison buildings, rather than the efficacious operation of enforcement and 
the institutions involved in terms of human rights.
In relation to the institutional rule of law elements, it was argued that 
in the context of development cooperation, the EU’s rule of law definition 
has been heavily geared towards institutional reform of the justice sector, 
i.e. improving the capacity and quality of the actors involved in the judicial 
process. So much so, that, as evidenced by the findings above, also the 
procedural elements of judicial review and enforcement are, to a large extent, 
conceptualised in terms of the strengthening of the institutional capacity of 
inter alia courts and the police force. In fact, it was asserted that institutional 
reform of the judiciary has become a particular rule of law related goal in 
itself, i.e. rule of law reform as judicial reform.
Interestingly, the examination in section 3.3 highlighted that regardless 
of this ubiquitous institutional understanding of the rule of law, neither the 
element of the separation of powers nor the element of judicial indepen-
dence have been clearly articulated. In fact, in relation to the former, it was 
demonstrated that, even though some references in the legal framework 
pertain to the necessity of the separation of powers as a means of strength-
ening the rule of law,272 many of the programming documents show a 
continued emphasis on institutional capacity building across the years.273 
This is largely due to the less-than developed and under-resourced state 
of the judiciary in the countries examined, which require the building of 
institutions from the ground up. However, such challenges have very little 
to do with the consolidation of a functioning separation of powers. Where 
the documents do touch upon some form of balancing between the legisla-
ture, executive, and the judiciary, the focus shifts to the question of judicial 
270 Section 3.2.1.
271 See section 3.2.3.
272 Article 9 Cotonou Agreement.
273 See section 3.3.2.
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independence. However, as was demonstrated by the analysis undertaken 
in section 3.3.3, the EU has failed to outline a comprehensive definition of 
the notion, omitting elements concerned with the judiciary as a whole (not 
just individual judges), the organisation, the funding or the independent 
management of the judiciary.
In the light of the foregoing, the emerging picture of the rule of law 
in development cooperation is one that includes the procedural elements of 
access to justice and, to a lesser extent, enforcement. However, it is appar-
ent that the Union’s conceptualisation of the rule of law leans heavily on 
the institutional components of judicial reform and judicial independence. 
More particularly, it was asserted that, while the legal framework and 
strategy documents put forward both institutional and procedural of rule of 
law related elements, in fact, the element of judicial reform was shown to 
permeate these at the more practical level of implementation.
4.2 The EU’s institutional understanding of the rule of law in 
development cooperation explained
From the above examination of the three categories of rule of law elements, 
it is apparent that the EU applies a rule of law definition in its development 
cooperation policy in which procedural and institutional elements are given 
precedence over formal ones. Furthermore, within this definition, the formal 
element of legality – the focal point of the rule of law in the national rule of 
law traditions and for legal scholars – is only touched upon in passing. One 
of the explanations for this discrepancy could be that in situation of fragil-
ity in developing countries there are more pressing issues than the quality 
of laws. In the least developed and low-income countries other rule of law 
concerns are much more immediate, such as the accessibility of any form of 
justice, particularly for women, children, and minorities, the existence of suf-
ficiently trained judges, and detention conditions in accordance with human 
rights.274 In such circumstances the focus will first and foremost be on capac-
ity building for strong institutions rather than on formal elements.275 There 
are two further reasons to shed light on why specifically the rule of law’s 
institutional understanding, i.e. the focus on reform of the judicial system 
and the actors within it, has been accorded such a prominent role. The first 
reason pertains to the influence of the overall international framework 
within which the EU’s development cooperation policy has taken shape. 
The second one is concerned with the rise of two areas, closely connected to 
development cooperation, namely good governance and security.
274 New Consensus on Development (2017), p. 35; Commission Communication on Towards 
an EU response to situations of fragility – engaging in diffi cult environments for sustain-
able development, stability and peace, COM(2007) 643 fi nal, 25 October 2007, pp. 8-9.
275 Joint Communication of the Commission and High Representative on A Strategic 
Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action, JOIN(2017) 21 fi nal, 7 June 2017, p. 3; 
New Consensus on Development (2017), p. 32.
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4.2.1 The path dependency of the broader field of development cooperation 
on the EU’s approach towards to the rule of law
As explained in section 2 of the present chapter, the EU’s development 
cooperation policy takes place within the confines of internationally agreed 
to commitments in the UN and OECD context. The rule of law is found as a 
sub-target of sustainable development goal 16, which is to promote ‘peace-
ful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to 
justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at 
all levels.’276 Furthermore, in the OECD’s Paris Declaration on Aid Effec-
tiveness of 2005, in their efforts to scale up for more effective aid, donors 
undertook, inter alia, to utilise their partner countries’ national institutions 
and systems in order to strengthen them and promote sustainability.277 
In the implementation at the EU level of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, 
the EU has been guided by the 2007 European Court of Auditors Special 
Report on the effectiveness of technical assistance in the context of capacity 
development.278 In this report, the need for increased focus on improv-
ing existing institutional capacity is pushed forward.279 Advice, which 
was implemented in the EU through the so-called ‘Backbone strategy’ 
on reforming technical cooperation and project implementation units for 
external aid provided by the European Commission.280 In that strategy the 
focus on institutional capacity development is addressed as one of a set of 
principles to guide future development cooperation.281
The rationale for such persistent institutional focus is a practical one. 
For societies to function properly, and, moreover, for development aid to 
be distributed effectively, public sector organisations need to function at 
least at some level. This latter point was also mentioned by the European 
Parliament in their 2013 Report with recommendations to the Commission 
on EU donor coordination on development aid in which the development of 
capacity was stressed so that countries ‘can build up the skills, know-how 
and institutions required to manage their own development effectively.’282 
276 See the Annex of the General Assembly Resolution 71/313 ‘Work of the Statistical Com-
mission pertaining to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, A/71/L.75, 6 July 
2017 [emphasis added].
277 See point 4(i) ‘We commit ourselves to taking concrete and effective action to address the 
remaining challenges, including: weaknesses in partner countries’ institutional capaci-
ties to develop and implement results-driven national development strategies.’ The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) is available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effec-
tiveness/34428351.pdf.
278 European Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 6 of 2007 on the effectiveness of technical 
assistance in the context of capacity development, OJ[2007] C312/02.
279 Ibid., pnts. 9-11.
280 European Commission ‘Reforming Technical Cooperation and Project Implementation 
Units for External Aid provided by the European Commission – A Backbone Strategy’ 
July 2008.
281 Ibid., p. 13
282 European Parliament Report with recommendation to the Commission on EU donor 
coordination on development aid, (2013/2057(INL)), 15 November 2013, pnt. 8 [empha-
sis added].
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Moreover, according to the Commission, improving institutions ‘is one of 
the most persistent and difficult challenges in development and develop-
ment cooperation. At the same time, nothing is more crucial for achieving 
sustained progress, growth and poverty reduction.’283 For the rule of 
law, this institutional focus has undeniably entailed a focus on the justice 
sector,284 with a side role for the legislature.285 Thus, it is apparent that the 
EU’s lopsided approach towards its definition of the rule of law, whereby 
institutional reform, and, more particularly, judicial reform, is highlighted, 
follows, at least partially, as a consequence of the international framework 
in which development cooperation takes place.
4.2.2 The institutional focus against the background of the rise of good 
governance and security
4.2.2.1 The rise of good governance in development cooperation and its influence 
on the EU’s rule of law definition
The institutional focus can also be explained on the basis of more substan-
tive reasons. At the end of the 80s, the development debate saw the emer-
gence of the notion of (good) governance.286 The idea behind it was that the 
creation of a regulative environment is a decisive precondition for reducing 
poverty and achieving sustainable development. Moreover, as already 
mentioned above, when it comes to managing resources and aid, the 
existence of a (well) functioning state is required. Consequently, ‘the state 
and its administrative capacities play a crucial role in the good governance 
debate… Improving governance in the development context, therefore, 
means building and strengthening state institutions and capacities.’287
For the EU, until the late 70s value considerations were neither de jure 
nor de facto part of its foreign policy in general, or of development coopera-
tion in particular.288 The Union’s policy on the latter reflected the conven-
283 Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 1 ‘Institutional Assessment and 
Capacity Development’ EuropeAid (2007), p. 5.
284 See for example the Programming Fiche ‘Rule of Law – The judicial system with the 
broader justice sector context (2009).
285 See the Programming Fiche ‘Rule of Law – The Parliaments’ (2006) in which the law-
making process is addressed from the institutional perspective of capacity building.
286 See for example the 1989 World Bank Report on Sub-Sahara Africa – From Crisis to Sus-
tainable Growth, A Long-term Perspective Study, p. 3 in which the failure of develop-
ment aid in that region was analysed and serious governance issues were identifi ed, such 
as the ‘deteriorating quality of government’, and ‘weak judicial systems and arbitrary 
decision-making’. See also the OECD Report on ‘Participatory Development and Good 
Governance’ (1995), available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/accountable-effective-
institutions/31857685.pdf, as well as the UNDP Report on ‘Governance for sustainable 
human development: an UNDP Policy Document (1997).
287 Tanja A. Börzel, Yasemin Pamuk& Andreas Stahn ‘Good Governance in the European 
Union’ Berlin Working Paper on European Integration No. 7 (2008), p. 8.
288 Toby King ‘Human Rights on the Development Policy of the European Community: 
Towards a European World Order?’ 28 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1997), pp. 
51-99 at 53. The author argues that the failure to reach agreement on political issues led to 
the omission of any reference to political values in the Rome Treaty.
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tional view of the time, namely that development was a precondition for 
respect for human rights and democratic concerns rather than vice versa.289 
More particularly, similar to most aid donors at the time,290 the policy of the 
EU and its Member States was based on the belief that while EU assistance 
was predicated on the existence of a democratic government, the principle 
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states should be observed.291 
However, practice showed that EU assistance did not lead to the desired 
results in a number of developing countries. Against the background of 
international recognition of the importance of governance, the 1991 Council 
Resolution on human rights, democracy, and development acknowledged 
the importance of the promotion of the EU’s values and the link between 
development and governance.292 Moreover, the Cotonou Agreement 
included good governance as a ‘fundamental element’ of the agreement.293 
Accordingly, Article 9(3) states that:
In the context of a political and institutional environment that upholds human 
rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, good governance is the trans-
parent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial 
resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails 
clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent 
and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and distri-
bution of resources and capacity building for elaborating and implementing 
measures aiming in particular at preventing and combating corruption. [Empha-
sis added]
From this passage, as well as from the 2003 Commission Communication 
on Governance and Development, the state-centric approach to governance 
is clearly visible. Not only does governance concern ‘the state’s ability to 
serve the citizen’, it is also ‘a key component of policies and reforms for 
poverty reduction, democratisation and global security. This is why institu-
tional capacity-building, particularly in the area of good governance and the 
289 Bartels (2008), p. 2.
290 See for example the world bank’s view on non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
states, David Williams The World Bank and Social Transformation in International Politics 
London: Routledge (2008), pp. 48-74.
291 1975 Annual Report on Political Cooperation, Bull EC 10-1975, p. 96.
292 Resolution on human rights, democracy and development of the Council, and Mem-
ber States meeting within the Council of 28 November 1991. In it, the Council states 
that ‘human rights and democracy form part of a larger set of requirements in order to 
achieve balanced and sustainable development. In this context, account should be tak-
en of the issue of good governance.’ Accordingly, ‘The Council stresses the importance 
of good governance … The Community and Member States will support the efforts of 
developing countries to advance good governance and these principles will be central in 
their existing or new development cooperation relationships.’
293 Under the Lomé IVbis Convention, governance had merely been ‘a particular aim of 
cooperation’.
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rule of law is one of the six priority areas for [EU] development policy…’.294 
The notion of governance is further fleshed out in the Reference Docu-
ment ‘Analysing and addressing governance in sector operations’295 and 
the Handbook on promoting good governance in EC development and 
cooperation.296 It is split in three overlapping dimensions. The first dimen-
sion refers to ‘rules, interests, resources and power’. The second dimension 
includes governance principles such as participation, inclusion, transpar-
ency, and accountability. The third dimension encompasses six ‘clusters’, 
the third of which is ‘reinforcement of the rule of law and the administra-
tion of justice.’297 When combining the state-centric approach with these 
dimensions, the focus of rule of law promotion very quickly shifts to the 
judicial sector and its operation. In other words, to ‘access for all to an 
independent justice system.’298 Moreover, the influence of governance on 
development cooperation also explains the conceptual confusion between 
judicial independence and judicial accountability,299 pointed out in section 
3.3.3 above. Through governance, and its insistence on transparency and 
accountability, the already complicated concept of judicial independence 
294 Commission Communication on Governance and Development, COM(2003) 615 fi nal, 
20 October 2003, p. 3 [emphasis added]. Also see Commission Communication on Gov-
ernance in the European Consensus on Development – Towards a harmonized approach 
within the European Union, COM(2006) 421 fi nal, 30 August 2006.
295 Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 4 ‘Analysing and addressing gover-
nance in sector operations’ EuropeAid (2008).
296 ‘Handbook on Promoting Good Governance in EC Development and Cooperation’ Euro-
peAid (2004).
297 Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 4 ‘Analysing and addressing gov-
ernance in sector operations’ EuropeAid (2008), p. 11. The other clusters are: support to 
democratisation; promotion and protection of human rights; enhancement of the role of 
civil society; public administration reform, management of public fi nances and civil ser-
vice reform; decentralisation and local government reform.
298 Commission Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Develop-
ment – Towards a harmonized approach within the European Union’ COM(2006) 421 
fi nal, 30 August 2006, p. 5.
299 The EU increasingly muddles the conceptual boundaries between good governance and 
the other EU values. On the one hand, good governance seems to be restricted to the 
proper functioning of the state administration, separate from the other values. On the 
other hand, an environment without democratic principles, respect for human rights, 
and the rule of law will hardly lead to good governance. Or, in the somewhat confusing 
words of the Commission in its 2003 Communication on Governance and Development: 
‘As the concepts of human rights, democratisation and democracy, the rule of law, civil 
society, decentralised power sharing, and sound public administration gain importance 
and relevance as a society develops into a more sophisticated political system, gover-
nance evolves into good governance’, Commission Communication on Governance and 
Development, COM(2003) 615 fi nal, 20 October 2003, p. 4. The Council has added to this 
‘that a holistic approach on governance also entails mainstreaming of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, good governance and rule of law to all policy sectors.’ Conclu-
sions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council – Governance in the European Consensus on Development: 
Towards a harmonised approach within the European Union, Doc. 14024/06, 16 October 
2006.
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has been enveloped in the vaguely defined notion of judicial accountability. 
As already argued, these are two different issues coming from two different 
perspectives. The rule of law itself merely requires judicial independence; it 
is the notion of good governance that commands accountability.
4.2.2.2 The increasing importance of the security – development nexus and its 
influence on the EU’s rule of law definition
Without offering a detailed exposé on the relationship between security and 
development cooperation,300 a few remarks must nonetheless be made on 
how this nexus has tipped the balance towards an institutionally oriented 
EU rule of law definition. Although the literature points out that the exact 
nature of the development-security nexus remains unclear,301 it is apparent 
that for the European Union, the objectives of development cooperation pol-
icy and security are intertwined.302 As an ‘important and complementary 
aspects of EU relations with third countries’,303 development and security 
are, at a minimum, ‘equally desirable and potentially mutually reinforcing 
goals.’304 The Commission formulated it rather bluntly, when it stated that 
‘there can be no development without peace and security; and no peace and 
security without development.’305 In essence, this two-way relationship is 
supported by the belief that an increased level of development reduces the 
level of insecurity, while, in turn, instability keeps the levels of develop-
300 The literature on this topic is extensive, see for example Gorm Rye Olsen ‘Changing 
European Concerns: Security and Complex Emergencies instead of Development’ in 
Karen Arts & Anna K. Dickson (eds) EU Development Cooperation. From Model to Symbol 
Manchester: Manchester University Press (2004), pp. 80-100.
301 Spernbauer (2014), p. 32. Youngs points out that the EU’s broad commitment to ensure 
coherence between development and security incorporates two very different sets of pol-
icy issues that are often confl ated by the EU policy makers. One set of issues relates to the 
security situation within the developing states themselves and the problems these pose 
for socio-economic development. Another issue relates to the EU’s own security concerns 
and the way these are assuaged by, it is claimed, enhanced development efforts. Rich-
ard Youngs ‘Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro-Platitude’ 30 Journal of 
European Integration (2008), pp. 420-421. The latter policy strand was pithily summarised 
by Commissioner Ferrero Waldner, who, in relation to the development of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, stated that if the EU does not export stability, it risks import-
ing instability and will thus put its own security at risk; Benita Ferrero Waldner ‘Wider 
Europe – the Last Five Years, SPEECH/09/467, 13 October 2009, available at: http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-467_en.htm. Also see Commission Commu-
nication on The Instruments for external assistance under the future fi nancial perspective 
2007-2013, COM(2004) 626 fi nal, 29 September 2004, p. 3.
302 Commission Communication on Increasing the impact of EU development policy: an 
Agenda for Change, COM(2011) 637 fi nal, 13 October 2011, p. 3.
303 European Consensus on Development (2006), pnt. 37.
304 David Chandler ‘The Security-Development Nexus and the rise of anti-foreign policy’ 10 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding (2007), pp. 362-386 at 366. Also see Youngs (2008), 
pp. 419-437 at 420.
305 Commission Communication on Policy Coherence for Development – Accelerating 
progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals, COM(2005) 134 fi nal, 12 
April 2005, p. 4.
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ment low.306 Thus, whereas there is no development in chronically insecure 
environments,307 by contrast, stable living conditions lead to increased 
human capacity, higher investment levels, and have a positive impact on 
economic growth and development.308 At the policy level, the EU has often 
recognised the increasingly close link between development and security. 
Security is stressed as a ‘first condition for development’,309 and ‘key to 
regional stability, poverty reduction and conflict prevention.’310 Moreover, 
‘[r]eforming the security sector in post-conflict environments is critical 
to the consolidation of peace and for promoting poverty reduction. Only 
where legitimate State authority is expanded through the rule of law and 
good governance will countries be prevented from relapsing into conflict 
and losing development achievements.’311
In turn, development is recognised as a precondition for peace and 
security. For these reasons, ‘the EU will continue to work to ensure that 
international security concerns are dealt with in synergy with support 
to development and good governance so as to achieve a coherent policy 
mix.’312 At the same time, the representatives of the EU Member States 
have underlined that ‘peace, security and stability, as well as human rights, 
democracy and good governance, are essential elements for sustainable 
economic growth and poverty eradication.’313 Moreover, the fragility of 
developing, conflict-prone states is to be addressed ‘through governance 
reforms, the rule of law, anti-corruption measures and the building of viable 
state institution.’314
Against this oft-recognised connection between development and 
security, in the last decade the EU has strengthened its concept of security 
sector reform (SSR). SSR focuses on ‘strengthening and reforming those 
institutions that are key to maintaining security and the rule of law’ and 
represents ‘a holistic approach to the reform of state institutions.’315 As such, 
it concerns reform of both the bodies which provide security to citizens
and the state institutions responsible for management and oversight of 
306 Paul Collier The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done 
About It? Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007), pp. 17-35.
307 Commission Communication on Governance and Development, COM(2003) 615 fi nal, 
p. 7.
308 Community Communication on Confl ict prevention, COM(2001) 211, 11 April 2001, p. 5.
309 European Security Strategy (2003), p. 13.
310 Commission Communication on Governance and Development, COM(2003) 615 fi nal, 
p. 7.
311 Statement on behalf of the European Union by Pedro Serrano, delegation of the EU to the 
United Nations, New York, 29 June 2010.
312 Council Conclusions, 2622nd External Relations Council, Doc. 12724/04, 22-23 November 
2004, p. 27.
313 Ibid.
314 European Consensus on Development (2006), pnt. 20.
315 Eva Gross ‘Assessing the EU’s Approach to Security Sector Reform’ European Parliament 
Policy Study (2013), p. 7.
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those bodies.316 The rule of law’s key role is underlined in a number of EU 
SSR related documents. For example, in the Council’s draft Conclusions on 
a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform, the point is made that ‘[p]
reventing and resolving violent conflict and addressing fragile states are 
part of the EU’s efforts to reduce insecurity and eradicate poverty through 
strengthening good governance and the rule of law in third countries.’317
In the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Com-
munication on EU support for SSR, the Commission has highlighted the 
link between the rule of law and institutional reform in the justice sector 
when it stated that SSR support in ACP countries is in the area of ‘justice 
reform, law enforcement and civil management, especially in the area of 
rule of law. This often includes capacity building of law enforcement agen-
cies, key ministries, legal reforms and access to justice for the population, by 
strengthening and modernising legal institutions that are primarily respon-
sible for the administration of justice.’318 This focus on the justice sector, 
and in particular on the judiciary, can be explained for the following reason. 
As shown above, the security sector is closely related to the justice sector, 
which, in turn, bears a close relation to the rule of law.319 Both include 
several of the same institutions and actors, such as courts, law enforcement 
bodies, prosecutors, and the penitentiary system.320 Moreover, both sectors 
share functional duties, such as securing the rights of individuals and the 
state,321 as well as the protection of the former against the powers of the 
latter. In other words, the judiciary is both a mechanism to hold security 
services accountable and a security provider itself.322
In sum, the EU’s bias towards an institutionally oriented rule of law 
conceptualisation can to a large extent be explained on the basis of develop-
316 Commission Communication on A concept for European Community support for secu-
rity sector reform, COM(2006) 253 fi nal, 24 May 2006, p. 3.
317 Draft Council Conclusions ‘A Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform’, Doc. 
9967/06, 6 June 2006, pnt. 2.
318 Commission Staff Working Document containing the Annexes to the Commission Com-
munication on A concept for European Community support for security sector reform, 
SEC(2006) 658, 24 May 2006, p. 8.
319 According to the Reference Document on the connection between the rule of law and the 
operation of the justice sector, both are ‘fundamentally inter-connected’, as ‘[t]he justice 
sector should both uphold the rule of law, and function according to its principles. The 
justice sector, and all professionals working within it, benefi t from consistent application 
of, and respect for, the rule of law from all governmental authorities and bodies. Clearly, 
the rule of law cannot exist if the justice sector does not comply with, apply, and enforce 
its principles.’ While this is the case, the rule of law, however, applies beyond the justice 
sector, and is thus a much broader concept. Tools and Methods Series Reference Docu-
ment No. 15 on ‘Support to Justice and the Rule of Law’ EuropeAid (2012), p. 16.
320 Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 9 ‘Support for Justice Reform in ACP 
Countries’ EuropeAid (2010), p. 12.
321 Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 15 on ‘Support to Justice and the Rule 
of Law’ EuropeAid (2012), p. 17.
322 Programming Guide for Strategy Papers, Programming Fiche on Rule of Law – The judi-
cial system within the broader justice sector context (2009), p. 5.
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ment of two policy areas adjacent to development cooperation, namely the 
rise of good governance and the increasing recognition of the development-
security nexus. Both bring with them an emphasis on institutional capacity 
building, which, when combined with the task of strengthening the rule of 
law, has led to EU to adopt an approach that relies heavily on reform of the 
judicial sector.
4.3 Some definitional problems and the confines of the EU’s 
development cooperation methodology
It is apparent from the examination of the three categories of rule of law 
elements undertaken in the present chapter that although it is possible to 
clearly identify a number of rule of law elements the EU has included in 
the definition in its development cooperation policy, for some of them, 
their further articulation leaves something to be desired. For example, in 
the case of the procedural elements of judicial review and enforcement, it 
was shown that the Union has adopted a rather generic approach to both 
elements, without providing clear guidelines for their interpretation. Fre-
quently, the programming documents do not go far beyond stressing the 
need for general improvement in a particular area without specification of 
the exact expectations. In contrast, as it was shown in section 4.1 above, 
the benchmarks proposed become most concrete when outlining measures 
related to institutional reform and capacity building of the judiciary. How-
ever, whereas it is apparent from the analysis undertaken in chapters 1 and 
2 that the rule of law allows for flexibility of institutional design, at the very 
minimum the lack of clearly articulated expectations with tangible bench-
marks points to a lack of a comprehensive EU definition that relies on more 
than judicial reform.
For the rule of law elements of access to justice and judicial indepen-
dence, the EU has attempted to flesh out the notions by reference to a list of 
indicators,323 as demonstrated for example in the 2013 Sector Guidance for 
Programming,324 in the Programming Fiche on Rule of Law – the judicial 
system within the broader justice sector context,325 and in the Governance 
Handbook.326 In the field of development cooperation, the use of such indi-
cators, whereby specific indicators are linked to expected results, is part and 
parcel of any policy based on a result-oriented approach, which makes use 
of conditionality incorporating indicators in order to better assess progress 
323 There are some exceptions to this, such as the Commission Communication on Democra-
tisation, the rule of law, respect for human rights and good governance: the challenges of 
the partnership between the European Union and the ACP States, COM(1998) 146 fi nal.
324 Sector Indicator Guidance for Programming – Sector Indicator Guidance Note – Rule of 
Law & Justice, EuropeAid (2013), pp. 14-18.
325 Programming Guide for Strategy Papers, Programming Fiche on Rule of Law – The judi-
cial system within the broader justice sector context (2009).
326 Governance Handbook on Promoting Good Governance in EC Development and Coop-
eration (2004), pp. 57-62.
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and monitor reform outcomes.327 Indeed, this methodology underlies the 
financial aid instrument EDF and DCI, which tie financial aid to a reliance 
on indicators for the implementation of their objectives.
However, as shown, for example, in the section on judicial indepen-
dence and judicial accountability, the EU has adopted rather a cherry 
picking-approach towards the use of indicators. In relation to judicial 
independence, it was outlined that the Sector Guide for Programming relies 
heavily on the UN Rule of Law Indicators. The latter is a well-put together, 
detailed guide on the delivery of justice in conflict and post-conflict situa-
tions. It takes as its point of departure a definition of the rule of law found 
in the ‘Report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post 
conflict societies’ by then-Secretary General Kofi Annan.328 Its scope has 
been narrowed down in order to focus solely on criminal justice institutions 
(police, courts, prosecution and defence, and corrections). More particularly, 
the indicators focus on the institution’s capacity, performance, integrity, 
transparency and accountability.329 However, according to the Sector 
Indicator Guidance Note, the EU proposed these indicators for the area of 
judicial independence, whereas the UN’s indicators fell within the domain 
of judicial accountability; a related, but nonetheless separate issue.330 Thus, 
instead of fully incorporating a set of indicators and their underlying rule 
of law definitions or creating its own, the Union in relation to judicial 
independence has done neither while at the same time blurring the con-
ceptual boundaries between the two different notions of independence and 
accountability.
This EU approach negates the work undertaken in these indicator lists 
and, more importantly, has not contributed to its own comprehensive defi-
nition of the rule of law. This much has been acknowledged by the Commis-
sion itself when it stated that ‘[i]t is not possible to provide an exhaustive 
list of sector indicators which cover every possible situation in a meaningful 
way.’331 Without an overarching definition of a specific notion, and espe-
cially one as multifaceted as the rule of law, indicators are just lists of boxes 
to be ticked, without interconnections between elements or an idea of their 
placement in the end goal of a strong society underpinned by the rule of 
law. Thus, the Commission’s approach whereby the aim of multiannual 
327 Following a Communication on budget support in 2000 (COM(2000) 58 fi nal, 2 February 
2000), the Commission has pioneered a result-oriented approach in development cooper-
ation based on outcome indicators. Also see Commission Communication on The future 
approach to EU budget support to third countries, COM(2011) 638 fi nal, 13 October 2011, 
p. 3.
328 Report of the Secretary-General on the rule of law and transitional justice in confl ict and 
post-confl ict societies (S/2004/616), pnt. 6.
329 The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators – Implementation Guide and Project Tools 
(2011), p. vi.
330 See section 3.3.3.
331 Sector Indicator Guidance for Programming – Sector Indicator Guidance Note – Rule of 
Law & Justice, EuropeAid (2013), p. 1.
164 Part II
and national indicative programmes is to ‘include a manageable number 
of indicators’,332 not only diminishes the importance of the concept, it also 
obstructs the actual comprehensive implementation of the rule of law in 
third countries.
It should also be pointed out here that the enhanced conditionality, as 
proposed in the 2011 Budget Communications,333 has not brought more 
clarity for the rule of law, even though both the High Representative and 
the Commission called for it in their Joint Communication on human rights 
and democracy at the heart of external action: ‘The task at hand is to ensure 
the clarity, coherence, and effectiveness of policy…The promise of the Lis-
bon Treaty to put human rights, democracy and the rule of law at the centre 
of all external action … make this even more pressing.’334 Specifically when 
it comes to the distribution of EU funding, the institutions have called for 
the explication of terms used in financial regulations in order to ensure legal 
certainty. For example in the 1303/2013 Regulation on the common provi-
sion for several internal funds, such as the European Regional Development 
Fund, it is stated in the Preamble that in order to ‘ensure the correct and 
consistent interpretation of provisions and to contribute to legal certainty 
for Member States and beneficiaries, it is necessary to define certain terms 
that are used in this Regulation.’335 However, when it comes to external aid 
more generally, the 2011 Joint Communication still called for ‘developing 
benchmarks to assess progress in human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law.’336
332 Ibid., p. 2.
333 Commission Communication on The future approach to EU budget support to third 
countries, COM(2011) 638 fi nal, 13 October 2011, p. 2. See also the Council Conclusions 
‘The future approach to EU budget support to third countries’(3166th Foreign Affairs 
Council, 14 May 2012), in which the Council confirmed that ‘[t]he commitment and 
record of partner countries to democracy, human rights and the rule of law is one of the 
key determinants of EU development cooperation, including general and sector budget 
support, and should be assessed to determine if using budget support is appropriate.’
334 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy on Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action 
– Towards a More Effective Approach, COM(2011) 886 final, 12 December 2011, p. 6 
[emphasis added].
335 Paragraph 7 of the Preamble of Regulation 1303/2013 of 17 December 2013 laying down 
common provision on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and 
the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund 
and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1083/2006, OJ[2013] L347/320.
336 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy on Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action –
Towards a More Effective Approach, COM(2011) 886 fi nal, 12 December 2011, p. 11.
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Regarding human rights and democracy, this situation has recently 
ameliorated.337 In June 2012, the Strategic Framework and Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy was adopted, the aim of which is to give 
practical expression to the promise of Lisbon and to provide guidelines for 
the EU to ‘step up its efforts to promote human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law across all aspects of external action.’338 Alongside the Strategic 
Framework, an Action Plan for the period 2012-2014, containing a set of 97 
actions covering a detailed range of human rights and democracy issues, 
was adopted in order to help implement the commitments.339 A similar 
Action Plan has been adopted for the 2015-2019 period.340
Regarding the rule of law, two remarks must be made. First, accord-
ing to the Strategic Framework mentioned above, the EU is to step up its 
promotion efforts in relation to all three principles. However, although the 
Action Plans make mention of the rule of law, they focus solely on commit-
ments regarding human rights and democracy. Secondly, even in the case 
where the most recent Action Plan does highlight rule of law related issues, 
such as the development of the justice sector, this is done from the institu-
tional perspective of the protection of human rights. Thus, where support is 
targeted at providing appropriate training of judicial staff, it is done so with 
a view to increasing awareness of international human rights standards 
and obligations,341 thereby demonstrating a lack of understanding of the 
strengthening of the rule of law as an objective in itself.
In sum, this section attempted to explain the notably institutional 
emphasis of the EU’s rule of law definition. It was shown that the interna-
tional development framework within which the EU’s policy is situated, as 
well as the increasing prominence of both good governance and security 
concerns, have impacted the way the Union has conceptualised the rule of 
law in development cooperation. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that 
the arbitrary way the EU has relied on several indicator lists compiled by 
337 Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, High Representative Ashton 
announced a major review of all human rights processes in relations to the EU’s exter-
nal action. As part of this review the EU commissioned an independent assessment of 
all EU funded human rights programming in third countries of the period 2000-2010. 
See the Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Respect of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (including solidarity with victims of repression), 
EuropeAid/122888/C/SER/Multi (2011). For Ashton’s speech see Catherine Ashton, 
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ‘Annual Human Rights 
Report’, SPEECH/10/757, 15 December 2010.
338 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, Doc. 
11855/12, 25 June 2012.
339 For an analysis of the Strategic Framework and the Action Plans accompanying it, see 
Annabel Egan & Laurent Pech ‘Respect for Human Rights as a General Objective of the 
EU’s External Action’ Working Paper 161 Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (2015).
340 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative on Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019) – Keeping Human Rights at the Heart of the 
EU Agenda JOIN(2015) 16 fi nal, 28 April 2015.
341 Ibid., pnt. 4a.
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other organisation without, however, having outlined its own underlying 
conception of several rule of law elements, has led to various definitional 
problems.
5. Conclusion
This chapter examined the EU’s definition of the rule of law in development 
cooperation, by testing the analytical framework established in Part I of the 
thesis against the Union’s practice in this policy. After a concise introduction 
of the international framework, the legal framework and its relevant policy 
strategies were briefly discussed in order to frame the analysis in the follow-
ing sections. The chapter continued by focussing on the three categories of 
rule of law elements, namely formal, procedural, and institutional. It was 
shown that the elements of legality – around which much of the rule of law 
discussion of legal doctrine is centred – and judicial review – the core ele-
ment safeguarding the rule of law in national legal systems – have remained 
largely underdeveloped. In contrast, it was asserted that the EU puts great 
emphasis on both the procedural element of access to justice, and the institu-
tional element of judicial independence. However, the analysis also showed 
that the EU’s articulation of both elements leaves much to be desired.
Next, the chapter turned to the general findings of the EU’s rule of law 
definition in this policy area and it was established that in the almost total 
absence of formal elements, the Union’s understanding of the rule of law 
in development cooperation mainly revolves around the institutional ele-
ment of judicial reform. Indeed, it was argued that the EU’s institutional 
approach towards the rule of law is so pervasive as to also influence the 
understanding of the procedural elements of judicial review and enforce-
ment. Section four went on to explore the reasons underpinning the EU’s 
emphasis on a fundamentally institutional understanding of the rule of law 
in development policy. It was asserted that the international framework, 
which the EU has committed itself to implement, has steered the policy of 
development cooperation towards the improvement of institutional capac-
ity in aid receiving countries in general. Against this background, it was 
argued that the EU’s institutional conceptualisation of the rule of law can, 
in particular, be explained by the impact of the notions of good governance 
and security sector reform on this external policy field. Both notions focus 
on the effective functioning of institutions, which, in the case of the rule of 
law, has resulted in a concomitant understanding of the rule of law in terms 
of the reform and strengthening of judicial institutions.
Finally, the chapter concluded by arguing that the EU’s methodology 
in the area of development cooperation has led to conceptual confusion in 
a number of the rule of law element identified. It was asserted that even 
though the use of indicator lists is common practice in a result-based coop-
eration policy, the Union’s indiscriminate application of these, without a 
comprehensive rule of law definition, has led to vagueness and ambiguity.
4 The EU’s conceptualisation of the rule 
of law in its enlargement practice
1. Introduction
In words similar to those found in the EU’s development cooperation 
policy, the rule of law is ‘central to the enlargement process’,1 and ‘a key 
priority’2 which needs to be addressed at an early stage of the accession 
process. Strengthening it ‘remains a key challenge’3 for all countries wishing 
to join the Union, and the both the Council4 and the Commission5 continue 
to attach a high priority to all aspects of rule of law in the enlargement 
countries. In the light of this repeated acknowledgement of the notion’s 
pivotal role in this policy area, a clear and comprehensive definition would 
be expected in order to guide the applicant states on the way to Member-
ship, if for no other reason than the fact that as future Member States, the 
countries are themselves expected to safeguard, consolidate, and promote 
the rule of law.6 In this light, the present chapter purports to assess whether, 
and if so, to what extent, the EU has developed such a conceptualisation 
of the rule of law in its enlargement policy. More particularly, in a similar 
manner to the previous case study, the analytical framework established in 
at the end of part I will be tested against the EU’s practice in this external 
policy area.
To this end, the chapter begins by providing a brief overview of the 
accession rounds to date, followed by an introduction into the policy area. 
It will be shown that the rule of law has come to play an increasingly impor-
tant role in enlargement. More particularly, it will be demonstrated that, 
1 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, 
COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 10 October 2012, p. 2.
2 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010, 
COM(2009) 533, 14 October 2009, p. 5.
3 See for example Consideration 9 of the Preamble of Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument for 
pre-accession assistance for the period 2014-2020 (IPA II), OJ[2014] L77/11; Commission 
Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-2015, COM(2014) 
700, 8 October, 2014, p. 11.
4 Council Conclusions ‘Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process’, General 
Affairs Council, Doc. 10555/18, 26 June 2018, pnt. 5.
5 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-2015, 
COM(2014) 700, 8 October, 2014, p. 12.
6 Articles 3(1), 21(2)(b), and 21(2)(a) TEU respectively. On the different functions of the rule 
of law in the EU see the Introduction to this thesis.
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based on the experiences of earlier enlargement rounds, progress in the area 
of the rule of law needs to be demonstrated more thoroughly and earlier 
than ever before. Following this, the EU’s legal framework will be explored 
in order to provide the background against which the analysis of the differ-
ent rule of law elements will take place. The chapter continues by examin-
ing the three categories of elements established in the analytical framework 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether these elements are validated by the 
EU’s practice. It will be shown that the formal element of legality has not 
only remained underdeveloped, but that it is actually undermined by the 
enlargement methodology’s focus on quantity in the legal approximation 
process – to the detriment of legality’s requirements of quality of legislation. 
Furthermore, it will be asserted that the elements of impartiality and judicial 
efficiency have increasingly been addressed in the annual reports, thereby 
gradually becoming core procedural elements of the rule of law. However, it 
will be also demonstrated that this prominence has not resulted in detailed 
standards for the applicant states to follow and apply. Following this, it will 
be claimed that the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in enlargement 
is perceived to a large extent in terms of institution and capacity-building, 
more particularly judicial reform. It will be shown that this institutional 
orientation has led to a particular emphasis on the institutional element of 
judicial independence. Against this background, the chapter will conclude 
by summarising the general findings of the exploration of the notion of the 
rule of law in this policy field.
A final note on methodology must be provided here. Since initial acces-
sions were predominantly based on political decisions without clearly 
defined criteria,7 the chapter will focus on the accession of 2004 based 
on the elaboration of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, and the subsequent 
rounds, including the negotiations with the current candidate and potential 
candidate states. In this way, if and where possible, a comparison can be 
drawn between the rounds in order to demonstrate the evolution of the 
EU’s conceptualisation in its enlargement policy. Considering the fact that 
there is only a single provision in the EU Treaty serving as the legal basis 
for the enlargement (Art. 49 TEU), the policy has developed over the years 
through Commission Opinions on the application for Membership of the 
EU, Strategy Papers, annual progress reports, Accession and European 
Partnerships, complemented by Presidency and Council Conclusions.8 It is 
in these Copenhagen related documents that the rule of law elements in 
enlargement can be found.
7 Wolfgang Nozar ‘The 100% Union: The Rise of Chapters 23 and 24’ (2012), available at: 
https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/fi les/The%20100%25%20Union.%20The%20
rise%20of%20Chapters%2023%20and%2024.pdf.
8 For reasons of readability, references to the annual reports and Accession and European 
Partnerships will be abbreviated (year and country). The full references can be found in 
the table of documents.
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2. The rule of law and its relation to EU enlargement: 
EU policy and the toolbox for rule of law promotion
Before venturing into the central part of the case study, it is necessary to 
provide some background to the EU’s enlargement policy to date and to set 
out the relationship between this policy area and the rule of law on the basis 
of the legal and policy framework within which this connection is shaped. 
For this reason, this section will provide the setting for the examination 
of the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in this particular external 
policy area. After a brief overview of the previous accession rounds, it will 
be shown that the EU has progressively concentrated on the rule of law as a 
central condition for development in the applicant states. More particularly, 
it will be pointed out that it is a condition for eligibility and one of the four 
Copenhagen political criteria, the non-compliance with which can constitute 
a potential case for suspension throughout the process. Moreover, by way of 
Chapter 23, it is also an issue to be tackled early on in the negotiations, lack 
of progress in the implementation of which can potentially halt the entire 
negotiations. Following this, the focus will turn to the rule of law in the 
enlargement’s legal framework. The main aim of the section will be to pro-
vide insight into the legal instruments that underpin the enlargement policy 
and the significance of the rule of law therein. The section will conclude by 
demonstrating that this legal framework mirrors the increasing importance 
of the rule of law in this external policy field.
2.1 Brief overview of the enlargement process to date
The founding Treaties and all subsequent amending Treaties have continu-
ally allowed for enlargement, and the European Communities always envis-
aged the possibility of more states than the original six (Germany, France, 
Italy, the Netherland, Belgium, and Luxembourg) joining in the project 
of integration.9 A mere four years after the conclusion and signing of the 
Treaty of Rome, the first applications for enlargement were made by the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. Due to French concerns 
over the British application, this request was denied, prompting a second 
attempt by the same four countries in May 1967.10 After a second French 
9 Kirstyn Inglis ‘EU Enlargement: Membership Conditions Applied to Future and Poten-
tial Member States’ in Steven Blockmans & Adam Lazowski The European Union and its 
Neighbours The Hague: TMC Asser Press (2006), pp. 61-94 at p. 67.
10 See Jean-Pierre Puissochet The Enlargement of the European Communities: A Commentary on 
the Treaty and the Acts concerning the Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
Leiden: Sijthoff (1975).
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intervention the Council shelved the request11 until the opening of nego-
tiations in 1970 and the singing of the first Accession Treaty on 22 January 
1972.12 After a negative popular vote Norway withdrew its application.13
The second enlargement round consisted of Greece. The application 
was made in June 1975, a year after the country had shed the colonels’ 
rule. The Accession Treaty was signed on 28 May 1979.14 The restoration of 
democracy also clearly played an important role in the positive outcome of 
the accession applications made by Spain and Portugal.15 Having applied 
for membership in 1977, the two countries concluded the third round16 of 
enlargement and the accession Treaty was signed on June 12, 1985.17
The applications for the fourth enlargement round came within three 
years of each other in the period 1989-1992. The negotiations and subse-
quent signing of the Accession Treaty with Austria, Sweden, Finland, and 
Norway on 24 June 199418 did not pose many obstacles, apart from the 
failure to ratify the Accession Treaty by Norway due to a second negative 
referendum.19 In 1993 accession perspective was granted by the European 
Council meeting in Copenhagen to the newly created countries in Eastern 
11 De Gaulle vetoed the fi rst request on grounds of economic suitability. He then expressed 
a second veto during a press conference on 27 November 1967. Notwithstanding offi cial 
support from the other EEC Member States, the Council of Ministers decided in Decem-
ber of the same year to shelve all four applications: ‘One Member State considered that 
the re-establishment of the British economy must be completed before Great Britain’s 
request can be considered.’ See Christopher Preston Enlargement and Integration in the 
European Union London: Routledge (1997).
12 Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, OJ[1972] L73/5.
13 Allan F. Tatham Enlargement of the European Union The Hague: Kluwer Law International 
(2009), p. 22.
14 Treaty of Accession of Greece, OJ[1979] L291/9.
15 See Commission Opinion on Spain’s Application for Membership, COM(78) 630, 30 
November 1978, p. 9;  Commission Opinion on Portuguese Application for Membership, 
COM(78) 220, 23 May 1978, p. 7.
16 The German reunifi cation of 20 October 1990 after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, while 
considered a de facto enlargement of the Communities, is not considered as a separate 
enlargement round. It found its legal basis in national law (Article 23 of the German 
Basic Law), not the Treaties. See for example Michael Bothe ‘The German Experience to 
meet the Challenges of Reunifi cation’ in Alfred Kellerman, Jaap de Zwaan & Jeno Czuc-
zai (eds) EU Enlargement: The Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level The Hague: 
T.M.C. Asser Press (2001).
17 Treaty of Accession of Spain and Portugal, OJ[1985] L302/9.
18 Treaty of Accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, OJ[1994] C241/9.
19 Within the same timeframe, Switzerland has also faced the consequences of a negative 
referendum. After taking part in the negotiations and signing of the EEA Agreement, the 
Swiss government submitted an application for accession to the EU in May 1992. During 
a referendum, held in December of the same year, the EEA membership was rejected. 
Consequently, since the EEA Agreement was regarded as a precursor to EU member-
ship, the Swiss government suspended negotiations for EU accession. The application 
of Switzerland has remained dormant until the Swiss parliament voted on 15 June 2016 
to offi cially withdraw the application for membership. Further, see https://www.dfae.
admin.ch/missions/mission-eu-brussels/de/home/aktuell/news.html/content/dea/
de/meta/news/2016/10/26/EU-Beitrittsgesuch.
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Europe. This decision led, over time, to the fifth ‘big bang’ enlargement, 
which consisted of eight new democracies from Central and Eastern Europe 
and two Mediterranean states: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta. An 
amalgamation of several political issues played in the background of this 
enlargement round. It started with the application of Turkey in 1987, which 
was put on hold by the Commission in its Opinion when it considered 
that it would ‘not be considered useful to open accession negotiations 
with Turkey straight away.’20 The Turkish application was followed by the 
membership applications of Cyprus and Malta in July of 1990 as well as the 
applications of the ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe (the CEECs) 
in the period 1994-1996.21 At the Luxembourg European Council of Decem-
ber 1997, taking into consideration the positive Commission assessment in 
its Agenda 2000,22 it was decided that negotiations would be opened with 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.23 At 
the Helsinki European Council in 1999 it was decided that the six countries 
that were left out would be included at the table24 and formal negotiations 
were opened with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slova-
kia in February 2000.
The fifth enlargement round was formally concluded with the singing of 
the Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003.25 Because of concerns over the lack of 
progress made with the implementation of reform measures, Bulgaria and 
Romania were given a later date of accession. Their joined signing of the 
Accession Treaty on 25 April 200526 formed the sixth round of enlargement. 
The Commission itself considers the latter to be the second phase of the fifth 
enlargement round.27 However, because both enlargements concerned two 
different Accession Treaties and involved two different sets of transitional 
measures, they will be treated as separate rounds in the present study.
20 Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for the Accession to the Community, SEC(89) 
2290 fi nal/2, p.8.
21 Hungary – 31 March 1994; Poland – 5 April 1994; Romania – 22 June 1995; Slovakia – 27 
June 1995; Latvia – 13 October 1995; Estonia – 24 November 1995; Lithuania – 8 December 
1995; Bulgaria – 14 December 1994; Czech Republic – 17 January 1996; Slovenia – 10 June 
1996.
22 Commission Communication on Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, 
COM(97) 2000 fi nal, 15 July 1997.
23 Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg European Council, 12-13 December 1997, pnt. 27.
24 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, pnt. 10.
25 Treaty of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia, OJ[2003] L236/17. On this Accession Treaty see, for exam-
ple, Kirstyn Inglis ‘The Union’s Fifth Accession Treaty: New Means to Make Enlargement 
Possible’ 41 Common Market Law Review (2004); Christophe Hillion ‘The European Union 
is Dead. Long Live the European Union. A Commentary on the Treaty of Accession 2003’ 
29 European Law Review (2004), pp. 583-612.
26 Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, OJ[2005] L157/11.
27 See for example the Commission Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness for EU 
Membership of Bulgaria and Romania, COM(2006) 549 fi nal, 26 September 2006.
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The Santa Maria da Feira European Council of June 2000 made it clear 
that the countries of the Western Balkans would be ‘potential candidates’ 
for membership.28 In February 2003 Croatia made its formal application 
for membership and was confirmed by the Council as a candidate country 
in June of 2004.29 The Accession Treaty was signed on 9 December 2011,30 
and Croatia’s single state accession to the Union on 1 July 2013 marked the 
seventh enlargement round.
The list of officially recognised candidate countries includes at pres-
ent Albania,31 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM),32 
28 Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000, pnt. 
67. This has been repeatedly confi rmed by subsequent European Council Conclusions, 
most vocally at Thessaloniki in 2003; Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European 
Council, 19-20 June 2003, para. 40. For more on the term ‘potential candidate’ see for 
example Lykke Friis & Anna Murphy ‘Enlargement of the European Union: Impacts on 
the EU, the Candidates and the “Next Neighbours”’ 14 ECSA Review (2001), pp. 2-7.
29 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 17-18 June 2004, pnt. 31.
30 Treaty of Accession of Croatia, OJ[2012] L112/10. On the Accession Treaty see for exam-
ple Adam Łazowski ‘European Union Do Not Worry, Croatia is Behind You: A Commen-
tary on the Seventh Accession Treaty’ 8 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy (2012) 
pp. 1-39.
31 Albania applied for EU membership on 24 April 2009. In its Opinion of 9 November 
2010, the Commission assessed that before negotiations could be opened, Albania had 
to achieve a greater degree of compliance with the membership criteria and meet 12 key 
priorities identifi ed in the Opinion. In its 2012 Progress Report, the Commission recom-
mended that Albania receive candidate status, subject to completion of key measures, 
particularly in the area of judicial and public administration reform. In June 2014, the 
Council granted Albania candidate status, which was endorsed by the European Council 
a few days later (Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 26-27 June 2014, 
pnt. 34).
32 FYROM applied for membership on 22 March 2004. The Commission issued a favourable 
Opinion on 9 November 2005 after which the country received candidate status on 16 
December 2005 (Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 15-16 December 
2005, pnt. 25). Negotiations have not started yet.
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Montenegro,33 Serbia,34 and Turkey.35 Two more countries are potential 
candidates: Bosnia and Herzegovina,36 and Kosovo (as defined by UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999).37 In its 2018 Western 
Balkans Strategy, the Commission holds out the prospect that both Serbia 
and Montenegro could potentially be ready to join the EU by 2025.38 The 
newest Strategy lays down a roadmap after Commission President Juncker 
had signalled an increased openness toward EU enlargement in his 2017 
State of the Union speech.39 Finally, Iceland, having gained candidate status 
33 Montenegro applied for membership on 15 December 2008. Following the Commission 
Opinion of 9 November 2010 in which seven key priorities were identifi ed that would 
need to be addressed before negotiations could be opened, the European Council con-
fi rmed Montenegro’s candidate states in December of the same year (Presidency Conclu-
sions, Brussels European Council, 16-17 December 2012, pnt. 10) after which accession 
negotiations started on 29 June 2012 (the European Council endorsed the Council deci-
sion thereto during its Brussels summit in June 2012; Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 
European Council, 28-29 June 2012).
34 Serbia applied for EU membership on 22 December 2009. Following the Commission 
Opinion of 14 October 2011, the European Council confi rmed Serbia’s candidate status 
in March 2012 (Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 1-2 March 2012, pnt. 
39). In line with the June 2013 decision of the European Council to open accession nego-
tiation, the latter started in 21 January 2014.
35 On 1 April 1987 Turkey has applied for membership of the European Communities. After 
the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 declared Turkey a candidate country 
(Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, pnt. 12), 
negotiations were formally opened in October 2005. Due to Turkey’s non-compliance 
with the additional protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement in relation to Cyprus, 
it was decided that negotiations on eight chapters are not to be opened. At the time of 
writing they still remain closed.
36 After having been identifi ed by the European Council as a potential candidate in Santa 
Maria da Feira in June 2000 along with the other countries in the Western Balkans, Bosnia 
has applied for membership in February 2016.
37 In its Communication ‘A European Future for Kosovo’, the Commission indicated that 
the ‘European perspective’ for the Western Balkans, as confi rmed in the Thessaloniki dec-
laration of the European Council of June 2003, is also open to Kosovo; Commission Com-
munication on A European Future for Kosovo, COM(2005) 156 fi nal, 20 April 2005. For 
the explicit acknowledgement of the Western Balkan countries’ membership potential see 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council meetings in Lisbon (pnt. 47) of 23-24 
March 2000, and Santa Maria da Feira (pnt. 67), 19-20 June 2000, as well as the Declara-
tion of the Zagreb Summit of 24 November 2000, made by the Heads of State or Govern-
ment of the EU Member States, Albania, FYROM, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and 
the FRY, as well as the Foreign Minister of Slovenia, and the President of the European 
Commission, in the presence of the Secretary General/High Representative for the CFSP, 
the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, the Special Represen-
tative of the EU to act as Coordinator of the Stability Pact for south-east Europe and the 
High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, pnt.4.
38 Commission Communication on A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and enhanced 
EU engagement with the Western Balkans, COM(2018) 65 fi nal, 6 February 2018, pp. 7-8.
39 Jean-Claude Juncker ‘State of the Union Address 2017’, SPEECH/17/3165, 13 September 
2017, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm.
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in 2010, requested in March 2015 that it should no longer be regarded as a 
candidate country.40
2.2 The policy framework: the increasing importance of the rule of law
There is abundant scholarly literature discussing the development of the 
enlargement process and its legal framework from various angles.41 The 
purpose of this section, therefore, is not to replicate this, but to sketch out 
the framework within which accession takes place, while highlighting the 
increasing importance of the rule of law in the context of the policy.
Until the European Council’s decision to acknowledge the member-
ship perspective of the Countries from Central and Eastern Europe,42 the 
enlargement process had by and large been covered by the same basic 
rules, set out in the Treaty.43 It was, however, during the fifth enlargement 
round that the expansion process progressed from an ad hoc procedure into 
a fully-fledged enlargement policy on EU eligibility and on Member State-
40 Iceland formally applied for EU membership on 16 July 2009. The Commission delivered 
its positive Opinion on 24 February 2010 after which the European Council decided to 
open negotiations in June 2010, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 17 
June 2010, pnt. 24. The negotiations had already been put on hold since June 2013, at the 
Icelandic government’s own request.
41 See for example Christophe Hillion ‘EU Enlargement’ in Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca 
(eds) The Evolution of EU Law Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 187-216; Tatham 
(2009); John O’Brennan The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union New York: Rout-
ledge (2006); Helene Sjursen(ed) Questioning EU Enlargement: Europe in Search of Identity 
New York: Routledge (2006); Christophe Hillion (ed) EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach 
Oxford: Hart Publishing (2004); Neil Nugent (ed) European Union Enlargement Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2004); Marise Cremona (ed) The Enlargement of the European 
Union Oxford: Oxford University Press (2003); Andrea Ott & Kirtyn Inglis (eds) Handbook 
on European Enlargement The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press (2002); Marc Maresceau & Erwan 
Lannon (eds) The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies, A Comparative Analysis 
Basingstoke: Palgrave (2001); Victoria Curzon Price, Alice Landau & Richard G. Whit-
man (eds) The Enlargement of the European Union. Issues and Strategies London: Routledge 
(1999); Phedon Nicolaïdes, Sylvia Boean, Frank Bollen & Parlos Pezaros A Guide to the 
Enlargement of the European Union: A Review of the Process, Negotiations, Policy Reforms, and 
Enforcement Capacity Maastricht: EIPA (1999); Heather Grabbe & Kirstyn Inglis Eastward 
Enlargement of the European Union London: Royal Institute of International Affairs (1998); 
Graham Avery & Fraser Cameron The Enlargement of the European Union Sheffi eld: Shef-
fi eld Academic Press (1998); Marc Maresceau (ed) Enlarging the European Union: Relations 
between the EU and Central and Eastern Europe London: Longman (1997); Christopher Pres-
ton Enlargement and Integration in the European Union London: Routledge (1997).
42 Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993.
43 Legally speaking, however, as the EU has gradually expanded and the body of enlarge-
ment rules and principles has developed in its wake, no enlargement round is identi-
cal to the previous one. For a brief analysis of the differences in procedure in the afore-
mentioned Articles, see Frank Hoffmeister ‘Changing Requirements for Membership’ in 
Andrea Ott & Kirtyn Inglis (eds) Handbook on European Enlargement The Hague: T.M.C. 
Asser Press (2002), pp. 90-102 at 91-91. Also see Hillion (2011), pp. 188-193.
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building,44 including yearly monitoring rounds during which progress is 
measured on the road to accession. Nonetheless, the Treaty text does not 
convey much of the ‘pre-accession strategy’45 – the strategy by which the 
EU ‘will continue to follow closely progress in the associated countries 
towards filling the conditions of accession’46 – that lies behind it and which 
forms the basis for the Union’s enlargement policy. Currently, Article 49 
TEU provides:
Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is 
committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The 
European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this appli-
cation. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which 
shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the 
consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its compo-
nent members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Coun-
cil shall be taken into account.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the 
Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agree-
ment between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall 
be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements.
Next to proscribing the procedure, the current provision is connected to the 
rule of law in two ways. First, Article 2 TEU refers to the rule of law as 
one of the founding values of the Union – a conditio sine qua non for third 
states to be considered as a candidate for membership. Secondly, the Article 
mentions the conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council 
in Copenhagen in 1993.47 In relation to the latter, the rule of law has been 
44 Further on this argument see Christophe Hillion ‘The Creeping Nationalisation of the 
EU Enlargement Policy’ Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies No. 6 (2010) and the 
subsequent commentary by Marise Cremona, available at http://sieps.se/sites/default/
fi les/Commentary_cremona_2010_6_1.pdf; Frank Emmert & Siniša Petrović ‘The Past, 
Present, and Future of EU Enlargement’ 37 Fordham International Law Journal (2014), pp. 
1349-1419 at 1379.
45 Council Conclusions, Essen European Council, 9-10 December 1994, Annex IV. The idea 
of a pre-accession period can be traced back to the Commission’s conclusions in its Opin-
ion on Greece’s application for membership in 1976. Further, see Tatham (2009), p. 31; 
Alan Mayhew Recreating Europe. The European Union’s Policy towards Central and Eastern 
Europe Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2002), chapter 6.
46 Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993.
47 Fulfi lment of which will lead to a country’s admissibility for accession negotiations. 
Christophe Hillion ‘Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis’ in Anthony 
Arnull & Daniel Wincott (eds) Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union Oxford: 
Oxford University Press (2002), pp. 401-418 at 412.
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inserted as one of the four ‘political conditions’48 for accession. According 
to the first of the three ‘Copenhagen criteria’, membership requires that 
the candidate country demonstrates ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities.’49
Following the formulation of these accession conditions, the European 
Council, with the help of the European Commission, has progressively elab-
orated their normative content. This has been done in a rather ad hoc man-
ner, taking into account the circumstances of both the state of the Union, 
and the candidate states. Thus, the Commission developed the policy 
framework through various Communications,50 addressing the concerns on 
the mutual dependency of widening and deepening EU enlargement51 that 
arose out of the applications for membership by the CEECs. At the same 
time, the European Council has refined the accession conditions, notably 
at the summits of Madrid in 199552 and Helsinki in 1999.53 Specific condi-
48 The fi rst set of Copenhagen criteria is frequently referred to in the literature as the ‘politi-
cal conditions’ for membership – in this thesis, the same term is used. See, for example, 
Hillion (2011), p. 195; Bruno de Witte ‘Enlargement and the EU Constitution’ in Marise 
Cremona (ed) The Enlargement of the European Union Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2003), pp. 209-262 at 228-233; Heather Grabbe ‘A Partnership for Accession? The Impli-
cations of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants’ EUI Working 
Papers RSC No. 12 (1999).
49 The Copenhagen criteria furthermore cover the shape and state of the economy – ‘the 
existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competi-
tive pressure and market forces within the Union’ – and the country’s ability to take on 
the acquis communautaire – ‘the ability to take on the obligations of membership, includ-
ing adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.’ Presidency Con-
clusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993.
50 For further detail see for example Commission Communication on The Europe Agree-
ments and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for 
Accession, COM(1994) 320 fi nal, 13 July 1994; Commission White Paper on the Prepara-
tion of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the 
Internal Market of the Union, COM(95) 163 fi nal, 3 May 1995; Commission Communica-
tion on Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, COM(1997) 2000 fi nal, 15 July 
1997.
51 Emmert & Petrović (2014), p. 1379.
52 The Madrid European Council defi ned that the initiated pre-accession strategy would 
have to be intensifi ed ‘in order to create the conditions for the gradual, harmonious inte-
gration of those States, particularly through the development of the market economy, 
the adjustment of their administrative structures and the creation of a stable economic 
and monetary environment.’ Since without these reinforced administrative structures, 
implementation of the acquis proved to be very diffi cult. Presidency Conclusions, Madrid 
European Council, 15-16 December 1995.
53 At Helsinki and in the wake of the Kosovo crisis, the European Council urged the candi-
date states to resolve their outstanding border disputes and other related bilateral issues, 
if need be through involvement of the International Court of Justice, before entering the 
EU. Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999.
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tions in relation to the Western Balkans followed54 – after their ‘European 
perspective’ was acknowledged in 2002.55
In contrast to previous accessions where candidate countries had to 
fulfil the admission conditions without EU interference, and, which, thus, 
afford only limited insight into the Union’s rule of law conceptualisation,56 
a more detailed and coordinated pre-accession approach was unavoid-
able, particularly because of the number and diversity of candidates both 
among themselves, and as compared to previous applicants, as well as to 
the EU Member States.57 Since the Copenhagen European Council left the 
content of admission conditions quite vague, elaborating upon them has 
been left largely to the institutions58 and the Member States.59 The first step 
towards this was provided by Agenda 2000 (July 1997), which contained 
the Commission’s opinions on the membership applications of the CEECs.60 
This document and the accompanying opinions are noteworthy for three 
reasons. First, they provide an insight into the Commission’s early concep-
tion of the rule of law. In this initial attempt at fleshing out the criterion 
of the rule of law, the Commission provided the rather pithy analysis that 
‘[a]ll the applicant countries have flaws in the rule of law which they need 
to put right.’61 The Agenda then indicated the areas under examination 
supporting this conclusion: ‘There is a lack of suitable qualified judges 
and guarantees for their independence. Police forces are poorly paid and 
require better training and discipline. The autonomy of local government 
54 See the Council Conclusions ‘The Application of Conditionality with a view to develop-
ing a Coherent EU-Strategy for the Relations with the Countries in the Region’, Annex 
to Annex III, 2203rd General Affairs Council, 29-30 April 1997; Council Conclusions ‘The 
Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European Integration’, 
Annex A, 2518th External Relations Council, 16 June 2003. Further see Steven Blockmans 
‘Raising the Threshold for Further EU Enlargement Process and Problems and Prospects’ 
in Andrea Ott & Ellen Vos (eds) 50 Years of European Integration: Foundations and Perspecti-
ves The Hague: TMC Asser Press (2009), pp. 203-220.
55 See for example the Presidency Conclusions, European Council Santa Maria de Feira, 
19-20 June 2000; Presidency Conclusions, European Council Copenhagen, 12-13 Decem-
ber 2002.
56 Hillion (2010), p. 11.
57 Kirstyn Inglis ‘The Pre-accession Strategy and the Accession Partnerships’ in Andrea Ott 
& Kirstyn Inglis (eds) Handbook on European Enlargement The Hague: T.M.C Asser Press 
(2002), pp. 103-112 at 103.
58 The Court of Justice of the EU has however refrained from giving further indications on 
the membership conditions; Case 93/78 Lothar Mattheus v Doego Fruchtimport und Tief-
kühlkost eG [1978] ECR 2203. See also Karen E. Smith 'The Evolution and Application of 
EU Membership Conditionality’ in Marise Cremona (ed) The Enlargement of the European 
Union Oxford: Oxford University Press (2003), pp. 105-140 at 115.
59 Further see Hillion (2010).
60 Commission Communication on Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, 
COM(97) 2000 fi nal, 15 July 1997.
61 Ibid., p. 40.
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also requires a firmer legal basis in several cases.’62 Without entering into a 
detailed analysis at this juncture since this is the focus of the second half of 
the case study, it suffices to say here that within the initial framework, the 
Commission seemed to consider the rule of law from the perspective of the 
functioning of the (wider) judicial system – specifically in terms of quality 
of personnel, and the legal underpinnings of the separation of powers.
Secondly, Agenda 2000 and the Opinions, as well as the subsequent 
endorsement of their set-up by the European Council, introduced the 
Commission’s methodology for its analysis of the CEECs’ fulfilment of the 
conditions, providing a first insight into the rule of law elements that would 
be considered critical in order for applicant countries to be able to accede.63  
Instead of examining the developments related to the four political criteria 
separately, the Commission initially adopted a binary approach, whereby 
on the one hand democracy and the rule of law, and on the other hand, 
human rights and minority protection, were bundled together. In relation 
to the first category, the examination was subsequently classified into three 
sections: the structure and functioning of the parliament (legislature), the 
structure and functioning of the executive, and the structure and function-
ing of the judiciary.64  In the Regular Reports of the following years a fourth 
category, anti-corruption measures, was added.65 Overall, this categorisa-
tion suggests that the Commission views the rule of law in terms of the 
62 Ibid.
63 The European Council, upon a positive assessment of Agenda 2000, endorsed the 
methodology and recommended the Commission follow it in its future evaluation of 
applicant States’ ability to meet the criteria; Presidency Conclusion, Luxembourg Euro-
pean Council, 12-13 December 1997, pnt. 29.
64 In relation to the monitoring process on the countries of the Western Balkans, this sub-
categorisation has been added to over the years. The 2005 Albania Progress Report, for 
example, discusses developments in the area of democracy and the rule of law under the 
sub-headings of Parliament, Government, Public Administration, Judicial System, and 
Anti-Corruption Policy. The Progress Report of Serbia and Montenegro of the same year 
also includes a discussion of Defence reforms, whereas, for example, the 2006 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Progress Report has an additional section on reform of the constitutional 
framework. During the 2013 and 2014 rounds of Progress Reports, three more subcatego-
ries are added to the section: Ombudsman, Civil society, and the Fight against organised 
crime; see for example the 2013 Montenegro Progress Report.
 In the 2015 and 2016 rounds of reporting, the Commission has opted for a different 
approach, particularly in relation to the rule of law. In order to refl ect its ‘fundamen-
tals fi rst’-approach and with the aim to further increasing the quality of the assessments 
in the reports as well as providing greater transparency, the assessment of the political 
criteria is split into fi ve components: democracy, public administration reform, rule of 
law, human rights and the protection of minorities, and regional issues and international 
obligations. The section on the rule of law is then further split into issues of the function-
ing of the judiciary, fi ght against corruption, and fi ght against organised crime, including 
the fi ght against terrorism. See for example, the 2015 Bosnia and Herzegovina Report, pp. 
12-20.
65 See for example the 1998 Poland Regular Report; 1999 Czech Regular Report.
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structure and functioning of the judicial system in ways similar to the previ-
ous point made above.66
Thirdly, Agenda 2000 laid the groundwork for a reinforced accession 
strategy in order to bring the different forms of support provided by the 
Union within a single framework. Formally launched as the ‘enhanced 
pre-accession strategy’ by the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, new 
instruments included the so-called Accession Partnerships (APs) in which 
the Copenhagen criteria were progressively spelled out in short, medium, 
and long term priorities,67 to be met by the candidate states as a condition 
to their accession, detailed assessments of each candidate’s performance 
in implementing the APs through annual reports,68 as well as increased 
66 This view is reinforced by the Commission later on in Agenda 2000, where it stressed the 
importance of the administrative and, in particular, judicial capacity for the application 
of the acquis (as formulated initially by the 1995 Madrid European Council). After all, ‘[t]
he applicant countries’ administrative and judicial capacity is of crucial importance for 
the adoption, implementation and enforcement of the acquis and for the effi cient use of 
fi nancial support… It is vital that Union legislation be transposed into national law. But 
this is not suffi cient to ensure its correct application … The applicants’ judicial systems 
must be capable of ensuring that the rule of law is enforced. This requires the retraining, 
and in some cases the replacement of judges to ensure that courts are able to operate 
effectively in cases involving Community law.’ For further analysis of this issue, particu-
larly on the relationship between the strengthening of the rule of law and judicial reform, 
see section 3.3.2.
67 According to the Council’s framework AP regulation, the Commission drafted individ-
ual country APs covering the priorities, principles, intermediate objectives, and condi-
tions on which preparations for accession must concentrate in view of the political and 
economic criteria, as well as the fi nancial resources for assistance (Article 1). Following 
this proposal by the Commission and after adoption by the Council by qualifi ed majority 
voting, the APs were submitted to the candidate countries (Article 2). Council Regulation 
(EC) No 622/98 of 16 March 1998 on assistance to the applicant States in the framework 
of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of Accession Partner-
ships, OJ[1998] L85/1.
 A similar methodology has been applied in relation to the countries of the Western Bal-
kans. Within the framework of the stabilisation and association process with these coun-
tries, the EU has set up partnerships with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, including Kosovo as defi ned 
by United Nations Security Council Resolution1244 of 10 June 1999. For the Council’s 
framework regulation see Council Regulation (EC) No 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the 
establishment of European partnerships in the framework of the stabilisation and asso-
ciation process, OJ[2004] L86/1.
68 On the intensifi ed review procedure, the 1997 Luxembourg European Council decided 
that ‘[f]rom the end of 1998, the Commission will make regular reports to the Council, 
together with any necessary recommendations for opening bilateral intergovernmental 
conferences, reviewing the progress of each Central and East European applicant State 
towards accession in the light of the Copenhagen criteria, in particular the rate at which 
it is adopting the Union acquis. … The Commission’s reports will serve as a basis for tak-
ing, in the Council context, the necessary decisions on the conduct of the accession nego-
tiations or their extension to other applicants.’ Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg 
European Council, 12-13 December 1997, pnt. 29.
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pre-accession aid linking financial support to progress and compliance.69 
This strategy effectively meant that the EU institutions, particularly the 
Commission,70 had far-reaching powers to shape the enlargement policy 
and monitor the candidate’s developments and progress on the way to 
accession. In relation to the rule of law, this also meant that the fulfilment of 
the accession conditions became subject to systematic EU monitoring.
Over the following years adjustments have been made to the enlarge-
ment policy, which has progressively concentrated on the rule of law as a 
central condition for development in applicant states. Introduced as ‘fair 
and rigorous conditionality’71 by the renewed consensus on enlargement,72 
the Commission expanded on the accession methodology starting with 
its 2006-2007 accession strategy. Agreed in the aftermath of Romania and 
Bulgaria’s accession and in order to waylay misgivings about the incon-
gruity between accession conditions and membership obligations,73 the 
strategy linked progress in the EU’s values, including the rule of law, to 
advancement in the negotiations through the introduction of opening and 
69 For a legal appraisal of the pre-accession strategy and its components see Tatham (2009), 
pp. 287-299; Marc Maresceau ‘Pre-accession’ in Marise Cremona (ed) The Enlargement of 
the European Union Oxford: Oxford University Press (2003), pp. 9-42; Inglis (2002), pp. 
103-112; Karen E. Smith The Making of EU Foreign Policy: the Case of Eastern Europe Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan (1999), pp. 122-134.
70 Brigid Laffan ‘From Policy Entrepreneur to Policy Manager: The Challenge Facing the 
European Commission’ 3 Journal of European Public Policy (1997) 4, pp.422-438.
71 Commission Communication on 2005 enlargement strategy paper, COM(2005) 561 fi nal, 
9 November 2005, p. 3.
72 The Commission’s approach, which envisaged the new principles to govern the acces-
sion policy and methodology, was based on consolidation, conditionality, and commu-
nication. Consolidation of the EU’s commitments on enlargement, extended use of fair 
and rigorous conditionality throughout the negotiations phase, and better communica-
tion of the enlargement policy towards citizens, both within the Member States and the 
applicant states. This ‘renewed consensus on enlargement’ was endorsed by the Euro-
pean Council. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 14-15 December 2006, 
pnt. 4.
73 Bulgaria and Romania are still formally under post-accession monitoring under the 
Cooperation and Verifi cation Mechanism, see Council Conclusions ‘Cooperation and 
Verifi cation Mechanism’, Doc. 7118/16, 15 March 2016. For the latest round of progress 
reports see: Report from the Commission on Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation 
and Verifi cation Mechanism, COM(2017) 43 fi nal, 25 January 2017; Report from the Com-
mission on Progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verifi cation Mechanism, 
COM(2017) 44 fi nal, 25 January 2017.
 For the legal basis of the mechanism see Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 
establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verifi cation of progress in Bulgaria to 
address specifi c benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fi ght against corrup-
tion and organised crime, OJ[2006] L354/58, and Commission Decision of 13 December 
2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verifi cation of progress in Romania to 
address specifi c benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fi ght against corrup-
tion, OJ[2006] L354/56.
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closing benchmarks of the chapters of the acquis.74 This meant that the rule 
of law not only forms an eligibility condition (enlargement rules state that 
a country is eligible for membership if it is European and if it respects the 
EU’s values), but also that non-compliance therewith could constitute a case 
for suspension of the process.75
Next to the continuous monitoring of the rule of law as an EU value 
and the possible consequences of lack of progress for the opening and pace 
of the negotiations, the rule of law dimension of the pre-accession process 
has also expanded in scope. In order to take on board the experiences of the 
2004 ‘big bang’ accession and considering the state of the Western Balkan 
applicants with their legacy of relatively recent armed conflict and bilateral 
disputes, the 2005 negotiating frameworks for Croatia76 and Turkey77 intro-
duced two specific negotiating chapters meant to assist enlargement coun-
tries to establish a society based on the rule of law: Chapter 23, including 
judiciary matters, and Chapter 24, entitled Justice, Freedom and Security.78 
In this manner, the EU made it clear that it conceives the rule of law as 
an integral part of the acquis,79 whereby parts of the notion are, thus, also 
considered under the third Copenhagen criterion (the candidates’ ability to 
take on the obligations of membership).
Including rule of law issues as a chapter of the acquis enabled the EU to 
further cement the notion’s place as a focal point of enlargement. Against 
the background of continued shortcomings in the areas of judicial reform, 
the fight against corruption and organised crime in Romania and Bulgaria,80 
74 The Commission proposed the introduction of benchmarks, defi ned by the Council, 
which the candidate state has to meet in order for the Union to consider opening and/
or closing a particular negotiating chapter. According to the strategy, the purpose of 
benchmarks is ‘to improve the quality of the negotiations, by providing incentives for the 
candidate countries to undertake necessary reforms at an early stage.’ Moreover, bench-
marks ‘are measurable and linked to key elements of the acquis chapter.’ Commission 
Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, COM(2006) 
649 fi nal, 8 November 2006, p. 6.
75 Ibid., p. 6. See also the Negotiating Framework for Turkey, 3 October 2005, pnt. 5; Nego-
tiating Framework for Iceland, 26 July 2010, pnt. 17; Negotiating Framework for Croatia, 
3 October 2005, pnt. 12; Negotiating framework for Montenegro, 29 March 2012, pnt. 4; 
Negotiating Framework for Serbia, 17 December 2013, pnt. 22.
76 Negotiating Framework for Croatia, 3 October 2005.
77 Negotiating Framework for Turkey, 3 October 2005.
78 Technically, chapter 23 is a new chapter introduced in 2005 in the negotiations with Croa-
tia and Turkey, entitled in full ‘judiciary and fundamental rights’, whereas chapter 24 has 
previously existed (under the former title of ‘cooperation in the fi eld of justice and home 
affairs’).
79 See also the Negotiating Frameworks for Montenegro, Serbia, and Iceland.
80 See the Commission’s stocktaking of the work undertaken in the context of the Coopera-
tion and Verifi cation Mechanism over the past ten years, Commission Report on progress 
in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verifi cation Mechanism, COM(2017) 43 fi nal, 25 
January 2017; Commission Report on progress in Romania under the Co-operation and 
Verifi cation Mechanism, COM(2017) 44 fi nal, 25 January 2017.
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as well as the lessons learned from Croatia’s accession,81 the 2011 Enlarge-
ment Strategy makes it clear that issues related to the judiciary and funda-
mental rights and to justice and home affairs, i.e. Chapters 23 and 24, would 
be tackled early in the accession process on the basis of national Action 
Plans.82 This ‘new approach’ was subsequently endorsed by the Council,83 
and implemented in the negotiations with Montenegro, as reflected in its 
negotiating framework of June 2012.84 According to the Commission, the 
new approach ‘maximises the time countries have to develop a solid track 
record of reform implementation, thereby ensuring that reforms are deeply 
rooted and irreversible.’85
The current Commission again emphasised the importance of the rule 
of law as one of the pillars86 of its enlargement policy by underlining, in the 
outline of its medium-term strategy for enlargement, the need to reaffirm a 
strong focus on the ‘principle of fundamentals first’ in the accession process.87
81 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012, 
COM(2011) 666 fi nal, 12 October 2011, pp. 2-3.
82 Ibid., p. 5. The instrumental signifi cance of Chapters 23 and 24 within this strategy is 
best evidenced by Montenegro’s negotiating framework, in which it is stated that ‘[g]
iven the link between the chapters ‘Judiciary and fundamental rights’ and ‘Justice, free-
dom and security’ … as well as their importance for the implementation of the acquis 
across the board’, should progress under these chapters signifi cantly lag behind progress 
in the negotiations overall, the Commission on its own accord or on the request of one 
third of the Member States can propose to withhold its recommendation to open and/or 
close other negotiating chapters ‘until this equilibrium is addressed’. See the Negotiating 
framework for Montenegro, 29 March 2012, pnt. 6.
83 Council Conclusions, 3132nd General Affairs Council, Doc. 18089/11, 5 December 2011. 
See also Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 9 December 2011.
84 Negotiating framework for Montenegro, 29 March 2012, pnt. 6.
85 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, 
COM(2013) 700 fi nal, 16 October 2013, p. 2.; Commission Communication on Enlarge-
ment Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 10 October 2012, 
p.3. Also see General EU Position – ministerial meeting opening the Intergovernmental 
Conference on the Accession of Montenegro to the European Union, AD 23/12, 27 June 
2012.
 In addition, the Commission proposed to strengthen the use of benchmarks, through the 
introduction of interim benchmarks of the acquis chapters in addition to the opening and 
closing benchmarks. This ‘new approach’ to the enlargement policy, furthermore, includ-
ed the use of screening reports, which establish the discrepancies between EU law and 
the candidates’ legislation over the whole range of the acquis, and the use of actions plans, 
drawn up by the candidate countries. Such action plans operate as guidance documents 
for both the opening and interim benchmarks, as well as for the subsequent negotiations. 
Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012, 
COM(2011) 666 fi nal, 12 October 2011, p. 5; Negotiating framework for Montenegro, 29 
March 2012, pnt. 22.
86 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, 
COM(2013) 700 fi nal, 16 October 2013, p. 6.
87 Commission Communication on EU Enlargement Strategy, COM(2015) 611 final, 10 
November 2015, p. 3.
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According to this principle, the core issues of the rule of law, fundamen-
tal rights, strengthening of democratic institutions, as well as economic 
development remain key priorities in the enlargement process, since these 
issues ‘reflect the importance the EU attaches to its core values and gen-
eral policy priorities.’88 The 2018 Western Balkan Strategy as well as the 
Enlargement Strategy of the same year reinforce the pivotal importance of 
rule of law reform in in the applicant states and reconfirm the fundamentals 
first-approach.89 According to the latter, addressing reforms in the area of 
the rule of law ‘remains the most pressing issue for the Western Balkans’; 
not only that, it is also ‘the key benchmark against which the prospects 
of these countries will be judged by the EU.’90 However, the former adds 
that ‘[e]fforts should be intensified to guide rule of law-related reforms 
in the region, to support the ambitious steps to be taken by the countries 
themselves,’91 indicating the importance of the notion as well as the contin-
ued struggles and need for more developments in this area.
This section showed that the EU has progressively concentrated on the 
rule of law as a central condition for development in the candidate states. 
It was demonstrated that the rule of law is not only a condition for eligibil-
ity and a Copenhagen political criterion – the non-compliance with which 
can constitute a potential case for suspension throughout the process. In 
addition, it is now also the first hurdle to overcome in the enlargement 
negotiations by way of Chapter 23; lack of progress in the rule of law can 
reduce the speed of or effectively halt the entire enlargement process. Next, 
the focus of this chapter will turn to the instruments that form the basis for 
the EU’s rule of law promotion in its accession policy.
2.3 The EU’s toolbox for rule of law promotion in its enlargement policy
The EU’s legal framework of its enlargement policy, i.e. its toolbox for rule 
of law promotion, mirrors the increasing importance of the rule of law as 
presented above. This section will show that the rule of law has become 
an important element in the legal framework. The basic aim here is to pro-
vide insight into the legal instruments that underpin the EU’s enlargement 
policy and the significance allocated to the consolidation and strengthening 
of the rule of law therein.
88 Ibid., p. 5. See also Commission Communication on 2016 Communication on EU Enlarge-
ment Policy, COM(2016) 715 fi nal, 9 November 2016, p. 2.
89 Commission Communication on 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 
COM(2018) 450 fi nal, 17 April 2018, p. 1.
90 Ibid., p. 2 [emphasis added].
91 Commission Communication on A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced 
Engagement with the Western Balkans, COM(2018) 65 fi nal, 6 February 2018, p. 10.
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The relations between the applicant countries and the EU are regulated 
by their individual association agreements. In the case of the CEECs this 
meant the so-called Europe Agreements (EAs). For Turkey, Malta and 
Cyprus the relationship was based on the Association Agreements con-
cluded in 1963 and in the early 70s.92 In relation of the countries in the 
Western Balkans the association is covered by the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Agreements (SAAs) within the broader context of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process.93
All agreements contain references to the rule of law, and, thus, clearly 
demonstrate the notion’s increasing significance. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the subsequent signing of Trade and Cooperation Agree-
ments with the newly independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
the European Council, meeting in Strasbourg in 1989, affirmed that the 
Community was ready to strengthen bilateral relations beyond the existing 
trade agreements.94 Subsequently, Europe Agreements95 were signed over 
a period of seven years – starting in 1991 with Poland,96 Hungary,97 and 
Czechoslovakia – before the articulation of the Copenhagen criteria, and 
with the Czech Republic98 and Slovakia99 separately, Estonia,100 Latvia,101 
92 Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey, OJ[1964] 
P217/3687; Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Malta, OJ[1971] 
L61/2; Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and the Republic of 
Cyprus, OJ[1973] L133/2.
93 Commission Communication on The Stabilisation and Association Process for the Coun-
tries in South-Eastern Europe, COM(1999) 235 fi nal, 26 May 1999. See further Steven 
Blockmans ‘Consolidating the Enlargement Agenda for South Eastern Europe’ in Steven 
Blockmans & Sacha Prechal (eds) Reconciling the Deepening and Widening of the European 
Union The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press (2008), pp. 59-86.
94 Presidency Conclusion, Strasbourg European Council, 8-9 December 1989, p. 10.
95 For a comprehensive study of Europe Agreements see Peter-Christian Müller-Graff (ed) 
East Central Europe and the European Union: From Europe Agreements to Member Status 
Baden-Baden: Nomos (1997); Peter-Christian Müller-Graff ‘Legal Framework for Rela-
tions between the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: General Aspects’ in 
Marc Maresceau (ed) Enlarging the European Union. Relations between the EU and Central 
and Eastern Europe London: Longman (1997), pp. 27-40.
96 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of 
Poland, OJ[1993] L348/2.
97 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of Hun-
gary, OJ[1993] L347/2.
98 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Czech Republic, 
OJ[1994] L360/2.
99 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of Slova-
kia, OJ[1994] L359/2.
100 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of Esto-
nia, OJ[1998] L68/3.
101 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of Lat-
via, OJ[1998] L26/3.
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Lithuania,102 Slovenia,103 Bulgaria,104 and Romania105 after the acknowl-
edgement of the CEECs membership perspective. While in the Preamble 
of all Europe agreements the rule of law is mentioned as one of the values 
underpinning the new political order, none of the EAs contain an explicit 
reference to the rule of law in the main body of the agreement.106
Similar to the pre-accession process for the CEECs, the Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP)107 is the broader strategic framework for 
the EU’s relations with the countries in the Western Balkans, designed to 
promote stability and bring the countries, each at their own pace, closer to 
the Union.108 
102 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of Lithu-
ania, OJ [1998] L51/3.
103 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of Slove-
nia, OJ[1999] L51/3.
104 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and the Republic of Bul-
garia, OJ[1994] L358/3.
105 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the EC and Romania, OJ[1994] 
L357/2.
106 All but the earliest Europe Agreements contain an essential elements clause in which ref-
erence is made to ‘respect for democratic principles and human rights, established by the 
Helsinki Final Act and in the charter of Paris for a New Europe, as well as the principle of 
market economy…’. Even though the latter, drawn up in the context of the OSCE, high-
lights human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in equal measure, it is just the fi rst 
two that made their way into the essential elements clause of the EAs explicitly.
107 Borrowing its ‘regional approach’, with elements of political and economic conditional-
ity, from its practice under the Lomé conventions, the EU’s approach towards South East 
Europe as a region was initiated at the multilateral Royaumont summit in 1995, during 
which the foreign ministers of the Member States, representatives of the former Yugo-
slav countries, representatives of the neighbouring countries, including Albania, met 
with delegations from Russia and the USA, as well as representatives from the Council 
of Europe and the OSCE. The ‘regional approach’ to support the implementation of the 
Dayton Peace Agreements and facilitate political stability and economic prosperity was 
adopted by the Council thereafter (see Council Conclusions and Declaration on former 
Yugoslavia of 26 February 1996). The approach was open to those countries in the region 
for which the Council had not yet adopted negotiating directives for an association 
agreement. Effectively, this meant the countries of former Yugoslavia and Albania. The 
EU offered fi nancial assistance, trade preferences and contractual relations and progres-
sive compliance with the conditions established by the Council is to be rewarded with 
intensifi ed bilateral cooperation. In case of serious and repeated non-compliance with the 
conditions underpinning the respective level of cooperation, however, trade preferences 
might be withdrawn, fi nancial assistance may be frozen and, where applicable, an agree-
ment may be suspended. For a detailed account of these measures see Christian Pippan 
‘The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process for the West-
ern Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality’ European Foreign Affairs Review (2004) 9, 
pp. 219-245 at 229-238.
108 Council Conclusions ‘The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving 
towards European Integration’, Annex A, 2518th External Relations Council, 16 June 2003; 
Commission Report on The Stabilisation and Association Process – First Annual Report, 
COM(2002) 163 fi nal, 3 April 2002, p. 4.
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Originally, the SAP stipulated that establishing SAAs would ‘depend on the 
willingness of the countries concerned to work towards consolidating peace 
and to the respect of human rights, the rights of minorities and democratic 
principles.’109 However, the General Affairs Council elucidated that rule of 
law conditionality has also always been part and parcel of the condition-
ality applied to the Western Balkans.110 This conclusion is reinforced by, 
amongst others, the feasibility studies prepared by the Commission for the 
negotiation of the SAAs, in which, for example in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, it is stated that: ‘Respect for democratic principles and human 
rights as proclaimed in key international documents such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and respect for the principles of international 
law and rule of law in general should form the basis of the domestic and 
external policies of parties to a SAA.’111 Qualified by the Commission as a 
new type of contract,112 Stabilisation and Association Agreements have been 
109 Council Conclusions and Declaration on former Yugoslavia of 26 February 1996. See also 
the Commission Communication on Common Principles for Future Contractual Rela-
tions with certain Countries in South-Eastern Europe, COM(96) 476 fi nal, 2 October 1996, 
p. 1, which limits itself to these three principles.
110 Council Conclusions ‘The Application of Conditionality with a view to developing 
a Coherent EU-Strategy for the Relations with the Countries in the Region’, Annex to 
Annex III, 2203rd General Affairs Council, 29-30 April 1997.
111 Commission Report on the preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a Sta-
bilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union, COM(2003) 692 fi nal, 18 
November 2003, p. 6 [italics added]. Also see Commission Communication on the pre-
paredness of Serbia and Montenegro to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ment with the European Union, COM(2005) 476 fi nal, 12 April 2005, p. 4; Commission 
Report on the feasibility of negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with 
the Republic of Croatia, COM(2000) 311 fi nal, 24 May 2000, pp. 4-5; Report from the Com-
mission on the feasibility of negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with 
Albania, COM(1999) 599 fi nal, 24 November 1999 p. 16; Commission Report on the feasi-
bility of negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, COM(1999) 300 fi nal, 16 June 1999.
112 Commission Communication on the Stabilisation and Association Process for countries 
of South-Eastern Europe, COM(1999) 235 fi nal, 26 May 1999, p. 3. Pippan has called the 
SAAs a ‘sui generis type of EU agreement’ the primary aim of which is the establishment 
of a formal association with the EU over a transitional period, during which the Western 
Balkan countries gradually adopt their laws to the core standards and rules of the single 
market. Pippan (2004), p. 233. See, however, Phinnemore’s article on the SAAs’ consider-
able similarities with the earlier Europe Agreements, David Phinnemore ‘Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the Western Balkans?’ 8 European 
Foreign Affairs Review (2003), pp. 77-103. For more on the SAAs see Steven Blockmans 
Tough Love. The European Union’s Relations with the Western Balkans The Hague: T.M.C. 
Asser Press (2007), pp. 253-268; Tatham (2009) pp. 167-170.
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signed since 2001 with FYROM,113 Croatia,114 Albania,115 Montenegro,116 
Serbia,117 Bosnia and Herzegovina,118 and Kosovo.119
The SAAs clearly emphasise the importance of the rule of law. Next 
to a reference in the preamble,120 the notion is included in Article 2 as an 
essential element, the non-compliance with which can, depending on the 
suspension clause in the agreement, be a reason for suspending the agree-
ment121 or can give rise to ‘appropriate measures’.122 It should be noted, 
however, that no further details as to the interpretation of the essential 
elements, and, thus, to the EU’s understanding of the rule of law in the 
specific context of the SAAs has been forthcoming so far. Furthermore, all 
SAAs’ aims (but for the earliest ones with Macedonia and Croatia) include 
support to the efforts of the country to strengthen democracy and the 
rule of law.123 More particularly, the agreements frame the strengthening 
efforts of the rule of law in in terms of the specific focus of the reinforce-
ment of institutions. Accordingly, particular importance is attached ‘to 
the consolidation of the rule of law, and the reinforcement of institutions 
at all levels in the areas of administration in general and law enforcement 
113 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia, OJ[2004] L84/13.
114 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic of Croatia, OJ[2005] L26/3.
115 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic of Albania, OJ[2009] 
L107/166.
116 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic of Montenegro, OJ[2010] 
L108/3.
117 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic of Serbia, OJ[2013] L278/16.
118 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part, 
OJ[2015] L164/2.
119 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo*, OJ[2016] L 71/3.
120 Exceptionally, the Preamble of the SAA with Kosovo pays specifi c attention to the com-
mitment of the parties to institutions based on the rule of law, to good governance and 
democratic principles, thereby diverging from the other SAAs on this particular para-
graph.
121 See for example Article 133 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia, 
which provides that ‘[e]ither Party may suspend this Agreement, with immediate effect, 
in the event of the non-compliance by the other Party of one of the essential elements of 
this Agreement.’
122 See for example Article 126(2) of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Alba-
nia, in which it is stated that ‘[i]f either Party considers that the other Party has failed 
to fulfi l an obligation under this Agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before 
doing so, except in cases of special urgency, it shall supply the Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Council with all relevant information required for a thorough examination of the 
situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties.’  According to the 
Joint Declaration concerning Article 126, attached to the Agreement, the parties agree 
that the cases of special urgency referred to in the Article mean ‘cases of material breach 
of the Agreement by one of the two Parties.’ Violation of the essential elements, includ-
ing the rule of law, is provided as an example of such a material breach. See also the Joint 
Declaration concerning Article 120 attached to the Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ment with Croatia.
123 See for example the Article 1(2)(a) of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with 
Montenegro.
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and the administration of justice in particular.’124 This specific aim is 
further divided into the elements for cooperation: strengthening judicial 
independence, improving judicial efficiency, improving the functioning of 
the police and other law enforcement bodies, providing adequate training, 
and fighting corruption and organised crime. The SAA with Kosovo adds 
to this list two more areas of cooperation: improving judicial impartiality 
and accountability, as well as developing adequate structures for the police, 
prosecutors and judges and other judicial and law enforcement bodies to 
adequately prepare them for cooperation in civil, commercial and criminal 
matters, and to enable them to effectively prevent, investigate, prosecute 
and adjudicate organised crime, corruption and terrorism.125 Overall, 
the text of the SAAs makes it abundantly clear that the objective of assis-
tance under the agreements is focused on institution building and shall, 
thus, contribute to ‘the democratic, economic and institutional reforms’126 
of the countries covered by the Stabilisation and Association Process.
Next to the bilateral Europe Agreements and Stabilisation and Asso-
ciation Agreements, the EU’s legal arsenal for rule of law promotion in the 
pre-accession process and the Stabilisation and Association Process consists 
of Accession Partnerships (APs) in the case of the CEECS, and the similar 
instrument of European Partnerships (EPs) for the Western Balkans, as 
well as a number of financial regulations which create the framework for 
financial and technical cooperation. Below, the APs, EPs, and the financial 
regulations will be briefly discussed, in so far as they relate to the rule of 
law.
While the Europe agreements formed the basis for the relations between 
the EU and the applicant states, it is the APs that guided the work of the 
candidates during the pre-accession process.127 Originally based on Regula-
tion 622/98 of 16 March 1998,128 the individual Partnerships were used as 
the framework in which the priorities, objectives, and conditions for each 
country are set out, including all forms of EU assistance.129 They define the 
priorities to be observed for adopting the EU acquis, formulated as short 
124 See for example Article 80 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia; 
Article 75 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Croatia; Article 74 of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Macedonia; Article 78 of the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement with Albania; Article 80 of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with Montenegro.
125 Article 83 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo.
126 Cf. Article 105 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Macedonia [emphasis 
added].
127 Inglis (2002), p. 107.
128 Council Regulation (EC) No 622/98 of 16 March 1998 on assistance to the applicant States 
in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of 
Accession Partnerships, OJ[1998] L85/1.
129 Maresceau (2003), p. 31.
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and medium-term objectives. As a process of permanent adaptation,130 
the APs were prepared, reviewed and updated by the Commission on 
the basis of its annual progress reports and subsequently proposed to the 
Council.131 As such, they form unilateral decisions by the Council and 
are, thus, legally binding on the Council and the Member States only.132 
However, in direct response to their country AP, every applicant has had 
to adopt a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) – a 
detailed, multi-annual plan for the alignment of domestic legislation with 
EU regulations.133 Because of the fact that they are unilateral instruments, 
the APs were more comprehensive than the Europe Agreements, in prin-
ciple reaching all areas of the acquis, including those areas that were not 
included, or even in existence, at the time of the conclusions of the earlier 
EAs. Annual reports on each country’s progress in meeting the objectives 
spelled out in the APs were included in the Commission annual reports.134 
130 For the first round of the Accession Partnerships of the ten CEECs see Decisions 
1998/259-1998/268, OJ[1998] L121/1-L121/46. Revisions occurred in 1999 (see Deci-
sions 1999/850-1999/859, OJ[1999] L335/1-L335/61) and 2002 (see Decisions 2002/83-
2002/94, OJ[2002] L44/1-L44/101). For Bulgaria and Romania a further revision fol-
lowed in 2003 (Decision 2003/396, OJ[2003] L145/1 and Decision 2003/397, OJ[2003] 
L145/21 respectively).
 The APs for Malta and Cyprus were introduced in 2000 on the basis of Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 555/2000 13 March 2000 on the implementation of operations in the frame-
work of the pre-accession strategy for the Republic of Cyprus and the Republic of Malta 
(see Decision 2000/248, OJ[2000] L78/10 for Cyprus and Decision 2000/249, OJ[2000] 
L78/17 for Malta). Both APs were updated together with the CEEC APs in 2002, see 
above.
 In the case of Turkey, Council Regulation (EC) No 390/2001 of 26 February 2001, on assis-
tance to Turkey in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the 
establishment of an Accession Partnership, formed the basis for the adoption of Turkey’s 
initial AP (Decision 2001/235, OJ[2001] L85/13). Revisions followed in 2003 (Decision 
2003/398, OJ[2003] L145/40), 2006 (Decision 2006/35, OJ[2006] L22/34), and 2008 (Deci-
sion 2008/157, OJ[2008] L51/4).
 Even though Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey were, and are in case of the latter, covered by 
a separate legal regime from the CEECs, scholarly literature has pointed out that the all 
candidates in the fi fth and sixth enlargement round were treated in essentially the same 
manner. See for example Inglis (2002), p. 107; Blockmans (2007), pp. 278-279; Tatham 
(2009), pp. 289-290.
131 In the Commission’s original proposal presented in Agenda 2000, the APs were intended 
to be Commission decisions, Commission Communication on Agenda 2000: For a Stron-
ger and Wider Union, COM(97) 2000 fi nal, 15 July 1997, pp. 63-64.
132 Kirstyn Inglis ‘The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of their Pre-accession 
Reorientation’ 37 Common Market Law Review (2000) pp. 1173-1210 at 1184.
133 Inglis (2002), p. 108; Tatham (2009) pp. 291-293.
134 See for example Section D on ‘Accession Partnership and National Programmes for the 
Adoption of the Acquis: Global assessment’ in the 2001 Poland Regular Report, pp. 108-
112.
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For the countries in the Western Balkan, the European Partnerships135 fulfil 
a largely similar role136 to the Accession Partnerships.137
Analysing the financial regulations underlying the Accession Partner-
ships and European Partnerships, it becomes apparent that the rule of law 
is emphasised in an incremental fashion, mirroring the EU’s enlargement 
policy’s increasing acknowledgement of its importance, as outlined above. 
From the beginning, Regulation 622/98, establishing the Accession Partner-
ships, linked financial assistance to respect of the commitments contained 
in the Europe Agreements and to progress towards fulfilment of the Copen-
hagen criteria, including the rule of law.138 The so-called ‘coordinating’ 
Regulation 1266/99, subsequently ensured for applicant countries with an 
Accession Partnership that the PHARE regulation – the original financial 
regulation for economic aid to the CEECs139 – was reoriented to a fully 
135 Council Decisions 2004/515/EC, 2004/528/EC, 2004/518/EC, 2204/519/EC, 2004/520/
EC, and 2004/648/EC, OJ[2004] L221/10, L222/20, L223/20, L227/21, and L297/19, 
respectively. These acts were repealed and replaced in 2006 by Council Decisions 
2006/55/EC, 2006/57 EC, 2006/54/EC, and 2006/56/EC, OJ[2006] L35/19, L35/57, 
L35/1, and L35/32, respectively, and once more in 2008 by Council Decisions 2008/211/
EC, 2008/212/EC, 2008/210/EC, and 2008/213/EC, OJ[2008] L80/18, L80/32, L80/1, 
and L80/46, respectively. After declaring its independence on 3 June 2006, it was appro-
priate to establish a separate European Partnership with Montenegro, which was done 
on 22 January 2007, see Council Decision 2007/49/EC, OJ[2007] L20/16.
136 For a comparison on the framework in relation to the Accession Partnerships with the 
CEECs, the framework covering Malta and Cyprus, and the regime that applies to Tur-
key, see Inglis (2002), pp. 106-107. For an analysis of the European Partnerships in the 
light of the Accession Partnerships, see Tatham (2009), pp. 324-325; Blockmans (2007), pp. 
278-279.
137 Introduced by the Commission as a means of bolstering the SAP on the basis of past 
experiences, particularly the enhanced pre-accession process, the fi rst round of EP’s 
with Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo 
as defi ned by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999), and Croatia was 
approved by the Council in March 2004 on the basis of Council Regulation 533/2004. 
See Commission Communication on The Western Balkans and European Integration, 
COM(2003) 285 fi nal, 21 May 2003, pp. 2-4. Also see the Declaration adopted at the EU-
Western Balkans Summit adopted at Thessaloniki, Doc. 10229/03, 21 June 2003, pnt. 4.
138 Article 1 Regulation (EC) No 622/98. Also see Article 1 of both Regulation (EC) 555/2000 
and Regulation (EC) 390/2011 on the Accession Partnerships and the pre-accession strat-
egy for Cyprus and Malta, and Turkey, respectively.
139 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on economic aid to the 
Republic of Hungary and the Polish People’s Republic, OJ[1989] L375/11. From 1990 
onwards, Yugoslavia, amongst others, was a recipient of PHARE assistance, see Council 
Regulation (EEC) 2698/90 of 17 September 1990, OJ[1990] L257/1. Until 2000 PHARE 
assistance was extended to Albania (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3800/91 of 23 Decem-
ber 1991, OJ[1991] L357/10); Bosnia-Herzegovina (Council Regulation (EC) No 753/96 of 
22 April 1996, OJ[1996] L103/5); Croatia (Council Regulation (EC) No 1366/95 of 12 June 
1995, OJ[1995] L133/1); Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Council Regulation 
(EC) No 463/96 of 11 March 1996, OJ[1996] L65/3).
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accession driven approach in line with the priorities, objectives and condi-
tions set out in the APs.140
The identification of priority areas for each candidate state is based on 
the analysis of the states’ ability to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. However, 
the first two rounds of APs show that the objectives within the political 
criteria are jumbled together, treated in a very condensed manner, and spe-
cific rule of law aims, short-term or medium-term, are virtually absent.141 
Be that as it may, the 2002 Accession Partnerships manifest an increased 
focus on the rule of law, in line with the enlargement’s policy focus on the 
rule of law, and the functioning of the judiciary in particular. Following the 
structure of the Regular Reports, the objectives under the political criteria 
have been made explicit and are divided on the basis of the binary approach 
of democracy and rule of law on the one hand, and human rights and the 
protection of minorities on the other.142 It is clear that in relation to the rule 
of law, the emphasis is heavily on the reform of the judicial system, with 
such objectives as the alleviation of courts’ workload;143 the review of the 
degree of immunity of members of the judiciary to ensure it is in line with 
international standards;144 and the continued training of specialised judges 
and prosecutors including in acquis-related matters.145
In contrast to the financial instruments covering the CEECs, the frame-
work for assistance to the Western Balkans has provided more detail on the 
topic. Already in the earliest financial regulation on the countries in the area, 
with aid allocated to the restructuring process, the objective of consolida-
140 Article 4(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 of 21 June 1999 on coordinating aid 
to the applicant countries in the framework of the pre-accession strategy and amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89, OJ[1999] L161/68.
141 The only exception is the 1998 Accession Partnership with the Slovak Republic in which 
mention is made of the necessity of guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary as a 
medium-term objective under the political criteria. However, in all 1998 and 1999 Acces-
sion Partnerships the functioning, effi ciency and reinforcement of the judiciary is dis-
cussed under the heading of ‘Reinforcement of institutional and administrative capacity’ 
(1998) or ‘Reinforcement of administrative and judicial capacity’ (1999). See for example 
the 1999 AP of the Czech Republic, which states as one of the short-term objectives under 
the latter heading ‘begin implementing a programme to reform the judiciary (judges and 
state prosecutors) by fi lling vacancies, simplifying procedures, stepping up training of 
judges to EC law.’
142 See for example Council Decision 2002/87/EC of 28 January 2002 on the principles, pri-
orities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the accession partnership 
with Hungary, OJ[2002] L44/37.
143 Council Decision 2002/88/EC of 28 January 2002 on the principles, priorities, inter-
mediate objectives and conditions contained in the accession partnership with Latvia, 
OJ[2002] L44/45.
144 Council Decision 2002/83/EC on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and 
conditions contained in the accession partnership with Bulgaria, OJ[2002] L44/1.
145 Council Decision 2002/89/EC on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and 
conditions contained in the accession partnership with Lithuania, OJ[2002] L44/54.
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tion of democracy and civil society is included.146 Furthermore, not only is 
respect for the rule of law expressly identified as an essential aspect for aid, 
the essential elements clause also includes fulfilment of the ‘specific condi-
tions laid down by the Council for the implementation of cooperation with 
former Yugoslavia’ as an precondition for financial assistance147 – going 
further than the comparable provisions of the framework for the CEECs. 
The term ‘specific conditions’ referred to the February 1996 Council Conclu-
sions and the simultaneously adopted Declaration on former Yugoslavia, in 
which value conditionality was introduced, albeit, however, in very broad 
and opaque terms.148 The General Affairs Council alleviated this indetermi-
nacy in April 1997 with its adoption of specific conditionality governing the 
EU’s relations with the Western Balkans. According to the Conclusions, the 
EU intends to develop its relations with the countries of the region ‘within a 
framework which promotes democracy, the rule of law, higher standards of 
human and minority rights, transformation towards market economies and 
greater cooperation between countries.'149 Furthermore, adding some level 
of specificity, rule of law benchmarks are introduced and include effective 
means of redress against administrative decisions, access to courts and right 
to fair trial, and equality before the law and equal protection by the law.150
Against this background, it can be shown that the subsequently 
adopted financial regulations underpinning the reform in the applicant 
states have augmented the rule of law’s importance both by making it a 
primary objective of cooperation and assistance as well as by adding more 
specific indicators and benchmarks. Thus, the CARDS Regulation enumer-
ated the creation of an institutional and legislative framework for the rule 
of law and the strengthening of legality as the second aim in the list of the 
Union’s assistance objectives,151 and the latest Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA II) called attention to the strengthening of the rule of law 
as a ‘key challenge’152 and a specific objective for the beneficiary countries, 
including an independent and efficient judiciary as well as the improve-
146 Article 4(2) Regulation (EC) No 1628/96, the so-called OBNOVA Regulation. This inclu-
sive approach to aid was already apparent from the Commission’s initial proposal on the 
topic, see Commission Communication on The European Union’s Financial Contribution 
to Reconstruction in Former Yugoslavia, COM(95) 581 fi nal, 18 December 1995, p. 2.
147 Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 1628/96.
148 Pippan (2004), pp. 223-224; Tatham (2009), p.319.
149 Council Conclusions ‘The Application of Conditionality with a view to developing 
a Coherent EU-Strategy for the Relations with the Countries in the Region’, Annex to 
Annex III, 2203rd General Affairs Council, 29-30 April 1997.
150 Ibid.
151 Article 2(2)(b) Council Regulation (EC) 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000 on assistance for 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 and 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2906/89 and (EEC) No 1360/90 and Decisions 97/256/
EC and 1999/311/EC, OJ[2000] L306/1.
152 Paragraph 9 of the Preamble of Regulation (EU) No 231/2014.
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ment of law enforcement.153 Moreover, in addition to this specific purpose 
of cooperation, the rule of law also forms a horizontal aim, to which par-
ticular attention should be paid throughout all actions in the policy areas 
covered by the Regulation.154
The greater emphasis – for example, ensuring full respect for the rule of 
law is a ‘key short-term priority’ for Kosovo in its 2008 European Partner-
ship155 – and level of detail of rule of law benchmarks are also reflected 
in the European Partnerships. Following the two-pronged approach of the 
structure of the political criteria, as introduced in the pre-accession process 
covering the CEECs, the section on democracy and the rule of law in the 
EPs has continued to provide a detailed list of rule of law related objec-
tives in need of improvement, demonstrating the EU’s interpretation of 
the notion. To highlight one example in relation to the strengthening of the 
judicial system taken from Croatia’s European Partnership:156
Develop and implement a comprehensive strategy for judicial reform in consul-
tation with interested bodies, including the adoption of necessary new legisla-
tion and the establishment of a career management system which also includes 
an open, fair and transparent system for recruitment, evaluation and mobility. 
Enhance professionalism in the judiciary by ensuring adequate State funding 
for the training institutions for judges and other judicial officials, allowing it to 
develop high-quality training for judges, prosecutors and administrative staff. 
Provide for adequate initial and vocational training schemes. Address the prob-
lem of backlog in courts. Take measures to ensure proper and full execution of 
court rulings.
Finally, in addition to the legal framework for rule of law promotion in 
enlargement described above, mention should be made of the judicial 
dialogues on rule of law or rule of law related matters. Initiated with three 
of the Western Balkan countries under the Stabilisation and Association 
Process, the dialogues were set up with the aim of advancing structured 
relations on the implementation of the rule of law with aspiring member 
countries prior to the SAAs entering into force. The Structured Dialogue on 
Justice with Bosnia-Herzegovina, launched in 2011, attempts to ensure an 
independent, effective, impartial and accountable judicial system.157 It is a 
platform for discussing the reforms necessary to allow Bosnia-Herzegovina 
153 Article 2(1)(a)(i) Regulation (EU) No 231/2014.
154 Article 3(2) Regulation (EU) No 231/2014.
155 Council Decision 2008/213/EC of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and con-
ditions contained in the European Partnership with Serbia including Kosovo as defi ned 
by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and repealing Deci-
sion 2006/56/EC, OJ[2008] L80/46.
156 Council Decision 2004/648/EC of 13 September 2004 on the principles, priorities and 
conditions contained in the European Partnership with Croatia, OJ[2004] L297/19.
157 Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy, ‘Friends of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, SPEECH/11/730, 8 November 2011, avail-
able at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-730_en.htm.
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to progress in the alignment of its judicial system with the acquis and 
relevant standards.158 At the end of each plenary session, the European 
Commission issues a set of recommendations in which necessary reform 
measures of, mostly, the judiciary sector are outlined.159
In order to address the rule of law early on in Kosovo’s pre-accession 
process, the Commission jointly with the Kosovo authorities launched 
a Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law in May 2012. The Dialogue 
takes place twice a year and proves a context in which to regularly assess 
Kosovo’s progress on the judiciary, the fight against organised crime, and 
the fight against corruption.160 With the opening of accession negotiations 
blocked by Greece for some years from 2009 onwards, the EU devised the 
so-called High Level Accession Dialogue as a mechanism with the intention 
to maintain the tempo of the reforms that the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia was carrying out under its National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis, adopted in response to its European Partnership. 
The Dialogue covers five issues, including the rule of law.161 Stressing the 
importance of the Dialogue, the Commission noted in its 2013-2014 Enlarge-
ment Strategy that: ‘The High Level Accession Dialogue has contributed to 
progress in most priority areas, including the elimination of court backlogs 
and progress in the fight against corruption. The country has already 
reached a high level of alignment relative to where it is in the accession 
process and has made further progress in improving its ability to take on 
the obligations of membership.’162
Against the background provided in this section, in which the Union’s 
enlargement policy was set out and the positioning of the rule of law within 
the framework of the policy was explained, the following section will turn 
to the testing of the analytical framework of the rule of law, established in 
Part I on the basis of an examination of the common rule of law elements 
found in the national rule of tradition (chapter 1) and in legal theory (chap-
ter 2), against the EU’s practice in the field of enlargement.
158 See for example the fi rst set of preliminary recommendations from the European Com-
mission, of 6 June 2011, available at http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/
delegacijaEU_2012022712220919eng.pdf.
159 For an overview of the recommendation adopted so far see the site of the EU’s Delegation 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina: http://europa.ba/?page_id=553.
160 See for example, European Commission ‘Structure Dialogue on the Rule of Law with 
Kosovo: Conclusions’ Press release, Brussels, 30 May 2012, available at: http://ec.europa.
eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/fule/docs/news/20120530_rold_conclussions_30_
may.pdf; European Commission ‘Third meeting of the Structured Dialogue on the Rule 
of law – Operational conclusions, Brussels, 16 January 2014, available at: http://md.rks-
gov.net/desk/inc/media/7BAF7A77-014B-4509-8D27-09A084C932D3.pdf.
161 The other themes are the freedom of expression, ethnic relations, challenges for electoral 
reform, public administration reform, strengthening of the market economy, and good 
neighbourly relations.
162 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, 
COM(700) fi nal, 16 October 2013, p. 17.
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3. Rule of law elements in the EU’s practice in enlargement
In this part of the chapter, the Union’s practice in its enlargement policy will 
be tested against the framework on the rule of law, established in Part I of 
the thesis. It should be recalled that the common rule of law elements found 
on the basis of an examination of the national rule of law traditions and 
legal theory were categorised in the framework along the lines of formal, 
procedural, and institutional elements. It was demonstrated in the first part of 
this thesis that to the first category belong those elements that are concerned 
with the qualifications for the validity and quality of law itself, encapsu-
lated by the notion of legality. However, in order for the rule of law to exist, 
those laws must be applied and enforced in a way that is procedurally just, 
and, moreover, in a judicial system that effectively supports their applica-
tion. Therefore, to the second category belong those elements that have to 
do with the procedures of how the law is applied in practice, including 
impartiality, efficiency, and access to justice. Finally, the analysis undertaken 
in the first part showed that for a state to function under the rule of law 
some form of the doctrine of the separation of powers must be established. 
Moreover, the point was made that legal scholars have concentrated their 
scrutiny of the rule of law on the ways of separation and the powers of one 
branch in particular, that of the judiciary. Consequently, the third category 
of institutional elements includes the notion of the separation of powers, 
with a particular emphasis on judicial independence. In this light, section 
3.1. will focus on formal elements, section 3.2 on procedural elements, and 
section 3.3 will cover the institutional elements of the rule of law.
3.1 Formal elements of the rule of law
The present section is concerned with the examination of the EU’s practice 
in its enlargement policy in relation to the principle of legality. The main 
argument advanced here is that, in line with the findings in the case study 
on development cooperation, the EU has little consideration for the element 
of legality in its conceptualisation of the rule of law in enlargement. It will 
be argued that the examination of the legal framework and the Copenhagen 
related policy documents shows that the Union not only values institutional 
aspects of the rule of law over formal ones, but also that the demands of 
legal approximation in combination with the qualitative methodology 
underlying the enlargement policy actually threaten formal elements such 
as stability and the coherence of law.
To this end, the section is divided into three subsections. Subsection one 
will focus on the definition of the rule of law proffered in Europe Agree-
ments concluded with the countries in central and Eastern Europe, the 
Association Agreements with Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey, the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements underlying the EU’s relations with the coun-
tries in South-eastern Europe, as well as the financial framework pertaining 
to the enlargement policy. It will be shown that the earlier Europe and 
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Association Agreements provide little towards the EU’s definition on the 
rule of law. Moreover, while the Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
expressly include support for the rule of law as an aim of association, it will 
be demonstrated that the areas of cooperation listed are again only institu-
tional in nature, thereby neglecting the formal element of the rule of law. 
It will furthermore be argued that the financial framework underpinning 
the EU’s enlargement policy provides a similar picture, whereby the early 
Regulations underpinning the Europe Agreements, such as PHARE, do not 
expressly include the rule of law, and the later financial Regulations cover-
ing the countries in South-eastern Europe offer financial aid for institutional 
rule of law reform, legislative approximation, and capacity building.
Subsection two will then continue by testing these findings against the 
policy’s main documents, including the Enlargement Strategy’s and the 
annual regular/progress reports. It will be argued that the Copenhagen docu-
ments confirm the institutional focus of the legal framework, with little atten-
tion for the rule of law’s formal element of legality. However, it will also be 
shown that the EU’s demands for legislative approximation in combination 
with the accession methodology has led to a quantitative approach, whereby 
alignment with the acquis is described in terms of quantity, not quality. In the 
third subsection it will be demonstrated that the EU’s quantitative approach, 
whereby progress assessment of the implementation of the acquis is measured 
on the basis of numbers rather than on the basis of legislative quality, has 
given rise to problems of legality at the domestic level, including stability, 
coherence, and compliance. It will be shown that even though there is grow-
ing evidence that for law to be effective local ‘adaptation’ is preferred over 
‘adoption’, the nature of the acquis is such that it precludes alterations by the 
applicant states, thereby leaving little to no room for considerations of the 
quality of the transposed laws within the overall domestic legal framework. 
Moreover, the literature confirms the findings of the preceding subsections 
that the EU’s ‘more is better’ mindset encourages a quantitative assess-
ment to the detriment of legality and its requirements for the quality of law.
3.1.1 The lack of formal legality in the legal framework underpinning 
enlargement
The EU’s legal framework for enlargement (Article 49 TEU, including the 
Copenhagen criteria, the bilateral agreements underpinning the relations 
with the applicant countries, and the financial framework) offers limited 
insight into the element of formal legality. While Article 49 TEU, without 
further elaboration, refers to Article 2 TEU and the European council 
conclusions, including the Copenhagen criteria, the latter merely provides 
that in order to become a Member State, the candidate county has achieved 
‘stability of institutions guaranteeing … the rule of law….’ As discussed in 
the section on the EU’s toolbox for enlargement,163 the Europe Agreements,
163 See section 2.3.
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as well as the Association Agreements covering the relations with Cyprus, 
Malta, and Turkey, did not provide much clarity on the notion’s under-
standing, merely mentioning the significance of the rule of law for the 
political system of the candidate countries in the Preamble.
In this respect, the Stabilisation and Association Agreements are slightly 
more illuminating. Incorporating support for the strengthening of the rule 
of law as a principal aim of the association, the agreements thereupon place 
the rule of law under the Title on ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ or, in the later 
agreements, ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’, the relevant provision of which 
lists a number of rule of law elements as the aims of cooperation. In line 
with the heading of the Article, namely, ‘Reinforcement of institutions and 
the rule of law’, the included elements comprise the quality and functioning 
of the institutions involved in the judicial sector, such as the judiciary, the 
police and other enforcement bodies. 164 As such, the Article closely follows 
the formulation of the Copenhagen political criteria of ‘stability of institu-
tions’ guaranteeing the rule of law. As demonstrated by the formulation of 
this particular provision, the institutional focus does not include a reference 
to the quality requirements for law itself.
It has to be mentioned that, notwithstanding this institution-centric 
interpretation of the rule of law, there is one reference in the later SAAs to 
a particular requirement of legality, namely, stability. The ‘strengthening of 
the rule of law in the business area through a stable and non-discriminatory 
trade-related legal framework’,165 is incorporated as a particular goal in the 
context of cooperation in the area of economic and trade policy. However, 
considering the consensus among legal philosophers on the relevance of 
the requirements of formal legality, it would be expected that stability is 
a desired quality of the entire legal framework, not merely of the trade 
area. It should be recalled that stability of the legal framework features 
prominently as a rule of law requirement put forward by Fuller and most 
other legal philosophers. After all, as it was argued in chapter 2,166 in the 
absence of both stability and predictability in law, citizens have difficulty 
managing their affairs effectively, putting law’s guiding function under 
pressure. Moreover, legal stability also has moral value insofar as it assures 
that like cases will be treated equally. Therefore, particularly in the context 
of the enlargement policy with its heavy emphasis on the implementation of 
the entire EU acquis, the issue of stability of the legal framework would be 
expected to be especially pertinent. After all, both the Europe Agreements 
and the Stabilisation and Association Agreements stipulate that the major 
164 See for example Article 80 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia.
165 See Article 87 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania; Article 89 of 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Montenegro; Article 89 of the Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreement with Serbia; Article 87 of the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina; Article 94 of the Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Agreement with Kosovo.
166 See chapter 2, section 3.2.
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precondition for the applicant countries’ economic integration into the 
Community, now Union, is the approximation of the existing and future 
legislation to that of the EU.167
However, examination of the reports confirms the initial findings on 
this requirement. In line with the Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ments, the basic statement made in the reports is that weaknesses in the 
judiciary and subsequent lack of stability, or legal certainty, hamper a fully 
functioning market economy.168 For example, in the 2009 Progress Report 
on FYROM, the Commission offers that ‘in general, legal procedures are still 
slow and sometimes the quality of court decisions is low. This is continuing 
to have a negative impact on legal certainty and is impeding the proper 
functioning of market mechanisms, with an adverse impact on the business 
environment and the country’s attractiveness to foreign investment.’169 
167 See for example Article 68 of the Europe Agreement with Poland. According to Article 
69, the approximation of laws would extend to the following areas in particular: customs 
law, company law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, pro-
tection of workers at the workplace, fi nancial services, rules on competition, protection 
of health and life of humans, animals and plants, consumer protection, indirect taxation, 
technical rules and standards, transport, and the environment. Later Europe Agreements 
have added other areas such as insurance law, rules on public contracts and public pro-
curement, nuclear law and regulation, telecommunications, public procurement, statis-
tics, product liability, labour law, and entrepreneurial law. See for example the Europe 
Agreements with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia respectively.
 For the SAAs, see for example 72(1) of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with 
Montenegro, which states that: ‘The Parties recognize the importance of the approxima-
tion of the existing legislation in Montenegro to that of the Community and of its effec-
tive implementation. Montenegro shall endeavour to ensure that its existing laws and 
future legislation will be gradually made compatible with the Community acquis. Monte-
negro shall ensure that existing and future legislation will be properly implemented and 
enforced.
168 2005 Progress Report Croatia, p. 80; 2005 Progress Report Kosovo, p. 57; 2006 Progress 
Report Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 25; 2006 Progress Report Croatia, p. 28; 2006 Prog-
ress Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, p. 21; 2007 Progress Report Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, p. 22; 2008 Progress Report Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, p. 26; 2008 Progress Report Albania, p. 22; 2008 Progress Report Kosovo, 
p. 37; 2009 Progress Report Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 35; 2009 Progress Report Monte-
negro, p. 24; 2010 Progress Report Croatia, p. 29; 2010 Progress Report Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia p. 30; 2011 Progress Report Albania, p. 37; 2011 Progress Report 
Croatia, p. 28; 2013 Progress Report Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 31; 2013 Progress Report 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, p. 46; 2014 Progress Report Albania, p. 45; 2014 
Progress Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, p. 11; 2014 Progress Report 
Serbia, p. 45; 2015 Report Serbia, p. 53; 2016 Report Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 42; 2016 
Report Serbia, p. 16.
169 2009 Progress Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, p. 28. Also see Com-
mission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, 
COM(2006) 649, 8 November 2006, p. 25; Commission Communication on Enlargement 
Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-2008, COM(2007) 663 fi nal, 6 November 2007, p. 38; 
Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009, 
COM(2008) 674 fi nal, 5 November 2008, p. 39; Commission Communication on Enlarge-
ment Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011, COM(2010) 660, 9 November 2010, p. 38.
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Furthermore, while in the later enlargement strategies legal certainty is 
described as an outcome of the strengthening of the rule of law, it remains 
firmly entrenched only as a requirement for the proper functioning of the 
business environment.170 Apart from this very singular interpretation of this 
particular requirement of legality, presented in the specific legal framework 
of the SAAs, it can, at this point, merely be concluded that the element of 
legality is not a predominant feature in the EU’s conceptualisation of the 
rule of law in enlargement. Further examination of the financial framework 
underpinning enlargement seems to substantiate this conclusion.
As already outlined above, the original PHARE Regulation and the 
Regulations relating to the accession partnerships do not provide further 
clarity on the rule of law elements the applicant states are expected to 
comply with.171 Even though the provision of aid is linked to respect of 
the commitments contained in the Europe Agreements/Association Agree-
ments and to progress towards fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, from 
the above examination it is clear that neither bring further detail to the table 
in terms of insight into the EU’s understanding of the rule of law in this 
context. Where the rule of law is mentioned, for example in the Coordinat-
ing Regulation in its reorientation of the PHARE Regulation, it again closely 
follows the formulation of the Copenhagen political criteria by stating that 
funding under the PHARE Programme shall focus on the main priorities for 
the adoption of the acquis, which is then phrased in terms of ‘building up 
the administrative and institutions capacities of the applicant States…’.172
The same institutional focus of rule of law reform can be observed in 
relation to the Western Balkans in the aims of cooperation of the CARDS 
Regulation.173 Similarly, the second Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
(IPA II) Regulation and its predecessor stipulate that assistance should be 
programmed and implemented, inter alia, in relation to institution- and 
170 According to the 2015 Strategy, ‘[t]he rule of law and economic development can be seen 
as two sides of the same coin. Strengthening the rule of law increases legal certainty, 
encourages and protects investment and contributes signifi cantly to supporting eco-
nomic development and competitiveness. Conversely, economic reforms and integration 
have the capacity to stabilise countries in the longer term.’ Commission Communication 
on EU Enlargement Strategy, COM(2015) 611 fi nal, 10 November 2015, p. 5. Further see, 
Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, 
COM(2013) 700 fi nal, 16 October 2013, p. 6; Commission Communication on Enlarge-
ment Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-2015, COM(2014) 700 fi nal, 8 October 2014, 
p. 10.
171 See for example Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 555/2000 on the pre-accession strategy 
for Cyprus and Malta which stipulates that: ‘Where an element that is essential for con-
tinuing to grant pre-accession assistance is lacking, in particular when the commitments 
contained in the Association Agreements are not respected and or progress towards 
fulfi lment of the Copenhagen criteria is insuffi cient, the Council, acting by a qualifi ed 
majority on a proposal from the Commission, may take appropriate steps with regard to 
any pre-accession assistance granted to Cyprus or Malta.’
172 Article 2(3) Regulation (EC) No 1266/99.
173 Article 2(3) Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000.
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capacity building.174 However, where the CARDS Regulation at least 
considered the generic legislative angle next to the strengthening of insti-
tutional capacity by stipulating that assistance should inter alia be for ‘the 
creation of an institutional and legislative framework to underpin … the rule 
of law…’,175 this component has disappeared in the later financial instru-
ments for pre-accession assistance. Moreover, the reference in the CARDS 
Regulation to the ‘strengthening of legality’,176 inserted almost as an after-
thought under the aims of cooperation in the same section that includes the 
rule of law and without further elaboration, has not been transposed to the 
later framework of the IPA Regulations.
After having examined the legal framework, it can be concluded that 
the EU’s understanding of the rule of law in enlargement does not consider 
formal legality as a main component. While the requirement of stability is 
put forward in the Stabilisation and Association Agreements in relation to 
the business environment, it is not regarded as a focal element for the over-
all legislative framework. Against this backdrop, the next section will focus 
on the Union’s implementation of this framework through the relevant 
Copenhagen related documents, including the Commission’s enlargement 
Strategies and the annual progress reports.
3.1.2 The lack of the element of formal legality in the Copenhagen criteria related 
documents in the light of the EU’s quantitative approach
Exploring the relevant documents, it appears that the Commission has 
attempted to create the impression of having constructed a pre-accession 
procedure that examines not just law in the books, but, rather, rule of law 
in action. For example, in the very first composite paper, the Commission 
stressed that concerning democracy and the rule of law it has looked 
at ‘the way democracy functions in practice instead of relying on formal 
descriptions of the political institutions.’177 In 2010, then EU enlargement 
Commissioner Füle, during his presentation of the yearly Enlargement 
strategy, underscored that: ‘The EU expects a convincing track record in 
174 Article 3(1)(a) Regulation (EU) No 231/2014. According to the overall institutional 
approach, the specifi c objectives pursued under the Regulation framed the rule of law 
in terms of an independent and effi cient judiciary as well as capacity-building measures 
for improving law enforcement, see Article 2. For the previous IPA Regulation see Arti-
cle 3(1)(a) Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006. Also see paragraph 13 of its Preamble, which 
states that: ‘Assistance for candidate countries as well as for potential candidate countries 
should continue to support them in their efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and 
the rule of law… and it should therefore be targeted at supporting a wide range of institution-
building measures.’ [emphasis added]
175 Article 2(2)(b) Regulation (EC) 2666/2000 [emphasis added].
176 Ibid.
177 Commission Composite Paper on progress towards accession by each of the candidate 
countries, COM(98) 712 fi nal, 17 December 1998, p. 3.
Chapter 4 The EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in its enlargement practice 201
the fulfilment of these benchmarks, in particular regarding judiciary and 
fundamental rights. Accession negotiations do not simply involve ticking 
boxes about legislative approximation. Countries must build a credible 
track record of reform and implementation, in particular in the area of rule 
of law.’178 This suggests that the European Union in its enlargement policy 
has not merely adopted an approach towards its rule of law reform that 
would focus on creating functioning institutions, the adoption of EU legisla-
tion and a quantitative progress analysis thereof during the pre-accession 
process, but a process that examines the quality of laws, of how law is 
applied in practice and of how law both guides peoples behaviour and 
sets the boundaries for institutions. However, already just one paragraph 
further down in the same 1998 composite paper, the Commission couched 
what needs to change in the applicant countries in purely institutional terms 
by stating that in the area of the rule of law ‘[a] common problem for all the 
candidate countries remains the inherent weakness of the judiciary, from 
the training of judges to procedural reforms aimed at overcoming excessive 
delays in court cases.’179
This institutionally oriented approach towards the rule of law is con-
firmed in the later Enlargement Strategies, for example in 2001 when the 
Commission remarked on the progress achieved by the applicant countries 
so far: ‘Further progress was made in reforming and strengthening the judi-
cial system, as a vital element in ensuring respect for the rule of law and in 
the effective enforcement of the acquis.’180 Similarly, the 2006-2007 Strategy 
states that the Commission ‘will pay particular attention to the establish-
ment of the structures needed to ensure the rule of law. This includes 
administrative and judicial capacity…’181 Also on the level of the individual 
candidate states the implementation of the acquis is formulated with refer-
ence to effective implementation capacity, as evidenced, for example, by the 
following in relation to Bulgaria:
178 Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and the Neighbourhood Policy, 
‘Press point on enlargement package’, SPEECH/10/639, 9 November 2010, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-639_en.htm.
179 Commission Composite Paper on progress towards accession by each of the candidate 
countries, COM(98) 712 fi nal, 17 December 1998, p. 3.
180 Commission Strategy Paper & Report on the progress towards accession by each of the 
candidate countries ‘Making a Success of Enlargement, COM(2001) 700 fi nal, 13 Novem-
ber 2001, p. 10. See also Commission Enlargement Strategy Paper & Report on progress 
towards accession by each of the candidate countries, COM(2000) 700 fi nal, 8 November 
2000, p. 17; Commission Strategy Paper & Report on the progress towards accession by 
each of the candidate countries – Making a Success of Enlargement, COM(2001) 700 fi nal, 
13 November 2001, p. 12.
181 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, 
COM(2006) 649 fi nal, 8 November 2006, p. 22.
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Overall, Bulgaria has now achieved a reasonable degree of alignment with the 
acquis in the large majority of areas. It is also on track in developing adequate 
administrative capacity to implement the acquis in a considerable number 
of fields. Bulgaria has established most of the necessary institutional struc-
tures. Nevertheless, in some sectors, further efforts and resources are required 
to strengthen the capacities of these institutions and to ensure their effective 
functioning.182
More importantly, in relation to the element of formal legality, as the above 
example shows, alignment with the acquis and changes made to domestic 
legislation are described in terms of quantity, not quality. Legal approxima-
tion, that is the harmonisation of national legislation to the Union’s acquis, 
is a critical component of the pre-accession process; alignment leads to 
credibility of reforms, and, thus to progress in the arduous and lengthy 
transition process in candidate countries to make them fit for accession. The 
logic behind this process assumes that the EU model brings with it a com-
prehensive quality and density of regulation that is superior to the existing 
legislation in the applicant states. Thus, according to Commission officials, 
‘adopting the EU acquis, irrespective of any imperfections, would still repre-
sent an improvement over the status quo.’183 Indeed, the acquis comprises a 
ready-made corpus of rules that needs to be accepted en bloc,184 and which 
will be difficult to develop in the absence of effective domestic policy-
making and legislative processes.185 Accordingly, the Commission sets the 
transposition of and the alignment with the acquis in all areas of EU law as 
the short and medium-term objectives in the Accession Partnerships.186
Inevitably, this approach encourages the setting of benchmarks and an 
appraisal of progress on the basis of a quantitative evaluation of transposed 
legislation. Indeed, progress is measured ‘on the basis of decisions actually 
taken, legislation actually adopted, international conventions actually rati-
fied (…) and measures actually implemented.’187 In other words, according 
to the Commission, progress is measured on what is actually happening on 
182 Commission Communication on 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, COM(2005) 561 fi nal, 
9 November 2005, p. 10.
183 Michaela Dodini & Marco Fantini ‘The EU Neighbourhood Policy: Implications for Eco-
nomic Growth and Stability’ 44 Journal of Common Market Studies (2006), pp. 507-532 at 
513-514.
184 Guy Harpaz & Lior Herman ‘Approximation of Laws by Non-EU Countries to the EU 
Acquis’ 9 European Journal of Law Reform (2007), pp. 357-360 at 357.
185 Andreas Herdina ‘Approximation of Laws in the Context of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy’ 9 European Journal of Law Reform (2007), pp. 501-504.
186 See for instance the 1999 Accession Partnership with Hungary, which requests for exam-
ple the complete transposition and enforcement of legislation in the area of nature pro-
tection under the environmental chapter. Similarly, the 2002 Accession Partnership with 
Poland stipulates that the country continue its legal alignment in the fi eld of transport, 
while taking into account the latest developments.
187 See for example the Commission’s description and justifi cation of its methodology in the 
2002 Report on Slovenia, p. 9.
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the ground and not just on the basis of promises made by the negotiating 
partners. However, the analysis in the annual progress reports and remarks 
made in the annual reports of the financing instruments,188 show that this 
has led to a quantitative approach of crunching data and numbers. For 
instance, in the 2000 Regular Report on Romania’s progress towards acces-
sion it is mentioned that ‘[i]n 1999, only 59 of the 453 draft laws, ordinances 
and emergency ordinances submitted to Parliament were adopted by the 
end of the year. This represents a significant decrease in comparison to 
previous years.’189 In a similar fashion, Turkey’s 2005 Regular Report states 
that ‘[a]fter the intensive reforms of the previous two years, Parliament 
continued its regular legislative work. A total of 184 draft laws have been 
submitted to Parliament since October 2004. Between October 2004 and 
June 2005 Parliament adopted 166 new laws.’190 The 2018 reporting round 
show that the Commission still relies on its quantitative approach albeit not 
only in terms of critique; the increase of legislative output is praised191 as 
much as the slowdown of reform pace is criticised.192
The reports also demonstrate that, in the essentially top-down EU 
driven process of legal approximation, compliance with the acquis is 
equated with success in legal reform.193 However, measuring the outcome 
of law transplants in terms of compliance is an ‘over-simplification’, which 
remains short of capturing the reality of legal change.194 While the enlarge-
ment success story of the fifth enlargement round comports with quanti-
tative studies examining the behaviour of new members – finding that 
they transpose and comply with EU law at rates similar to older Member 
States,195 in contrast, qualitative studies talk of a ‘world of dead letters’196 
188 The annual reports on the PHARE Regulation in particular discuss progress of the candi-
date states in terms of ‘the momentum reached in transposing legislation’ and ‘signifi cant 
progress in legislative harmonization’, see for example Commission Report on The Phare 
Programme – Annual Report 1998, COM(2000) 183 fi nal, 31 March 2000, p. 25; Commis-
sion Staff Working Paper Annex to the 2002 Report on Phare and the pre-accession instru-
ments for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, SEC(2003) 910, 11 August 2003, p. 26.
189 2000 Romania Regular Report, p. 15.
190 2005 Turkey Progress Report, p. 10.
191 2018 Albania Report, p. 9; 2018 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Report, p. 11.
192 2018 Bosnia and Herzegovina Report, p. 4.
193 Rilka Dragneva ‘CIS Model Legislation and its Contribution to Company Law Reform 
and Harmonization’ in Rilka Dragneva (ed) Investor Protection in the CIS: Legal Reform and 
Harmonization Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff (2007), pp. 1-44 at 1-2.
194 Randall Peerenboom ‘What Have We Learned about Law and Development? Describing, 
Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China’ 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 
(2006), pp. 823-871 at 834-836.
195 Ulrich Sedelmeier ‘Is Europeanisation Through Conditionality Sustainable? Lock-in of 
Institutional Change after EU Accession’ 35 West European Politics (2012), pp. 20-38; Ber-
nard Steunenberg & Dimiter Toshkov ‘Comparing Transposition in the 27 Member States 
of the EU: The Impact of Discretion and Legal Fit’ 16 Journal of European Public Policy 
(2009), pp. 951-970.
196 Gerda Falkner, Oliver Treib & Elisabeth Holzleithner Compliance in the Enlarged European 
Union: Living Rights or Dead Letters? Surrey: Ashgate (2008).
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– pointing to problems of legality197 as well as issues of compliance.198 The 
EU’s ‘more is better’ mindset199 in combination with conditionality and the 
compliance paradigm has led to a methodology that emphasises quantity 
over quality, whereby no consideration is given to legality’s requirements at 
the domestic level. As it will be shown in the next section, there is growing 
evidence that the quantitative approach followed by the EU in actual fact 
often undermines the element of legality by not considering the require-
ments for the quality of laws at the domestic level.
3.1.3 The quantitative approach in enlargement and problems with 
the element of legality
The previous section confirmed that the element of legality does not form 
part of the conceptualisation of the rule of law in enlargement, thereby 
corroborating the conclusion reached on the basis of the examination of 
the legal framework. In this section it will be shown that the quantitative 
progress analysis of the implementation of the acquis and the concomitant 
changes to domestic legislation adopted by the Commission comes with a 
specific set of problems that actually undermine legality. It is submitted that 
in combination with the speed of reforms,200 the demonstrable struggle of 
the applicant countries with administrative and judicial capacity, and the 
necessity of establishing a ‘solid track record’, the demand for more laws 
has potentially fostered legal inflation, instability, lack of generality of law, 
as well as problems of enforcement.201
197 Marko Kmezić EU Rule of Law Promotion – Judiciary Reform in the Western Balkans Lon-
don: Routledge (2017); Martin Mendelski ‘The EU’s Pathological Power: The Failure of 
External Rule of Law Promotion in South Eastern Europe’ 39 Southeastern Europe (2015), 
pp. 318-346; Martin Mendelski ‘The EU’s Rule of Law Promotion in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Where and Why Does It Fail, and What Can be Done About It? Bingham Centre for 
the Rule of Law Global Rule of Law Exchange Papers (2016); Martin Mendelski ‘Europeaniza-
tion and the Rule of Law: Towards a Pathological Turn’ 40 Southeastern Europe (2016), pp. 
346-384.
198 Jonathan B. Slapin ‘How European Union Membership can Undermine the Rule of Law 
in Emerging Democracies’ 38 West European Politics (2015), pp. 627-648.
199 Mendelski (2016b), p. 11.
200 Also coined the ‘hasty transplant syndrome’, explained by Grabbe in the context of the 
countries in central and Eastern Europe: ‘It took Greece well over a decade to adapt to the 
EU’s single market norms. By contrast, prospective CEE members are expected to have 
oriented their institutions and policies to the EU prior to membership, which means less 
than a decade in practice. Moreover, they have done so from a much lower starting-point 
and with very limited scope for negotiating transitional periods.’ Heather Grabbe ‘Euro-
peanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process’ in Kevin 
Featherstone & Claudio M. Radaelli (eds) The Politics of Europeanization Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2003), pp. 303-330 at 306.
201 For empirical evidence on these so-called ‘pathologies of Europeanization’ see Mendelski 
(2016a), pp. 353-357.
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The Commission has recognised, in a number of reports throughout the 
years, that there are problems of legislative quality arising from the ten-
sion between the need to attain the agreed to targets and the impact on the 
quality of the implemented legislation at the domestic level. For example, 
FYROM’s 2007 Progress Report states: ‘[A] backlog of EU-related legislation 
built up in the second half of 2006. The government, in pursuit of its stated 
objective of having all the legislation for 2006 and 2007 adopted by the end 
of the summer, stepped up its efforts on legislative drafting. It managed to 
catch up partially, but without always giving sufficient attention to the qual-
ity and enforceability of legislation.’202 Moreover, lack of expertise on EU issues 
at the domestic level may also hamper the harmonisation of legislation, as 
evidenced for example by the 2007 Progress Report on Albania in which it 
is stated that ‘[t]he level of expertise available to the parliament, including 
on EU integration issues, remains low. This is reflected in the quality of 
legislation.’203
Furthermore, because of the quantitative agreements underlying the 
adoption of the acquis, minority governments often need to resort to other 
legislative options in order to ensure that targets are met, thereby severely 
undermining the stability of the law. For example, since the ruling coalition 
lost its majority in Romania in 2000, one of the mechanisms used by the gov-
ernment to bypass this has been the issuing of ordinances and emergency 
ordinances. These ordinances enter into force immediately and only need 
retrospective approval by the Parliament. However, while the Commission 
on the one hand pushes for more ‘progress’, on the other hand Romania’s 
2000 Report continues to state that this practice is a matter of concern ‘since 
legislation can be adopted before adequate consultation has taken place and 
because Parliament’s powers to modify or reject the ordinances, without 
a time limit being set for the examination of the ordinances, can lead to 
legislative instability.’204
Moreover, it is acknowledged that hasty adoption and the subsequent 
lack of quality can also lead to problems further down the road, as dem-
onstrated by the Progress Reports on FYROM. In 2011 the Constitutional 
Court increased the number of annulments of new legislation by 5% to 
nearly 30% of all laws.205 In 2014, this trend showed no sign of diminishing 
with visible complications for the coherence of the legal framework: ‘The 
202 2007 FYROM Progress Report, p. 7 [emphasis added]. Also see 2018 Kosovo Report, p. 7.
203 2007 Albania Progress Report, p. 6. See also Serbia’s 2009 Progress Report, which high-
lights a related problem: ‘There has been increased legislative output from the parlia-
ment. There is, however a need to improve ex ante compatibility checks with EU 
standards before legislation is adopted. There has, moreover, been insuffi cient public 
consultation on content and impact of draft laws.’ 2009 Serbia Progress Report, p. 7.
204 2000 Romania Regular Report, p. 15. In a similar vein, the Commission has criticised 
FYROM’s and Serbia’s use of the shortened/urgent legislative procedure, see 2018 
FYROM Report, p. 12; 2018 Serbia Report, p. 6.
205 2011 FYROM Progress Report, p. 11.
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number of constitutional challenges received and handled annually remains 
on par with previous years, but there still have not been any steps taken to 
improve legal certainty as regards legislation which has been annulled due 
to unconstitutionality, and this often creates gaps in the legal framework.’206 
In addition to this, the reports frequently mention that monitoring imple-
mentation207 and compliance208 of new legislation with the acquis remains 
a difficult task.
The acknowledgement that the legal approximation process undertaken 
by the candidate states has led to questionable developments in relation 
to the requirements of formal legality such as stability, generality, and 
coherence,209 has recently gained traction in political science literature but 
has so far not been recognised in legal literature. Political science scholar-
ship has been building on the critical law and development literature 
and the growing realisation that ‘law is not a kitchen appliance that we 
can unplug in the United States or Germany and simply plug in again in 
Russia,’210 and that introducing the right laws is insufficient to create incen-
tives for the correct behaviour in developing and transition countries.211 
Generally speaking, for law to be effective, it must be meaningful in the 
context in which it is applied so citizens have the incentive to use the law 
and institutions will enforce and develop the law. Moreover, information 
about the existence of a norm and its contents is a prerequisite for any 
impact of the law beyond a shelf life.212 In addition to this, judges, lawyers, 
politicians, and other legal intermediaries that are responsible for develop-
ing the law ‘must be able to increase the quality of law in a way that is 
responsive to demand for legality.’213 Interestingly, the origin of the law per 
se is not necessarily the crux of the problem, rather, complications stem from 
‘law reform processes that generally do not permit users to participate in 
adapting the draft – whatever its origin – to local conditions. … Lack of 
local input, not transplantation is the problem.’214 After all, legal rules must 
206 2014 FYROM Progress Report, p. 5. The problem of gaps in the legislative framework is a 
recurring worry across various reports, see for example the 2013 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Progress Report, p. 20; 2016 Kosovo Report, p. 28.
207 2016 Montenegro Report, p. 5.
208 2016 Albania Report, p. 7; 2016 Turkey Report, p. 15; 2004 Turkey Regular Report, p. 160.
209 See the work undertaken by Mendelski and Slapin.
210 Stephen Holmes ‘Can Foreign Aid Promote the Rule of Law?’ 68 East European Constituti-
onal Review (1999), pp. 68-74 at 71.
211 Rilka Dragneva & Kataryna Wolczuk ‘EU Law Export to the Eastern Neighbourhood’ in 
Paul James Cardwell (ed) EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press (2012) pp. 217-240 at 220.
212 Katharina Pistor ‘The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing Economies’ 
G-24 Discussion Paper No. 4 (2000), p. 8.
213 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard ‘Economic Development, 
Legality and the Transplant Effect’ 47 European Economic Review (2003), pp. 165-195 at 167.
214 Wade Channell ‘Lessons not Learned about Legal Reform’ in Thomas Carothers (ed) Pro-
moting the Rule of Law Abroad – In Search of Knowledge Washington: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace (2006), pp. 137-159 at 140.
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be understood to be effective; something that is a serious constraint for legal 
transplantation since the meaning of legal statements is a function of social 
norms, not of the speaker’s intentions.215 Accordingly, because the impact 
of any law is ultimately determined by how it is understood by law makers, 
law enforcers, and law users at the receiving end,216 domestic participa-
tion is indispensable.217 Consequently, it is emphasised that ‘adaptation’ is 
preferred over ‘adoption’, i.e. without taking local conditions into account, 
attempting to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its origin 
entails the risk of rejection.218 However, the EU’s model is one of adoption 
rather than adaptation because of the specific nature of the acquis.
The acquis is a unifying concept that needs to ensure its self-preservation 
and continued coherent development.219 Its rationale encompasses ‘ensur-
ing the continued coherence, integrity and viability of the Union edifice, 
by preventing incompatible foreign bodies from violating the communal 
corpus politik.’220 In scholarly literature on the nature of the acquis, there 
is general agreement on the fact that a legal order, which seeks to preserve 
its ‘genetic code’,221 must refer to some type of acquired characteristics as 
‘guarantees of its integrity’.222 The specific nature of the acquis has, by neces-
sity, two corollaries. Not only is it a unifying Union concept, which, through 
its collective nature, should provide a shared standard for Member States 
and acceding states alike, it is, moreover, an objective standard over which 
215 Cass R. Sunstein ‘On the Expressive Function of Law’ 144 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review (1996), pp. 2021-2053 at 2050.
216 Pistor (2000), p. 8.
217 In the past decade, adaptation to local circumstances and taking into account existing 
legal tradition have increasingly been recognised as crucial elements of sustainable legal 
reform. See for example, Cheryl Gray ‘Reforming Legal Systems in Developing and Tran-
sition Countries’ 34 Finance and Development (1997), pp. 14-16; Dragneva (2007), p. 6.
218 Otto Kahn-Freund ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ 37 Modern Law Review 
(1974), pp. 1-27 at 27.
219 Amichai Magen ‘Transformative Engagement through Law: The Acquis Communautaire 
as an Instrument of EU External Relations’ 9 European Journal of Law Reform (2007), pp. 
361-392 at 370. For an overview of the role of law the acquis throughout earlier enlarge-
ment rounds see Grabbe (1999), pp. 6-7. Further see José Luís da Cruz Vilaça EU Law and 
Integration. 20 Years of Judicial Application of EU Law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2014), pp. 
34-35; Loïc Azoulai ‘The Acquis of the European Union and International Organizations’ 
11 European Law Journal (2005), pp. 196-231; Antje Weiner ‘The Embedded Acquis Com-
munautaire: Transmission Belt and Prism of New Governance’ in Karlheinz Neunreither 
& Antje Weiner (eds) European Integration after Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Pros-
pects for Democracy Oxford: Oxford University Press (2000), pp. 318-342; Horst Günther 
Krenzler & Michelle Everson ‘Preparing for the Acquis Communautaire: Report of the 
Working Group on the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union’ Robert Schuman 
Centre Policy Paper (1998) No. 6; Pierre Pescatore ‘Aspects judiciaires de l’acquis com-
munautaire’ Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen (1981), pp. 617-651.
220 Magen (2007), p. 377.
221 Christine Delcourt ‘The Acquis Communautaire: Has the Concept had its day?’ Common 
Market Law Review 38 (2001), pp. 829-870 at 840.
222 Azoulai (2005), p. 197.
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the EU has exclusive control.223 Accordingly, it is projected by the EU not 
only as the ‘right’ legal template for development but also as the exclusive 
and comprehensive legal template from which deviations or opt-outs are 
not permitted for the aspiring Member States. However, this absence of the 
possibility of engagement limits from the outset its potential for becoming 
‘living law’ in the applicant states.224 Indeed, ‘the effort to plough through 
reform blueprints … resembles a form of dependent development, to the 
point of precluding the ‘organic’ development of accountable domestic 
policies.’225 In the same vein, the suitability of the acquis can be questioned 
as a template for post-communist reforms during the enlargement prepa-
rations of the CEECs. The EU regulatory framework was never designed 
as a development agenda; instead the rules are the incremental result of 
negotiations, compromises, and agreements between the Member States 
over decades of European integration.226 Thus, in the light of the critique 
and the Commission’s own acknowledgement of the pathological effects, 
i.e. negative reinforcing effects, at the very least questions arise as to the 
extent to which the EU’s method of legal approximation in the enlargement 
policy is bound to undermine legality by its very nature.
3.1.4 Conclusions
Despite the promises made by former Commissioner Füle, that the acces-
sion negotiations would not simply involve a ticking of boxes on the issue 
of legislative approximation, it was shown in this section that the accession 
framework is set up in such a way to do just that – with its emphasis on 
support for rule of law institutions and the quantitative progress analysis of 
the implementation of the acquis. Whereas it was shown in chapters 1 and 
2 that the national concepts of the Rechtsstaat, état de droit, and the Anglo-
Saxon rule of law, as well as legal theory place legality and its requirements 
of stability, coherence, generality, and congruence at the centre of their 
understanding of the rule of law, from the above examination it is clear that 
in enlargement, legality – in the sense of the quality of domestic laws – is 
not considered. In this way, the findings of the previous case study on the 
EU’s development cooperation policy are confirmed here. Furthermore, 
apart from the fact that the requirements of legality are wholly neglected 
in the EU’s understanding of the rule of law in development, on the basis 
223 Next to these two features, Magen has identifi ed three more characteristics of the acquis, 
that of aiding of bureaucratic coherence and Commission domain expansion in external 
relations; extraordinary rule scope, determinacy, and fl exibility; and the acquis’ instru-
mental nature through which intrusive change can be couched in technocratic, de-politi-
cized language. Magen (2007), pp. 382-391.
224 Dragneva & Wolczuk (2012), p. 219.
225 Anna Grzymala-Busse & Abby Innes ‘Great Expectations: The EU and Domestic Politi-
cal Competition in East Central Europe’ 17 East European Politics and Societies (2003), pp. 
64-63 at 66.
226 Grabbe (2003), pp. 306-307.
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of careful analysis of the relevant Copenhagen documents, it was demon-
strated that the nature of enlargement together with its methodology even 
has the potential of jeopardising the rule of law’s formal element of legality 
in the applicant states. Consequently, by choosing quantitative progress 
analysis over qualitative scrutiny of the applicant states’ headway in their 
process of legal approximation, the EU has put legality, and thus, the rule 
of law, at risk in the new Member States. The next section will continue the 
study into the procedural elements of the rule of law in enlargement.
3.2 Procedural elements of the rule of law
In the present section, the focus will turn to the procedural elements of the 
rule of law. Four elements will be presented here. First the section will tackle 
the issue of impartiality. In relation to this notion, it will be argued that the 
assessment of the Copenhagen related documents demonstrates its increas-
ing importance, whereby the Commission’s reporting has progressed from 
generic statements to providing actual guidance for improvement in this 
area. More particularly, it will be asserted that impartiality is perceived to 
consist of two sets of sub-elements. On the one hand, the legal framework, 
including the incorporation of international ethical standards, and the pro-
cedures for the internal organisation of courts can be distinguished. On the 
other hand, there is a subset of elements that highlights a particular aspect 
of impartiality, but only in the reports of a single country. However, it will 
also be demonstrated that in spite of the element’s incremental importance, 
there is evidence of conceptual confusion between impartiality and judi-
cial independence. It will be shown that impartiality is only infrequently 
addressed in its own right. Furthermore, even when it is, the presented 
analysis in the reports very often touches upon issues of independence, 
rather than impartiality, demonstrating a persistent level of conceptual 
indeterminateness.
Secondly, it will be argued that the pre-accession process shows that 
efficiency and quality of the judiciary, while not necessarily obstacles to 
accession, did become issues of major concern in the Commission’s analysis 
of the functioning of the judiciary. It will be asserted that these topics have 
been considered as prime rule of law elements from the very beginning, 
not in the least because of the role of Member States courts in the applica-
tion of EU law. It will be argued that the Commission has conceptualised 
procedural efficiency in terms of its underlying impediments, namely prob-
lems of enforcement, low clearance rates and backlogs, excessive length of 
proceedings, and lack of procedural legislation. However, it will also be 
shown that the Commission has not provided a standard for efficiency the 
applicant countries can introduce into their systems, leaving the countries 
sufficient space to introduce their own.
Thirdly, it will be asserted that the Copenhagen documents demonstrate 
that the Commission has taken a rather fragmented approach regarding the 
pivotal task of the judiciary, namely judicial reform. Whereas it was shown 
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in chapters 1 and 2 that judicial reform is related to the overall checks and 
balances between the three branches of government, the monitoring reports 
bear out the view that the focus is on the individual components of the 
judicial system, such as the establishment of courts and capacity-building, 
rather than on the judiciary’s actual task and the functioning of the review 
process itself.
Fourthly, it will be shown that for the EU, access to justice is one of the 
preconditions in order to safeguard the right to a fair trial; a right, which 
the applicant countries as future Member States of the EU have to guar-
antee. More particularly, it will be asserted that access to justice is mainly 
interpreted to contain two aspects, namely access to court and access to 
legal aid. Furthermore, the section will also address the fact that the Copen-
hagen documents do not distinguish between access to justice as a rule of 
law or as a human rights element, evaluating the element in both sections, 
demonstrating the Commission’s understanding of the interrelatedness of 
both notions in relation to this element. Finally, the section will conclude by 
asserting that, even though the monitoring reports evidence the inclusion of 
access to justice as a rule of law element, the Commission’s general lack of 
critique in situations where there was little to no progress seems to suggest 
that access to justice does not fulfil a central role as a procedural element in 
the understanding of the rule of law in enlargement.
3.2.1 The growing importance of the element of judicial impartiality
In relation to the notion of impartiality it is manifest from the examina-
tion of the Copenhagen documents that its importance has increased over 
time. While references to the notion are scattered throughout the rounds of 
reports relating to the fifth enlargement, from 2005 onwards impartiality is 
clearly included as a rule of law element in Chapter 23 on the functioning 
of the judiciary and fundamental rights. Not only that, across the reporting 
rounds, reports have gone from including generic statements on the need 
for improvement, such as in the 2002 Regular Report on Slovakia which 
states that ‘[t]here is still concern about the level of professional impartiality 
and political neutrality amongst part of the judiciary’,227 to providing guid-
ance on what should be done in order to enhance this particular element. To 
give an example of the latter, the 2010 Progress Report on Croatia discusses 
the ethnic bias against Serbs in local courts in the context of war crimes trials 
in domestic courts. The Report points to the existing problems but goes on 
to provide the solution in order to remedy the situation: ‘Problems persist 
in certain localities. Insufficient use is being made of one powerful weapon 
227 2002 Slovakia Regular Report, p. 23. Also see for example the 2002 Turkey Report in 
which it is stated that ‘[s]ubstantially more work is needed to strengthen the impartiality 
and independence of the judiciary’, without, however, any indication as to the criteria of 
improvement. 2002 Turkey Regular Report, p. 122.
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for impartial prosecution of war crimes – the specialised courts, although an 
increased willingness to use this possibility is evident recently.’228
Throughout the annual reports and the screening reports on Chapter 
23 on the functioning of the judiciary in the countries in South-eastern 
Europe, two sets of sub-elements of the notion of impartiality can be dis-
tinguished. First, there is the subset of elements that includes the necessary 
legal framework underpinning impartiality. In the screening reports it is 
verified whether impartiality, or rather its outcome – equality before the 
law – is enshrined in the law.229 In the analyses in the the annual reports 
it is checked whether or not the international framework on ethical stan-
dards has been implemented both for judges and prosecutors and whether 
there are effective mechanisms to monitor compliance.230 The first subset 
furthermore includes rules dealing with the internal organisation of the 
courts in order to remove doubts as to the impartiality of judges and 
prosecutors, such as conflict of interest rules in combination with rules 
on asset declarations,231 rules on the random allocation of cases,232 and 
rules regulating the withdrawal/recusal,233 disciplinary proceedings,234 
dismissal,235 and disqualification.236 Secondly, there is a subset of elements 
that highlights a particular aspect of impartiality, but only in the reports of 
specific countries: the prevention of ethnic bias in relation to war crimes in 
228 2010 Croatia Progress Report, p. 49.
229 Croatia Outcome of screening for Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights, Doc. 
16473/07, 18 December 2007, p. 19; Iceland Outcome of screening for Chapter 23: Judi-
ciary and fundamental rights, Doc. 12975/11, 19 July 2011, p. 4; Montenegro Outcome of 
screening for Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights, Doc. 17785/12, 14 Decem-
ber 2012, p. 20; Serbia Outcome of screening for Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental 
rights, Doc. 12003/14, 16 July 2014, p. 23.
230 See for example the 2005 Turkey Report: ‘In order to raise awareness of international 
ethics standards, the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors disseminated the United 
National Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct to all judges and prosecutors.’ 2005 
Turkey Progress Report, p. 104. Further see 2006 Croatia Progress Report, p. 49; 2006 Tur-
key Progress Report, p. 58; 2008 Croatia Progress Report, p. 52; 2011 Albania Progress 
Report, p. 11; 2011 FYROM Progress Report, p. 58; 2014 Montenegro Progress Report, 
p. 37.
231 See for example 2007 Croatia Progress Report, p. 48; 2010 Croatia Progress Report, p. 47.
232 See for example 2011 Albania Progress Report, p. 11; 2011 FYROM Progress Report, p. 58; 
2011 Montenegro Progress Report, p. 11; 2012 Serbia Progress Report, p. 10; 2013 Ser-
bia Progress Report, p 39; 2014 Montenegro Progress Report, p. 37; 2015 Albania Report, 
p. 13; 2015 Kosovo Report, p. 13; 2015 Turkey Report, p. 15; 2016 Albania Report, p. 15; 
2016 Kosovo Report, p. 14.
233 See for example 2014 FYROM Progress, p. 40; 2014 Montenegro Progress Report, p. 37; 
2015 FYROM Report, p. 13; 2015 Bosnia and Herzegovina Report, p. 13.
234 See for example 2008 FYROM Progress Report, p. 56; 2008 Croatia Progress Report, p. 51; 
2010 Croatia Progress Report, p. 47.
235 See for example 2011 FYROM Progress Report, p. 58; 2013 FYROM Progress Report, p. 39.
236 See for example 2015 Bosnia and Herzegovina Report, p. 13; 2015 Montenegro Report, 
p. 13.
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Croatia;237 and the recurring issue of military judges in the civilian Consti-
tutional Court,238 as well as problems of subjective impartiality, i.e. public 
statements on cases made by members of the judiciary,239 in Turkey.
However, in spite of the element’s incremental importance, it has to 
be pointed out that across all the annual reports throughout the years, in 
relation to both the CEECs and the Western Balkans, there is evidence of 
conceptual confusion between impartiality and judicial independence. In 
a nutshell, the difference between the notions lays in the fact that judicial 
independence safeguards the judiciary against interference by state organs 
or private persons in the performance of judicial duties. This independent 
status in relation to others rests in objective conditions and involves both 
individual and institutional relationships, as reflected in such matters as 
the security of tenure and the institutional/administrative relationships to 
the legislative and executive branches of government, respectively.240 In 
contrast, impartiality implies that judges must not harbour any preconcep-
tions about the matters put before them, and that they must not act in ways 
that promote the interest of one of the parties;241 it reflects the attitude of 
the tribunal in relation to the issues in a particular case. According to the 
case-law of the ECHR, the notion of impartiality contains both a subjective 
and an objective element; not only should ‘no member of the tribunal holds 
any personal prejudice or bias’, but the tribunal must also ‘be impartial 
from an objective viewpoint’, in that ‘it must offer guarantees to exclude 
any legitimate doubt in this respect’.242
Even though the concepts are closely linked, more clarity could have 
been provided had assessment criteria on impartiality been articulated.243 
Almost always mentioned in the same breath as the latter,244 impartiality is 
only infrequently addressed in its own right. Even when it is, the analysis 
very often touches upon issues of independence, rather than impartiality. 
237 See for example 2005 Croatia Progress Report, p. 104; 2006 Croatia Progress Report, p. 49; 
2010 Croatia Progress Report, p. 49.
238 See 2010 Turkey Progress Report, p. 13; 2011 Turkey Progress Report, p. 15.
239 2008 Turkey Progress Report, p. 67; 2009 Turkey Progress Report, p. 69; 2010 Turkey Prog-
ress Report, p. 13.
240 Council of Europe Report ‘Challenges for Judicial Independence and Impartiality in the 
Member States of the Council of Europe’, SG/Inf(2016)3 rev, 24 March 2016, pp. 7-10.
241 Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 387/1989 (Karttunen v. Finland), UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989, para. 7.2.
242 See for example ECtHR, Daktaras v. Lithuania, Appl. No. 42095/98, para. 30; ECtHR, Mori-
ce v. France, Appl. No. 29369/10, paras. 73-78.
243 For possible indicators, see for example the ECtHR’s Guide on Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 31 December 2017, pp. 39-43, available at https://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf.
244 See for example the 2003 Report on Cyprus: ‘Under the constitutions judges are obliged 
to be impartial. They are independent from the government.’ 2003 Cyprus Compre-
hensive Monitoring Report, p. 12-13. Similarly, in relation to Turkey: ‘With regard to 
strengthening the impartiality and independence of the judiciary, no concrete steps can 
be reported.’ 2002 Turkey Regular Report, p. 119.
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For instance, in the 2011 report on Kosovo the question of a secure work-
ing environment for judges is raised: ‘There are still reports of threats and 
intimidation against judges, especially in sensitive cases such as on property 
rights. This is a serious concern as regards impartiality of judiciary.’ How-
ever, the report then continues by linking the need for a secure working 
environment to problems of judicial independence rather than impartiality, 
by stating that: ‘Political interference in the work of the judiciary is still a 
concern.’245 Similarly, the 2010 Report on FYROM examines the efforts the 
country has undertaken to combat corruption in order to ensure impartial-
ity. However, in the same section the report proceeds with an analysis of 
the role of the Minister of Justice within the Judicial Council, which raises 
‘serious concerns about the interference of the executive power and political 
control in the work of the judiciary.’246 As it will be demonstrated in more 
detail in section 3.3, the latter is much more concerned with the separation 
of powers and judicial independence than impartiality.
Thus, despite this procedural element’s significance for the rule of law, 
and the common subset of elements found throughout the reports related 
to the countries in South-eastern Europe, the reports demonstrate a persis-
tent level of conceptual indeterminateness. In this respect it is noteworthy 
that while the reports make mention of the international ethical standards, 
which, like the United Nations Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 
include a definition of impartiality,247 the reports fail to present a particular 
EU definition of impartiality, or even discuss the existing European stan-
dards as set out by the European Court of Human Rights under Article 6 of 
the ECHR.248
3.2.2 Judicial efficiency and quality as crucial elements underpinning 
the EU’s procedural understanding of the rule of law
Despite the fact that issues such as judicial impartiality and independence 
are often seen as the bedrock of a well-functioning judiciary, the pre-acces-
sion process shows that judicial efficiency and quality were, and are, at least 
as great a stumbling block for applicant countries to be able to guarantee 
procedural safeguards for the rule of law. It will be demonstrated that the 
elements of judicial efficiency and quality did become issues of major con-
cern in the Commission’s analysis of the functioning of the judiciary.
The legal foundation for the efficiency of the judicial process is stipu-
lated in Article 6(1) ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Article 6(1) ECHR reads that ‘[i]n the determination of his civil 
245 2011 Kosovo Progress Report, p. 12.
246 2010 FYROM Progress Report, p. 57.
247 See Value 2 of the UN Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct which outlines both a 
defi nition of the principle of impartiality and guidelines for its application,
248 See for example the ECtHR’s standard formulation of judicial impartiality in Case 
ECtHR, Micallef v. Malta, Appl. No. 17056/06, paras. 93-101.
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rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time…’.249 
In requiring cases to be heard within a reasonable time, the ECHR has 
underlined the importance of administering justice without delays which 
might jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility.250 A growing caseload on 
the issue of ‘reasonable time’, i.e. the problem of extensive delays in court 
proceedings, against the member states of the Council of Europe has made 
this topic from the very beginning one of the prime rule of law elements to 
be considered in the EU’s enlargement policy, not in the least because of 
the role of Member States courts in the application of EU law. After all, as 
highlighted in the Introduction, from the date of accession, the EU becomes 
dependent on the way the national courts of the new Member States func-
tion.251 In fact, because of the doctrine of direct effect,252 the obligation to 
refer,253 as well as the principle of sincere cooperation,254 the EU legal order 
as a whole, and the CJEU in particular, is dependent on their effectiveness. 
Moreover, for the principle of mutual trust between the Member States to 
operate, particularly in the light of a common and reliable Area of Justice,255 
a well-functioning effective judicial system is an essential requirement, 
indispensable for membership.256
249 The Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No R(94) 12 on the 
Independence, Effi ciency and the Role of Judges provides further clarifi cation.
250 See for example Case ECtHR, H. v. France, Appl. No. 10073/82, para. 58; Case ECtHR, 
Klatte Klitsche de la Grange v. Italy, Appl. No. 12539/86, para. 61.
251 Dimitry Kochenov EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession Condi-
tionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law The Hague: Kluwer Law Interna-
tional (2008), p. 228.
252 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v Neder-
lanse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1.
253 In relation to the preliminary ruling procedure, the Court has stated that the procedure 
‘requires the national court and the court of justice, both keeping within their respective 
jurisdiction, and with the aim of ensuring that Community law is applied in a unifi ed 
manner, to make direct and complementary contributions to the working out of a deci-
sion.’ Case 16/65 Firma G. Schwarze v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1965] ECR 877.
254 As the Court ruled in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, ‘in accordance with the principle of 
sincere cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty [current Article 4(3) TEU], nation-
al courts are required, so far as possible, to interpret and apply national procedural rules 
governing the exercise of rights of action in a way that enables natural and legal persons 
to challenge before the courts the legality of any decision or other national measure rela-
tive to the application to them of a Community act of general application, by pleading the 
invalidity of such an act. Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] 
ECR I-6677, para. 42.
255 Daniela Piana ‘New Legal Instruments in a Changing World: Legal Political and Cultural 
Developments in EU Judicial Cooperation’ International Spectator (2012), pp. 49-66.
256 Commission Communication on Towards the Enlarged Union – Strategy Paper and 
Report of the European Commission on the Progress towards Accession by Each of the 
Candidate Countries, COM(2002) 700 fi nal, 9 October 2002, p. 11. Cf. Opinion 2/13 ECHR 
II, EU:C:2006:81, 18 December 2014, para. 191.
Chapter 4 The EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in its enlargement practice 215
From the outset, the conclusion must be drawn that from the early start 
of the pre-accession process both in the countries in central and Eastern 
Europe and in the countries of the Western Balkans, a wide array of issues 
of judicial effectiveness, such as lack of legislation on procedures, clearance 
rate and backlogs, enforcement, and length of proceedings, have hampered 
the judicial process. Indeed, the Commission’s Opinion on the Slovenia’s 
Application for Membership illustrates the Commission’s analysis of the 
status quo at the beginning of the fifth enlargement round: ‘The main prob-
lems facing the Slovenian judiciary are inefficiency and the amount of time 
it takes to hand down judgements: it can take up to five years before a civil 
case is brought before the courts. … This situation should be improved as 
a result of the programme to equip courts with computers and the planned 
procedural reforms.’257 The early regular and progress reports of the coun-
tries in both central and Eastern, and South-eastern Europe confirm this pic-
ture. Poland’s 1999 Regular Report, for example, adds that ‘[a]lthough some 
progress has been recorded … significant further efforts are expected… In 
particular, the level of enforcement of judicial decision and the length of 
judicial proceedings, particularly in commercial matters, require significant 
further improvements.’258 Similarly, the 2005 Report for Croatia states that 
‘[i]mproving the functioning of the judiciary remains a major challenge’,259 
with little improvement in the problems highlighted in the Opinion, such 
as the inefficiency of courts, the excessive length of court proceedings, and 
difficulties with the enforcement of judgments. Furthermore, ‘[t]hese struc-
tural difficulties have contributed to an increase in the already very large 
backlog of cases before the Croatian courts, thus further weakening judicial 
capacity.’260 Notwithstanding the fact that EU law was already applied by a 
number of courts in the candidate countries of central and Eastern Europe 
before accession,261 it is clear from the reports that the issue of efficiency 
of judicial procedures has been at the focus of attention early on, and is a 
recurring issue in the pre-accession process of the Western Balkans. In order 
to understand their importance for the Commission’s understanding of the 
rule of law in enlargement, the underlying obstacles to procedural effective-
ness, namely problems of enforcement, low clearance rates and backlogs, 
excessive length of proceedings, and lack of procedural legislation, will be 
briefly sketched out and illustrated on the basis of the relevant Copenhagen 
documents below.
257 Commission Opinion on Slovenia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, 
COM(97) 2010 fi nal, 15 July 1997, p. 14.
258 1999 Poland Regular Report, p. 15.
259 2005 Croatia Progress Report, p. 15.
260 Ibid.
261 See Albi’s comprehensive assessment on this issue, Anneli Albi EU Enlargement and the 
Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005), 
pp. 52-56. Further Zdenĕk Kühn ‘European Law in the Empires of Mechanical Jurispru-
dence: The Judicial Application of European Law in Central European Candidate Coun-
tries’ Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy (2005), pp. 1-14.
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Both the Accession Partnerships and the European Partnerships 
acknowledge concern over the effective enforcement of court decisions and, 
accordingly, it is among the main priorities in all rounds of partnerships.262  
The reports reveal that problems of enforcement afflict all levels of the 
judiciary, including the Constitutional Courts of candidate countries.263 In 
order to address this problem,264 the Commission recommended that court 
judgements be more effectively enforced, mostly through the introduction 
of the profession judicial executors or bailiff services,265 including the adop-
tion of relevant legislation on bailiffs ‘without delays’.266
In relation to the issue of backlogs of cases and the concomitant problem 
of length of proceedings, the 2013 Serbian Progress Report is exemplary for 
the situation throughout the years, across all the reports: ‘The size of the 
backlog of cases continue to raise concern. There are still major imbalances 
in the workload of judges and the length of proceedings remains excessive 
in many cases.’267 Backlogs were and are found in all courts,268 however, 
as Kochenov has pointed out in relation to the fifth enlargement, the judi-
ciaries were quite unequally affected.269 In some countries certain regions 
tended to be more overburdened than others;270 while in other countries the 
majority of backlogs were concentrated at certain levels.271 In the countries 
of the Western Balkans the same trend is visible,272 including backlogs in 
particular courts.273
The fact that this problem is not so easily tackled, particularly in the 
light of the enlargement methodology, is demonstrated by the 2009 Croatian 
Report, which highlights that the overall backlog as well as the number of 
unresolved cases remains high. However, the report then addresses the 
fact that without more far-reaching reform, continued reduction might 
not be sustainable, ‘especially if judges have focussed on ‘easier’ cases to 
262 For the Accession Partnerships, see for example 1999 Accession Partnership Romania; 
2002 Accession Partnership Estonia; 2002 Accession Partnership Latvia.
 For the European Partnerships, see for example, 2004 European Partnership Croatia; 2004 
European Partnership Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo.
263 1998 Slovakia Regular Report, p. 10.
264 See the 2009 Progress Report on the Situation in Croatia, in which it is stated that ‘prob-
lems with the enforcement of court rulings constitute a major obstacle to the effi ciency of 
the judicial system.’ 2009 Croatia Progress Report, p. 52.
265 See for example, 2002 Czech Republic Regular Report, p. 23. On Bailiffs see for example 
1999 Slovenia Regular Report, p. 59; 2000 Romania Regular Report, p. 92; 2001 Latvia 
Regular Report, p. 17; 2010 FYROM Progress Report, p. 57; 2013 Serbia Progress Report, 
p. 40; 2016 Albania Report, p. 40.
266 2002 Latvia Regular Report, p. 22. Cf. Montenegro 2013 Progress Report, p. 37.
267 2013 Serbia Progress Report, p. 9.
268 See for example 2016 Albania Report, p. 16.
269 Kochenov (2008), p. 291.
270 2000 Poland Regular Report, p. 17; 2002 Estonia Regular Report, p. 24.
271 1999 Hungary Regular Report, p. 12; 2001 Hungary Regular Report, p. 17.
272 See for example the 2013 Report on Serbia in which the backlog of the constitutional 
Court is of particular concern, 2013 Serbia Progress Report, p. 40.
273 2013 Montenegro Progress Report, p. 37.
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meet output targets.’274 On the same topic, but from a different angle, both 
the reports on the countries in central and Eastern Europe, as well as the 
reports on the South-eastern European countries, address the problem of 
accurate data.275 Without having provided a central definition of backlog,276 
the Commission questions the reliability of statistics and the soundness of 
the methods used, thereby even calling attention to the fact that this cre-
ates ‘problems with the consistency of data and effective follow-up.277 
Moreover, apart from providing an analysis of the yearly status quo on the 
basis of unclear data, the Commission has failed to shed light on what is an 
acceptable backlog situation and what is not. Furthermore, even though the 
reduction of backlogs is a concern in all rounds of Accession and European 
Partnerships,278 it is still an issue at the time of the accession, as demon-
strated by the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports.279
As a result of the persistent problem of backlogs, the issue of length of 
proceedings was, and still is, high on the agenda,280 with the reports not-
ing, more often than not, that ‘the overall length of court proceedings from 
initiation to final judgment remains a concern’.281 Not in the least because 
of the number of cases on the violation of the right to a speedy trial dealt 
with by the ECtHR.282 By including in its analysis the case law of the latter, 
the Commission circumvented having to provide its own standards on this 
274 2009 Croatia Progress Report, p. 52.
275 See for example 2000 Estonia Regular Report, p. 16; 2001 Slovenia Regular Report, p. 17; 
2002 Lithuania Regular Report, p. 23; 2008 Kosovo Progress Report, p. 14; 2009 Montene-
gro Progress Report, p. 11.
276 It should be pointed out that the Commission did not refer to the existing Council of 
Europe’s Recommendation R (86) 12 of 16 September 1986 Concerning Measures to Pre-
vent and Reduce the Excessive Workload in the Courts or Council of Europe Recom-
mendation R(95) 12 of 11 September 1005 on the Management of Criminal Justice. It did, 
however, in the later reports on the Western Balkans, come back to this issue by referring 
to the Guidelines of the European Commission for the Effi ciency of Justice (CEPEJ) and 
the instruction for collecting statistical data therein. See for example 2015 Report Monte-
negro, p. 51.
277 Montenegro 2011 Progress Report, p. 11.
278 See for example, 2002 Accession Partnership Estonia; 2002 Accession Partnership Latvia; 
2008 Accession Partnership Croatia; 2006 European Partnership Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na; 2006 European Partnership Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo.
279 See for example 2003 Latvia Comprehensive Monitoring Report, p. 12; 2012 Croatia Com-
prehensive Monitoring Report, p. 6.
280 The Commission regularly pointed to problems arising from this issue, as in the 2000 
Report on Slovakia, in which it outlined that ‘[a] recent survey, produced at the request of 
the government, indicated that about one fi fth of the parties involved in court proceed-
ings would have experienced corrupt behaviour from judges. Bribes were given either to 
infl uence the outcome of the cases or to accelerate their proceedings.’ 2000 Slovak Regu-
lar Report, p. 17.
281 2015 FYROM Report, p. 15.
282 On the requirement of ‘reasonable time’ as mentioned in Article 6 ECHR in relation to 
the applicant states, see, for example, ECtHR, Tričković v. Slovenia, Appl. No. 39914/98; 
ECtHR, Bočvarska v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Appl. No. 27865/02; 
ECtHR, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, Appl. No. 5766/03.
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point.283 It did push, however, for the development of the legislative basis 
of procedures applied by the courts. Progress, or lack thereof, on the imple-
mentation of civil and criminal procedural legislation, including the reduc-
tion of pre-trial detention time, received ample mention in the reports.284
Examination of the reports shows that the Commission did not (in rela-
tion to the CEECs) and does not (in relation to the countries in the Western 
Balkans), provide a blueprint for improvements the applicant countries can 
introduce to their systems. While this creates unclarity, is also leaves the 
countries sufficient space to introduce their own. The Commission, has, 
however, proposed a number of improvements in order to enhance the 
overall quality of the judicial process.285 As described in the 2013 report on 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia:286
As regards quality of justice, improvements are needed to ensure that the way 
in which the court system and the career structure of judges are organised does 
not drive them towards formalistic decision-making in order to reach short-term 
productivity targets, rather than actually solving disputes, building a stable 
jurisprudence, issuing clear, well-reasoned judgments and providing long-term 
legal certainty in the interest of the citizen.
In a nutshell, these improvements relate to the following four sub-
elements:287 training of judges, prosecutors, and court staff, particularly in 
information technology, EU law and ECtHR jurisprudence;288 monitoring of 
judicial activities through the introduction of a so-called case-management 
system;289 open access electronic availability of decisions in order to 
283 See for example Croatia’s 2006 Report in which it is reported that ‘[t]he European Court 
of Human rights delivered 25 judgements (sic) concerning Croatia in the reporting peri-
od. The majority of judgments issued against Croatia continue to concern violations of 
the right to a fair trial and the length of proceedings, under Article 6 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights’, 2006 Croatia Progress Report, p. 8. Fur-
ther see, 1999 Poland Regular Report, p. 14; 2000 Slovakia Regular Report, p. 17; 2006 
FYROM Progress Report, p. 12.
284 See for example 1999 Bulgaria Regular Report, p. 12; 2000 Czech Republic Regular 
Report, p. 18; 2001 Estonia Regular Report, p. 17; 2002 Poland Regular Report, p. 25; 2009 
Montenegro Progress Report, p. 11; 2015 FYROM Report, p. 52; 2015 Albania Report, 
p. 15.
285 For an examination of the quality of the judicial process in each of the Western Balkan 
countries individually, see Kmezić (2017), pp. 105-118.
286 2013 FYROM Progress Report, p. 11.
287 The elements are outlined in a more systematic fashion from the 2015 round of reports 
onwards, however, all elements can be found throughout all the reports from the very 
beginning.
288 See for example 2000 Latvia Regular Report, p.17; 2000 Hungary Regular Report, p. 16; 
2000 Czech Republic Regular Report, p. 20; 2002 Turkey Regular Report, p. 22; 2002 Slo-
vakia Regular Report, p. 24; 2002 Poland Regular Report, p. 25.
289 See for example 2000 Czech Republic Regular Report, p. 21; 2002 Slovakia Regular 
Report, p. 24; 2009 FYROM Progress Report, p. 13; 2009 Montenegro Progress Report, 
p.11.
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enhance transparency and consistency290 of jurisprudence; and the avail-
ability of alternative dispute resolution.291 Since all of these issues need suf-
ficient budget in order to be realised, the Commission annually considered 
the applicant countries’ budgetary allocations.292 Coming from a situation 
of ‘manual registration and administrative processing’,293 the computerisa-
tion of courts took up a large part of the analysis. However, irrespective of, 
or perhaps because of, the fact that the Council of Europe has been monitor-
ing developments in this field for decades,294 the Commission, much like in 
the area of judicial effectiveness, did not go much further than examining 
developments and advocating the need for improvements, thereby failing 
to provide detailed recommendations or standards to which the applicant 
countries should adhere.295
3.2.3 The fragmented approach to the element of judicial review
In chapter 1 it was established that in order to comply with the rule of law, 
the judiciary branch of government is endowed with the possibility of judi-
cial review of both legislative and executive action. Moreover, it was shown 
that to rule on the propriety of government behaviour, courts must rely on 
the ability to review legislation and actions under a higher authority, gener-
ally the constitution. Examination of the Copenhagen documents shows 
that the Commission has taken a rather fragmented approach regarding this 
pivotal task of the judiciary – related to the overall checks and balances of 
the three branches; it focusses on the individual components that make up 
the judicial system, rather than on the actual execution of the judicial review 
process itself.
For judicial review of administrative acts, this has meant, at a very 
basic level, that a number of applicant countries, both from Central Eastern 
Europe as well as from South-Eastern Europe, first needed to establish 
some of the requisite judicial organs. Early reports on the Czech Republic’s 
progress towards accession, for example, noted and later criticised that the 
Supreme Administrative Court stipulated in the Constitution was non-exis-
tent.296 Similarly, the 2006 Progress Report on the Former Yugoslav Republic 
290 See for example 2015 Albania Progress Report, p. 14; 2015 Bosnia and Herzegovina Prog-
ress Report, p. 14.
291 See for example 2015 Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report, p. 14; 2015 Albania Prog-
ress Report, p. 14; 2015 FYROM Progress Report, p. 14.
292 See for example 2005 Serbia and Montenegro Progress Report, p. 15.
293 2001 Bulgaria Regular Report, p. 18.
294 See for the latest documentation for example the Council of Europe’s CEPEJ 2016 The-
matic report on the use of information technologies in courts, available at: http://www.
coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2016/publication/REV1/2016_2%20-%
20CEPEJ%20Study%2024%20-%20IT%20Report%20-%20EN.pdf.
295 Also see Kochenov (2008), p. 295.
296 1998 Czech Republic Regular Report, p. 9; 1999 Czech Republic Regular Report, p. 13.
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of Macedonia highlighted the necessity of the creation of administrative 
courts for first instance judicial review of administrative decisions, a task 
that up till then overburdened FYROM’s Supreme Court.297
In addition, the various rounds of reports address issues of capacity (the 
filling of judicial posts),298 and issues of effectiveness of judicial procedure. 
It was, however, demonstrated in the previous section that quality of the 
judicial process is understood by the Commission in terms of modernisa-
tion through case-management systems and electronic availability of deci-
sions, as well as training (particularly in EU/ECHR law and jurisprudence) 
of employees in the judicial sector. While these elements are undoubtedly 
meant to ensure that qualified personnel works in an effectively and effi-
ciently organised modern(ised) judiciary, the reports rarely go beyond a 
descriptive approach chronicling the ‘existence’ of each individual element 
on a yearly basis. By doing so, they fail to give insight into a preferred 
minimum standard or to provide a comprehensive update as to the actual 
practice of judicial review, i.e. how the judicial institutions fulfil their roles 
as opposed to institutional questions such as those related to qualified staff.
Regarding judicial review of individual rights, the analysis of the judi-
cial system in the Commission Opinions on the Application for Member-
ship of the CEECs and SEECs indicates a predilection for the existence of 
the protection of such rights through Constitutional Courts.299 However, 
while a more substantive analysis and examples of best practices of rights 
adjudication of particular rights are occasionally provided in the section 
on human rights,300 the reports again do not produce a clear picture of the 
preferred modalities of constitutional judicial review. Some applicant states 
have constitutional complaint proceedings,301 however, the lack of criti-
cism in relation to states that do not afford this opportunity demonstrates 
that this is not a requirement. Similarly, in relation to legislative review, 
examples can be found of ex post control or ex ante review,302 abstract (adju-
dication on the constitutionality of a legislative act without the need for a 
specific case) or concrete (in a particular case on the basis of referral by an 
297 2006 FYROM Progress Report, p. 9.
298 See for example 2000 Lithuania Regular Report, p. 16; 2002 Romania Regular Report, 
p. 26; 2013 Albania Progress Report, pp. 38-39.
299 See for example the Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of 
the European Union, COM(1997) 2002 fi nal, 15 July 1997, p. 14; Commission Opinion on 
Hungary’s Application for Membership of the European Union, COM(1997) 2001 fi nal, 
15 July 1997; Commission Opinion on Croatia’s Application for Membership of the Euro-
pean Union, COM(2004) 257 fi nal, 20 April 2004, p. 17.
300 See for example, 2000 Poland Regular Report, p. 19; 2008 Montenegro Progress Report, 
p. 13.
301 See for example 2002 Czech Republic Regular Report, p. 22.
302 See for example 2014 Albania Progress Report, p. 39
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ordinary court) review,303 with the Commission abstaining from indicating
its own preferences. Along the same lines, examination of the reports 
does not demonstrate a predisposition on the side of the EU as to who can 
commence constitutional proceedings. Abstract review can be initiated by 
the President,304 but also a group of parliamentarians.305 Additionally, it 
seems that abstract review can be initiated by the Supreme Court306 or the 
Ombudsman.307
It was argued in chapter 1 that the rule of law allows for various 
modalities of judicial review. Accordingly, the fact that the Commission 
does not provide a concrete outline of its preferred institutional set-up can 
be in line with the rule of law. After all, as demonstrated previously, the 
national traditions of Rechtsstaat, état de droit, and the Anglo-Saxon rule 
of law display their own similarities and differences. Even the Council of 
Europe, in its Recommendation (2004)20 on Judicial Review of Administra-
tive Acts, provides a broadly defined concept by merely stating that ‘[a]
ll administrative acts should be subject to judicial review’.308 However, 
particularly in relation to this form of judicial review, it seems that by 
adopting the outlined fragmented approach whereby the courts main task 
is not directly addressed but, rather, the emphasis is on a descriptive yearly 
overview of the institutional set-up of judiciary bodies whereby the judicial 
process is divided into quantifiable sub-elements, the Commission displays 
a lack of understanding of the ways through which it could truly promote 
and further consolidate this rule of law element.
3.2.4 The auxiliary element of access to justice
Access to justice is one of the prime procedural rule of law elements through 
which states can ensure that all citizens have effective means of recourse to 
their rights. It enables individuals to protect themselves against infringe-
ments of their rights, to hold executive power accountable, to remedy civil 
wrongs, and to defend themselves in criminal proceedings; it is crucial 
for individuals seeking to benefit from their procedural and substantive 
rights.309 Moreover, access to justice is one of the preconditions in order to 
303 See for example 2001 Poland Regular Report, p. 20; 2001 Czech Republic Regular Report, 
p. 21; 2007 Montenegro Progress Report, p. 36.
304 See for example 2012 Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report, p. 38.
305 See for example 2013 Montenegro Progress Report, p. 9.
306 See for example 2016 FYROM Report, p. 55.
307 See for example 2009 Montenegro Progress Report, p. 10; 2010 Serbia Progress Report, 
p. 9; 2013 Turkey Progress Report, p. 10.
308 Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2004)20, 15 December 2004, under B(1)(a).
309 Handbook on European Law Relating to Access to Justice Prepared jointly by the European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the Council of Europe (2016), p. 16.
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safeguard the right to a fair trial; a right, which the applicant countries as 
future Member States of the EU have to guarantee.310
On the basis of the examination of the Copenhagen documents, three 
conclusions can be drawn. First, access to justice is mainly interpreted to 
contain two aspects: access to court and access to legal aid, in particular for 
disadvantaged groups. Secondly, the way the Commission has addressed 
these two aspects of this procedural element – both under the rule of law 
and under human rights – in the different sections of the report, reflects the 
nature of these two aspects and the underlying interrelation on this issue 
between the rule of law and human rights. Thirdly, from the analysis of the 
monitoring reports, it is clear that even though access to justice is included 
in the EU’s rule of law conceptualisation in its enlargement policy, it only 
plays an auxiliary role, since the absence of developments in relation to the 
consolidation of this element does not lead to lack of progress in the nego-
tiations, or even accession. Below, these three conclusions will be address 
in turn.
The first conclusion relates to the two aspects that make up the more 
generic term of access to justice, namely access to court and legal aid. Both 
aspects are referred to in the documents pertaining to the fifth enlargement 
round of the countries in central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the 
annual reports covering progress in the countries in South-eastern Europe. 
To give a few examples of the first aspect, the Polish 1999 Report discusses 
the lack of improvement in relation to the provisions of access to courts;311 
the Romanian report of 2002 analyses the problems of prisoners and their 
lack of access to a court in order to review the final outcome an adminis-
trative procedure;312 the 2007 report on the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia criticises the lack of access to possibilities for appeals against 
acts and decisions by civil servants;313 Croatia’s 2011 report describes prog-
ress regarding access to justice in the area of administrative law, with the 
introduction of four first instance court as well as a Higher Administrative 
Court;314 the 2014 report on the situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia goes as far as to examine actual physical access to the Basic 
Court in Skopje, in terms of lifts for people with special needs.315
310 See Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which reads:
 ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated 
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions 
laid down in this Article.
 Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the 
possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available 
to those who lack suffi cient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective 
access to justice.’ Also see Article 6 and 13 ECHR.
311 1999 Poland Regular Report, p. 14.
312 2002 Romania Regular Report, p. 28.
313 2007 FYROM Progress Report, p. 12.
314 2011 Croatia Progress Report, p. 50.
315 2014 FYROM Progress Report, p. 42.
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The second aspect of access to legal aid covers rather more issues than 
access to court. It includes the general set up of a free legal aid system in 
the applicant states316 and the concomitant problem of lack of funding,317 
access to a lawyer in both criminal and civil cases,318 difficulties with the 
realisation of legal aid in the rural areas of Turkey in particular,319 problems 
with legal aid in a language other than the main language spoken in the 
country,320 as well as strengthening legal aid for particular groups of people, 
such as women and children,321 minorities,322 asylum seekers,323 victims of 
domestic abuse,324 trafficking,325 and war crimes.326
The second conclusion – the connection between the rule of law and 
human rights in the area of access to justice – is supported by the way 
the issue is addressed over the years and across reports and Accession/
European Partnerships in the same year, i.e. the placement of the element 
under different headings. To start with, the 1999 and 2002 rounds of Acces-
sion Partnerships with the CEECs list ‘facilitat[ing] access to legal advice 
and representation’,327 ‘widen[ing] the availability of legal aid’,328 and 
‘promot[ing] access to justice’,329 as priorities or short-term objectives under 
the political criteria of democracy and the rule of law, and more particularly, 
under judicial reform. However, most 2002 Regular Reports examine the 
situation in relation to the facilitation of legal aid within the section of civil 
and political rights under the Copenhagen political criteria of human rights 
and the protection of minorities. Indeed, Romania’s Report of that year 
even stresses the lack of legal aid in relation to certain crimes as a human 
316 For example, 2005 Serbia and Montenegro Progress Report, p. 19; 2007 Albania Progress 
Report, p. 12; 2009 Croatia Progress Report, p. 12; 2009 Serbia Progress Report, p. 14; 2011 
Montenegro Progress Report, p. 16; 2013 Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report, p. 13; 
2016 Serbia Report, p. 4.
317 For example, 2011 Turkey Progress Report, p. 24; 2011 Kosovo Progress Report, p. 15; 2013
Albania Progress Report, p. 40; 2014 Montenegro Progress Report, p. 39.
318 For example, 2001 Turkey Regular Report, p. 16; 2002 Turkey Regular Report, p. 26; 2007 
Turkey Progress Report, p. 14; 2009 Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report, p. 16.
319 2002 Turkey Regular Report, p. 27; 2007 Turkey Progress Report, p. 14; 2009 Turkey Prog-
ress Report, p. 16; 2011 Turkey Progress Report, p. 24.
320 2005 Turkey Progress Report, p. 23; 2013 Montenegro Progress Report, p. 38; 2014 Kosovo 
Progress Report, p. 14.
321 2011 Turkey Progress Report, p. 24; 2013 Kosovo Progress Report, p. 12; 2014 Turkey 
Progress Report, p. 47.
322 2001 Hungary Regular Report, p. 22.
323 2011 FYROM Progress Report, p. 16.
324 2011 Albania Progress Report, p. 16; 2013 Albania Progress Report, p. 40; 2014 Montene-
gro Progress Report, p. 39.
325 2013 Albania Progress Report, p. 40; 2013 Kosovo Progress Report, p. 12; 2014 Kosovo 
Progress Report, p. 14.
326 2015 Montenegro Report, p. 53.
327 1999 Accession Partnership Romania.
328 2002 Accession Partnership Lithuania; 2002 Accession Partnership Hungary; 2002 Acces-
sion Partnership Romania; 2002 Accession Partnership Estonia.
329 2002 Accession Partnership Latvia.
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rights issue that needs to be tackled: ‘In crimes where the maximum sanc-
tion is less than 5 years imprisonment, … there is no mandatory legal aid 
provided. This is a limitation to the right to legal representation [and] is a 
human rights issue that needs to be addressed.’330
The later Accession and European Partnerships show a similar picture. 
The 2003 AP with Bulgaria includes ensuring ‘implementation and suffi-
cient budgetary resources to ensure access to justice and legal aid’ under 
the heading of human rights and the protection of minorities,331 the 2003 
AP with Romania discusses the extension of access to free legal aid as a 
priority under judicial reform,332 and Turkey’s 2003 AP lists the further 
development of the legal aid system ‘to ensure that all citizens enjoy access 
to justice’ as a medium-term priority in the acquis section of justice and 
home affairs.333 While the 2004 European Partnerships discussed ensur-
ing ‘the viability of a comprehensive legal aid system’334 as an objective of 
reinforcing the judicial system under the political criteria of democracy and 
the rule of law, the 2006 and 2008 European Partnerships (and Accession 
Partnership in the case of Croatia, Turkey and the FYROM) again show the 
placement of access to justice under both the rule of law335 as well as the 
section on human rights.336 The 2008 European Partnership with Serbia 
including Kosovo is a case in point, with the strengthening of access to 
justice included as an objective for Serbia under civil and political rights, 
and as a target for Kosovo under the judicial system and the rule of law.337 
The annual progress reports further blend the categorisation of this proce-
dural element by not following the positioning outlined in the APs/EPs,338 
switching the placement across years,339 and sometimes also mixing it up 
within a year.340 It should also be noted that the available screening reports 
on Chapter 23 demonstrate the same approach by dealing with the issue 
of access to justice and/or legal aid both under the rule of law, more par-
330 2002 Romania Regular Report, p. 32.
331 2003 Accession Partnership Bulgaria.
332 2003 Accession Partnership Romania.
333 2003 Accession Partnership Turkey.
334 2004 European Partnership Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo. See also the 2004 
European Partnership with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 2004 European 
Partnership Croatia.
335 See for example 2006 Accession Partnership Croatia; 2008 European Partnership Serbia 
including Kosovo.
336 See for example 2006 Accession Partnership Turkey; 2008 European Partnership Albania.
337 2008 European Partnership Serbia including Kosovo.
338 While the 2004 European Partnerships locate the objective under judicial reform, the 2004 
and 2005 rounds of annual reports discuss the issue under civil and political rights. See 
for example 2004 Bulgaria Regular Report, p. 22 or 2005 Turkey Progress Report, p. 23.
339 For example, the annual reports of 2013 and 2014 clearly locate the analysis of access to 
justice under the heading of the functioning of the judiciary. However, the 2015 and 2016 
reports more often than not examine the issue in the section on human rights.
340 In the 2011 round of annual reports access to justice is discussed under the heading of 
civil and political rights, however, FYROM’s report addresses the issue under the section 
on the functioning of the judiciary. 2011 FYROM Progress Report, p. 60.
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ticularly, the reform of the judiciary, as well as under fundamental rights.341 
In sum, the examination of the Accession and European Partnerships and 
the monitoring reports of both the CEECs and the SEECs, demonstrates an 
understanding by the Commission of the close interrelatedness of the rule 
of law and human rights in relation to this particular element. The lack of 
clear placement under either heading could have led to unequal treatment 
under the new approach and the Commission more recent commitment to 
the principle of ‘fundamentals first’.342 However, since Chapter 23 includes 
both the judiciary and fundamental rights, this has so far not been an issue.
Against this background, the focus will next turn to the third conclu-
sion. It is argued here that the inclusion of access to justice as a procedural 
element of the conceptualisation of the rule of law in enlargement, is only in 
a supplementary manner. This conclusion is supported by the findings on 
the analysis of the way in which the Commission has reported on this issue 
over the years. To start with, access to justice only became an issue from 
2000 onwards.343 Subsequently, after it had made its way into the Accession 
and European Partnerships and the reports, it is clear from the latter that the 
attention paid to it is uneven, with some years, such as 2002, 2005, and 2014 
devoting quite some space to it, and other years, including 2007, 2011 and 
2015 barely attributing more than a few lines to the examination of progress 
in relation to this element.
However, and more importantly, it is the way in which progress is anal-
ysed over the years that diminishes this element’s significance. Simply put, 
year after year, the documents report on lack of progress, and demonstrate 
limited or simply no criticism of the situation. Moreover, no minimum 
standards are articulated in this area. To give some examples, ‘there appears 
to be no improvement in the problems of access to legal aid’344 in Bulgaria 
in 2000, ‘[n]o changes have been made to the legal aid system during the 
reporting period’345 in Romania in 2002, and in Turkey ‘in some town, no 
legal council is available’346 in the same reporting year. In relation to the 
countries in South-eastern Europe the picture remains the same: Serbia’s 
2005 report states that ‘there is a lack of coherent planning and management 
of legal aid, with the result that laws are not being applied and there is 
no clear mechanism for ensuring the quality of legal aid’.347 Similarly ‘[a]
ccess to justice is still hampered by the lack of a comprehensive system 
of legal aid’348 in Croatia in 2007, ‘[f]ree legal defence is not recognised in 
341 See for example Serbia’s screening report of Chapter 23 on pp. 17 (fair trial rights) and 24 
(judiciary).
342 For the recent affi rmation of the latter, see Commission Communication on 2018 Com-
munication on EU Enlargement Policy, COM(2018) 450 fi nal, 17 April 2018, p. 1.
343 The issue is almost whole excluded from the 1998 and 1999 Accession Partnerships.
344 2000 Bulgaria Regular Report, p. 17.
345 2002 Romania Regular Report, p. 25.
346 2002 Turkey Regular Report, p. 27.
347 2005 Serbia and Montenegro Progress Report, p. 19.
348 2007 Croatia Progress Report, p. 11.
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the High Court of Justice’349 of Albania, and ‘no progress has been made 
on adopting legislation and establishing a comprehensive system of legal 
aid’350 in Serbia in 2009. Turkey’s 2011 report is especially damning: ‘With 
respect to access to justice, the legal aid provided is of inadequate scope and 
quality. Budgetary provisions are inadequate. There is no effective moni-
toring mechanism that would remedy long-standing problems.’351 In the 
same way, more recent reports also expand on lack of or limited improve-
ment.352 On the basis of the fact that even in the Comprehensive Monitoring 
Reports of the countries of the fifth,353 sixth354 and seventh355 enlargement 
round, drawn up half a year before the date of accession, progress on 
access to justice and legal aid is reported on as being ‘under-developed’,356 
‘unsatisfactory’,357 and ‘rather restricted’,358 the conclusion must be drawn 
that, even though access to justice is incorporated as a procedural rule of 
law element in enlargement, its treatment in the reports would suggest that 
it is not an element of prime importance.
3.2.5 Conclusions
In line with a number of the reports, in which it is stated that ‘[i]mpartial-
ity, integrity and high standards of adjudication by the courts are essential 
for safeguarding the rule of law’,359 this section of the chapter showed 
that impartiality has increasingly become recognised as a fundamental 
procedural element of the rule of law in enlargement. However, it was 
demonstrated that in spite of this recognition, the Commission has refrained 
from clearly outlining the notion, particularly in relation to judicial inde-
pendence. Furthermore, it was argued that next to impartiality, the elements 
of judicial efficiency and quality have become major issues of concern in the 
Commission’s assessment of the functioning of the judiciary. It was asserted 
that procedural effectiveness has been conceptualised in the reports mainly 
in terms of procedural obstacles, including such sub-elements as enforce-
349 2007 Albania Progress Report, p. 12.
350 2009 Serbia Progress Report, p. 14.
351 2011 Turkey Progress Report, p. 87.
352 See for example 2014 Albania Progress Report, p. 43; 2014 Bosnia and Herzegovina Prog-
ress Report, p. 14; 2015 Serbia Report, p. 4; 2016 Kosovo Report, p. 27.
353 See for example 2003 Latvia Comprehensive Monitoring Report, p. 13.
354 Romania’s Monitoring Report states that ‘[t]he reform of the legal aid system needs to be 
carried out.’ 2007 Romania Monitoring Report, p. 7.
355 Croatia’s Monitoring Report simply states that ‘[t]he legal framework for free legal aid 
has to be improved to enable better access to legal aid and to foster the role of NGOs as 
legal aid providers.’ 2012 Croatia Comprehensive Monitoring Report, p. 37.
356 2003 Poland Comprehensive Monitoring Report, p. 16.
357 2003 Lithuania Comprehensive Monitoring Report, p. 13.
358 2003 Hungary Comprehensive Monitoring Report, p. 14.
359 2005 Turkey Progress Report, p. 103. Also see the Analytical Report for the opinion on 
the application from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for EU membership, 
SEC(2005) 1425, 9 November 2005, p. 105.
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ment, backlogs, length of proceedings, and general lack of procedural 
legislation. It was, however, also pointed out that the Commission has 
refrained from providing a detailed standard for the applicant countries to 
take into account in their improvements. Following this, the third element 
in this section highlighted the Commission’s fragmented approach towards 
to element of judicial review. It was argued that the Copenhagen documents 
address this element from an institutional angle rather than an examination 
of how judicial review is organised in the candidate countries, i.e. judicial 
review is interpreted in terms of the organisation of courts, rather than the 
functioning of those courts. Finally, the section examined the element of 
access to justice, acknowledged as one of the preconditions for a fair trial. It 
was asserted that access to justice is mainly interpreted in two ways, access 
to court and access to legal aid. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the 
Commission places this element both under the heading of rule of law as 
well as human rights, indicating an understanding of the close connection 
between both notions in relation to this element. The section concluded by 
arguing that even though the reports evidence the inclusion of access to 
justice as a rule of law element, the Commission’s lack of critique in situa-
tions when there has been very little to no progress in the yearly monitoring 
reports, gives the impression that this element at the very least does not 
fulfil a central role as a procedural element in the understanding of the rule 
of law in enlargement.
3.3 Institutional elements of the rule of law
This section will focus on the assessment of the EU’s practice in enlarge-
ment in order to substantiate the third category of institutional rule of law 
elements of the analytical framework established in Part I. It will be argued 
that the EU’s understanding of the rule of law in its accession policy is 
largely oriented towards institutional reform measures. More particularly, it 
will be demonstrated that rule of law reform is envisaged as judicial reform, 
mainly in terms of the proper functioning of courts. It will be asserted that 
this institutional approach is reflected both in the legal framework and in 
the Copenhagen documents underlying the enlargement policy. Moreover, 
in relation to the separation of powers – found in chapters 1 and 2 as the 
notion through which the power-balance of the three branches of govern-
ment is levelled and the rule of law is reinforced – it will be shown that 
while the Copenhagen documents seem to be structured in such a way as to 
support the doctrine, in actual fact they do not provide any insight into the 
Commission’s ideas on this per se. Instead, it will be demonstrated that in 
early reports, the three branches of government are addressed individually, 
without regard to how they interrelate.
Subsequently, turning to the issue of judicial independence, it will be 
demonstrated that within the EU’s institution-centric approach, the element 
of judicial independence is one of the main components of the rule of law 
in the pre-accession process. More particularly, it will be shown that the 
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Commission, despite frequently mentioning the existence of ‘European 
standards’ in this area, has failed to articulate a detailed comprehensive 
common standard on this issue. Instead it has chosen to address it along the 
rudimentary lines of institutional and personal independence. Furthermore, 
the reports show that judicial independence is increasingly combined with 
judicial accountability, whereby it will be demonstrated that in relation to 
the latter, the Commission has adopted a one-dimensional approach that 
focuses on sub-elements that can be easily quantified, such as the number 
of cases in a particular area, rather than tackling the question of whether the 
judiciary is also perceived to be accountable. Finally, the section on judicial 
independence will conclude by addressing the question whether the under-
standing of these rule of law elements in enlargement in such an elementary 
way has in actual fact provided the applicant states with the opportunity to 
grapple to some extent with their own ideas of protecting the independence 
of the judiciary and its judges, allowing them to develop models of inde-
pendence of their own. In the light of the findings in chapter 1, where it was 
argued that the constitutional traditions of the Member States have shaped 
their own particular model of judicial independence, it will be asserted that 
the Commission’s approach might, however unintentionally, be more in line 
with the rule of law than hitherto perceived in the literature.
3.3.1 The pervasive institutional rule of law approach: the EU’s understanding 
of the rule of law as judicial reform
The legacy of the EU’s earlier attempt at providing clarity on the rule of 
law as a condition for accession to the Union by the applicant states, i.e. 
the stability of institutions that guarantee … the rule of law, 360 is not to be 
underestimated. Conceived by the European Council in 1993, this origi-
nal formulation has permeated the EU’s conception of the rule of law in 
enlargement from the beginning, so much so, in fact, that the rule of law in 
enlargement has come to be synonymous with institutional reform (‘a great 
deal of institution building is required’)361, and more specifically judicial 
reform. Furthermore, the often pre-modern state of the judicial system in 
the countries of central and Eastern Europe, whereby several countries 
did not even have the basic judicial structure required by their own newly 
adopted Constitutions, enhanced the perceived necessity of the institutional 
focus. The legal framework as well as the Copenhagen documents, i.e. the 
Commission’s Enlargement Strategies and the country specific reports, sup-
port this argument, as will be further explained below.
After the 1994 Essen European Council had designated PHARE as the 
main financial instrument in the pre-accession strategy,362 the Commission 
360 Presidency Conclusions, European Council Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993.
361 2001 Poland Regular Report, p. 110.
362 Presidency Conclusions, Essen European Council, 9-10 December 1994. Also see the Pres-
idency Conclusions, Amsterdam European Council, 16-17 June 1997.
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introduced a refocusing of the financial programme.363 In its Guidelines for 
PHARE Programme Implementation, the Commission identified ‘institu-
tion building’364 as the first of two priorities (the other being ‘investment 
in the acquis365), since ‘the reinforcement of institutional and administrative 
capacity of candidate countries is a key requirement of enlargement, if the 
countries are to be in a position to adopt, implement and enforce the acquis 
as required by membership of the Union.’366 More particularly, the Com-
mission outlined that this will require modernisation of the judiciary.367 The 
same institutional focus is also discernible in the CARDS Regulation,368 as 
well as in the later IPA Regulations.369 Where the legal framework in rela-
363 See Commission Communication on Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, 
COM(97) 2000 fi nal, 15 July 1997, pp. 52-53.
364 Defi ned in the Guidelines as ‘helping the candidate countries to develop the structures, 
human resources and management skills needed to put in place economic, social and 
regulatory systems equal to the task required for approximation of laws and implemen-
tation of the acquis communautaire, and an inclusive democratic civil society capable of 
fulfi lling the requirements of the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’.’ Commission Decision on the 
Guidelines for PHARE Programme Implementation in Candidate Countries, 1998-1999, 
SEC(1998) 1012 fi nal, 15 June 1998, p. 5. Also see Commission Decision on the Guidelines 
for the PHARE Programme Implementation in Candidate Countries for the Period 2000-
2006, in Application of Article 8 of Regulation 3906/89, SEC(1999) 1596 fi nal, 13 October 
1999; Commission 2002 Report on PHARE and the pre-accession instruments for Cyprus, 
Malta and Turkey, COM(2003) 497 fi nal, 11 August 2003.
365 This second priority is meant essentially that the candidate countries need to invest in 
adapting their enterprises and main infrastructure to respect Community norms. Accord-
ing to the Guidelines, ‘the only alternative to ling transitional periods is a major invest-
ment effort by the applicant countries to adapt to Community norms and standards.’ 
Commission Decision on the Guidelines for PHARE Programme Implementation in Can-
didate Countries, 1998-1999, SEC(1998) 1012 fi nal, 15 June 1998 p. 9.
366 Ibid., p. 9.
367 Ibid., p. 5.
368 According to Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000, fi nancial aid is aimed 
at ‘the creation of an institutional and legislative framework to underpin … the rule of 
law.’ Moreover, the assistance shall be implemented by fi nancing investment and institu-
tion-building programmes.
369 According to para. 13 of the Preamble of IPA I Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006, assistance 
for candidate countries should ‘be targeted at supporting a wide range of institution-
building measures. Accordingly, Article 2 stipulates that the scope of assistance covers 
the ‘strengthening of democratic institutions, as well as the rule of law, including its 
enforcement’, which, according to Article 3, shall be implement by inter alia institution 
building. The IPA II Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 has the same institutional focus (Arti-
cle 3), and lists as its specifi c objective not only the strengthening of institutions, but high-
lights at the same time that, in the case of the rule of law, this implies ‘an independent and 
effi cient justice system’ (Article 2(1)(a)(i) and 2(2)(a)). Not only that, in Annex II, covering 
the thematic priorities for assistance, the Regulation stipulates that in relation to the rule 
of law the following priorities will be addressed: ‘Establishing and promoting from an 
early stage the proper functioning of the institutions necessary in order to secure the rule 
of law. Interventions in this area shall aim at: establishing independent, accountable and 
effi cient judicial systems, including transparent and merit-based recruitment, evaluation 
and promotion systems and effective disciplinary procedures in case of wrongdoing.’
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tion to the fifth enlargement round gave little ‘actual substance’ 370 to the 
rule of law,371 more effort was put into outlining the notion in relation to 
the countries in South-eastern Europe. Hence, in its 1997 Conclusions, the 
General Affairs Council indicated the elements of examination for compli-
ance with the rule of law as well as the other political criteria in order to 
advance the countries’ bilateral relation with the EU in the context of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process. For the rule of law (taken together 
with human rights) there is a clear focus on the judicial process, as it is stip-
ulated that countries need to demonstrate effective means of redress against 
administrative decisions, access to courts and the right to fair trial, equality 
before the law and equal protection by the law, and freedom from inhuman 
or degrading treatment and arbitrary arrest.372 Furthermore, the Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreements, as already outlined previously,373 epito-
mise the institutional judicial focus of the notion by including as an aim of 
cooperation the consolidation of the rule of law through the ‘reinforcement 
of institutions’, including inter alia the strengthening of independence of the 
judiciary and improving its efficiency, and improving the functioning of the 
police and other law enforcement bodies.374
The Commission’s own approach of rule of law reform as institutional 
reform, and more specifically as judicial reform, is seen clearly throughout 
its Enlargement Strategies. Arguing for the necessity of its institutional 
emphasis in 1999 – ‘institution building helps the candidates meet the 
importance challenge of strengthening their … judicial capacity to enforce 
and implement the acquis’375 – the Commission tied this focus explicitly to 
the rule of law, amongst others in its 2006 Strategy, by stating that it will pay 
‘particular attention to the establishment of the structures needed to ensure 
the rule of law. This includes administrative and judicial capacity…’.376 In 
line with these intentions, also the later strategies confirm that reinforcing 
the rule of law is seen not only as institution-building in general, but as 
judicial reform in particular. In the words of the 2014 and 2015 strategies: 
‘Strengthening the rule of law is a key challenge for most of the countries in 
370 Päivi Leino ‘Rights, Rules and Democracy in the EU Enlargement Process: Between 
Universalism and Identity’ 7 Austrian Review of International and European Law (2002), pp. 
53-90 at 81.
371 Marks has criticised the Commission’s attempt at outlining what it would look for in the 
Copenhagen political criteria in Agenda 2000 as a ‘simplistic sum’, see Susan Marks The 
Riddle of All Constitutions. International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology Oxford: 
Oxford University Press (2000), p. 74.
372 Council Conclusions ‘The Application of Conditionality with a view to developing 
a Coherent EU-Strategy for the Relations with the Countries in the Region’, Annex to 
Annex III, 2203rd General Affairs Council, 29-30 April 1997.
373 See section 2.3.
374 See for example Article 80 Stabilisation and Association Agreement Montenegro.
375 Commission Composite Paper – Reports on Progress towards Accession by Each of the 
Candidate States, COM(1999) 500 fi nal, 13 October 1999, p. 9.
376 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, 
COM(2006) 649 fi nal, 8 November 2006, p. 22.
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the enlargement process, in particular in terms of improving the functioning 
and independence of the judiciary.’377
Additional support for this line of argumentation can be found in the 
regular and progress reports. From the first reporting round onwards, the 
Commission has tackled the analysis of the Copenhagen political criteria in 
two parts, democracy and the rule of law on the one hand, human rights 
and the protection of minorities on the other. Under the former, the exami-
nation has been divided into four sections: parliament, executive, judiciary, 
and anti-corruption matters.378 It is submitted that the Commission’s rule 
of law analysis is concentrated solely on the judiciary branch.379 Indeed, 
in the 2015 and 2016 reports, in which the Commission has addressed for 
the first time democracy and the rule of law separately, the evaluation of 
the rule of law section focused almost exclusively on the functioning of the 
judiciary.380 Additionally, while the structure of this section has changed 
marginally over the years,381 the basic analysis and the elements contained 
therein has not.
Next to the Copenhagen European Council’s institutional formulation 
of the rule of law, the necessity of creating a basic institutional judicial envi-
ronment even before the question of judicial reform could be tackled, added 
to the institutional-centric focus of the Commission’s rule of law conceptu-
alisation. Several of the applicant states’ Constitutions stipulated a lay out 
of a judicial system that had yet to materialise, both in terms of the creation 
as well as the abolishment of judicial bodies. To name a few example in 
order to provide an insight into the magnitude of this undertaking, in Bul-
garia, a three-tier jurisdiction, courts of appeal throughout the country and 
the supreme court of appeal, as well as the supreme administrative court 
were introduced.382 In the Czech Republic a supreme administrative court 
needed to be created.383 In Hungary a fourth level of courts, the high courts 
377 Commission Communication on EU Enlargement Strategy, COM(2015) 611 final, 10 
November 2015, p. 5, [emphasis added]. The Communication moreover continues fur-
ther down the same page that ‘[t]here have been some positive developments on the rule 
of law over the past years. This has been primarily in terms of putting in place legal 
frameworks and institutional structures. Also see Commission Communication on EU 
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-2015, COM(2014) 700 fi nal, 8 October 
2014, p. 11.
378 See for example, 1999 Slovenia Regular Report.
379 For the argument that anti-corruption matters should not be understood to form part of 
the Commission’s rule of law conceptualization, see section 4.3.
380 See for example 2016 FYROM Report, pp. 12-19; 2015 Montenegro Report, pp. 12-19.
381 In relation to the countries in South-eastern Europe, the basis breakdown of parliament, 
government, public administration, judicial system, and anti-corruption policy, has only 
expanded in the 2013 and 2014 reporting rounds.
382 1998 Bulgaria Regular Report, 8; 2000 Bulgaria Regular Report, p. 16.
383 In accordance with Article 91 of the Czech Constitution. 1998 Czech Regular Report, p. 9. 
Much to the annoyance of the Commission, the supreme administrative court as fore-
seen by the Constitution, did not materialise; rather, a system of administrative senates in 
regional courts was initiated. 1999 Czech Regular Report, p. 13.
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of justice, was to be inserted between regional courts and the Supreme 
Court.384 In Lithuania, apart from a four-tier judicial system that was intro-
duced, special arbitration tribunals were set up and the Commercial Court 
was abolished.385 In Poland, a new layer of jurisdiction was introduced 
dealing with petty cases, in order to unburden the backlogged system.386 In 
the light of these examples it becomes apparent that the frequent lack of a 
basic judicial court structure has intensified the Commission’s emphasis on 
the institutional set-up in the applicant states, even before it could start to 
discuss the functioning of these institutions.
Against this background of the Commission’s understanding of the 
rule of law as judicial reform, the rest of this section will further dissect the 
institutional elements of the rule of law.
3.3.2 The lack of articulation of the element of separation of powers
For an institution so much vested in state-building, it is striking to note that 
the Commission, at the strategic level, has not put forward its understand-
ing on the doctrine of the separation of powers.387 Notwithstanding the 
fact that the structure of the analysis of the political criteria of democracy 
and the rule of law in the annual reports followed the separation of pow-
ers rationale,388 i.e. the subdivision of parliament, executive, and judiciary, 
this structural approach has not provided any insights into the Commis-
sion’s idea of the doctrine per se. Since within each sub-section the analysis 
concentrated on the developments of that particular topic only, without 
providing an assessment of the ways in which these branches of govern-
ment interrelate or how their separation is organised in practice, such an 
analysis does not actually cover the separation of powers. After all, the fact 
that they are analysed separately does not support the conclusion of their 
actual separation in the legal systems in question.389
384 1998 Hungaria Regular Report, p. 9.
385 1998 Lithuania Regular Report, pp. 8-9; 1999 Lithuania Regular Report, p. 12.
386 2000 Poland Regular Report, p. 17.
387 Of course, at the internal level of the EU there is the principle of institutional balance, as 
recognized by the Court as a fundamental principle of the EU legal order. See the line of 
case-law starting with Case 9/56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgische, SpA v High Autho-
rity [1958] ECR 11. Despite the fact that it has been argued that this principle corresponds 
to the separation of powers recognized in the constitutional orders of the Member States, 
one should not be confused with the other. See Jean-Paul Jacqué ‘The Principle of Insti-
tutional Balance’ 41 Common Market Law Review (2004), pp. 383-391. Further, see Alexan-
der Fritzsche ‘Discretion, Scope of Judicial Review and Institutional Balance in European 
Law’ 47 Common Market Law Review (2010), pp. 361-403; Sasha Prechal ‘Institutional Bal-
ance: A Fragile Principle with Uncertain Contents’ in Ton Heukels, Niels Blokker & Mar-
cel Brus (eds) The European Union after Amsterdam – A Legal Analysis The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International (1998) pp. 273-294; Koen Lenaerts ‘Some Refl ections on the Separation 
of Powers in the European Community’ 28 Common Market Law Review (1991), pp. 11-35.
388 Kochenov (2008), p. 112.
389 Ibid., p. 113.
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Examining the legal and strategic framework as well as the annual 
reports, it is evident that the Commission barely touches upon the separa-
tion of powers and the interrelation of the three branches of government. 
None of the Agreements, financial instruments, strategies or reports 
confront the issue, let alone provide a definition. To give an example, the 
2012-2013 Enlargement Strategy, which is the Commission’s main strategy 
document in terms of ‘putting the rule of law at the centre of enlargement 
policy’, appears to tackle the separation of powers by addressing the three 
branches of government. According to the Strategy, the applicant states 
‘have to establish and promote from an early stage the proper functioning 
of the core institutions necessary for democratic governance and the rule 
of law, from the national parliament through government and the judicial 
system….’390 However, no actual explanation of the separation of powers is 
provided, i.e. an answer to the question what is meant by the ‘proper func-
tioning’ of the institutions, what their scope of competences ideally should 
be, or how their interactions should be shaped and defined.
It is submitted that the Copenhagen documents do not provide clarity 
on this issue either. The Commission’s Opinions on the application for mem-
bership do not go beyond a pithy statement in line with the formulation 
of the Copenhagen political criteria. For example in the case of one of the 
Baltic States, the Commission’s avis states that ‘Latvia’s political institutions 
function properly and in conditions of stability.’391 Similarly, in the case of 
Croatia, focussing on the functioning of Parliament, the Opinion offers that 
the institutions ‘functions satisfactorily, its powers are respected….’392 The 
annual reports related to the countries in central and Eastern Europe merely 
supply their assessment of progress on the basis of the aforementioned 
sub-division: the parliament and the legislative process, the executive and 
public administration reform, and the functioning of the judicial system and 
processes.393 Their interrelation is not taken into account.
While the annual reporting rounds on the countries in central and East-
ern Europe revealed almost nothing on the Commission’s interpretation 
of the doctrine of the separation of powers,394 the reports on the Western 
Balkans are more forthcoming, if only in relation to the problem of undue 
political interference. Although the Commission does not set out any prefer-
ences for the organisation of the separation of powers of the various institu-
tions, it heavily criticises the instances of political interference in the other 
branches. For example, in the 2007 Report on Croatia, such involvement in 
the public administration is condemned: ‘The civil service continues to be 
390 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, 
COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 10 October 2012, p. 4.
391 Commission Opinion on Latvia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, 
COM(1997) 2005 fi nal, 15 July 1997.
392 Commission Opinion on Croatia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, 
COM(2004) 257 fi nal, 20 April 2004, p. 13.
393 See for example 2002 Slovenia Regular Report, pp. 19-23.
394 For one of the few examples, see the 2002 Romania Regular Report, p. 25.
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politicised. Policy implementation often remains in the hands of political 
advisors. Undue political influence, even in the recruitment of technical 
staff continues.’395 Analysis of the reports shows that political interference 
in the other branches of government is a particularly endemic problem 
in most of the countries in the Western Balkans. The 2016 Report on the 
situation in Kosovo serves as just one illustration: ‘The recent allegations 
of political interference in recruitment to and decision-making processes 
in public bodies, based on leaked telephone intercepts, raise concern and 
should be fully investigated.’396
Two closely related arguments can be made to mitigate the Commis-
sion’s lack of specificity in relation to the separation of powers. First, the 
nature of the doctrine does not lend itself to an easy breakdown into ele-
ments. As it was argued in chapter 1, all three national rule of law traditions 
require some form of a separation of powers in order to ensure that the 
government is bound by the law alone. It was furthermore shown that there 
are many differences in the ways in which the division of tasks between the 
judicial, legislative, and executive branches can be organised, allowing for 
institutional leeway in the EU Member States, and thus, one would expect, 
also in the applicant states. As it was argued in chapter 2,397 even though 
it is a collective ‘desideratum’,398 there is no commonly agreed-on institu-
tional design.399 Accordingly, it is doubtful whether ‘the doctrine is specific 
enough to be a useful constitutional standard.’400 In a way, by addressing 
the separation of powers only marginally and by concentrating on the 
functioning of the three branches in their own right, i.e. separately, the Com-
mission seems to allow for the separation of powers to develop over time 
in each of the applicant states, while at the same time providing guidance 
by criticising the instances in which it is clear that one of the governmental 
branches has abused its powers. While this seems far from ideal, addressing 
the legislature, executive, and judiciary separately might be the only way 
in which the Commission has found it possible to formulate quantifiable 
benchmarks; which leads to the second point.
Secondly, the methodology of enlargement can hardly be said to 
be suited to the promotion and/or consolidation of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers. In the light of the domestic room for manoeuvre, it 
should be pointed out that, particularly for such a malleable concept as the 
separation of powers, there is an inherent paradox embedded in the EU’s 
395 2007 Croatia Progress Report, p. 8.
396 2016 Kosovo Report, p. 8. Also see 2016 Serbia Report, p. 11.
397 See chapter 2, section 4.
398 Robert S. Summers ‘Legal Institutions in Professor H.L.A. Hart’s Concept of Law’ 75 
Notre Dame Law Review (2000), pp. 1807-1828 at 1814.
399 Martin Krygier ‘Rule of Law’ in N.J. Smelser & P.B. Baltes (eds) International Encyclopedia 
of the Social and Behavioral Sciences New York: Elsevier (2001), pp. 13404-13408 at 13404.
400 William B. Gwyn The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine from 
Its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
(1965), p. 128.
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enlargement policy based on the methodology of conditionality. Progression 
towards accession, and the accompanying financial assistance,401 is based 
on headway made towards achievement of the objectives set out, amongst 
others, in the Accession Partnerships, which, according to Article 2(2) of 
the IPA II Regulation, ‘shall be monitored and assessed on the basis of pre-
defined, clear, transparent and, where appropriate, country-specific and 
measurable indicators.’402 This methodology plainly requires at the very 
least the setting of minimum benchmarks. However, while the ideal of the 
separation of powers could be formulated as a rule of law related objective, 
common benchmarks that apply to all applicant states in order to measure 
progress on how to achieve this are very difficult to set. Furthermore, it was 
argued in section 3.1 on the missing rule of law element of legality, that 
enlargement’s methodology of quantitative progress measurements has 
undermined a number of the requirements of legality itself. Here, it is sub-
mitted that the EU’s enlargement methodology has forced the Commission 
to concentrate only on those issues of the rule of law for which benchmarks 
could be formulated.403 Clearly, in relation to the general doctrine of the 
separation of powers, benchmarks or minimum requirements have not been 
articulated. The reports address the institutions related to the three branches 
but fail to also include standards in relation to the question of how the EU 
sees these branches should interconnect.
In sum, the above analysis has demonstrated that in its enlargement 
policy, the EU assesses the separation of powers only marginally. Judging 
from the analysis of the Reports, it does not see the doctrine per se as an 
element of the rule of law.
3.3.3 The emphasis on the element of judicial independence and the later addition 
of judicial accountability
As demonstrated above, the doctrine of the separation of powers is largely 
absent from the enlargement framework. At this point, it should, however, 
be recalled that it was argued in chapter 2 on the common features of the 
rule of law in legal theory, that, notwithstanding their acknowledgement of 
the importance of the separation of powers for the proper functioning of the 
rule of law, legal scholars have concentrated almost exclusively on what the 
doctrine prescribes for the functioning of the legal institutions, namely the 
particular issue of judicial independence. It seems that the Commission has 
done the same.
401 Article 4 Regulation (EU) No 231/2014.
402 Article 2(2) Regulation (EU) No 231/2014.
403 See for example the 2010 Enlargement Strategy, in which it is stated that ‘[t]he use of 
benchmarks in the accession negotiations serves as an important catalyst for reforms and 
gives a clear message that rule of law issues must be addressed seriously before acces-
sion. Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-
2011, COM(2010) 660, 9 November 2010, p. 7.
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Since the Commission’s understanding of the rule of law is informed 
by the institutional angle, and, more particularly, the perspective of judicial 
reform,404 this is hardly surprising. Judicial independence is one of the 
few specific rule of law elements mentioned in the legal framework405 and 
can be found as an objective throughout all rounds of the Accession and 
European Partnerships.406 Its relevance is highlighted across all years, albeit 
in fairly generic terms, in the Enlargement Strategies,407 and the annual 
reports allocate a significant amount of space to the assessment of progress 
in this area.
As rightly noted by Scott, only if the judiciary is independent from the 
other branches of government, ‘can we say that we live in a society where 
the rule of law is able to flourish.’408 Indeed, for any society to be based on 
the rule of law, there must be an institution charged with the responsibility 
of ensuring that it is the law that rules.409 As seen in chapter 1, Dicey argued 
that it is the role of the courts to keep the state, and its citizens, from arbi-
trary government, and to ensure equality by law.410 The notion of judicial 
independence is widely accepted and Article 6 ECHR enshrines the right to 
a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.411 
In the Sunday Times case, the ECtHR described the relationship between this 
right and the rule of law, by stating that Article 6 ‘reflects the fundamental 
principle of the rule of law.’412
404 See section 3.3.1.
405 As was already analysed above, the Europe Agreements provide no substantive input 
for the EU’s defi nition of the rule of law. The Stabilisation and Association Agreements, 
however, in their institutional approach on the rule of law, zoom in on judicial indepen-
dence. See for example Article 74 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. See also Article 2(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 
231/2014.
406 See for example the 1999 Accession Partnership Bulgaria; 2002 Accession Partnership Slo-
vakia; 2003 Accession Partnership Romania; 2008 European Partnership Serbia including 
Kosovo.
407 See for example the 2006 Strategy, in which it is stated that the Commission ‘is promoting 
greater awareness of how best to ensure the independence, impartiality and effectiveness 
of the judiciary and to prevent corruption.’ Commission Communication on Enlarge-
ment Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, COM(2006) 649, 8 November 2006, p. 5.
408 Richard J. Scott ‘Accountability and Independence’ 45 University of New Brunswick Law 
Journal (1996), pp.27-36 at 27. Further, see Simon Shetreet & Jules Deschênes (eds) Judicial 
Independence – the Contemporary Debate Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff (1985), p. xv; John 
Reitz ‘Export of the Rule of Law’ 13 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems (2003), pp. 
429-486 at 437.
409 Antonio Lamer ‘The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence: Protecting Core Values in 
Times of Change’ 45 University of New Brunswick Law Journal (1996), pp. 3-18 at 6.
410 Albert Venn Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution London: Mac-
Millan Press (1959).
411 See for example ECtHR Lauko v. Slovakia, Appl. No. 4/1998/907/1119, para. 63.
412 ECtHR Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 6538/74, para. 55. See also ECtHR Stan 
Greek refi neries v. Greece, Appl. No. 13427/87, para.  46; ECtHR Salbiaku v. France, Appl. 
No. 10519/83, para. 28.
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Within the EU’s institution-centric approach, the promotion of judicial 
independence was, and is, one of the main issues addressed by the Com-
mission in the pre-accession process.413 The 2015 Enlargement Strategy 
formulates the consolidation of the rule of law particularly in terms of 
‘improving the functioning and independence of judiciary….’414 Consider-
ing the cultural and historical context of the applicant countries, both for 
the countries in central and Eastern Europe415 and the Western Balkans,416 
strong institutional guarantees of judicial independence are required. How-
ever, even though various legal instruments acknowledge the importance 
of judicial independence,417 it was already pointed out in the previous 
case-study418 that there is an abundance of legal and political documents,419 
including those by the UN Human Rights Committee,420 the International 
Bar Association (IBA),421 the International Commission of Jurists,422 and 
413 It can be found as an objective in a great number of Accession and European Partner-
ships, see for example 2003 Accession Partnership Bulgaria; 2003 Accession Partnership 
Turkey; 2002 Accession Partnership Estonia. Also see the 2008 European Partnership Bos-
nia and Herzegovina; 2008 European Partnership with Albania.
414 Commission Communication on EU Enlargement Strategy, COM(2015) 611, 10 Novem-
ber 2015, p. 5.
415 See the Report of the Open Society Institute on Judicial Capacity, in which it is stated that 
‘[i]n the candidate States in particular, the legacy of the judiciary’s subordination and 
dependence and, more broadly, the lasting cultural effects of political dictatorship, may 
require institutional separation and institutional guarantees of judicial independence 
that are more far-reaching then in countries with an entrenched culture of judges’ inde-
pendence or a tradition of decision-making based on consensus and negotiation.’ Open 
Society Institute (2002) Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity, p. 15, avail-
able at:  https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/fi les/1judicialcapacity
full_20030101_0.pdf.
416 See the analysis of the legacies of the past as obstacles to EU rule of law promotion in 
Kmezić (2017), pp. 39-47.
417 See for example Article 14 ICCPR. Further, see the Council of Europe, European Char-
ter on the Statute for Judges, DOC(98) 23, July 1998, available at: https://rm.coe.
int/16807473ef; Council of Europe Recommendation No. (94) 12, on the Independence, 
Effi ciency and Role of Judges, 13 October 1994.
418 See section 3.3.3.
419 See the overview compiled by the International Commission of Jurists, available at: 
https://www.icj.org/themes/centre-for-the-independence-of-judges-and-lawyers/
international-standards/.
420 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 13: Article 14 (Admin-
istration of Justice) Equality before the Court and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing 
by an Independent Court Established by Law, 13 April 1984, para. 3, available at: http://
www.refworld.org/docid/453883f90.html.
421 International Bar Association, Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, adopted 
in 1982, available at: https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/IBA_Resolu-
tions_Minimum_Standards_of_Judicial_Independence_1982.pdf.
422 International Commission of Jurists, Policy Framework for Preventing and Eliminating 




the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ).423 These docu-
ments approach judicial independence from various angles and present 
rather diverse views of the notions substance, making it difficult to rely on 
one standard over another.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Council of Europe has produced a 
number of key (non-binding) documents on the topic,424 which, together 
with the ECtHR’s case law on Article 6 ECHR, provides an insight to its 
own understanding of judicial independence, it is submitted that neither 
the EU nor the Council of Europe has a clearly defined, precise, clear-cut 
standard on judicial independence which is applied in the enlargement 
process. Indeed, as Smilov has argued, among the Member States of both 
there is a plurality of models of judicial independence, with ‘no prospect of 
convergence among them on the key issues.’425
The Court of Justice of the European Union itself has provided a generic 
view of judicial independence in its case-law when it stated that ‘[i]t should 
be remembered that the expression ‘court or tribunal’ is a concept of Com-
munity law, which, by its very nature, can only mean an authority acting 
as a third party in relation to the authority which adopted the decision 
forming the subject-matter of the proceedings.’426 Later case-law has added, 
inter alia, that a tribunal or court should give judgement without receiving 
any instructions, giving it a status aparte from the authorities that took the 
decision under appeal.427 Or, in the words of the Court in the recent case 
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,428
423 European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, Report on Independence and Account-
ability of the Judiciary 2013-2014, available at: https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/
pdf/workinggroups/independence/encj_report_independence_accountability_2014_
disclaimer.pdf.
424 See for example Council of Europe, European Charter on the Statute for Judges, DOC(98) 
23, July 1998, available at: https://rm.coe.int/16807473ef; Council of Europe Recommen-
dation No. (94) 12 of 13 October 1994 on the Independence, Effi ciency and Role of Judges. 
Also see the important work of two of its other bodies, the Venice Commission (European 
Commission for Democracy through Law) and the Commission for the Effi ciency of Jus-
tice (CEPEJ).
425 Daniel Smilov ‘EU Enlargement and the Constitutional Principle of Judicial Indepen-
dence’ in Wojchiech Sadurski, Adam Czarnota & Martin Krygier Spreading Democracy and 
the Rule of Law? Dordrecht: Springer (2006), pp. 313-334 at 314. For a comparative study 
on the institutionalisation of judicial independence see Carlo Guarnieri & Patrizia Ped-
erzoli The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2002).
426 Case C-24/96 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277, para. 15. See further, Case C-393/92 Almelo v 
Energiemaatschappij IJsselmij [1994] ECR I-1277 para. 21; Case 109/88 Handels-og Kontor-
funktionærernes Forbund i Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening [1989] ECR 3199, paras. 
7-8; Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò [1987] ECR 2545, para. 7; Case 338/85 Fratelli Pardini [1988] 
ECR 2041, para. 9.
427 Case C-407/98 Abrahamsson [2000] ECR I-5539, paras. 36-37.
428 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, EU:C:2018:117, 
27 February 2018, para. 44.
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The concept of independence presupposes, in particular, that the body 
concerned exercises its judicial functions wholly autonomously, without being 
subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and 
without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, and that it 
is just protected against external interventions or pressures liable to impair the 
independent judgment of its members and to influence their decisions.
It must be pointed out that the CJEU’s rudimentary view of judicial 
independence has been informed by the legal framework in which it 
pronounced on the question, that of the preliminary reference procedure 
(Article 267 TFEU). This was reiterated in the abovementioned case, in 
which the importance of judicial independence and its relationship to the 
rule of law was explicitly placed in the context of the role of Member State 
courts in ensuring effective judicial review for individual parties in fields 
covered by EU law.429 Furthermore, the independence of national courts 
and tribunals is, according to the Court, particularly ‘essential to the proper 
working of the judicial cooperation system embodied by the preliminary 
ruling mechanism…’, in that ‘that mechanism may be activated only by 
a body responsible for applying EU law which satisfies, inter alia, that 
criterion of independence.’430 However, while this limited formulation 
provides enough guidance to assess whether referring courts and tribunals 
are entitled to ask a preliminary reference, it clearly falls short of providing 
a comprehensive standard on the issue. Turning to Strasbourg’s human 
rights protection system, judging from the line of case law on the topic, 
including the case of Holm v Sweden431 which combined both personal 
and institutional guarantees, it can be said that judicial independence is 
interpreted broadly, covering a variety of difference components.432 As it 
has been analysed in the literature,433 the latter has as a consequence that 
429 Ibid., paras. 34, 42.
430 Ibid., para. 43.
431 The European Commission on Human Rights ruled that ‘[i]n determining whether a 
body can be considered to be an independent tribunal, regards must be had to the man-
ner of appointment of its members and the duration of their term of offi ce, the existence 
of regulations governing their removal or guarantees for their irremovability, law pro-
hibiting their being given instructions by the executive in their adjudicatory role, the 
existence of legal guarantees against outside pressures, the question whether the body 
presents an appearance of independence and the attendance of members of the judiciary 
in the proceedings.’ European Commission on Human Rights Holm v. Sweden Applica-
tion Nos. 6878/75 and 7238/75, para. 55.
432 See for example the Langborger case in which the Commission held that ‘[i]n order to 
establish whether a body can be considered ‘independent’ regard must be had, inter alia, 
to the manner of appointment of its members and their term of offi ce, to the existence of 
guarantees against outside pressures and to the question whether the body presents an 
appearance of independence.’ ECtHR, Langborger v. Sweden, Appl. No. 11179/84, para. 
32. See further ECtHR, Procola and others v. Luxembourg, Appl. No. 14570/89, para. 43; 
ECtHR, Bryan v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 19178/91, para. 37; ECtHR, Steel and Morris v. 
United Kingdom, Appl. No. 68416/01, para. 73.
433 Martin Kuijer The Blindfold of Lady Justice: Judicial Independence and Impartiality in Light of 
the Requirements of Article 6 ECHR Leiden: E.M.C. Meijers Instituut (2004), p. 213.
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the Strasbourg case-law is context-based and flexible, without, however, 
providing a comprehensive clear-cut standard.
It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to go into a detailed, lengthy, 
and critical analysis of the Commission’s assessment of judicial indepen-
dence throughout the reports in order to point out all the divergences. Such 
analysis of the effectiveness and consistency of the Commission’s evalua-
tions has already been undertaken in the existing literature, both in rela-
tion to the countries in central and Eastern Europe,434 and to the Western 
Balkans.435 Nonetheless, on the conceptualisation of this particular element 
in enlargement across the documents regarding all the applicant countries 
concerned, three points should be made in relation to judicial independence 
and the rule of law.
First, the Commission has organised its assessment of judicial indepen-
dence mainly along the lines of the prevailing approach436 of institutional 
and personal independence,437 or, in the words of the ENCJ’s report on 
Independence and Accountability, the independence of the judiciary as a 
whole and the independence of the individual judge.438 The 2001 Regular 
Report on Estonia serves a good example of the Commission’s assessment 
since it demonstrates both aspects of judicial independence.
All judges are appointed for life and the Constitution and legislation explicitly 
safeguard the independence of judges. However, there is a need to further rein-
force the institutional independence of the courts particularly in the context of 
the ongoing court reform. The close administration of the courts (with the excep-
tion of the Supreme Court) by the executive (Ministry of Justice), and the courts’ 
limited financial autonomy, threaten judicial independence.439
434 For an analysis of judicial independence in the reports of the fi fth round of enlarge-
ment in the light of conditionality and the questionable coherence of the Commission’s 
approach see Kochenov (2008), pp. 252-275; Smilov (2006), pp. 313-334.
435 For a normative and empirical analysis of judicial independence in the Western Balkans, 
see Kmezic (2017), pp. 65-84.
436 Shetreet has stated that ‘a modern conception of judicial independence cannot be con-
fi ned to the individual judge and to his substantive and personal independence, but 
must include collective independence of the judiciary as a whole.’ Shimon Shetreet ‘The 
Emerging Transnational Jurisprudence on Judicial Independence: The IBA Standards and 
Montreal Declaration’ in Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschênes (eds) Judicial Independence: 
The Contemporary Debate The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1985), pp. 393-402 at 393.
437 This division is rather rudimentary; there are diverging views on the placement of sub-
elements within this divide, such as the question whether the arrangements for selecting, 
appointing, evaluating, and disciplining of judges is part of either institutional indepen-
dence, or individual independence. However, considering the differences in the various 
instruments, for present purposes it is not necessary to go into a more detailed outline.
438 European Network of Council’s for the Judiciary ‘Independence and Accountability 
of the Judiciary – ENCJ Report 2013-2014’ adopted in Rome, 13 July 2014, available at: 
https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/workinggroups/independence/encj_
report_independence_accountability_adopted_version_sept_2014.pdf.
439 2001 Estonia Regular Report, p. 18.
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In relation to institutional independence, the Commission’s focus included 
(in relation to the CEECs), and includes (regarding the SEECs), the follow-
ing sub-elements: the existence of a legal framework that guarantees and 
regulates judicial independence; the governance structure in terms of self-
regulation; and the budgetary arrangements both in terms of quantity and 
level of independence in allocation. Whereas the reports on the countries 
in central and Eastern Europe demonstrate that the first sub-element of 
Constitutional guarantees is little more than a legislative check, 440 in rela-
tion to the countries in the Western Balkans the assessment takes the actual 
application of the rules in practice into account. Indeed, as the Montenegro 
Screening Report of Chapter 23 shows, the Commission, after evaluating 
the relevant Constitutional provisions, warns that ‘existing rules present a 
number of shortcoming and create risks for undue political influence.’441 
This shows that in the area of judicial independence the Commission 
increasingly found ways to go past legislative window-dressing, in order to 
address the actual application of rules.
On the second sub-element of the governance structure, the assessment 
focuses mainly on the underlying legal framework allowing judicial self-
government, the composition of the self-governing body, i.e. the Judicial/
Prosecutorial Council, and the relations with the Minister/Ministry of 
Justice. According to the 2002 authoritative report by the Open Society 
Institute on judicial capacity in relation to the countries in central and 
Eastern Europe, self-governance has become one of the focal points of judi-
cial reform, since an autonomous judiciary ‘will better be able to respond 
with flexibility to its perceived needs than will one that is directed by an 
external authority.’442 The underlying idea is that judges who feel that they 
are responsible for or can influence the administration of their own affairs 
have more incentive for acting independently and protecting their indepen-
dence.443 However, the problem of insufficient institutional independence 
was, and still is,444 acute in the applicant states and the Commission has 
actively promoted a greater degree of independence in the organisation of 
the judicial sector’s self-governance, criticising too much involvement of the 
440 The early reports included simply the check whether the Constitution provides for both 
institutional and personal independence of judges, see for example 2001 Poland Regular 
Report, p. 20; 2001 Hungary Regular Report, p. 16.
441 Montenegro Outcome of screening for Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights, 
Doc. 17785/12, 14 December 2012, p. 18.
442 Open Society Institute Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity (2002), p. 41, 
available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/fi les/1judicialcap
acityfull_20030101_0.pdf.
443 Open Society Institute Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Independence (2001), 
p. 23, available at:  https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/fi les/judi-
cialind_20011010.pdf.
444 Commission Communication on 2016 Communication on Enlargement Policy, 
COM(2016) 715 fi nal, 9 November 2016, p. 3.
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executive and legislature,445 the failure to adopt the necessary legislation,446 
and the composition of the Judicial Councils.447
In relation to the budgetary arrangements, while the ultimate power 
may lay with the legislature, it is vital that the judiciary itself participates 
in the drafting and application of its own budget in order to ensure that 
the judges’ legitimate interests are protected from indirect economic pres-
sure.448 This is all the more so in the case of the applicant countries where 
the courts came from a situation of underfunding and executive opposition 
to budget increases. Accordingly, the Commission has criticised decreases 
in the judiciary budget in terms of amount/percentage GDP,449 but also in 
terms of executive intervention in the budget adoption procedure.450 From 
the phrasing of the reports, it is apparent that the Commission must have 
had some general judiciary budgetary standards in mind – ‘[t]he number of 
judges and prosecutors in Montenegro is above the EU average in relation 
to the size of the population, as is the percentage of the budget spent on 
staff.’451 However, the reports do not indicate what these percentages are 
and how salary expenses relate to the overall expense of judicial build-up 
and reform. Thus, even though budgetary management is clearly included 
as a sub-element of institutional judicial independence, the Commission has 
refrained from offering a minimum standard.
On the issue of personal independence, the comments here can be 
brief. The Commission looked at the same elements across all the years, 
both in relation to the CEECs and SEECs. These include appointment and 
irremovability,452 transfer,453 probation,454 selection proceedings,455 and 
remuneration.456 It is interesting to see, however, that only in some of the 
later reports concern is expressed over the need to ensure protection mecha-
nisms of both external (external pressure on individual judges in relation 
to their individual decision-making) and internal (judicial peer pressure) 
independence of judges, a subdivision of personal judicial independence 
445 See for example 2001 Estonia Regular Report, p. 18; 2001 Latvia Regular Report, p. 19; 
2002 Latvia Regular Report, p. 21; 2012 Serbia Progress Report, p. 10.
446 See for example 1998 Bulgaria Regular Report, p. 8; 2001 Slovakia Regular Report, p. 17; 
2008 Montenegro Progress Report, p.11.
447 See for example 2001 Romania Regular Report, p. 20; 2008 Montenegro Progress Report, 
p.11; 2012 FYROM Progress Report, p. 10.
448 Open Society Institute Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity (2002), p. 46.
449 See for example 2001 Hungary Regular Report, p. 17; 2002 Hungary Regular Report, 
p. 25; 2016 Montenegro Report, p. 14.
450 See for example 2002 Bulgaria Regular Report, p. 24; 2016 Serbia Report, p. 13.
451 2016 Montenegro Report, p. 14.
452 See for example 2001 Hungary Regular Report, p. 16; 2001 Bulgaria Regular Report, p. 18; 
2008 Montenegro Progress Report, p. 11.
453 See for example 2016 Turkey Report, p. 64.
454 See for example 2008 Croatia Progress Report, p. 51; 2010 Turkey Progress Report, 14; 
2010 Iceland Progress Report, p. 7.
455 See for example 2006 Croatia Progress Report, p. 49; 2016 Serbia Report, p. 55.
456 See for example 2001 Lithuania Regular Report, p. 18.
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as proposed in the ENCJ Report on the Independence and Accountabil-
ity of the Judiciary.457 Thus, for example in FYROM’s 2016 Report, the 
Commission condemns the situation that although high ranking judicial 
officials have pointed publicly to the need to respect the independence 
of the judiciary, ‘there is no framework in place to protect judges against 
external pressures.’458 Furthermore, as an illustration of internal personal 
independence, Montenegro’s 2015 report highlights the Commission’s 
awareness of the fact that such independence may be undermined by the 
Supreme Court’s possibility to adopt legal positions of principle and by the 
supervisory powers of higher courts vis-à-vis lower courts.459
The second point that should be made in relation to judicial indepen-
dence is the fact that it is increasingly mentioned in combination with 
judicial accountability. While the latter is hardly a matter of concern in the 
reports on the fifth enlargement round, it is clearly on the agenda in the 
reports on the Western Balkans, as, for example, the 2014-2015 Enlargement 
Strategy demonstrates.460
[N]umerous challenges remain. Independence of state judicial councils needs to 
the ensured, more sound procedures for the appointment of judges and pros-
ecutors put in place and judicial independence needs to be safeguarded whilst 
ensuring accountability.
The addition of judicial accountability comes in recognition of the fact that 
judicial independence and judicial accountability are complementary con-
cepts.461 After all, as was already pointed out in the previous case study, the 
judiciary has been granted a limited measure of autonomy for a particular 
common purpose, and an independent judiciary must therefore be account-
able for its decisions and operations.462
457 European Network of Council’s for the Judiciary ‘Independence and Accountability of 
the Judiciary – ENCJ Report 2013-2014’ adopted in Rome, 13 July 2014, pp. 11-12.
458 2016 FYROM Report, p. 13.
459 2015 Montenegro Report, p. 13.
460 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-2015, 
COM(2014) 700 fi nal, 8 October 2014, p. 11.
461 In the previous case study in the concomitant section, it was pointed out that, although 
they are intertwined, judicial independence and judicial accountability are two distinct 
concepts, describing competing visions of the relationship of the judiciary/judges to the 
rest of society. It was highlighted that judicial independence covers both institutional and 
decisional independence, keeping the judiciary separate from other branches of govern-
ment and judicial decision-making free from undue infl uence. Judicial accountability 
describes the ideal that the judiciary, much like the legislature and the executive, should 
be held accountable for their work. Also see Open Society Institute Monitoring the EU 
Accession Process: Judicial Independence (2001), pp. 18-19; Kmezić (2017), p. 84.
462 See section 3.3.3. Further, see Open Society Institute Monitoring the EU Accession Process: 
Judicial Capacity (2002), p. 16.
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The Commission has not indicated what it means by judicial account-
ability, however, most of the reports concentrate on the existence and 
functioning of a disciplinary system for judges and prosecutors463 and 
the issue of immunities.464 While the formulation of the assessment occa-
sionally indicates that stronger procedures need to be put into place – ‘[t]
he current system of disciplinary responsibility for judge and prosecutors 
result mostly in mild disciplinary sanctions and therefore fails to produce 
a deterrent effect’465 – the Commission does not outline its own particular 
standards, often merely providing a quantitative overview of the number of 
cases against judges and prosecutors in a reporting year.466 Moreover, the 
Commission pays very little attention to issues of transparency, for example 
by way of freely accessible data that could enhance accountability,467 
thereby demonstrating that it has a one-dimensional approach that focuses 
on quantitative specifics, rather than tackling the question of whether the 
judiciary is also perceived to be accountable. In order for the rule of law to 
exist, citizens’ faith in the judicial system and its workings is of the utmost 
importance;468 only concentrating on the functioning of an institution will 
not necessarily generate such confidence as a corollary.
Thirdly, in relation to judicial independence, the Commission has 
been heavily criticised for relying on ‘European standards’ in this area,469 
without clarifying what this concept entails.470 Taking this argument one 
step further, Smilov has argued that the Commission has wilfully devel-
oped a ‘myth of a common European theory of judicial independence’471 
since the advancement of such a theory served the EU’s own interests for 
463 See for example 2012 Serbia Progress Report, p. 10; 2014 Kosovo Progress Report, p. 13.
464 2005 Croatia Progress Report, p. 84; 2012 Montenegro Progress Report, p. 45.
465 Serbia Outcome of screening for Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights, Doc. 
12003/14, 16 July 2014, p. 23. See for a similar formulation on judicial immunity (‘the 
scope of application of these provisions and the procedures for removing functional 
immunity are not fully clear and need to be reviewed to ensure full accountability of 
judges and prosecutors under criminal law’) Montenegro’s Screening Report, Mon-
tenegro Outcome of screening for Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights, Doc. 
17785/12, 14 December 2012, p. 20.
466 See for example 2012 FYROM Progress Report, p. 50; 2014 Montenegro Progress Report, 
p. 37; 2015 FYROM Report, p. 52.
467 One of the few exceptions is the 2016 Albania Report, p. 58.
468 As Krygier has noted, ‘successful attainment of the rule of law is a social outcome, not 
a merely legal one’, Martin Krygier ‘The Rule of Law: Legality, Teleology, Sociology’ in 
Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker Relocating the Rule of Law Oxford: Hart Publishing 
(2008), pp. 51-79 at 64.
469 See for example 2011 Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report, p. 13; 2014 FYROM Prog-
ress Report, p. 40.
470 Kochenov (2008), pp. 256-257; Denis Preshova, Ivan Damjanovski & Zoran Nechev ‘The 
Effectiveness of the ‘European Model’ of Judicial Independence in the Western Balkans: 
Judicial Councils as a Solution or a New Cause of Concern for Judicial Reforms’ Cleer 
Paper No.1 (2017).
471 Smilov (2006) p. 314.
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bureaucratic, normative, and pragmatic reasons. After all, the whole process 
of measuring progress on the basis of standards and other benchmarks is 
dependent on the existence of these; the myth is instrumental in the self-
creation of the EU as a polity based on common principles and standards; 
and during negotiations the existence of a ‘common European standard’ 
forms an almost unbeatable argument for reform.472
The critique is right in stating that the Commission has repeatedly failed 
to formulate a ‘European standard’ in the area of judicial independence. 
However, the argument put forward here is more nuanced. What the litera-
ture fails to take into account in its considerations is the fact that the rule of 
law has an inherent flexibility in its institutional design, which undercuts 
the idea of a common European standard. As it was argued in chapters 1 
and 2, the rule of law does not come with an institutional blueprint and 
allows for many different ways through which it can be guaranteed.473 
Accordingly, the critique is misguided in attempting to push the Commis-
sion to formulate common standards regarding this particular rule of law 
element, i.e. to put flesh on the bones of the ‘European standards’ in the 
area of judicial reform. Rather, it is argued here that it would be more in line 
with the rule of law to acknowledge the fact that there are very few gener-
ally applicable standards in this area. Indeed, as already outlined above, 
the Commission would have been hard pressed to provide an overview of 
common sub-elements, since such a consistent set of common standards 
concerning judicial independence does not exist, neither in the various 
instruments and documents mentioned, nor in the EU Member States. To 
be sure, the Report on Judicial Capacity of the Open Society Institute states 
that judicial reform will ‘inevitably always have a highly particular, national 
character, given the strongly domestic focus and divergent traditions of dif-
ferent States’ legal systems. Indeed, … there will always be broad scope for 
choice in how States wish to organise their judiciaries – even to the point 
472 Ibid., pp. 326-330.
473 On the different models of judicial independence generally, see Shimon Shetreet ‘Judicial 
Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and Contemporary Challenges’ in Shimon 
Shetreet & Jules Deschênes Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff (1985), pp. 590- 681 at 644; Sergio Bartole ‘Alternative Models of Judicial 
Independence: Organizing Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe’ 7 East European Con-
stitutional Review (1998), pp. 62-69 at 62.
 On the issue of self-governance see the 2002 Open Society Report on Judicial Capacity 
which highlights at least three models of self-governing ranging from total independence 
to increasingly hybrid forms of executive involvement in the CEECs: the independent 
model (autonomous governance by the judiciary); the power-sharing model (the gov-
ernance and administration of the judiciary are to a certain degree shared between an 
autonomous judicial council and another executive body); the executive-centred model 
(the judiciary is not a separate a entity, but rather an agency subordinated to the Ministry 
of Justice). Open Society Institute Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity 
(2002), pp. 42-46. Also see the Open Society Institute’s report on Monitoring the EU Acces-
sion Process: Judicial Independence (2001).
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that what may be seen as essential to a just system in one may be thought 
antithetical to justice in another.’474 This is particularly the case for such a 
pliable concept as judicial independence. Moreover, the legacy of commu-
nism and the unsettled political transition may require solutions that would 
be unacceptable in the Member States475 – stretching the boundaries of the 
element of judicial independence even further.
This does not mean that the EU should not put forward a minimum 
standard of judicial independence – the creation of a union of shared val-
ues necessitates the articulation of the minimum standards of the various 
rule of law elements which membership requires – candidate states can-
not reasonably be expected to align their judiciaries to standards that are 
themselves not defined. However, it does imply that the Commission’s 
uneven approach towards reforms in the area of judicial independence 
has given the applicant states the opportunity to grapple to some extent 
with their own ideas of protecting the independence of the judiciary and 
its judges – bringing the pre-accession practice, however unintentionally, 
to some extent in line with the rule of law. The point is that by focussing 
on the Commission’s approach in the light of its puzzling emphasis on 
non-existent ‘European standards’, the critique displays in its analysis an 
unjustified tendency to precarious generalization476 – instead of allowing 
for national specificity there is a trend to generalise to all countries against 
the background of a predisposition to find proof of Europeanisation as a 
success story.477 By doing so, it has bypassed the actual room for manoeuvre 
the Commission has afforded the individual applicant states. Indeed, the 
actual practice debunks the Commission’s own narrative of ‘European stan-
dards’ while, at the same time, allowing room for more organic approaches 
by the candidate states to the development of this element – in line with the 
flexibility inherent in the concept of the rule of law. The advantage of this 
perspective change is that it shifts the focus in the area of judicial reform 
474 Open Society Institute Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity (2002), p. 21.
475 Open Society Institute Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Independence (2001), 
p. 28.
476 Cf. Georgi Dimitrov ‘The Europeanization of the Countries in South-East Europe through 
Enhancement of the Rule of Law: A Mission in Progress’ 39 Southeastern Europe (2015), pp. 
277-293 at 288; Michael Hein ‘Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of 
Europe (Oxford 2012: Oxford University Press). A Comment’ 39 Southeastern Europe (2015) 
pp. 421-430.
477 See, for example, Antoaneta Dimitrova ‘The New Member States of the EU in the After-
math of Enlargement: Do New European Rules Remain Empty Shells?’ 17 Journal of 
European Public Policy (2010), pp. 137-148; Antoaneta Dimitrova (ed) Driven to Change: 
The European Union’s Enlargement Viewed from the East Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press (2004); Heather Grabbe The EU’s Transformative Power. Europeanization through 
Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2006); James 
Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse & Claire Gordon (eds) Europeanization and Regionalization in 
the EU’s Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. The Myth of Conditionality New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan (2005).
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from the exact delineation of standards applicable in the pre-accession 
process to all candidate states, to the question of what is necessary in order 
to consolidate judicial independence in the candidate states. This more 
nuanced understanding, allows for a better insight into the effectiveness of 
the consolidation of the rule of law in the acceding states.478
3.3.4 Conclusions
This section explored to what extent the legal framework and practice of the 
EU’s enlargement policy confirmed the institutional rule of law elements 
established in the previous chapters. It was demonstrated that following 
the formulation of the Copenhagen political criteria, the rule of law is per-
ceived in terms of reform of the rule of law institutions. Following this, it 
was asserted in relation to the doctrine of the separation of powers that the 
Commission, by addressing the three branches of government separately in 
the annual reports, has omitted setting out its thoughts on the doctrine per 
se. However, it was demonstrated that the reports show a particular focus 
on judicial independence, thereby confirming the findings of chapters 1 and 
2 on this topic. More particularly, it was asserted that the legal framework 
and the reports manifest a focus on judicial independence, making it one of 
the main institutional elements addressed in the pre-accession process.
3.4 Interim conclusions
This part of the chapter tested the analytical framework of the three catego-
ries of rule of law elements against the EU’s legal framework and practice 
in its enlargement policy. For each of the three categories, the question was 
examined whether, and if so to what extent, the elements established previ-
478 In the literature on the Western Balkans in particular, it has been highlighted that prog-
ress on the issue of the effective consolidation of judicial independence in the appli-
cant states has so far been quite problematic. In the light of the recent developments in 
Poland, Hungary, and Romania – the Member States have come under close scrutiny 
related to judicial independence and the rule of law. It is apparent that the strengthening 
of the rule of law, at least in the area of judicial independence, leaves a lot to be desired. 
However, further research into the effectiveness of the EU’s rule of law promotion efforts 
fall outside the ambit of this thesis. For an analysis of issues related to the EU’s promo-
tion of judicial independence in the Western Balkans, see for example Kmezić (2017), 
pp. 65-84; Denis Preshova, Ivan Damjanovski & Zoran Nechev ‘The Effectiveness of the 
‘European Model’ of Judicial Independence in the Western Balkans: Judicial Councils as 
a Solution or a New Cause of Concern for Judicial Reforms’ Cleer Paper No.1 (2017). On 
the Member State mentioned, see Commission Recommendation of 20 December 2017 
regarding the rule of law in Poland, complementary to Commission Recommendations 
(EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520, C(2017) 9050 fi nal, particularly sec-
tion 2; European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2015 on the situation in Hungary, 
2015/2935(RSP), pnt. F; Joint Statement of European Commission President Juncker and 
First Vice-President Timmermans on the latest developments in Romania, 24 January 
2018, STATEMENT/18/423.
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ously were reflected in practice. It was shown that the formal element of 
legality, which lies at the heart of the rule of law debate of legal scholars, 
does not appear in the legal and policy framework and is hardly considered 
by the Commission in its reporting. Instead, the examination demonstrated 
that, because of the chosen enlargement methodology, which quantifies 
progress in the legislative approximation process instead of also focussing 
on legislative quality, legality is actually undermined. More particularly, 
the findings in the reports attest to the fact that by stressing quantity over 
quality, problems have arisen in relation to various requirements of legality 
including stability, generality, and coherence. This was shown to be the case 
across all enlargement rounds and also in the current enlargement process 
regarding the Western Balkan countries.
Furthermore, it was asserted that four particular procedural elements 
have been fleshed out in the Commission’s reporting during the pre-
accession period, namely impartiality, judicial efficiency and quality, and 
access to justice. With regard to the first element, it was argued that in spite 
of impartiality’s increasing importance from one enlargement round to 
the other, the documents display a distinct lack of clarity of the notion in 
relation to the institutional element of judicial independence. On the issues 
of judicial efficiency and quality, it was demonstrated that they have been 
conceptualised mostly in terms of their underlying obstacles, including 
problems of enforcement, low clearance rates and backlogs, and excessive 
length of proceedings. In relation to the third element of judicial review, 
it was argued that the Commission views this rule of law element mostly 
through an institutional lens, interpreting it in terms of the organisation 
of courts and their capacity, instead of focussing on the ways these bod-
ies function and what are the necessary steps in order to strengthen this. 
In relation to the fourth element of access to justice, it was asserted that 
this element is mainly interpreted in terms of access to court and access 
to legal aid. Furthermore, it was shown that the evaluation of this element 
takes place under the headings of both the functioning of the judiciary and 
fundamental rights. The section concluded by arguing that even though the 
reports evidence the inclusion of access to justice as a rule of law element, 
the Commission’s lack of critique in situations when there has been very 
little progress in the yearly monitoring reports, gives the impression that 
this element is not at the core of the procedural elements in the understand-
ing of the rule of law in enlargement.
Lastly, it was argued that the EU perceives the rule of law in its acces-
sion policy mainly in terms of institutional reform, more particularly 
judicial reform. It was shown that this conclusion is supported by the both 
the legal and the policy framework. Moreover, it was demonstrated that 
judicial independence, as the main component of the separation of powers, 
has been acknowledged as a main element through which the rule of law 
is guaranteed, lending evidentiary force to the findings on this issue in the 
first two chapter of the thesis.
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4. General findings
In this section, the general findings on the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule 
of law in the pre-accession process will be discussed. As already explained 
in the previous case study, these are the findings in relation to the conceptu-
alisation of the rule of law in enlargement that transcend the individual cat-
egories of the analytical framework. More particularly, the general findings 
are concerned with the overall picture of the definition of the rule of law in 
this policy area. The first section of the general findings will outline the defi-
nition of the rule of law in this policy area, weighing the elements in each of 
the three categories, as well as analysing the relative weight of each of the 
categories individually. It will be shown that the conceptualisation of the 
rule of law in enlargement, while largely devoid of the formal element of 
legality, relies heavily on both procedural and institutional elements. More 
particularly, it will be demonstrated that the strong institutional focus of the 
policy has led to an emphasis on judicial reform, which, in turn, has also 
influenced the understanding of some of the procedural elements, such as, 
for example, judicial review. Furthermore, it will be asserted that, regarding 
the evolution of the conceptualisation of the rule of law across the enlarge-
ment rounds and the current pre-accession process, it is apparent from the 
examination conducted throughout this chapter that most of the elements 
appear in the accession rounds under review. However, for three of these, 
the procedural element of judicial impartiality, and the institutional elements 
of the separation of powers and judicial independence and accountability, 
the analysis will demonstrate a slight change of focus, or rather, a more 
nuanced understanding which has taken place during the pre-accession 
process in relation to the Western Balkans.
The chapter will continue by offering an explanation for the EU’s partic-
ular focus on judicial reform. It will be argued that in its conceptualisation 
of the rule of law in enlargement, the EU tends to interpret its strengthening 
efforts in this area in the applicant states mostly in the light of their role and 
functioning as future Member States. More particularly, it will be shown 
that the EU’s rule of law efforts centre around judicial reform because of the 
pivotal role of national courts in the EU legal order. Next to this, the section 
will turn to a last observation stemming from the analysis undertaken in 
part 3 of this chapter. From the examination of rule of law elements under-
taken in section 3 it is apparent that there is an overlap in the monitoring 
reports between the two sections dealing with the rule of law, i.e. the rule 
of law under the first of the Copenhagen criteria and the rule of law under 
Chapter 23. This last section will examine the question whether the rule 
of law as a value is interpreted differently from the rule of law as part of 
Chapter 23 of the acquis. For reasons outlined below, it will be demonstrated 
that a trend can be established in the reports towards increasing substantive 
overlap of rule of law elements and analysis thereof to the extent that it 
can be said that the part of Chapter 23 concerned with the functioning of 
the judiciary to a large extent codifies the political criterion of the rule of 
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law. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that the recent rounds of reporting 
confirm this trend.
4.1 The conceptualisation of the rule of law in enlargement: strong 
emphasis on judicial reform
The above examination has shown that the rule of law increasingly occupies 
a central place in the EU’s enlargement policy. Starting with its inclusion as 
one of the Copenhagen political criteria, demonstration of progress in this 
area has been steadily pushed to the forefront of the pre-accession process, 
from the renewed consensus on enlargement479 and the Commission’s ‘new 
approach’480 to the strategy of ‘fundamentals first’.481 Addressing reforms 
in the area of the rule of law ‘remains the most pressing issue’ and is ‘a key 
benchmark’482 for the enlargement countries. From the outset, the treatment 
of the rule of law has been done in a rather opaque manner, by evaluat-
ing the developments together with one of the other Copenhagen political 
criteria, either democracy or fundamental rights. However, having analysed 
the various Europe Agreements, Stabilisation and Associations Agreements, 
Accession and European Partnerships, Enlargement Strategies, Council 
Conclusions, and Parliamentary reports and resolutions, the yearly rounds 
of monitoring reports have provided the most insight into the EU’s concep-
tualisation of the rule of law. Below, the definition of the rule of law in this 
policy area will be addressed, and the relative weight of the elements within 
each of three categories (formal, procedural, and institutional), and these 
categories in relation to each other, will be assessed. In the various sections 
the interpretation of the various rule of law elements in the enlargement 
rounds (the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) and the current pre-
accession process (the Western Balkan countries) was highlighted. While 
not repeating the comparative analysis, this section, in so far as possible, 
will set out to provide an overview of those similarities and difference in 
order to paint the overall picture of the possible evolvement of the rule of 
law in enlargement.
The analysis of the formal rule of law elements in section 3.1, has made 
it immediately apparent that the all-important issue of the consolidation of 
legality is largely absent from the enlargement framework and monitoring 
reports, both in relation to the big bang enlargement of 2004 and in the pre-
accession process thereafter. It was shown that in the field of legal approxi-
mation, the adopted methodology has led to a quantitative evaluation of 
479 Commission Communication on 2005 enlargement strategy paper, COM(2005) 561 fi nal, 
9 November 2005.
480 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012’ 
COM(2011) 666 fi nal, 12 October 2011, p. 5.
481 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, 
COM(2013) 700 fi nal, 16 October 2013.
482 Commission Communication on 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 
COM(2018) 450 fi nal, 17 April 2018, p. 2.
Chapter 4 The EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in its enlargement practice 251
progress with regard to further alignment with the acquis. Moreover, it was 
posited that because of the particular nature of the acquis as a ready-made 
corpus of rules which the applicant states have to adopt without much 
negotiating space, there is only a small margin for local engagement with 
those rules. More particularly, it was asserted that this approach has had 
an impact on various sub-elements of legality, with examples across all 
enlargement rounds demonstrating the detrimental effect on such issues as 
legislative quality and stability.
Turning to the procedural category of the rule of law, the following 
four elements were examined: judicial impartiality, judicial efficiency and 
quality, judicial review, and access to justice. Three general finding can be 
observed. First, in relation to their relative weight, it was shown that the ele-
ments of judicial efficiency and access to justice have been part and parcel of 
the pre-accession process from the very beginning. However, while judicial 
impartiality has made its appearance particularly in the pre-accession 
process from 2005 onward, it was asserted that the EU’s approach towards 
judicial review has been fragmented at best. Unlike the previous case study, 
wherein it was argued that access to justice is omnipresent throughout the 
legal framework and reports, none of the procedural elements presented in 
this chapter has been found to be present to that same extent.
Secondly, regarding a number of these elements and various of their 
sub-elements, it was argued that a general lack of articulation can be 
detected. In other words, neither in the legal framework, nor in the Com-
mission’s Enlargement Strategies or Council Conclusions can clear com-
prehensive definitions be found from which possible benchmarks could 
be deducted. For example, in section 3.2.1 on judicial impartiality, it was 
shown that in spite of the many available definitions, the EU has failed to 
indicate a preference for one of them, outline its own, or even to divulge 
whether it relies on the existing standards under Article 6 ECHR. In relation 
to judicial review, the lack of articulation has led the Commission to adopt 
a largely institution-based approach in which the focus has been put on the 
capacity and effectiveness of judicial organs, rather than an evaluation of 
the actual practice of judicial review.483 Also regarding a number of sub-
elements of judicial efficiency, such as backlog and enforcement, the lack of 
definition has led to unclarity concerning the data on which the Commis-
sion has based its progress assessment and has led to inconsistent findings 
across the years. Interestingly, it was demonstrated that, in contrast to the 
element of judicial impartiality, in relation to the sub-element of length of 
proceeding/reasonable time, the Commission relies on the standards found 
in the caselaw of the ECtHR in its critique of developments.484
Thirdly, in relation to two of the procedural elements identified in this 
chapter, namely judicial efficiency and access to justice, the Commission has 
adopted the somewhat paradoxical approach whereby the lack of progress 
483 See section 3.2.3.
484 See section 3.2.2.
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has not prevented the applicant states from singing their accession treaties. 
For example, in the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports of the countries of 
the fifth,485 sixth486 and seventh487 enlargement round, drawn up half a year 
before the date of accession, progress on access to justice and legal aid is 
reported on as being ‘under-developed’,488 ‘unsatisfactory’,489 and ‘rather 
restricted’.490 However, even with such a bad track record, the countries 
still acceded to the EU according to plan. Since none of the Western Balkan 
countries are in their final stages of negotiation it is as yet unclear whether, 
and if so to what extent, the same approach will be adopted in relation 
to them. While this certainly does not exclude the elements from being 
included in the EU’s rule of law definition, it does somewhat diminish their 
importance, pushing them away from the core understanding of the notion 
in this policy area.
The examination of the third category of institutional elements, included 
judicial reform, the separation of powers, and judicial independence and 
judicial accountability. It was shown that the EU’s strong focus on institu-
tion building follows from the objectives outlined in the Europe Agreement, 
the Stabilisation Agreements, as well as in the financial framework, which 
all prioritise the reinforcement of institutions in relation to the consolidation 
of the rule of law.491 Following this, it was demonstrated that the Enlarge-
ment Strategies place a heavy emphasis on the development of judicial 
structures and capacity-building needed to ensure this. It was, furthermore, 
argued that in the EU’s enlargement policy, the prominence of institution-
building in which the rule of law has been continuously cloaked, has given 
rise to a prominent focus on judicial reform; a finding that was confirmed 
by the structure of the monitoring reports from the inception of the rule of 
law as one of the Copenhagen political criteria until the current rounds.
Interestingly, and comparable to the findings on the conceptualisation 
of the institutional rule of law elements under the previous case study, this 
pervasive judicial-institutional focus has not resulted in a clear articulation 
of the EU’s understanding in the identified areas. Neither in relation to the 
separation of powers, nor to judicial independence or judicial accountability 
has it been clarified what standards will be relied on, or what, for example, 
the minimum requirements for the various sub-elements are. In the case of 
judicial independence, it was shown that, for instance, one of the results 
has been that the monitoring reports frequently demonstrate a level of 
485 See for example 2003 Latvia Comprehensive Monitoring Report, p. 13.
486 Romania’s Monitoring Report states that ‘[t]he reform of the legal aid system needs to be 
carried out.’ 2007 Romania Monitoring Report, p. 7.
487 Croatia’s Monitoring Report simply states that ‘[t]he legal framework for free legal aid 
has to be improved to enable better access to legal aid and to foster the role of NGOs as 
legal aid providers.’ 2012 Croatia Comprehensive Monitoring Report, p. 37.
488 2003 Poland Comprehensive Monitoring Report, p. 16.
489 2003 Lithuania Comprehensive Monitoring Report, p. 13.
490 2003 Hungary Comprehensive Monitoring Report, p. 14.
491 See section 3.3.1.
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conceptual confusion with the procedural element of judicial impartiality.492 
Regarding the separation of powers, it was put forward that the lack of 
articulation has been amplified by the chosen structure and treatment of the 
Copenhagen political criteria in the monitoring reports, which follow the 
separation of powers-rationale by focussing on the three branches individu-
ally. Thus, instead of approaching the doctrine from the premise of how the 
three branches interact together, the emphasis is on their separate structure 
and capacity, mostly in isolation and without outlining minimum standards 
how to shape their balance of powers. However, it was subsequently also 
shown that this approach has somewhat evolved during the current pre-
accession process by providing criticism in those instances where there has 
been evidence of undue political interference in the independence of the 
judiciary.493
In relation to the evolution of the rule of law elements over time, across 
the pre-accession monitoring rounds, a note has to be made on the EU’s 
modification of its methodology. As was shown in section 2.2 on the increas-
ing importance of the rule of law in the enlargement policy framework, the 
institutions have consistently underlined ‘the importance of placing the 
rule of law even more at the heart of enlargement policy.’494 As argued at 
the start of this section, this has resulted in the ‘new approach’ and, more 
recently, on a strategy of ‘fundamentals first’, which both place a high value 
on addressing the rule of law at the early stages of the process in order to 
afford candidates the opportunity to ‘demonstrate their ability to strengthen 
the practical realisation of the values on which the Union is based at all 
stages of the accession process.’495 While this has led, amongst others, to 
additional moments for measuring progress, for example, by way of interim 
benchmarks (next to the opening and closing benchmarks), the rule of law 
elements themselves, have, by and large, not substantively changed, other 
than the changes indicated above. Additionally, in 2015, the Commission 
introduced a strengthened approach to its assessments in the annual 
reports, with additional emphasis put on the state of play in the countries 
and where they stand in terms of preparedness on the basis of harmonised 
assessment scales.496 The ‘new style of reporting’497 also includes guidance 
492 See section 3.2.1.
493 See sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
494 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, 
COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 10 October 2012, p. 4. Also see, for example, Council Conclusions 
‘Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process’, General Affairs Council, Doc. 
No.17604/12, 11 December 2012, pnt. 37, as well as the Council Conclusions ‘Enlarge-
ment and Stabilisation and Association Process’, General Affairs Council, Doc. 10555/18, 
26 June 2018, pnt. 5
495 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, 
COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 10 October 2012, p. 4.
496 Commission Communication on EU Enlargement Strategy, COM(2015) 611 final, 10 
November 2015, Annex 2.
497 Ibid., p. 4.
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on what the countries are expected to do for the following year. However, 
even though it has been indicated that these changes should not be under-
stood as a narrow set of technical negotiations, but, rather, that they ‘reflect 
more clearly that the European integration efforts of the enlargement coun-
tries should entail a steady and thorough process of political and economic 
reforms’,498 the elements on the basis of which progress is determined in the 
area of the rule of law have largely remained the same. 499 As has, in spite of 
its promises, the Commission’s assessment.
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the conceptualisation of the 
rule of law in enlargement relies heavily on those elements of a procedural 
and institutional nature. It was argued that a number of elements of both 
these categories lack a clearly defined expression giving rise to some 
conceptual uncertainty, but also opening the door to a more institutionally-
oriented approach, for example, in relation to the procedural element of 
judicial review, than is warranted. Furthermore, it was argued that not only 
are formal elements largely absent from the legal and policy framework, 
the specific nature of enlargement and the EU’s adopted methodology in 
this policy area were shown to have had a detrimental effect on the qual-
ity and stability of national laws and regulations. Finally, in relation to the 
evolution of the conceptualisation of the rule of law in enlargement, the 
analysis made it clear that most of the elements make their appearance in 
all the accession rounds under review. However, regarding three of them, 
the procedural element of judicial impartiality, and the institutional elements 
of the separation of powers and judicial independence and accountability, 
some change has taken place starting with the pre-accession in relation to 
the Western Balkans, be it in terms of visibility (impartiality) or in terms of 
a widening of the existing interpretation (separation of powers and judicial 
accountability).
4.2 The judicial focus of the rule of law in enlargement explained: 
the EU’s understanding of the rule of law in the light of the applicant 
states’ future role as Member States
From the previous section it is clear that the EU understands the rule of law 
in its enlargement policy predominantly in terms of reform of the judicial 
sector. As a possible explanation for this, it is argued here that the Union 
seems to be very much focussed on establishing the necessary judicial 
498 Commission Communication on 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 
COM(2016) 715 fi nal, 9 November 2016, p. 8
499 The 2018 Council Conclusions on Enlargement serve as an interesting example in this 
context. As one of the Council’s most elaborate statements on the enlargement process 
to date, it actually offers only limited insights into the conceptualisation of the rule of 
law. While the value is highlighted as lying at the core of the EU’s accession policy, the 
only element discussed is that of an independent, impartial, accountable and effi cient 
judiciary. Council Conclusions ‘Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process’, 
General Affairs Council, Doc. 10555/18, 26 June 2018, pnt. 5.
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machinery in the applicant states needed for their future role as Member 
States, thereby failing to consider other rule of law elements that are needed 
to ensure that the notion is truly embedded.
The EU’s enlargement policy lays bare the difficulty of distinguishing 
between rule of law reform in the applicant states at the domestic level, and 
reforms which the states need to implement in preparation of their role as 
future Member States for the sake of the functioning of the EU itself. In its 
enlargement policy, the EU should primarily be concerned with strengthen-
ing and consolidating the rule of law domestically in the applicant states. 
Indeed, the states have to establish and promote ‘the proper functioning 
of the core institutions necessary for democratic governance and the rule 
of law, from the national Parliament, through Government and the judicial 
system, including the courts and public prosecutor, and law enforcement 
agencies.’500 However, that is not the only thing the Union is concerned 
with. As countries aspiring to join the Union, they ‘must demonstrate their 
ability to strengthen the practical realisation of the values on which the 
Union is based.’501 In relation to the rule of law, as it was argued in section 
3.1.2 of the introduction on the function of the rule of law ‘common to the 
Member States’, this is so because of the EU legal order’s dependence on 
mutual recognition and mutual trust between the Member States, as well 
as the all-affected principle. More particularly, as was asserted in the sec-
tion on the procedural element of judicial efficiency,502 the functioning of 
the domestic legal order and the role of courts within that, is crucial for 
upholding EU law within the Union. The EU is dependent on the effective 
operation of domestic courts because of the obligation to refer,503 the doc-
trine of direct effect,504 and the principle of sincere cooperation.505 In the 
words of the Commission: ‘…[T]he actual implementation and enforcement 
on the ground of [EU] law, whether it is directly applicable in the Member 
States or transposed into national legislation, is based on the existence of 
appropriate judicial and administrative machinery in the Member States.’506 
Thus, the rationale of enlargement incorporates the fact that the aspiring 
Member States must adhere to the European Council’s Copenhagen criteria 
not only for their own sake, but also with view to ‘contributing to the well-
500 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, 
COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 10 October 2012, p. 4.
501 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, 
COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 10 October 2012, p. 4.
502 See section 3.2.2.
503 Case 16/65 Firma G. Schwarze v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1965] 
ECR 877.
504 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v Neder-
lanse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1.
505 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, para. 42.
506 Commission White Paper on Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union, COM(95) 163 fi nal, 
3 May 1995, p. 16.
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functioning of the Union as a whole.’507 This dual construct gives rise to the 
following observation: in its conceptualisation of the rule of law in enlarge-
ment, the EU interprets the strengthening of the rule of law in the applicant 
states mostly in the light of their role and functioning as future participants 
in the collective of Member States. In other words, when attempting to 
consolidate the rule of law in the applicant states, it approaches rule of 
law reform from the perspective of the EU and what the EU requires of its 
Member States, with a particular emphasis on judicial reform.
In a way, this observation addresses the rationale of the rule of law 
under the first and third Copenhagen criteria. While the requirement to take 
on the obligations of membership by way of the effective implementation 
of the acquis clearly revolves around the functioning of the EU, the require-
ment of the stability of institutions guaranteeing the rule of law seems to 
be concerned with the performance of domestic institutions that need to 
buttress the rule of law at the national level. However, whereas according 
to Article 49 TEU, ‘[a]ny European State which respects the values referred 
to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become 
a member of the Union’, the values referred to in Article 2 TEU are not just 
values, these are values that are ‘common to the Member States’ which 
must be respected in order to keep Membership rights intact.508 Moreover, 
these are values that have inspired the EU’s creation, which it intends to 
safeguard (Article 21 TEU). Accordingly, in the context of enlargement the 
EU has positioned the rule of law as a value that should be consolidated 
at the domestic level, but also as a common value of the EU edifice. The 
functioning of the EU as a legal and political system relies on the veracity 
of the assumption that its component parts are in compliance of these val-
ues.509 As the Court of Justice put it, the Union is ‘based on the fundamental 
premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, 
and recognizes that they share with it, a set of common values on which the 
EU is founded…’.510 After all, the EU is a structured network of principles, 
rules and mutually interdependent legal relations linking the EU and its 
Member States, and its Member States with each other.511 In the light of 
this, it becomes apparent that during the pre-accession procedure, the EU 
507 Commission Communication on EU Enlargement Strategy, COM(2015) 611 final, 10 
November 2015.
508 Ronald Janse ‘The Evolution of the Political Criteria for Accession to the European Com-
munity, 1957-1973’ 24 European Law Journal (2018), pp. 57-76 at 75; Christophe Hillion 
‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal Mandate and Means’ in Carlos Closa & 
Dimitry Kochenov (eds) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press (2016), pp. 59-81 at 60.
509 Amichai Magen ‘Cracks in the Foundations: Understanding the Great Rule of Law 
Debate in the EU’ 5 Journal of Common Market Studies (2016) 5, pp. 1050-1061 at 1055.
510 Opinion 2/13 ECHR II, EU:C:2006:81, 18 December 2014, para. 168.
511 Ibid., para. 167; Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, 
EU:C:2018:117, 27 February 2018, para. 30.
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focuses in particular on a conception of the rule of law with a view to the 
applicants’ accession that will make them part of this interconnected and 
mutually dependent construct.512 After all, European integration has led to 
a ‘Community based on the rule of law’,513 which, at the very least, requires 
that the effectiveness of EU law is similar, if not the same, as that of domes-
tic law in all the EU Member States.514
Against this background, the findings of section 3, and in particular 
section 3.1 and 3.3, lend further support to the argument that the EU has 
approached its rule of law activities primarily from the perspective of the 
requirements of its own functioning. In section 3.1 on the element of legal-
ity, it was demonstrated that the EU’s main focus is on the implementation 
of the acquis, not on the quality of the domestic legislation and the adoption 
process. More particularly, it was shown that the EU’s quantitative approach 
has actually undermined legality and has given rise to problems in terms of 
stability and generality of law. Furthermore, in section 3.3 on the institu-
tional elements of the rule of law, it was asserted that the EU has framed 
its conceptualisation of the rule of law in enlargement predominantly in 
terms of institutional reform, notably reform of the judiciary. In the light of 
the importance of the role of national courts as EU courts this emphasis is 
understandable. As the early reports demonstrate in the section on judicial 
capacity,515 improvements in the judiciary sector are needed not only for 
the applicants states themselves, but more so because of their role in the 
application of EU law. According to the 1998 Composite Paper on progress 
in enlargement, a well-developed judiciary is central to the candidate coun-
tries, and ‘[i]n order to effectively implement and enforce the acquis, existing 
institutions need to be strengthened and new institutions created.’516 The 
Regular Reports show that the initial separate section on the assessment of 
judicial capacity (1999 round) has been merged with the section on judicial 
reform under the section on Democracy and the Rule of Law (2000 round 
onwards), thereby demonstrating that the Commission understands the 
rule of law in terms of judicial institutions and capacity-building. Not just 
because the rule of law dictates this at the domestic level of the applicant 
512 In light of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, ensuring 
respect for the rule of law and being committed to its promotion in order to ‘facilitate 
the achievement of the Union’s tasks’ will be incumbent on the applicant states from the 
moment of their accession.
513 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para. 23.
514 Armin von Bogdandy & Michael Ioannidis ‘Systemic Defi ciency in the Rule of Law: What 
It Is, What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done’ 51 Common Market Law Review (2014), pp. 
59-96 at 63.
515 As highlighted in section 2, judicial and administrative capacity were added as an addi-
tional membership requirement by the 1995 Madrid European Council. Presidency Con-
clusions, Madrid European Council, 15-16 December 1995.
516 Commission Composite Paper – Reports on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the 
Candidate Countries, COM(1998) 712 fi nal, 17 December 1998, p. 16.
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states, but primarily because this is necessitated by the particular nature of 
the EU, since without it there can be no legal interdependence between the 
Member States.
In the light of the above, it becomes legitimate to pose the question 
to what extent the EU has actually been involved in domestic rule of law 
reform, or rather in Member State building in the name of rule of law 
reform. Regular reporting appears not to contain a general analysis of the 
state of the rule of law in the candidate states, but almost exclusively the 
analysis of the adaptation to the acquis.517 Furthermore, the latest report-
ing rounds show that more institution and capacity building in the judicial 
sector has not necessarily lead to more or better rule of law,518 and that 
‘structural shortcomings persist, notably in the key areas of rule of law’.519 
The situation in Montenegro in 2016 is particularly telling in this regard: 
‘The legal framework in the area of rule of law is largely complete and the 
institutional set-up is in place. The entire rule of law system now needs to 
deliver more results’.520 This indicates that the EU seems to consider that 
from its own primary requirements, i.e. the adoption of legislation and the 
building of a judicial system, the rule of law will naturally follow. However, 
to consolidate and strengthen the latter is, as highlighted throughout this 
case study, far more complicated. This is also recognised more fully in the 
2018 Western Balkan Strategy, which states that the rule of law must be 
strengthened significantly, as well as the fact that addressing reforms in this 
area ‘remains the most pressing issue for the Western Balkans.’521 As long 
as the Union approaches the rule of law primarily from its own vantage 
point and its own requirements that flow from EU Membership (i.e. the 
rule of law as a means to an end), without adjusting its conceptualisation 
to incorporate a more domestically oriented rule of law focus, the annual 
reports might not get more optimistic in tone.
517 Dimitry Kochenov ‘Why the Promotion of the Acquis Is Not the Same as the Promotion 
of Democracy and What Can Be Done In Order to Also Promote Democracy Instead of 
Just Promoting the Acquis’ 2 Hanse Law Review (2006), pp. 171-195 at 172-173. Cf. Klein-
feld who argued that ‘[w]hen the EU pushes acceding countries to adopt the entire legal 
acquis communitaire [sic], it is not building the rule of law through all these legal changes; 
it is simply helping them create a legal system that can mesh with its own.’ Rachel Klein-
feld ‘Competing Defi nitions of the Rule of Law’ in Thomas Carothers (ed) Promoting the 
Rule of Law Abroad – In Search of Knowledge Washington: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace (2006), p. 57.
518 FYROM’s 2016 report is just one of the reports, which state that in the area of judicial 
reform there has been either no progress or backsliding, 2016 FYROM Report, p. 12.
519 Commission Communication on 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 
COM(2016) 715 fi nal, 9 November 2016, p. 2.
520 Ibid., p.11.
521 Commission Communication on A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced 
Engagement with the Western Balkans, COM(2018) 65 fi nal, 6 February 2018, p. 4.
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4.3 The lack of conceptual differentiation between the rule of law as a 
political criterion and as part of Chapter 23 of the acquis under the 
third of the Copenhagen criteria
In section 2.2 it was shown that the EU’s policy framework on enlargement 
has seen the addition of Chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis as ‘rule of law-
chapters’522 during the negotiating process with Croatia and Turkey. In the 
light of the rule of law as one of the political conditions established by the 
European Council at Copenhagen, this addition gives rise to a particular 
question in relation to the pre-accession process concerning the Western 
Balkan countries: whether, and if so to what extent, has the Union, by 
introducing and relabelling Chapter 23 and 24, respectively, as rule of law-
chapters, articulated in its enlargement policy different conceptions of the 
rule of law under the first (the rule of law as part of the political criteria) 
and third Copenhagen criteria (the rule of law as part of the acquis)? This 
issue consists of two sub-questions: that of scope – is the rule of law under 
the Copenhagen political conditions in the current pre-accession process 
more or less broadly defined than under the acquis chapters? – and that of 
substance – if similar rule of law elements exist under both conditions, are 
they approached and analysed in an identical manner, i.e. are they substan-
tively similar? Below, these two sub-questions will be discussed in turn.
4.3.1 The scope of the rule of law under the first and third Copenhagen criteria
From the outset, it seems that the scope of Chapters 23 and 24 is broader 
than what is tackled in the reports under the rule of law as a political condi-
tion. For a start, Chapter 23 includes, next to the functioning of the judiciary, 
which covers the procedural and institutional elements as discussed in section 
3, sub-sections on anti-corruption measures and on fundamental rights. 
Chapter 24 covers issues of justice, freedom, and security. Whereas anti-
corruption measures overlap with what is discussed under the Copenhagen 
political criteria in the section on Democracy and the Rule of Law, and the 
assessment of fundamental rights shows commonalities with the section 
on Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities, the topics contained in 
Chapter 24 do not have such complementing sections under the political 
criteria.
At first glance, this would suggest a widening of scope of the under-
standing of the rule of law. However, the argument advanced here is that 
the scope of the rule of law under both criteria is the same. Two arguments 
will be discussed to support this. Firstly, the labelling of both chapters as 
522 On the Commission’s interpretation of these two specifi c chapters as ‘rule of law-chap-
ters’ see for example Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges 2011-2012, COM(2011) 666 fi nal, 12 October 2011, pp. 4-5; Commission Com-
munication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, COM(2012) 600 
fi nal, 10 October 2012, p. 4.
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‘rule of law-chapters’523 is a misnomer; the pairing of elements in Chapter 
23 and 24 should not be seen as a broadening of scope of the rule of law, 
but rather testifies to the Commission’s instrumental usage of the term ‘rule 
of law’ within the broader enlargement strategy. It was shown that, tak-
ing the experiences with the enlargements of Bulgaria and Romania, and 
Croatia, on board, the EU thought it prudent to address the functioning of 
the judiciary and human rights as early on in the negotiations as possible 
in order to allow the candidate states maximum time for their implemen-
tation.524 This approach was thereafter reaffirmed by the enlargement 
strategy principle of ‘fundamentals first’ – prioritising reforms in the key 
areas of the rule of law, including the topics found in Chapters 23 and 24.525 
Declaring the components of justice, freedom, and security also as ‘rule of 
law-topics’ has allowed the Commission to strategically position these on 
the same exceptional pedestal alongside the functioning of the judiciary and 
human rights. From the fact that the EU has addressed Chapters 23 and 24 
in this manner in the pre-accession process for strategic reasons, it cannot 
be concluded that it includes all of the elements mentioned therein in its 
understanding of the rule of law.
Secondly, looking in turn at the elements of human rights and justice, 
freedom, and security, there are a number of additional arguments sup-
porting the conclusion that the EU has not broadened its scope of the rule 
of law under the third Copenhagen criterion. To start with human rights, 
the Copenhagen criteria related documents do not testify to a conceptual 
understanding of the rule of law that includes fundamental rights, and free-
dom, security, and justice issues. The protection of human rights is treated 
as a category in its own right under the Copenhagen political criteria. This 
finding is not diminished by the fact that the rule of law’s connection to 
human rights is one of enabling, support and enforcement – the scope of 
the rule of law includes mechanisms set up to protect fundamental rights 
and the activities of bodies established to enforce this protection,526 as was 
shown, inter alia, in the sections on the procedural rule of law elements of 
523 See for example the Commission 2012-2013 Strategy in which it discusses its new 
approach to enlargement and the ‘screening of the key rule of law chapters’ 23 and 24; 
Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy 2012-2013, COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 
p. 6. Further, see the Commission Communication on Enlargement strategy 2011-2012, 
COM(2011) 666 fi nal, pp. 4-5; Commission Communication on Enlargement strategy 
2013-2014, COM(2013) 700 fi nal, pp. 6-7; Commission Communication on Enlargement 
strategy 2014-2015, COM(2014) 700 fi nal, p. 2; Commission Communication on 2016 
Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, COM(2016) 715 fi nal, p. 2.
524 Commission Communication ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012’ 
COM(2011) 666 fi nal, 12 October 2011, pp. 2-3.
525 Commission Communication on EU Enlargement Strategy, COM(2015) 611 final, 10 
November 2015, p. 3.
526 Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild & Nicholas Hernanz ‘The Triangular Relationship between 
Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU – Towards an EU Copen-
hagen Mechanism’ CEPS (2013), p. 21.
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judicial review and access to justice.527 Moreover, neither the structure of 
Chapter 23, within which the two elements are treated separately, nor the 
substance of the analysis of either topic, give rise to the impression that the 
Commission has actively broadened the material scope of the rule of law in 
enlargement to include human rights.
In relation to the issues covered by Chapter 24, including, amongst oth-
ers, migration, asylum, visa policy, police cooperation and the fight against 
organised crime, the fight against terrorism, and cooperation in the field of 
drugs, the point should be made that during the 2004 negotiations, (then) 
Chapter 24, which overlaps substantively with the current Chapter 24, has 
never been addressed within the context of the rule of law.528 Furthermore, 
there is evidence stemming from other policy areas that the EU understands 
the relationship between the rule of law and issues of freedom, security, and 
justice to be of a causal nature rather than one of substantive overlap. The 
causality between the two is expressed, for example, in the 2003 European 
Security Strategy:529
Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our secu-
rity has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, 
women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities 
of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism. Such criminal activities are 
often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fueled 
the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues 
from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of 
the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order 
itself.
From this paragraph it is clear that security issues undermine the rule of 
law. Conversely, as was argued in the introductory section on the four 
functions of the rule of law in the Union, the EU attempts to tackle security 
issues through the strengthening of the rule of law.530 Ever since the devel-
opment and consolidation of the rule of law was a specific intention of the 
CFSP (ex Article 11 EU), the Union has connected, and as is asserted here, 
conflated, the strengthening of the rule of law to such issues as security, 
and the fight against terrorism and organised crime, i.e. the rule of law is 
understood as a means to the realisation of these security-related ends.531 
527 See sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 respectively.
528 See for example Poland’s Regular Report of 2000, pp. 72-77. 
529 European Council ‘European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World’ 12 
December 2003, p. 4.
530 Introduction, section 3.1.4.
531 Neil Walker ‘The Rule of Law and the EU: Necessity’s Mixed Virtue’ in Gianluigi Palom-
bella & Neil Walker Relocating the Rule of Law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2009), p. 120. For 
a wide-ranging discussion of the growth of legal instrumentalism, see Brian Z. Tamanaha 
Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(2006).
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This dual causal link, however, should not lead to the conclusion that the 
EU has extended its material scope of the rule of law to also include all 
those issues covered in Chapter 24 which either threaten the rule of law, or 
could be better tackled by strengthening the rule of law.
4.3.2 The converging substantive assessment of the rule of law under the first 
and third Copenhagen criteria
Turning next to the second sub-question, the issue under examination is 
whether similar rule of law elements exist under the first and the third 
Copenhagen criteria and if so, whether there can be said to be substantive 
overlap. The analysis undertaking in part 3 of this chapter, shows that both 
sections deal with the elements of the functioning of the judiciary. In rela-
tion to this issue, it is submitted that a trend can be established towards 
increasing overlap of sub-elements and analysis thereof under both the 
Copenhagen political criteria and Chapter 23, without a clear distinction 
being drawn between the two. Since 2005 the rounds of monitoring reports 
include cross-references in the section on the political criteria to the specific 
chapters of the acquis. For example, the 2005 Regular Report on Turkey 
states in the section on the political criteria that it provides an assessment 
of developments in Turkey, ‘seen from the perspective of the Copenhagen 
political criteria, including the overall functioning of the country’s … judi-
cial system.’ Indicating the connection between progress in these areas and 
the ability to implement the corresponding acquis, the report goes on to state 
that ‘[s]pecific information on progress in implementing the acquis in these 
fields can be found in … Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) … 
of the section dealing with the ability of Turkey to assume the obligations 
of membership.’532 Similar cross-referencing is also apparent in Chapter 23 
itself of reports across the years, which, in its progress overview, refers back 
to the analysis of developments under the Copenhagen political criteria.533 
The cross-referencing indicates that there is, at the very least, a substantive 
overlap of topics under both sections.
Moreover, having examined the sections on the functioning of the 
judiciary under the Copenhagen criteria and Chapter 23 in section 3, it is 
difficult to single out differences of assessment in the sub-topics covered 
in each section. Whereas the analysis of the functioning of the judiciary in 
Chapter 23 will, in general, be (a little) more elaborate, the same issues are 
covered in both sections including the institutional as well as the procedural 
532 2005 Turkey Regular Report, p. 10.
533 Particularly in relation to Chapter 23. See for example 2012 FYROM Progress Report, 
p. 49. Similar cross-references can also be found in the Accession/European Partnerships. 
See for example Croatia’s 2008 Accession Partnership in which the section listing the pri-
orities for Chapter 23, to be implemented and completed for the next few years, directly 
links back to the priorities set out under the section on the political criteria.
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elements identified and analysed above.534 This demonstrates that not only 
are the elements in both sections the same, the progress assessment under-
taken in both sections actually overlaps to the extent that it can be said that 
the part of Chapter 23 concerned with the functioning of the judiciary to a 
large extent codifies the political criterion of the rule of law.535
The 2015 and 2016 progress reports provide further evidence of the 
approach of increasing convergence of assessment. Following the Com-
mission’s proposal for a more structured assessment,536 the section on the 
rule of law under the Copenhagen political criteria and chapter 23 follow 
the exact same composition.537 In their discussion on the functioning of the 
judiciary, both sections discuss the state of play in addition to shortcom-
ings, revision, and areas of progress. Finally, the 2018 enlargement reporting 
round does away with the distinction altogether. Chapter 23 is removed 
from its place in between the other chapters of the acquis and discussed 
under the heading of the political criteria at the beginning of the reports – in 
line with the policy’s priority of its ‘fundamentals’.538 This further supports 
the conclusion that the Commission has not only refrained from articulat-
ing a specific conceptualisation of the rule of law under the Copenhagen 
political criteria on the one hand, and under the third Copenhagen criteria 
on the other, but, moreover, that it has actually converged its analysis of the 
functioning of the judiciary as part of the rule of law under both sections.
5. Conclusion
This chapter examined the EU’s definition of the rule of law in the EU’s 
enlargement policy, by testing the analytical framework established in Part I
of the thesis against the Union’s practice in this area. After an introduc-
tion on the accessions to date, the legal framework and the relevant policy 
strategies were discussed in order to frame the analysis in the following 
sections. The chapter continued by focussing on the three categories of 
534 See for example 2011 FYROM Progress Report, pp. 11-13 and 58-60.
535 Cf. Ann-Kristin Jonasson The EU’s Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbours 
New York: Routledge (2013), p. 137.
536 The 2015 Enlargement Strategy provides that [t] Commission has introduced … a 
strengthened approach to its assessment in the annual reports. In addition to reporting 
on progress, much more emphasis is put on the state of play in the countries and where 
they stand in terms of preparedness for taking on the obligations of membership.’ The 
reports are supposed to provide ‘even clearer guidance for what the countries are expect-
ed to do in both the short and long term.’ To this end, harmonised assessment scales 
will be used to assess both the state of play and the level of progress, in order to increase 
comparability between the countries and provide greater transparency in the process. 
Commission Communication on EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, COM(2015) 611 fi nal, 10 
November 2015, p. 4.
537 Namely, strategic documents, management bodies, independence and impartiality, 
accountability, professionalism and competence, quality of justice, and effi ciency.
538 See for example 2018 Montenegro Report, pp. 13-18; 2018 Turkey Report, pp. 22-27.
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formal, procedural, and institutional rule of law elements. It was demon-
strated that little attention has been paid to the element of legality, in spite 
of the fact that it forms the core of the rule debate in legal theory. Moreover, 
it was pointed out that the methodology of enlargement in relation to the 
process of legislative approximation is based on a mostly quantitative 
demonstration of progress. It was shown that as a consequence of this, 
legality’s qualitative requirements (such as legal stability and coherence) 
have actually been undermined. Next, it was asserted that the elements of 
impartiality and judicial efficiency have increasingly been addressed in the 
annual reports as forming core procedural elements of the rule of law. How-
ever, it was highlighted that this has not led to a clearer articulation of EU 
standards in these areas, thereby actually making the assessment of whether 
the applicant states comply with these elements more difficult. Following 
this, it was shown that the formulation of the Copenhagen criteria and the 
relevant legal framework have been very influential in the EU’s adoption of 
a mainly institutional focus in its activities to strengthen the rule of law in 
the applicant states. It was shown that the rule of law is conceptualised in 
terms of judicial reform with an emphasis on the structure and functioning 
of the courts. It was furthermore asserted that this has resulted in a particu-
lar emphasis on the institutional element of judicial independence.
The chapter continued by turning to the general findings of the rule 
of law elements in enlargement and three overall conclusions were drawn. 
First, it was concluded that the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in 
enlargement is strongly geared towards both procedural and institutional 
elements, with an almost total absence of the formal element of legality. It 
was shown that the extensive institutional focus of the policy has led to an 
emphasis on judicial reform, which has also permeated a number of the 
procedural elements, such as judicial review. Furthermore, it was demon-
strated that there has been only a limited evolution of rule of law elements 
across the enlargement rounds, including the current pre-accession process. 
Secondly, it was argued that, even though the EU professes to domestic rule 
of law reform, its conceptualisation of the rule of law is heavily influenced 
by the fact that the applicant states are future Member States. It was further 
asserted that this has resulted in neglecting certain rule of law elements 
(legality) and disproportionately emphasising others (judicial indepen-
dence). Finally, it was concluded that the Commission has refrained from 
clearly differentiating between the rule of law elements under the Copen-
hagen political criteria and as part of the acquis, and, moreover, that it has 
actually converged its analysis of the functioning of the judiciary as part of 
the rule of law under both sections, thereby codifying the political criterion 
of the rule of law.
 Conclusions: the influence of the policy 
area on the EU’s conceptualisation of the 
rule of law in its external relations
1. Introduction
The analysis undertaken in both case studies showed that the EU views the 
strengthening of the rule of law as a central element in both development 
cooperation1 and enlargement.2 Both case studies, however, also demon-
strated that the Union has not put forward a comprehensive conceptual 
understanding of the rule of law in its external relations. As it was argued 
in chapters 3 and 4, while the EU’s commitment to the rule of law is beyond 
reproach and often repeated, it has proven hard to identify a comprehensive 
definition of the concept. The case studies showed a number of commonali-
ties regarding the EU’s understanding of the rule of law in relation to the 
three categories of formal, procedural, and institutional elements. However, 
whereas the conclusion can be drawn that the EU’s conceptualisation of the 
rule of law in both areas is largely identical, it can also be pointed out that 
both policy areas favour some elements over others. This chapter will argue 
that these similarities and differences can be explained on the basis of the 
particularities found in the policy areas themselves.
The chapter will start by shedding light on the reasons underpinning 
the case studies’ focus on judicial reform (section 2.1) as well as the lack 
of the formal rule of law element of legality (section 2.2). It will then focus 
on the reasons behind the different emphasis given to different elements 
belonging to the procedural and to the institutional categories (section 2.3). 
Next, the chapter will elucidate the assumptions underlying the EU’s use of 
the rule of law as a means to other ends that have led to a limited articula-
tion of several rule of law elements (section 2.4). Against this background 
the chapter will then turn to the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law 
as it was identified in the case studies and compare it with the core rule of 
1 See, for example, the New Consensus on Development, which states that the EU and its 
Member States will promote the rule of law because it is ‘a precondition’ for sustainable 
development and stability;  Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Commission ‘The New European Consensus on Development – Our World, Our 
Dignity, Our Future’ OJ[2017] C210/1, pnt. 61.
2 See, for example, the Commission’s 2018 Strategy on Enlargement, which discusses ‘the 
growing focus on rule of law reform’; Commission Communication on 2018 Communica-
tion on EU Enlargement Policy, COM(2018) 450 fi nal, 17 April 2018, p. 2.
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law elements identified in the national rule of law conceptualisation in the 
three Member States. The chapter argues that there is a glaring discrepancy 
between the two and that this discrepancy is problematic on the following 
grounds. First, it will be asserted that even though the rule of law is a rather 
flexible concept that comes in many different domestic manifestations, this 
flexibility does not imply that the EU may leave out core components of the 
rule of law such as formal legality. Secondly, it will be claimed that since the 
financial instruments underpinning development cooperation and enlarge-
ment require clarity and transparency, the EU should be more explicit 
regarding its rule of law definition.
The last section of the chapter will address the way forward and will 
provide three insights for rule of law reform stemming from the findings 
of the research undertaken in this thesis. First, it will be asserted that, 
although a comprehensive approach to rule of law is welcome, this does 
not negate the need to understand (and thus define) the individual compo-
nents of the rule of law and how these interrelate. It will be shown that in 
this way, lacunae can be detected, imbalances can be prevented, and lack 
of articulation can be forestalled. Secondly, it will be argued that the EU 
should acknowledge that developments within a policy area also influence 
the weight attributed to different elements within that particular area; 
thus, any shift in policy might bring along a shift of emphasis on different 
rule of law elements. By understanding these influences on its rule of law 
definition, the EU can make more conscious choices about its rule of law 
reform and the elements it wishes to emphasise therein instead of being 
pushed into a particular direction on grounds of policy considerations. 
Finally, it will be demonstrated that the Union should become cognizant 
of certain assumptions underlying its instrumental use-value approach to 
the rule of law. It will be shown that the EU relies on the rule of law as a 
means to various other ends, which have led to a strong emphasis on vari-
ous end goals (such as economic growth, the protection of human rights) 
and a subsequent lack of attention to precisely what rule of law elements 
are needed to achieve what specific ends. By realising this cognitive bias, 
the EU should be in a better position to distinguish between what it wants 
to achieve and how it will get there – which necessarily requires a clearer 
articulation of the rule of law.
2. The EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in development 
cooperation and enlargement: influences and explanations
The following section will discuss the findings regarding the EU’s concep-
tualisation of the rule of law in development cooperation and enlargement 
from a comparative perspective. Additionally, the last sub-section will 
consider this conceptualisation in the light of the fact that it was established 
in chapter 1 that the rule of law is indeed a concept with elements that are 
‘common to the Member States’.
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2.1 Strong institutional bias: the reasons behind the rule of law as 
judicial reform
The general findings of the previous two chapters showed that the EU, in 
both policy areas, conceives of the rule of law strongly in terms of judicial 
reform, translating the notion more often than not into an institutional 
checklist. Indeed, in both external areas the initial appearance of the rule 
law was put explicitly within this institutional frame of reference. This is, 
inter alia, evidenced by the 1995 Lomé IVbis Convention’s specific objective 
of cooperation of support for institutional reform measures with a view 
to consolidating the rule of law3 and the 1993 Copenhagen criteria’s well-
known articulation of the rule of law in terms of the stability of institutions 
that guarantee the notion’s taking root in the candidate states.4 Following 
this, the case studies showed that in the financial instruments applicable to 
the policy areas under review, a similar institutional orientation in relation 
to the rule of law’s promotional activities has been expressed, from their 
initial formulation until the recent revision of the instruments in the context 
of the multiannual financial budget for 2014-2020.5 This has furthermore 
been buttressed by the strategic policy documents, such as the Agenda 
for Change (in which the rule of law is explicitly tied to the functioning of 
3 Articles 5 and 224(m) Lomé IVbis Convention.
4 Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993.
5 For development cooperation: See Article 5(2)(f) Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 in which 
it is stated that reform activities in the area of the rule of law include capacity building 
and strengthening the institutional and legislative framework. According to Article 3(3) 
and Annex I(B)(IV)(c) on cooperation with Central Asia of the follow-up DCI Regulation 
233/2014, specifi c attention shall be paid to the rule of law as a cross-cutting issue of 
development cooperation, particularly in terms of institution building. In the same vein, 
the EIDHR regulations put forward similar institutionally-geared objectives of coopera-
tion regarding the rule of law, see Article 2(2)(b) Regulation (EC) No 975/1999, Article 
2(1)(a)(ii) Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006, and Article 2(1)(a)(ii) Regulation (EU) No 
235/2014. Also the European Development Funds have allocated means towards insti-
tutional development and capacity building, in line with the objectives of the Cotonou 
Agreement (Article 9(4) and 33(1)(c)).
 For enlargement: See the Decision of the Commission on the Guidelines for PHARE 
Programme Implementation in Candidate Countries, 1998-1999, SEC(1998) 1012 fi nal, 
15 June 1998, p. 5; Commission Decision Guidelines for the PHARE Programme Imple-
mentation in Candidate Countries for the Period 2000-2006, in Application of Article 8 of 
Regulation 3906/89, SEC(1999) 1596 fi nal, 13 October 1999; Article 2(2) of Council Regu-
lation (EC) No 2666/2000; Article 2 and 3 Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006; Article 2, 3, and 
Annex II Regulation (EU) No 231/2014. For more detail, see section 3.3.1 of each case 
study.
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judicial systems in developing countries6), and the Enlargement Strategies 
('[t]he Commission will pay particular attention to the establishment of the 
structures needed to ensure the rule of law’7, including, inter alia, ‘efforts to 
modernise legal frameworks and infrastructure’8) and Council Conclusions 
(regarding rule of law reform, ‘key challenges that require particular and 
urgent attention include, in particular, judicial reform’9) in that area.
In fact, it was argued that this institutional understanding is so per-
vasive that a number of procedural elements were conceived of in terms 
of judicial reform instead of their role in, and effective execution of, the 
administration of the law. This can be illustrated by way of the example of 
the procedural element of judicial review, which enables the duly autho-
rised institutions, the judiciary, to assess and make binding judgements 
about whether and to what extent government action complies with the 
procedural and/or substantive requirements embodied in the relevant 
constitution and other relevant legislation. In both external policy areas, it 
was pointed out that the focus was on the structure of the judiciary and the 
people working therein (inter alia staffing of courts, the training of judges) 
rather than on the assessment process itself or the contours of the types of 
judicial review (administrative acts, individual rights).
This section argues that, while both policy areas showcase the EU’s 
institutional understanding regarding the consolidation of the rule of law, 
they do so for different reasons. For development cooperation, these relate 
to the international framework within which the EU’s policy takes place, 
and the influence of the two cross-cutting policy areas of good governance 
and security.
The first case study demonstrated that the EU’s development coopera-
tion policy takes place within the confines of the international aid agenda, 
most importantly, the UN’s 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and the work undertaken by the OECD,10 which form the 
6 Commission Communication on Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an 
Agenda for Change, COM(2011) 637 fi nal, 13 October 2011, p. 6. Also see for example the 
Commission’s Communication on the EU’s development policy of 2000, in which the 
rule of law is put in the context of institutional capacity building: ‘Institutional capacity 
building must be a key element in the fi ght against poverty. In this context, good gover-
nance and the rule of law are key element [sic] in ensuring social peace and stability as 
well as economic growth.’ Commission Communication on The European Community’s 
Development Policy, COM(2000) 212 fi nal, 26 April 2000, p. 27.
7 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, 
COM(2006) 649 fi nal, 8 November 2007, p. 22.
8 Commission Communication on 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 
COM(2016) 715 fi nal, 9 November 2016, p. 3.
9 Council Conclusions ‘Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process’, General 
Affairs Council, 16 December 2014, pnt. 5.
10 See, amongst others, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Accra Agenda 
for Action, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf, and the 
follow-up 2011 Busan Partnership Agreement, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/
effectiveness/49650173.pdf.
Conclusions: the influence of the policy area on the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in its external relations 269
international framework for poverty elimination and sustainable develop-
ment. While this policy background sets the goals for sustainable develop-
ment globally, it has also set specific sub-targets. It was pointed out that the 
Agenda and SDGs firmly link the promotion of the rule of law in develop-
ing countries to the strengthening of institutions;11 the predominant view 
being that ‘[e]ffective institutions and policies are essential for sustainable 
development. Institutions fulfilling core state functions should, were nec-
essary, be further strengthened.’12 Furthermore, it was demonstrated that 
the EU, in the implementation of the international framework, has pushed 
forward the need for an increased focus on improving existing institutional 
capacity in developing countries.13 With the SDGs’ translation of its rule of 
law sub-target in terms of access to justice,14 the translation of the overall 
persistent institutional orientation has led to a clear focus on the judicial 
sector, and has given rise to the articulation of rule of law reform in terms 
of judicial reform.
Furthermore, it was shown that this particular understanding has been 
further strengthened by the fact that the EU’s development cooperation 
policy is intersected by a number of other (external) concerns, most promi-
nently good governance and security, which have each added their own 
institutional priorities with a particular emphasis on judicial reform. To 
start with the former, it was sketched out in section 4.2.2 of the relevant 
case study, that since the early 2000s the EU has considerably broadened 
its understanding of good governance in relation to development coop-
eration.15 In its Communications on the topic (endorsed by the Council16), 
the Commission has steadily stressed the link between governance and the 
rule of law in terms of institutional reform and capacity building, and more 
11 The Resolution in which the Agenda is set out, states that the need to build peaceful, just 
and inclusive societies is recognised, that ‘provide equal access to justice and that are 
based on respect for human rights (including the right to development), on effective rule 
of law and good governance at all levels and on transparent, effective and accountable insti-
tutions.’ General Assembly Resolution 70/1 ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development’, A/70/L.1, 25 September 2015, pnt. 35 [emphasis added].
12 2011 Busan Partnership Agreement, pnt. 29.
13 See European Court of Auditors’ Special Report No 6 of 2007 on the effectiveness of tech-
nical assistance in the context of capacity development, OJ[2007] C312/02, pnts. 9-11; 
EuropeAid ‘Reforming Technical Cooperation and Project Implementation Units for 
External Aid provided by the European Commission - A Backbone Strategy’ July 2008 
p. 13.
14 See sub-target 16.3, which provides as its goal to ‘promote the rule of law at the national 
and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.’
15 Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse ‘Venus Approaching Mars? The European Union’s 
Approaches to Democracy Promotion’ in Amichai Magen, Thomas Risse & Michael 
McFaul (eds) Democracy Promotion in the US and the EU Compared Houndsmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan (2009), pp. 34-60.
16 See, inter alia, Council Conclusions ‘Governance in the context of development coopera-
tion’, Doc. 14773/03, 13 November 2003.
270 Conclusions: the influence of the policy area on the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in its external relations
particularly, judicial reform.17 Moreover, both the former as well as the new 
Consensus on Development reflect this emphasis. Accordingly, the 2006 
Consensus framed the need for ‘an institutional environment that upholds 
human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law’ in terms of the 
reform of the judicial system.18 In the same vein, the 2017 New Consensus 
highlights the promotion of independent and impartial courts as rule of law 
related ‘[e]ffective governance institutions and systems that are responsive 
to public needs’.19
The way that security has entered into development cooperation has 
also geared the EU’s understanding of the rule of law towards judicial 
reform. The case study showed that the EU conceives of development and 
security as ‘important and complementary aspects’20 of its relations with 
third countries. They are mutually reinforcing and the Union has asserted 
that there cannot be the one without the other.21 Security is stressed as a 
‘first condition for development’22 and, vice versa, ‘sustainable development 
lies at the heart of a resilient state.’23 In the case study on development coop-
eration, the argument was presented that, in ways similar to good gover-
nance, this security angle brings with it a particular insistence on institution 
and capacity-building, which, when linked to the promotion of the rule of 
17 The 2003 Communication on Governance and Development stressed that: ‘Governance 
is a key component of policies and reforms for poverty reduction, democratisation and 
global security. This is why institutional capacity-building, particularly in the area of 
good governance and the rule of law is one of the six priority areas for EC development 
policy….’ Commission Communication on Governance and Development, COM(2003) 
615 fi nal, 20 October 2003, p. 3. Further, see Commission Communication on Governance 
in the European Consensus on Development, COM(2006) 421 fi nal, 30 August 2006, p. 1; 
Commission Communication on Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An 
Agenda for Change, COM(2011) 637 fi nal, 13 October 2011, p. 6.
18 Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Mem-
ber States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission 
on European Union Development Policy, ‘The European Consensus’, OJ[2006] C46/1, 22 
November 2005, pnt 86.
19 Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Mem-
ber States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission 
‘The New European Consensus on Development – Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future’ 
OJ[2017] C210/1, p. 32.
20 European Consensus on Development (2006), pnt. 37.
21 In the words of the Commission: ‘There cannot be sustainable development without 
peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no 
sustainable peace.’ Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representa-
tive on A Renewed Partnership with the Countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacif-
ic, JOIN(2016) 52 fi nal, 22 November 2016, p. 8. Also see Commission Communication on 
Governance and Development, COM(2003) 615 fi nal, p. 7; Community Communication 
on Confl ict prevention, COM(2001) 211, 11 April 2001, p. 5; Council Conclusions, 2622nd 
External Relations Council, Doc. 12724/04, 22-23 November 2004, p. 27.
22 European Council ‘European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World’12 
December 2003, p. 13.
23 ‘A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy – Shared Vision, 
Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, June 2016, p. 24.
Conclusions: the influence of the policy area on the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in its external relations 271
law, has, more often than not, been interpreted as judicial reform. Thus, the 
fragility of developing, conflict-prone states is to be addressed through ‘the 
rule of law … and the building of viable institutions’.24 Moreover, in post-
conflict settings, ‘a nationally-owned transitional justice and rule of law sys-
tem, engaging official and non-governmental institutions is fundamental.’25 
More particularly, the establishment of independent, transparent and 
effective institutions is considered by the EU to be essential for building 
trust in a country in transition, for creating a basis for development, and for 
fighting crime. These issues all require an independent judiciary to solve 
disputes, a well-equipped policy force to fight crime, and, more generally, 
respect for the rule of law.26 Since the security sector is so closely related to 
the justice sector, with both sectors sharing functional duties (securing the 
rights of individuals and/against the state),27 consolidation of the rule of 
law is understood as the strengthening of the institutions in that sector,28 
with the judiciary at its centre as both a mechanism for holding the state 
accountable and a security provider itself.29
Turning now towards the enlargement policy, the analysis undertaken 
in chapter 4 showed that the EU’s practice in the area of rule of law reform 
has focused largely on judicial reform, with both sections in the monitoring 
reports on the rule of law under the Copenhagen criteria30 as well as under 
Chapter 23 aimed at the applicant states’ progress regarding the function-
ing of the judicial sector.31 The reason for this lies in the fact that domestic 
courts fulfil a central role in the implementation of the acquis before acces-
sion and in the application of EU law thereafter; both are necessary for the 
operation of the Union.
As put forward by the Commission in its 2012-2013 Enlargement 
Strategy, countries aspiring to join the EU must demonstrate their ability 
to strengthen ‘the practical realisation of the values on which the Union 
24 European Consensus on Development (2006), pnt. 20.
25 Commission Communication on Towards an EU response to situations of fragility - 
engaging in diffi cult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace, 
COM(2007) 643 fi nal, 25 October 2007, p. 9.
26 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative on EU Support for 
Sustainable Change in Transition Societies, JOIN(2012) 27 fi nal, 3 October 2012, p. 7.
27 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative on Elements for 
an EU-wide Strategic Framework to Support Security Sector Reform, JOIN(2016) 31 fi nal, 
5 July 2016, p. 6; Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 15 on ‘Support to 
Justice and the Rule of Law’ EuropeAid (2012), p. 17.
28 Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 9 ‘Support for Justice Reform in ACP 
Countries’ EuropeAid (2010), p. 12.
29 Programming Guide for Strategy Papers, Programming Fiche on Rule of Law - The judi-
cial system within the broader justice sector context (2009), p. 5.
30 For an example of a progress report in relation to the CEECs, see for example, 2002 Slove-
nia Regular Report, pp. 21-23.
31 See, for example, 2014 Montenegro Progress Report, pp. 35-39.
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is based at all stages of the accession process.’32 In relation to the rule of 
law this has meant, according to the same Communication, the ‘proper 
functioning of the core institutions’33 necessary for the rule of law, namely 
the judicial system, including the courts and public prosecutor, and 
law enforcement agencies. The introduction (section 3.1.2) as well as the 
enlargement case-study (section 4.2) pointed out that there is ample case 
law34 and scholarly literature35 on the importance of Member State courts 
in upholding the EU legal edifice. Recently, this was reiterated by the CJEU 
when in stated that ‘Article 19 TEU, which gives concrete expression to the 
value of the rule of law stated in Article 2 TEU, entrusts the responsibility 
for ensuring judicial review in the EU legal order not only to the Court of 
Justice but also to national courts and tribunals.’36 Consequently, national 
courts, together with the CJEU, ‘fulfil a duty entrusted to them jointly of 
ensuring that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
32 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, 
COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 10 October 2012, p. 4.
33 Ibid., p. 4.
34 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, EU:C:2018:117, 
27 February 2018; Opinion 1/09 Agreement creating a Unifi ed Patent Litigation System, 
[2011] ECR I-01137; Case C- 583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Katanami and Others v Parliament and 
Council, EU:C:2013:625, 3 October 2013; C-456/13 P T&L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Com-
mission, EU:C:2015:284, 28 April 2015; Case C-216/18 PPU LM, EU:C:2018:585, 25 July 
2018.
35 See, for example, Michal Bobek ‘The Court of Justice, the National Courts, and the Spirit 
of Cooperation: Between Dichtung and Wahrheit’ in Adam Łazowski & Steven Block-
mans Research Handbook on EU Institutional Law London: Edward Elgar (2016), pp. 353-
378; Urszula Jaremba ‘The Role of National Courts in the Process of Legal Integration in 
the European Union: Retrospective and Prospective’ in Flora Goudappel & Ernst Hirsch 
Ballin (eds) Democracy and the Rule of Law in the European Union The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press (2016), pp. 49-62; John Bell Judiciaries Within Europe: A Comparative Review Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press (2006); Zdeněk Kühn ‘The Application of European 
Law in the New Member States: Several (Early) Predictions’ 6 German Law Journal (2005), 
pp. 563-582; Xavier Groussot ‘The Role of the National Courts in the European Union – A 
Future Perspective’ SIEPS  No. 10 (2005); George Tridimas & Takis Tridimas ‘National 
Courts and the European Court of Justice: A Public Choice Analysis of the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure’ 24 International Review of Law and Economics (2004), pp. 125-145; 
Francis G. Jacobs ‘The Evolution of the European Legal Order’ 41 Common Market Law 
Review (2004), pp. 303-316; John Temple Lang ‘Developments, Issues and New Reme-
dies – The Duties of National Authorities and Courts under Article 10 of the EC Treaty’ 
27 Fordham International Law Journal (2004), pp. 1904-1939; Takis Tridimas ‘Knocking on 
Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Effi ciency and Defi ance in the Preliminary Reference 
Procedure’ 40 Common Market Law Review (2003), pp. 9-50; Karen Alter Establishing the 
Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe Oxford: 
Oxford University Press (2001); Anne Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet & Joseph H.H. 
Weiler (eds) European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence Oxford: Hart 
Publishing (1997).
36 Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, ECLI:EU:C:
2018:117, para. 32.
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observed.’37 In relation to the Union’s accession policy, the interdependence 
of the national courts in the Member States, in combination with their role 
in the implementation of the enlargement acquis, has led the Commission, 
in its White Paper on the preparation of the CEECs for integration into 
the internal market of 1995, to remark on the necessity of ‘the existence of 
appropriate judicial and administrative machinery’ in the aspiring Member 
States.38 As it was argued in the general findings on the conceptualisation of 
the rule of law in enlargement (section 4.1), there is ample evidence to show 
that this focus on judicial reform has stayed the same in all enlargement 
rounds under review and is also being followed in the current pre-accession 
process regarding the countries in the Western Balkans.
In sum, it was shown that from the earliest conceptualisation of the rule 
of law in development cooperation and in enlargement, the EU has come 
to understand rule of law reform as judicial reform. For both policy areas 
this has meant a full focus on the functioning of the institutions (and their 
staff) within the judicial sector. It was, however, also asserted that while 
both external areas thus attach similar weight to judicial reform, they do so 
on the basis of different rationales.
2.2 Lack of the formal element of legality explained on the basis 
of policy characteristics
Both case studies showed that neither legal framework has incorporated 
formal legality, i.e. the requirements regarding the validity and quality of 
laws, as an element of the rule of law. In relation to development coopera-
tion, with the formulation of the rule of law-related cooperation objectives 
in the Cotonou Agreement39 and further cooperation agreements,40 and 
37 Case C-64/16, para. 33. Also Opinion 1/09 (Agreement creating a Unifi ed Patent Litigation 
System), EU:C:2011:123, para. 6; Case C-583/11P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parlia-
ment and Council, EU:C:2013:625, para. 99.
38 Commission White Paper on Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union, COM(95) 163 fi nal, 
3 May 1995, p. 16. Also see Commission Communication on Composite Paper - Reports 
on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, COM(1998) 712 
fi nal, 17 December 1998, p. 16.
39 For the rule of law as an essential element of the agreement, see Article 9 Cotonou Agree-
ment. For the rule of law as a cross-cutting theme of cooperation, see Article 33 Cotonou 
Agreement.
40 See for example, Articles 2 and 65 Agreement on Trade, Development and Coopera-
tion between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of South Africa, of the other part, OJ [1999] L311/3; Articles 1 and 8 Political 
Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Mem-
ber States, of the one part, and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua and Panama, of the other part, OJ [2014] L111/6; Articles 1 and 2(2)(f) 
Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, OJ [2013] L20/2.
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in the financial instruments41 primarily based on institutional and proce-
dural elements of, inter alia judicial independence and access to justice,42 
considerations of legislative quality seem to have been left out altogether. 
Regarding the EU’s policy of enlargement, it was demonstrated that formal 
legality is (largely) absent as a rule of law related element from the Europe 
Agreements with the CEECs,43 the Association Agreements covering the 
relations with Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey, as well as from the Stability and 
Association Agreements with the Western Balkan countries.44 Furthermore, 
the financial instruments advance an institutional understanding of its rule 
of law aims45 similar to the one found in the framework related to develop-
ment cooperation. It is also here that the argument can be made that the 
policy area itself has impacted the EU’s conceptualisation of this particular 
element of the rule of law; both policy areas will be discussed in turn below.
The development cooperation case study showed that the EU, in its 
legal and policy framework, understands the strengthening of the rule of 
law predominantly through an institutional lens. This institutional-centric 
orientation has resulted in a rather ‘anatomical approach’ regarding the rule 
of law with a focus on legal institutions and norms; listing the attributes of 
the judiciary is presented as ‘adding up to the rule of law’.46 In contrast, it 
was argued that neither the policy and legal framework, nor the practice 
on the ground, examined by way of the monitoring documents, seem to 
include formal legality, or (a number of) its sub-elements, as a core element 
of the rule of law. The various reports of the programming cycles do not go 
much further than some general statements on ‘improving the legal and 
41 Article 1(2)(b)(ii) 11th EDF implementation Regulation (EU) 2015/322; Article 2(1)(ii) Reg-
ulation (EU) No 233/2014; Article 2(1)(a)(ii) Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
42 See, for example, Annex I of Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 which outlines the objective of 
‘strengthening of the rule of law and the independence of judicial and protection systems 
and ensuring unhindered and equal access of justice for all’, Annex I A(I)(a)(ii) Regula-
tion (EU) No 233/2014.
43 In all but the earliest Europe Agreements, there is merely a single reference to the rule 
of law in the Preamble. See for example, Europe Agreement establishing an association 
between the EC and the Republic of Latvia, OJ[1998] L26/3.
44 As outlined in section 2.3 of the enlargement case-study, in the SAAs, the rule of law is 
mentioned in the Preamble and included as an essential element. Furthermore, support 
to efforts to strengthen the rule of law is framed in terms of the reinforcement of the 
institutions concerned with the administration of justice and law enforcement. See for 
example Article 80 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Montenegro.
45 In Article 2(2)(a) of IPA II, the specifi c objectives of cooperation include: ‘progress in 
the areas of strengthening democracy, the rule of law and an independent and effi cient 
justice system….’ Further, see, Article 3(1)(a) Regulation (EU) No 231/2014; Article 2(3) 
PHARE Regulation 1266/99; Article 2(3) CARDS Regulation 2666/2000.
46 Martin Krygier ‘The Rule of law: Legality, Teleology, Sociology’ in Gianluigi Palombella 
& Neil Walker Relocating the Rule of Law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2009), pp. 45-69 at 48.
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regulatory framework’47 by filling gaps in the legislation in various areas,48 
without providing standards against which reforms can be measured.
However, in the EU’s development cooperation policy, the element 
of legality has been affected in a particular way. Whereas formal legality 
receives scant attention, it is argued that substantive legality does, particu-
larly in the light of recent policy developments. The documents show that 
it is apparent that the Union pushes hard for substantive legality by way 
of alignment of national legislation with human rights standards and best-
practices, instead of concentrating on formal legality. The protection and 
promotion of human rights has been, in the joint words of the Commission 
and the High Representative ‘a silver thread running through all EU action 
both at home and abroad,’49 with the human rights and development coop-
eration agendas having been closely interlinked;50 the EU has a longstand-
ing commitment to ensure that respect for human rights is mainstreamed 
across development cooperation.51 More recently, following the 2012 
Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy,52 it was shown that 
the EU has committed to the rights based approach for development coop-
eration. As it was explained in the relevant chapter, via this approach the 
Union aims to integrate human rights principles into its operational activi-
ties for development cooperation.53 According to the Commission’s ‘Tool-
box’ in which the rights-based approach is further elucidated, one of the 
underlying working principles ties the framework explicitly to the rule of 
law. Under the heading of ‘Accountability and access to the rule of law’ the 
fourth principle connects the rule of law to alignment of national legislation 
with legal human rights obligations and an institutional understanding of 
47 Malawi Joint Annual Report 2008, p. 22; Commission Report on The implementation of 
measures intended to promote observance of human rights and democratic principles 
in external relation for 1996-1999, COM(2000) 726 fi nal 14 November 2000, p. 12; and it 
1995 counterpart Commission Report on the implementation of measures intended to 
promote observance of human rights and democratic principles (for 1995), COM(1996) 
672 fi nal, 17 January 1996, pp. 8-9.
48 See for example the Regional Multiannual Indicative Programme of Central Asia 2014-
2020, which includes as one of the rule of law related focal areas: ‘support to develop-
ment of the legal framework: Constitutional Law and/or the Administrative Law and/
or Criminal Law’, pp. 4-5. Further, Malawi Joint Annual Report 2008, p. 22. See also the 
Commission Report on The implementation of measures intended to promote obser-
vance of human rights and democratic principles in external relation for 1996-1999, 
COM(2000) 726 fi nal 14 November 2000, p. 12.
49 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy on Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action 
– Towards a More Effective Approach, COM(2011) 886 fi nal, 12 December 2011, p. 4.
50 Commission Communication on Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An 
Agenda For Change, COM(2011) 637 fi nal, 13 October 2011, p. 5.
51 The 2006 European Consensus on Development identifi es the promotion of human rights 
as one of the cross-cutting issues, pnt. 101.
52 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, Doc. 
11855/12, 25 June 2012.
53 See section 3.2.2.1 of chapter 3.
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access to justice. Indeed, the application of this principle should lead to the 
‘identification of the lack of capacity of the state to fulfil its obligations’ and 
demands that ‘legal services are accessible’.54 Consequently, since according 
to the first principle of ‘Applying all rights’ all beneficiaries are entitled to 
all human rights,55 there has been an intensified attempt to promote the 
ratification and effective implementation of human rights treaties, including 
regional human rights instruments, in developing countries. This empha-
sis is also reflected in the Action plan on Human Rights and Democracy 
attached to the 2012 Strategic Framework56 and its successor Action Plan 
2015-2019.57 Moreover, the DCI covering the period of 2014-2020 has freed 
up funds in order to ‘promote a rights based approach encompassing all 
human rights’ in order to assist partner countries ‘in implementing their 
international human rights obligations and to support the right holders, 
with a focus on poor and vulnerable groups, in claiming their rights.’58 
Thus, interestingly, it can be concluded that the EU has focussed on substan-
tive legality while paying little attention to formal legality.
Turning now to the enlargement chapter, it was shown that the lack of 
formal legality in the Enlargement Strategies and monitoring documents 
across the accession rounds can be explained on the basis of the character-
istics of the policy area itself. In ways similar to the policy on development 
cooperation, there is a pronounced emphasis on rule of law reform by 
way of judicial reform. However, and more importantly regarding formal 
legality, the policy showcases the necessity of legislative approximation in 
combination with the particular exclusionary nature of the acquis and the 
quantitative methodology underlying progress monitoring during the pre-
accession process, which, as was asserted, have led to negative reinforcing 
effects regarding legality’s sub-elements,59 such as coherence, generality, 
and stability.60
The acquis represents a ready-made corpus of legal rules that have to 
implemented and enforced at the domestic level of the applicant states. It 
was argued that there is limited space for engagement with the EU’s legal 
template by the applicant states; in point of fact, there is evidence that in 
54 Commission Staff Working Document on Tool-Box – A Rights-Based Approach, Encom-
passing All Human Rights for EU Development Cooperation, SWD(2014) 152 fi nal, 30 
April 2014, p. 18.
55 ‘Ibid., p. 16.
56 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, Doc. 
11855/12, 25 June 2012, outcome II.
57 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative on Action Plan on 
Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019) – Keeping Human Rights at the Heart of the 
EU Agenda JOIN(2015) 16 fi nal, 28 April 2015.
58 Article 3(8)(b) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014.
59 See sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of chapter 4.
60 As was shown in chapter 2, these sub-elements are part and parcel of Fuller’s list of eight 
conditions for the validity of law; a body of legal rules needs to constitute a coherent 
whole and remain stable or unchanged for a period of time long enough to provide the 
necessary predictability and constraints for decision makers.
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cases where key legal definitions are highly specific, the EU considers a lit-
eral translation of EU text desirable.61 Moreover, as a ‘sacred’ EU concept62 
– even ‘the holiest cow of all’63 – the acquis constitutes a body of rules whose 
scope, trajectory and interpretation remains exclusively within the EU’s 
own control.64 As the non-national, shared patrimony of 28 Member States 
who adhere to it themselves, the acquis enjoys a high degree of legitimacy, 
integrity, but also inviolability. Consequently, the particular nature of the 
acquis has precipitated a lack of local engagement with those rules, giving 
rise to quality issues as well as problems of enforcement. Furthermore, there 
is evidence that the EU’s methodology in the pre-accession process, which 
directly links acquis approximation to progress on the road to accession by 
completing acquis-chapters in the negotiation, with the yearly monitoring 
reports adding time-pressure, has resulted in additional detrimental effects 
in relation to legality’s requirements of laws. Enactment of EU-related 
laws is often fast-tracked with little parliamentary discussions and with 
the executive controlling the process throughout,65 allowing governments 
‘to by-pass parliament and to justify the centralisation of decision-making 
by the emergency-like circumstance’,66 in order to meet formal indicators 
of compliance. Next to an erosion of democratic procedures, the lack of 
substantive debate about legislation and the most appropriate aims ways 
to achieve their aims in the domestic context has not been beneficial to 
61 Ulrich Sedelmeier ‘After Conditionality: Post-Accession Compliance with EU Law in 
East Central Europe’ 15 Journal of European Public Policy (2008), pp. 806-825 at 821. Also, 
Frank Schimmelfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier ‘Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europe-
anization of Central and Eastern Europe’ in Frank Schimmelfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier 
(eds) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
(2005), pp. 1-28.
62 Philippe C. Schmitter ‘Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New 
Concepts’ in Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter & Wolfgang Streeck 
(eds) Governance in the European Union London: Sage Publishing (1996), pp. 121-165 at 162 
fn 110.
63 Joseph H.H. Weiler ‘The Reformation of European Constitutionalism’ 35 Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies (1997), pp. 97-131 at 98.
64 With the CJEU as its ultimate authoritative interpreter. Amichai Magen ‘Transformative 
Engagement through Law: The Acquis Communautaire as an Instrument of EU External 
Infl uence’ 3 European Journal of Law Reform (2007), pp. 361-392 at 386.
65 On this point generally, see Heather Grabbe ‘How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE 
Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity’ 8 Journal of European Public Policy 
(2001), pp. 1013-1031.
66 Wojciech Sadurski ‘Introduction: The Law and Institutions of New Member States in Year 
One’ in Wojciech Sadurksi, Jacques Ziller & Karolina Zurek (eds) Après Enlargement: Legal 
and Political Responses in Central and Eastern Europe Florence: European University Insti-
tute (2006), pp. 3-18 at 7.
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legislative quality, even undermining formal legality.67 It was argued in the 
section on the rule of law’s category of formal elements, that although the 
Commission seems to recognise the drawbacks of its approach in a number 
of the monitoring reports covering the previous enlargement rounds as well 
as the current pre-accession process, it has refrained from adjusting it.
Having shown in the case studies that formal legality is a missing 
element of the EU’s rule of law conceptualisation both in its development 
cooperation and enlargement policy, this section proceeded to explain the 
little weight attributed to formal legality on the basis of particularities 
related to the policymaking domains. The chapter now turns to the ele-
ments within the procedural and institutional categories and the reasons 
underpinning the emphasis on some of them.
2.3 The reasons underpinning the focus on different elements in 
development cooperation and enlargement
Looking though a comparative lens, the previous sections showed that for 
both policy areas there is a manifest understanding of the rule of law in 
terms of institutional reform and capacity building – albeit for separate rea-
sons. In addition to that, the different reasons were explained on the gounds 
that little to no attention is paid in development cooperation and enlarge-
ment to considerations of the validity and quality of laws, i.e. formal legality 
as it is found on the first category of rule of law elements. However, the case 
studies also showed that in the EU’s understanding of the rule of law some 
of the elements within the procedural and institutional categories receive 
more attention and are, thus, more prominently featured than others. This 
holds true for the legal and policy framework as much as for the practice on 
the ground. This section will provide the different rationales underpinning 
the policies’ focus.
67 It is interesting to note that in the literature on post-accession behaviour of states it is 
pointed out that, contrary to popular belief that compliance with EU law would dete-
riorate after accession particularly in the case of the eight Member States involved in the 
2004 big-bang enlargement, this is not the case. In fact, it is argued that the experiences 
with pre-accession conditionality – the biggest factor undermining formal legality - has 
compelled the applicant states to build up legislative capacity. Indeed, many countries 
made institutional investments to increase the effectiveness of national arrangements for 
the adoption of EU law, which allowed them to transpose a massive amount of acquis into 
national legislation within a short period of time. This, in turn, has aided the new Mem-
ber States, after their accession in 2004, to maintain some of the established procedures, 
which increased their capacity for timely and correct transposition of EU directives into 
national law. Ulrich Sedelmeier ‘Compliance After Conditionality: Why Are the Europe-
an Union’s New Member States So Good?’ MAXCAP Working Paper Series No. 22 (2016); 
Radoslaw Zubek ‘Complying with Transposition Commitments in Poland: Collective 
Dilemmas, Core Executive and Legislative Outcomes’ 28 West European Politics (2005), 
pp. 592-619; Ulrich Sedelmeier ‘After Conditionality: Post-Accession Compliance with 
EU Law in East Central Europe’ 15 Journal of European Public Policy (2008), pp. 806-825 at 
820-821.
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2.3.1 Explaining the prominence of certain rule of law elements in the procedural 
category
To start with the procedural category, in the development cooperation 
case study it was put forward that unlike the underarticulated elements 
of judicial review and enforcement, the element of access to justice runs 
like a red thread through the EU’s understanding in this external area. It 
is the only procedural elements mentioned consistently at all levels; as a 
specific objective of cooperation in the ACP context68 and in a number of 
other cooperation agreements,69 as a focal point for EU financial assistance 
in the DCI70 and EIDHR71 regulations, as well as in many strategic policy 
documents throughout the years.72 There are two reasons that support its 
prominence and both relate to the nature of the policy area. First, access to 
justice has increasingly come to the fore in the international framework of 
development cooperation, culminating in its inclusion as the only explicit 
rule of law related goal of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.73 This 
international focus on access to justice, in turn, has been translated into the 
EU’s own development cooperation policy agenda.74 Both the Council and 
the Commission have done so in such a way as to highlight the central role 
of access to justice in achieving this. For example, in its conclusions on the 
implementation of the post-2015 development agenda and the SDGs, the 
Council has stated that effective and inclusive institutions need to be pro-
moted, based on the rule of law, in order to foster the legal empowerment 
68 Articles 9 and 33 Cotonou Agreement.
69 See for example Article 102 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Iraq, of the other 
part, OJ[2012] L204/20; Article 30 on cooperation in the fi eld of the rule of law of the 
Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, OJ [2013] L20/2.
70 Annex I section A(I)(a)(ii) of Regulation (EU) No 233/2014. See Articles 3(3) and 5(2)(f) of 
the previous DCI, Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006.
71 Article 2(1)(a)(ii) of Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
72 See, for example, Commission Communication on Democratisation, the Rule of Law, 
Respect for Human Rights and Good Governance: The Challenges of the Partnership 
between the European Union and the ACP States, COM(1998) 146 fi nal, 12 March 1998, 
p. 4; European Parliament Resolution on the EU and the global development framework 
after 2015, (2014/2143(INI)), 17 November 2014, pnt. 29; Council Conclusions ‘A new 
global partnership for poverty eradication and sustainable development after 2015’, Doc. 
9241/15, 26 May 2015; Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the gov-
ernments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Commission ‘The New European Consensus on Development – Our World, Our 
Dignity, Our Future’ OJ[2017] C210/1, pnt. 61.
73 Sustainable Development Goal No 16.3, available at https://www.un.org/sustain-
abledevelopment/peace-justice/.
74 New Consensus on Development (2017), pnt. 61. For the ACP context more particu-
larly, see the Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative on 
A Renewed Partnership with the Countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacifi c, 
JOIN(2016) 52 fi nal, 22 November 2016, p. 19.
280 Conclusions: the influence of the policy area on the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in its external relations
of woman as well as accountability. Accordingly, promoting access to justice 
for all ‘is an essential means of implementation of the agenda and an impor-
tant objective in itself.’75 In a similar vein, the Commission has expressed its 
desire that countries promote effective and responsive institutions, which 
should include ‘providing fair and predictable legal frameworks that pro-
mote and protect human rights.’76
The second reason for the distinction of access to justice as the most 
visible procedural rule of law element follows from the fact that this ele-
ment lies at the cusp of the intersecting lines of good governance, the 
protection of human rights, and the strengthening of the rule of law in the 
EU’s development cooperation policy. This means that it has received atten-
tion through all these policy strands, since improving it boosts all policy 
objectives. Indeed, as the Council spelled out in its May 2012 Conclusions, 
the promotion of human rights, the rule of law and good governance, and 
of inclusive and sustainable growth are the two mutually reinforcing basic 
pillars of the EU’s development policy.77 For this reason, a rights-based 
approach, ‘promoting in particular the right to universal and non-discrimi-
natory access to basic services, … justice and the rule of law’ should feature 
more prominently.78 For the EU, respect for the rule of law, including access 
to justice and the right to a fair trial, is essential for the protection of human 
rights,79 particularly those of poor and vulnerable groups.80 Not only that, 
there is a governance and an economic aspect to access to justice as well, 
since the reliable operation on courts ‘is an absolute requirement for judicial 
certainty without which investors may turn away from the country and 
in which case its development is doomed to failure.’81 Accordingly, access 
to justice is a sine qua non condition both for poverty reduction and for 
economic development. Furthermore, as it was pointed out in the section 
on access to justice in the development cooperation case study,82 this rule 
75 Council Conclusions ‘A new global partnership for poverty eradication and sustainable 
development after 2015’, Doc. 9241/15, 26 May 2015, pnt. 11.
76 Commission Communication on A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sus-
tainable Development after 2015, COM(2015) 44 fi nal, 5 February 2015, p. 4.
77 Council Conclusions ‘Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for 
Change’ 3166th Foreign Affairs Council, 14 May 2012, pnt. 6.
78 Ibid., pnt. 7.
79 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy on Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action 
– Towards a More Effective Approach, COM(2011) 886 fi nal, 12 December 2011, p. 7; 
Commission Communication on A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sus-
tainable Development After 2015, COM(2015) 44 fi nal, 5 February 2015, p. 4.
80 Joint Staff Working Document of the Commission and the High Representative on Gen-
der Equality and Women’s Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women 
through EU External Relations 2016-2020, SWD(2015) 182, 21 September 2015, p. 7; Com-
mission Staff Working Document ‘EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women’s 
Empowerment in Development 2010-2015, SEC(2010) 265 fi nal, 8 March 2010, p. 3.
81 Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 9 ‘Support for Justice Reform in ACP 
Countries’ EuropeAid (2010), p. 8.
82 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1.
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of law element also follows in the slipstream of the EU’s focus on judicial 
reform (see section 2.1 of this chapter) in combination with the rights-based 
approach. After all, empowering rights holders to claiming their rights, 
obtaining redress, or settling disputes is moot without courts (and other 
non-state forms of justice) to turn to, thus necessitating the strengthening 
of institutional capacity of the judicial sector.83 Vice versa, the rights-based 
approach is designed to ensure that justice reform programmes do not focus 
exclusively on capacity-building within the judiciary, but also take into 
account the rights and access of the end-users of the justice system.84
In contrast to development cooperation, it was demonstrated in the 
case study on enlargement that access to justice does not nearly receive the 
same level of attention as it does in development cooperation. Instead, two 
other procedural rule of law elements come to the fore,85 namely impar-
tiality (including its sub-elements ethical standards, rules on the random 
allocation of cases, rules regulating withdrawal/recusal, disciplinary pro-
ceedings, and dismissal), and judicial efficiency and quality (including its 
sub-elements backlogs, length of proceedings, enforcement, training of staff, 
case management, electronic availability decisions, and availability alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanisms). The reason for their prominence is 
threefold. First, the EU’s persistent emphasis on judicial reform has, as a 
corollary, turned the focus on the people working within the institutions, as 
well as the effectiveness and quality of the judicial process, as evidence, for 
instance by the EU’s 2000 Enlargement Strategy in which the strengthening 
of the judiciary is formulated in terms of the training of judges,86 and by the 
2006 Strategy, in which the Commission voiced the need for greater aware-
ness of judicial effectiveness.87 Secondly, as highlighted above, the function-
ing of the EU legal order is dependent on the effectiveness and quality of 
Member State courts, as well as the mutual trust between Member States,88 
emphasising the need for reform in these areas. Thirdly, impartiality and 
83 Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 15 on ‘Support to Justice and the Rule 
of Law’ EuropeAid (2012), p. 14.
84 Commission Staff Working Document on Tool-Box – A Rights-Based Approach, Encom-
passing All Human Rights for EU Development Cooperation, SWD(2014) 152 fi nal, 30 
April 2014, p. 6.
85 Both procedural elements are also included as interim benchmarks of Chapter 23 of both 
Serbia and Montenegro, see European Union Common Position, Chapter 23: Judiciary 
and Fundamental Rights Montenegro, AD 17/13, 12 December 2013; European Union 
Common Position, Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights Serbia, AD 20/16, 8 
July 2016.
86 Commission Enlargement on Strategy Paper & Report on progress towards accession by 
each of the candidate countries, COM(2000) 700 fi nal, 8 November 2000, p. 16.
87 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, 
COM(2006) 649 fi nal, 8 November 2007, p. 5.
88 Dimitry Kochenov EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession Condi-
tionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law The Hague: Kluwer Law Interna-
tional (2008), p. 228. Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de 
Contas, EU:C:2018:117, 27 February 2018, para. 33.
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judicial efficiency are emphasised in enlargement, because these procedural 
elements flow from the requirements that stem from Article 47 of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights and Article 6 ECHR and that need to be adhered 
to.89 In relation to the latter, as Members of the Council of Europe, having 
ratified the ECHR they need to act in accordance with its standards, already 
during the pre-accession process. In the case of the former, the applicant 
states will have to abide by the Charter and protect the rights enshrined 
therein after accession. In fact, as it was argued in the case study,90 regard-
ing the efficiency sub-element of reasonable time, the ECtHR’s growing 
case load on violations of the right to a speedy trial,91 i.e. the problem of 
extensive delays in court proceedings, against the applicant states, made 
this topic from the very beginning of the fifth enlargement round of the 
countries of central and Eastern Europe one of the prime rule of law sub-
elements to be considered in the reports.92
2.3.2 Explaining the prominence of certain rule of law elements in the 
institutional category
Turning now to the institutional category, in both case studies the conclu-
sions was drawn that judicial independence is the central institutional rule 
of law element. In their treatment of this notion, the case studies show some 
similarities. First, the legal framework of both development cooperation 
and enlargement specifically mention judicial independence as an impor-
tant precondition for the rule of law to exist. Accordingly, the essential 
elements clause of the Cotonou Agreement specifies that the rule of law 
will entail an independent legal system;93 a number of cooperation agree-
89 In this regard, Turkey’s screening report of Chapter 23 is quite insightful: ‘The rule of law 
principle and the right to a fair trial, as enshrined in Article 6 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, provide that the judiciary must be independent and impartial. The 
content of these notions has been clarifi ed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), which is an accepted reference for the EU acquis under Article 
6 (2) of the EU Treaty. In particular, Courts must be established by law; there shall be 
no discrimination in the appointment procedures of judges; the judiciary must not be 
infl uenced in its decision-making by either the executive or the legislature; judges must 
act impartially and be seen to do so; their conditions of tenure must be adequately 
ensured by law; the grounds for disciplinary action or removal from the post must be 
limited and laid down in the law.’ Screening Report Turkey, Chapter 23 – Judiciary and 
Fundamental Rights, 27 June 2007.
90 See chapter 4, section 3.2.2.
91 On the requirement of ‘reasonable time’ as mentioned in Article 6 ECHR in relation to 
the applicant states, see, for example, ECtHR, Tričković v. Slovenia, Appl. No. 39914/98; 
ECtHR, Bočvarska v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Appl. No. 27865/02; 
ECtHR, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, Appl. No. 5766/03.
92 See, for example, 1999 Poland Regular Report, p. 14; 2000 Slovakia Regular Report, p. 17; 
2006 FYROM Progress Report, p. 12; 2006 Croatia Progress Report, p. 8.
93 Article 9(2) Cotonou Agreement. Also see Article 33(1)(c) of the same Agreement.
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ments94 and Stabilisation and Association Agreements95 include the notion 
as a component of the rule of law; and the financial instrument applicable 
to development cooperation96 and enlargement97 all explicitly include it 
as a rule of law element. Furthermore, it is frequently mentioned through-
out the various Strategic documents,98 and, in the case of development 
cooperation, it can be found throughout the multiannual and/or national 
indicative programmes.99 In relation to enlargement, judicial independence 
is included as an objective throughout all rounds of the Accession and Euro-
94 See, for example, Article 102 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Iraq, of the other 
part, OJ[2012] L204/20; Article 8 Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between 
the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Andean Com-
munity and its Member Countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), of 
the other part, 15 December 2003.
95 As mentioned in the case study on enlargement, the Europe Agreements provide no sub-
stantive input for the EU’s defi nition of the rule of law. The Stabilisation and Associa-
tion Agreements, however, in their institutional approach on the rule of law, zoom in on 
judicial independence. See Article 74 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ[2004] L84/13; Article 80 Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement with the Republic of Montenegro, OJ[2010] L108/3; Article 80 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic of Serbia, OJ[2013] L278/16; 
Article 78 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic of Albania, 
OJ[2009] L107/166; Article 83 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo*, 
OJ[2016] L 71/3; Article 75 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the Republic of 
Croatia, OJ[2005] L26/3.
96 In the Development Cooperation Instrument, judicial independence is an element under 
the common areas of cooperation, see Annex I(A)(I)(a)(ii)) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014. 
Also see Article 2(1)(a)(ii) Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
97 Judicial independence is included in the current Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
twice as a specifi c objective (Article 2(1)(a)(i) and 2(2)(a)), and as a thematic priority of 
assistance in Annex II(b) Regulation (EU) No 231/2014.
98 For development cooperation, see, for example, Commission Communication on Democ-
ratisation, the Rule of Law, Respect for Human Rights and Good Governance: The Chal-
lenges of the Partnership between the European Union and the ACP States, COM(98) 146 
fi nal, 12 March 1998, p. 4; Commission Communication on Human Rights, Democracy 
and Development Cooperation Policy, SEC(91) 61 fi nal, 25 March 1991, p. 6; New Euro-
pean Consensus on Development (2017), pnt. 61.
 In relation to enlargement, to highlight just a few Communication, see Commission Com-
munication on Composite Paper - Reports on Progress Towards Accession by Each of 
the Candidate Countries, COM(98) 712 fi nal, 17 December 1998, p. 3; Commission Com-
munication on Strategy Paper & Report on the progress towards accession by each of 
the candidate countries ‘Making a Success of Enlargement’, COM(2001) 700 fi nal, 13 
November 2001, p. 10; Commission Communication on 2005 enlargement strategy paper, 
COM(2005) 561 fi nal, 9 November 2005, p. 8; Commission Communication ‘Enlarge-
ment Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011’ COM(2010) 660, 9 November 2010, p. 5; 
Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012’ 
COM(2011) 666 fi nal, 12 October 2011, p. 5; Commission Communication on 2018 Com-
munication on EU Enlargement Policy, COM(2018) 450 fi nal, 17 April 2018, p. 2.
99 See, for example, the Philippines Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020, p. 5.
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pean Partnerships,100 it is an element in covered in the annual reports of 
the previous accession rounds as well as those of the current pre-accession 
process,101 it is highlighted in the screening reports of chapter 23,102 and 
progress in strengthening it is included as an interim benchmark of that 
same chapter.103
The reasons for its prominence are interrelated, twofold and valid for 
both external policy areas. First, the EU’s understanding of the rule of law 
in terms of institutional reform and, more particularly, judicial reform, as 
pointed out at the start of this chapter, ensures that its focus is firmly on 
the flaws within the traditional institutions of justice – the courts and its 
judges.104 Since judicial independence is such a core notion within this 
context, its emphasis is only logical. This is evidenced more generally by 
its extensive treatment in the ECtHR’s case law on Article 6 ECHR,105 as 
well as it being a focal point in many indicator list regarding the rule of 
law and judicial independence drawn up by various other international 
organisations, such as the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of 
the Judiciary,106 the Performance Indicators on Independence, Account-
ability and Quality of the Judiciary drawn up by the European Network 
of Councils for the Judiciary,107 and the International Principles on the 
100 See, for example, the 1999 Accession Partnership Bulgaria; 2002 Accession Partner-
ship Slovakia; 2003 Accession Partnership Romania; 2008 European Partnership Serbia 
including Kosovo.
101 See, for example, 2001 Poland Regular Report, p. 20; 2001 Hungary Regular Report, 
p. 16; 2001 Romania Regular Report, p. 20; 2008 Montenegro Progress Report, p.11; 2012 
FYROM Progress Report, p. 10.
102 See Serbia Outcome of screening for Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights, Doc. 
12003/14, 16 July 2014, pp. 4-5; Montenegro Outcome of screening for Chapter 23: Judi-
ciary and fundamental rights, Doc. 17785/12, 14 December 2012, pp. 3-5; Iceland Out-
come of screening for Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights, Doc. 12975/11, 19 
July 2011, pp. 3-4; Turkey’s Chapter 23 Screening Report, 27 June 2007, pp. 4-5.
103 European Union Common Position, Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights Mon-
tenegro, AD 17/13, 12 December 2013, pp. 19-20; European Union Common Position, 
Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights Serbia, AD 20/16, 8 July 2016, p. 22.
104 For the purposes of this section, courts and their staff are highlighted, however, as shown 
throughout the case studies, judicial reform encompasses also the policy, prisons, and 
lawyers.
105 For an extensive overview, see the ECtHR’s own guide to its interpretation of Article 6, 
both in relation to the civil limb (https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_
ENG.pdf) as well as the criminal limb (https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_
Art_6_criminal_ENG.pdf).
106 These principles, formulated in 1985 to assist Member States in their task of securing and 
promoting the independence of the judiciary, are available at: http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx.
107 European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, Independence, Accountability and 
Quality of the Judiciary – ENCJ Report 2016-2017, 9 June 2017, available at:  https://
www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/workinggroups/independence/encj_report_ia_ga_
adopted_ga_13_6.pdf.
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Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors of 
the International Commission of Jurists.108
Secondly, judicial independence has come to the fore as one of the 
main ways of ensuring the separation of powers. As it was pointed out in 
chapters 1 and 2, restraint of governmental power is one of the core tenets 
of the rule of law; it guarantees that governments rule through law and 
are themselves bound by it.109 It was also shown that in order to achieve 
this, the doctrine of the separation of powers was developed to attempt 
to ensure that power is divided into different component parts, whereby 
certain parts of government bind other parts of that same government to the 
law.110 However, in the section on the rule of law element of the separation 
of powers, the understanding of this doctrine in both case studies showed 
that the EU has chosen to approach this doctrine mainly through an empha-
sis on the independence of the judiciary branch.111 Both in development 
cooperation and in enlargement, the main focus in either policy area is not 
on the doctrine per se, i.e. on how the three branches interrelate and power is 
balanced, but rather on the sole element of judicial independence, hence the 
strong emphasis on the latter.
2.4 The reason explaining the limited articulation of procedural and 
institutional elements
The previous section showed that in relation to the procedural rule of law 
elements, the EU favours the element of access to justice in its development 
cooperation policy. In contrast, in enlargement, it has emphasised judicial 
impartiality and the effectiveness and quality of the judiciary. Several 
explanatory reasons were provided of why this is the case. In a similar 
fashion, the institutional element of judicial independence was shown to be 
the outstanding institutional element in both policy areas. Next, the chapter 
turns to the general finding of the case studies that a number of the proce-
dural and institutional rule of law elements suffer from a lack of articulation 
and general vagueness. The section will show that the EU’s focus on the 
rule of law as a means to an end has led to a strong emphasis on the end 
goals of the rule of law, i.e. what strengthening the rule of law is meant to 
achieve, rather than on the articulation of the rule of law itself.
Throughout the case studies it was noted that the precise articula-
tion of a number of rule of law elements identified therein left much to 
be desired and in some cases led to conceptual confusion. For instance, it 
108 International Commission of Jurists, International Principles on the Independence and 
Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors – Practitioners guide No. 1 (2007), 
available at: http://icj2.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Principles-inde-
pendence-lawyers-publication-2007.pdf.
109 See chapter 1, section 2; chapter 2, section 2.
110 See chapter 1, section 3; chapter 2, section 4.
111 See chapter 3, section 3.3.2.; chapter 4, section 3.3.2.
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was asserted in the chapter on the EU’s development cooperation policy, 
that the procedural element of judicial review has not been fleshed out in 
detail. It was shown that mention is made of the fact that the judiciary ‘must 
control the interpretation and the application of the law’,112 however, noth-
ing further is provided regarding minimum standards or required types of 
review. Instead, the case studies showed that the EU has adopted a rather 
anatomical approach whereby various requirements for a well-functioning 
judicial system are outlined, such as an independent judiciary, effective and 
accessible legal services, equality before the law, and an effective executive 
capable of enforcing the law,113 but that little is advanced on how some of 
these aspects need to come together in order for the judiciary to actually 
fulfil its role of review, i.e. to assess and make binding judgments about 
whether and to what extent a government action complies with procedural 
and substantive requirement embodied in the law.
Similarly, in the enlargement case study, as far as the procedural ele-
ment of judicial impartiality is concerned, it was highlighted that the EU 
has frequently failed to delineate between this notion, and the closely linked 
concept of judicial independence, thereby demonstrating conceptual confu-
sion. The analysis presented in the case study drew attention to the fact 
that impartiality is often mentioned together with judicial independence, 
as shown by references throughout the monitoring documents such as the 
following: ‘The principles of impartiality and judicial independence are set 
out in the Constitutions and reflected in the laws on the governance of the 
judiciary and on the status of judges and prosecutors.’114 More particularly, 
it was argued that impartiality is only infrequently addressed in its own 
right, and that, even when it is, the analysis repeatedly touches upon issues 
of independence, rather than impartiality itself, of which a number of 
examples were provided in the relevant section.115
It is submitted here that part of the reason why the EU has failed to 
provide a clear articulation of the rule of law and some of its elements 
in the two case studies, lies in the fact that the EU relies on two separate 
assumptions. The first assumption relates to the rule of law’s instrumental 
use-value: there is evidence in both policy areas that the EU has the assump-
tion that the rule of law is a means to a variety of ends (security, economic 
growth, human right protection) rather than an end in itself (what the rule 
of law brings instead of what it is), which has led to a strong emphasis on 
the end itself and a lack of attention on precisely what elements of the rule 
of law are needed for achieving those ends. The second assumption relates 
112 Programming Guide for Strategy Papers, Programming Fiche on Rule of Law - The judi-
cial system within the broader justice sector context (2009), p. 1.
113 See the defi nition provided by the Commission on the requirements needed for a coun-
try to operate under the rule of law, Programming Guide for Strategy Papers, Program-
ming Fiche on Rule of Law - The judicial system within the broader justice sector context 
(2009), p. 1.
114 2018 Albania Report, p. 18.
115 See chapter 4, section 3.2.1.
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to the dominance of the idea of judicial reform: the assumption is that creat-
ing well-equipped judiciaries and training the staff within them will result 
in a general respect for the rule of law.
In relation to the first assumption, a great many examples can be found 
in the various documents related to development cooperation as well as 
enlargement in which the focus is not on the rule of law itself, but rather 
on its instrumental force, i.e. the rule of law is understood as a means to 
the realisation of other particular goals.116 To provide a few, in the Joint 
Communication on the renewed partnership with the ACP countries, it is 
stated that ‘[t]he partnership should focus on delivering the rule of law. 
This is a fundamental value, a necessary basis for sustainable development, a key 
component in preventing conflict, and a foundation for successful cooperation in 
other areas of interest for the EU.’117 In its 2015 Enlargement Strategy the Com-
mission offered that ‘[s]trenthening the rule of law increases legal certainty, 
encourages and protects investments and contributes significantly to supporting 
economic development and competitiveness. Conversely, economic reforms and 
integration have the capacity to stabilise countries in the longer term. It is 
imperative that the enlargement process facilitates these synergies, to pro-
vide a stronger impetus to economic reforms so that the aspiring Member 
States enjoy the benefits of functioning market economies with a strong 
rule of law before they join.’118 Furthermore, the Multi-annual Indicative 
Programmes for the Kyrgyz Republic for the period 2014-2020 put forward 
that ‘the enhancement of the rule of law greatly benefits the business climate 
and hence trade, investments and economic growth in the country. Continued 
support to rule of law and judicial reforms is therefore very much needed 
to strengthen democracy and protect individual rights, including human rights, as 
well as combating corruption.’119
While there are many more examples, the basic message to take away 
from the ones highlighted here is that they demonstrate that the Union 
perceives of the rule of law as a virtue that brings with it numerous positive 
other ends; the assumption is that by promoting the rule of law, economic 
development will follow, conflict will be prevented and security will be pro-
vided, and the protection of human rights will be strengthened. More spe-
116 See Neil Walker ‘The Rule of Law and the EU: Necessity’s Mixed Virtue’ in Gianluigi 
Palombella & Neil Walker (eds) Relocating the Rule of Law Oxford: Hart Publishing (2009), 
pp. 119-138 at 123; Brian Z. Tamanaha Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2006). Rachel Kleinfeld ‘Competing Defi nitions 
of the Rule of Law’ in Thomas Carothers (ed) Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad. In Search of 
Knowledge Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2006), pp. 31-73.
117 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative on A Renewed 
Partnership with the Countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacifi c, JOIN(2016) 52 
fi nal, 22 November 2016, p. 8 [emphasis added].
118 Commission Communication on EU Enlargement Strategy, COM(2015) 611 final, 10 
November 2015, p.5 [emphasis added].
119 Multi-annual Indicative Programme for the Kyrgyz Republic 2014-2020, p. 4 [emphasis 
added].
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cifically, according to many strategic policy documents, the EU understands 
that there is a causal connection between rule of law reform and these other 
outcomes. This instrumental use-value of the notion was also highlighted 
in the introductory chapter of this thesis as the fourth function of the rule 
of law in relation to the EU’s own security.120 It was shown there that the 
Treaties have linked the EU’s objective of safeguarding the rule of law to 
the protection of its own security. Moreover, it was pointed out that since 
the EU’s internal and external security interests are highly intertwined, the 
more instrumental understanding of the rule of law has also made its way 
into the Union’s perception of it in relation to its external security. Indeed, 
the EU sees the rule of law as a means to achieving economic prosperity, 
social order, and secure environments, which will, in turn, make people 
better able to withstand criminal activity and abuse of power.121 After all, 
the most advantages to the EU are stable states, with potential for trade, 
investment and economic growth. Clearly, both case studies demonstrate 
the Union’s instrumental understanding of the rule of law. However, with-
out entering in the discussion on the effectiveness of rule of law reform,122 
it is fairly obvious that societies are complex and that the rule of law, while 
surely being a contributing factor, is not capable of achieving all these end 
goals on its own. The strength of the belief in the link between the rule of 
law on the hand and its assumed benefits on the other, however, is such, 
that none of the documents in either case study provide an insight into 
how specifically the rule of law contributes to the connection and what this 
means for the concept’s definition. Thus, the strong causal assumptions 
underlying the rule of law’s instrumental use-value, i.e. by strengthening 
the rule of law in a given country economic growth and stability will auto-
matically follow, have led to a lack of attention to its precise components.
The second assumption relates to the EU’s ubiquitous institutional 
understanding of the rule of law, namely, that by concentrating on judicial 
reform, the implicit belief is that the rule of law in its many assets will flour-
ish, with effective judicial review, independent, efficient and qualitatively 
well-functioning judiciaries staffed with accountable and impartial judges. 
120 See the Introduction to this thesis, section 3.1.4.
121 Compare with the general fi ndings of the section on the lack of conceptual differentia-
tion between the rule of law as a political criterion and as part of Chapter 23 of the acquis 
(chapter 4, section 4.3) in which it was argued that elements that threaten the rule of law 
such as corruption and organised crime, should not be considered as part of the rule of 
law.
122 See, for example, Rachel Kleinfeld Advancing the Rule of Law Abroad. Next Generation 
Reform Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2012); Amichai 
Magen ‘The Rule of Law and its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope’ 45 Stanford 
Journal of International Law (2009), pp. 51-116; Thomas Carothers (ed.) Promoting the Rule 
of Law Abroad. In Search of Knowledge Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace (2006); Eric G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller Beyond Common Knowledge – Empirical 
Approaches to the Rule of Law Stanford: Stanford University Press (2003). Frank Upham 
‘Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy’ in Carothers (2006), pp. 75-104; Wade 
Channell ‘Lessons Not Learned About Legal Reform’ Carothers (2006), pp. 137-160.
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The case studies demonstrate that this reflects the EU’s approach. They also 
show, that only selective elements have been articulated, some of them not 
fully, and the focus is on them in isolation, rather than on their performance 
in combination. However, while legal institutions supporting the rule of law 
are a conditio sine qua non, this does not mean that institutions are in them-
selves sufficient guarantees for the rule of law to operate in a satisfactory 
manner.123 After all, the renewed emphasis on the rule of law in the EU’s 
Enlargement Strategies of the past decade,124 in combination with the lack 
of progress and even backsliding125 in relation to the rule of law across the 
Western Balkan countries,126 confirm that this is not the case. While the EU’s 
rule of law approach has certainly led to judicial capacity-building, this, 
in itself, has not had more rule of law as a direct consequence. Thus, in a 
similar vein as the first assumption, the strong belief in the fact that judicial 
reform is equated with the rule of law, has led to the limited articulation 
of those rule of law elements, such as judicial review and the separation of 
power, that rely on more than the simple definition of component parts.
2.5 The EU’s definition of the rule of law in development cooperation 
and enlargement in the light of the common elements identified 
in chapter one
The case studies demonstrate that the EU’s definition of the rule of law 
found therein, departs from the rule of law as it is found to be ‘common to 
the Member States’. Indeed, chapter 1 showed that formal legality is con-
sidered to be the common substance of the rule of law, setting requirements 
123 Paul Blokker ‘EU Democratic Oversight and Domestic Deviation from the Rule of Law’ 
in Carlos Closa & Dimitry Kochenov (eds) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the Euro-
pean Union Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2016), pp.249-269 at 255.
 In its latest enlargement communications, the Commission seems to have understood 
this to some extent since it announced that ‘[s]trengthening the rule of law is not only 
an institutional issue. It requires societal transformation,’ a statement it repeated a few 
months later in the 2018 Enlargement Strategy. Commission Communication on A Cred-
ible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced Engagement with the Western Balkans, 
COM(2018) 65 fi nal, 6 February 2018, p. 4; Commission Communication on 2018 Com-
munication on EU Enlargement Policy, COM(2018) 450 fi nal, 17 April 2018, p. 2.
124 In almost all Enlargement Strategies from 2011 onwards, the following sentiment, or 
a variation thereof, is repeated: ‘Strengthening the rule of law has been identifi ed as a 
continuing major challenge and a crucial condition for countries moving towards EU 
membership. This issue has been given greater attention in recent years at all stages of 
the accession process.’ Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main 
Challenges 2011-2012’ COM(2011) 666 fi nal, 12 October 2011, p. 4.
125 Laurent Pech & Kim Lane Scheppele ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the 
EU’ 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2017), pp. 3-47.
126 According to the 2018 Enlargement Strategy: ‘Structural shortcomings persist, notably in 
the key areas of the rule of law and the economy. Accession candidates must deliver on 
the rule of law.’ Commission Communication on 2018 Communication on EU Enlarge-
ment Policy, COM(2018) 450 fi nal, 17 April 2018, p. 1.
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for governments in relation to their laws, while also setting criteria for the 
validity of laws themselves. In development cooperation and enlargement, 
however, formal legality is largely absent and even, in the case of the lat-
ter, undermined by the policy’s methodology. Judicial review of legislation 
and executive acts, found to be the common mechanism to safeguard the 
rule of law in the Rechtsstaat, état de droit, and Anglo-Saxon rule of law,127 is 
underarticulated and only minimally present in the EU’s conceptualisation 
of the rule of law in the two external policy areas. The same finding applies 
to the separation of powers; the doctrine’s inclusion as a rule of law element 
follows directly from the existence of legality in its power-constraining 
dimension and by virtue of the fact that its requirements are directed at the 
different branches of government.128 However, the case studies show that 
while there is sensitivity about the necessity of the separation of powers, its 
articulation is restricted to a focus on judicial independence.129
Furthermore, in contrast to the elements established in chapter 1, there 
is a particular emphasis on some procedural elements in either one of the 
external areas, the reasons for which were explained above (section 2.3). In 
the same vein, the case studies show that the EU concentrates much of its 
rule of law efforts on judicial reform, a finding that differs from the three 
national rule of law conceptualisations that were examined in the begin-
ning of this thesis, in which the institutional angle is largely absent. Apart 
from the reasons explaining this emphasis provided above, the case studies 
also showed that there is an obvious difference between the rule of law as 
it has developed over time in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, 
and the many different stages of development the developing countries 
and applicant states find themselves in, which often require state-building 
rather than the tweaking of existing rule of law structures. Compare, for 
example, the EU’s rule of law efforts in the pre-accession process of the 
CEECs and the countries in the Western Balkans with the Commission’s 
avis on Iceland’s application for EU membership in which it was stated that 
‘[t]he rule of law … [is] guaranteed. The Icelandic authorities need to make 
further efforts to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, especially 
regarding the procedure for judicial appointment. Mechanisms to prevent 
conflicts of interest need to be strengthened.’ Apart from these two adjust-
ments, the Commission concluded that the country satisfied the political 
Copenhagen criteria.130
127 See chapter 1, section 5.
128 See chapter 2, section 4.
129 Although, in the case of enlargement, some additional attention is paid to the fact that 
there should not be undue interference in the work of courts by the executive branch.
130 Commission Opinion on Iceland’s Application for Membership of the European Union, 
COM(2010) 62 fi nal, 24 February 2010, p. 7.
Conclusions: the influence of the policy area on the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in its external relations 291
The question arises whether these discrepancies, although they can be 
explained, are problematic? In the light of the fact that the EU’s external 
action shall be guided by the principles which have guided its own creation 
(Article 21(1) TEU), development and enlargement - those same principles 
that are common to the Member States (Article 2 TEU) - the findings are 
disconcerting. In development cooperation and enlargement, the EU is 
clearly expounding a rule of law concept that is at variance with what the 
EU Treaty expects and even prescribes that it should be. While there are 
some extenuating circumstances related to the nature of the rule of law con-
cept itself that allow for a more flexible approach towards the concept, these 
discrepancies are cause for concern. The clearest reason for more precision 
regarding the rule of law’s definition lies in the EU’s policy financing instru-
ments and conditionality, as will be shown below.
Regarding the nature of the rule of law, it is repeated several times 
throughout this thesis, that the notion does not prescribe institutional 
design, rather, it informs states about the balance and effects of its choices; 
it sets a framework in order to better understand the inherent trade-offs.131 
For example, strict adherence to the doctrine of the separation of powers 
would preclude judicial review. However, since the rule of law requires the 
review of actions of governmental bodies at least in a marginal sense in 
order to prevent abuse of power,132 checks and balances become a matter 
of degree.133 Similar trade-offs exist in relation to the rule of law elements 
of judicial independence, impartiality, and judicial accountability.134 
131 Rodriguez et al. formulate trade-offs in terms of confl icts among institutions aiming to 
promote the rule of law, i.e. the choices that have to be made in order to accommodate 
the various aims of the rule of law. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Mathew D. McCubbins & Barry 
R. Weingast ‘The Rule of Law Unplugged’ 50 Emory Law Journal (2010), pp. 1455-1494 at 
1459.
132 Tom Bingham The Rule of Law London: Penguin Books (2010), p. 61; Geranne Lauten-
bach The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human Rights Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2013), p. 42; Jeremy Waldron ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial 
Review’ 115 The Yale Law Journal (2006), pp. 1346-1406 at 1354; Trevor R.S. Allan ‘Legisla-
tive Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism’ 44 Cambridge 
Law Journal (1985), pp. 111-143 at 114.
133 Allen (1985), p. 113.
134 Further, see Martin Mendelski ‘Europeanization and the Rule of Law: Towards a Path-
ological Turn’ 40 Southeastern Europe (2016), pp. 346-384; Michal Bobak & David Kosar 
‘Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and 
Eastern Europe’ 15 German Law Journal (2014), pp. 1257-1292; Ramona Coman ‘Quo Vadis 
Judicial Reforms? The Quest for Judicial Independence in Central and Eastern Europe’ 
66 Europe-Asia Studies (2014), pp. 892-924; Rodriguez et al. (2010), pp. 1492; Erik S. Her-
ron & Kirk A. Randazzo ‘The Relationship between Independence and Judicial Review 
in Post-Communist Courts’ 65 The Journal of Politics (2003), pp. 422-438; Open Society 
Institute (2001) Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Independence, p. 18, available 
at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/fi les/judicialind_20011010.
pdf.
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Consequent ly, from the perspective of the rule of law, it is clear that the EU 
can give states some leeway in how to strengthen and consolidate it in a 
manner that reflects this.135 This flexibility might even be preferable from 
the perspective of country specificity in relation to the rule of law,136 but 
does rely on the assumption that there is an actual will to strengthen the 
rule of law on the side of the third state with the appropriate allocation of 
funds provided by the EU.137 Nonetheless, while the flexibility applies in 
relation to how elements can be implemented, it does not allow the rule of 
law to stretch so far as to exclude elements altogether; a definition of the rule 
of law without legality is patently missing one of its core components.
According to the Preamble of the EU’s financing instruments for 
development cooperation and enlargement, they take as their point of 
departure the direct correlation between the rule of law as it is found in 
all the Member States and the same value as it is tasked with promoting 
in its external action.138 The DCI, EIDHR and IPAII Regulations all call for 
progress towards achievement of the specific objectives set out in them to be 
monitored and assessed on the basis of ‘pre-defined, clear, transparent and, 
where appropriate, country specific and measurable’ indicators.139 In the 
light of the fact that conditionality requires at the very minimum that con-
crete and clear minimum standards are formulated, the EU’s limited rule 
135 Several fi ndings in the cases studies showed that the EU’s limited articulation has had as 
its outcome that it has allowed states, at least to some extent, to grapple with rule of law 
issues in a manner that they see fi t. See, for instance the section on the procedural element 
of judicial quality and effi ciency in the enlargement chapter, where it was shown that the 
Commission acknowledged the existing problems, such as the effective enforcement of 
court decisions and backlogs, but did/does not provide a detailed outline of what the 
applicants need(ed) to achieve. See chapter 4, section 3.2.2.
 In the case of development cooperation, an example can be found in the section on judi-
cial independence where, instead of offering a comprehensive defi nition, a handful of 
sub-elements are offered from which developing countries are seemingly allowed to pick 
the ones that fi t them best. See chapter 3, section 3.3.3.
136 EuropeAid’s document on Sector Indicator Guidance for Programming even states that 
‘it should be noted that due to the inherently different operating contexts across coun-
tries, it is not possible to provide an exhaustive list of sector indicators which cover every 
possible situation in a meaningful way.’ Sector Indicator Guidance for Programming - 
Sector Indicator Guidance Note - Rule of Law & Justice, EuropeAid (2013), p. 1.
137 See the European Court of Auditors’ Report on Pre-accession assistance to Turkey, in 
which this exact point is made in terms of the sustainability of reform efforts being at risk 
due to lack of political will. See European Court of Auditors ‘EU Pre-Accession Assis-
tance to Turkey: Only Limited Results So Far’ Special Report No 7 (2018), pnt. 35.
138 See, for example, the Preamble of Regulation (EU) No 235/2014, paras. 2-5.
139 Article 2(2) Regulation (EU) No 231/2014; Article 11(5) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014; 
Article 5 Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
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of law articulation is, while at the very least unhelpful for third states,140 
also legally problematic.141 How is the Union to follow its own instructions 
that progress measurement of and allocation of funds for rule of law reform 
be performed in a transparent way,142 if there is no clear articulation of the 
concepts it applies?
It seems that, to some extent, the EU is aware of outside expectations 
regarding definitional clarity. In 2011, in their Joint Communication on 
Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action, the 
Commission and the High Representative remarked on the fact that the EU 
has not always been as successful as it might have been and that to improve 
the situation, the task at hand was ‘to ensure the clarity, coherence and 
effectiveness of policy’.143 Moreover, according to the same Communica-
tion, since the Lisbon Treaty put the rule of law at the centre of all external 
action, the efficacious implementation of this principle is made ‘even more 
140 At the Balkan summit on May 17, the Albanian prime minister again expressed the oft-
heard sentiment that the accession process has become much more diffi cult and much 
less predictable, see Eric Maurice ‘Connectivity Trumps Enlargement at Balkan Summit’ 
17 May 2018, available at; https://euobserver.com/enlargement/141854. On the prob-
lem of ‘moving targets’ in the pre-accession process of the CEECs, see Heather Grabbe 
‘A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and 
East European Applicants’ RSC Working Paper (1999) No. 12; Andrew Williams ‘Enlarge-
ment of the Union and Human Rights Conditionality: A Policy of Distinction’ 25 Euro-
pean Law Review (2000), pp. 601-617; Marise Cremona ‘Accession to the European Union: 
Membership Conditionality and Accession Criteria’ 25 Polish Yearbook of International Law 
(2002), pp. 219-240; Christophe Hillion ‘Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal 
Analysis’ in Anthony Arnull & Daniel Wincott (eds) Accountability and Legitimacy in the 
European Union Oxford: Oxford University Press (2002), pp. 401-418; Karen E. Smith ‘The 
Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality’ in Marise Cremona (ed) 
The Enlargement of the European Union Oxford: Oxford University Press (2003), pp. 105-
140.
141 In at least two of its reports on the topic of rule of law reform in enlargement, the Court 
of Auditors pointed out that there has been a lack of clear benchmarks and objectively 
verifi able indicators to assess progress in meeting the EU’s rule of law related objectives. 
See European Court of Auditors ‘European Union Assistance to Kosovo Related to the 
Rule of Law’ Special Report No 18 (2012), pnt. 68; European Court of Auditors ‘EU Pre-
Accession Assistance to Turkey: Only Limited Results So Far’ Special Report No 7 (2018), 
pnt. 24.
142 Next to the fi nancial instruments that have already been mentioned, the Regulation 
applicable to the fi nancial regulation of the 11th European Development Fund mentions 
under its principle of sound fi nancial management that ‘[s]pecifi c, measurable, achiev-
able, relevant and timed objectives shall be set. The achievement of those objectives shall 
be monitored by performance indicators.’ Moreover, ‘the operation shall be subject to an 
ex post evaluation with a view to ensuring that the intended results justifi ed the means 
deployed.’ Article 11(2) and 11(3)(b) Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 
on the fi nancial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund. Also see 
Article 2(2) Regulation (EU) No 231/2014; Article 11(5) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014; 
Article 5 Regulation (EU) No 235/2014.
143 Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy on Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action 
– Towards a More Effective Approach, COM(2011) 886 final, 12 December 2011, p. 6 
[emphasis added].
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pressing’.144 Specifically when it comes to the distribution of EU funds, the 
Union has shown that it is cognizant of the fact that there is an element of 
legal certainty in relation to the EU and Member States on the one hand, and 
beneficiaries on the other.’145 However, at the very minimum for reasons of 
legal certainty, the EU should put forward a more concrete definition of the 
rule of law.
3. The way forward?
This chapter discussed the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law in 
development cooperation and enlargement and provided reasons in order 
to explain the outcomes of the case studies in relation to the rule of law 
elements identified therein. In this final section, the focus turns to the ques-
tion of the way forward; what are the lessons learned from the research 
undertaken in this thesis? Three interrelated insights will be presented 
here, along with suggestions for improvement. The first insight relates to 
perspective, the second to policy influence, and the third insight to the need 
to distinguish between the rule of law’s definition and its projected benefits.
3.1 In order to see the bigger picture, start with the component parts
Throughout the strategic documents underlying the case studies, the call 
for a ‘comprehensive’ approach towards rule of law reform is stressed. For 
example, in the guidance document for future EU development cooperation 
programmes of 2012 it is stated that there is a need for a more comprehen-
sive perspective toward technical assistance for capacity development in 
the justice area,146 a sentiment already expressed in the 2004 Handbook on 
promoting Good Governance in EC Development and Co-Operation.147 
Similarly, the Programming Fiche on the Rule of Law put forward that the 
EU’s response strategy ‘should approach the reforms in the judicial system 
in a holistic way.’148 Moreover, taking stock of developments in the pre-
144 Ibid.
145 Paragraph 7 of the Preamble of the Regulation 1303/2013 of 17 December 2013 laying 
down common provision on the European Regional Development Fund, the European 
Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on 
the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion 
Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1083/2006, OJ[2013] L347/320.
146 Tools and Methods Series Reference Document No. 15 on ‘Support to Justice and the Rule 
of Law’ EuropeAid (2012), p. 53.
147 ‘Handbook on Promoting Good Governance in EC Development and Cooperation’ Euro-
peAid (2004), p. 33.
148 Programming Guide for Strategy Papers, Programming Fiche on Rule of Law - The judi-
cial system within the broader justice sector context (2009), p. 1.
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accession process in the Western Balkan, the 2012 Enlargement Strategy 
affirmed that since limited progress had been achieved in the area of judicial 
system reform, a constructive attitude towards the need for a comprehen-
sive reform strategy needed to emerge.149
These calls for a more all-encompassing approach towards rule of 
law reform are echoed in the literature. Since the notion is regarded as a 
variegated,150 complex151 and cross-cutting152 one, it is oft repeated that 
the EU should pay greater attention to ‘the whole forest and not just the 
trees’153 when it comes to rule of law reform. In other words, the rule of 
law needs to be defined and assessed from a comprehensive perspective 
that considers all its parts together, as well as its interplay with a host of 
other ideals, such as democracy, human rights, and security. The idea is 
that merely establishing a definition consisting of ‘laundry lists’154 of insti-
tutional attributes, with a selective focus on the performance of atomised 
rule of law elements is not a sufficient condition for the rule of law to be 
truly embedded at the domestic level of states.155 The point here is not to 
deny this approach; rather, the insight gained from the present research 
is that a comprehensive perspective should necessarily be preceded by 
an understanding of the component parts and their interrelationships, in 
order to understand the elements that make up the rule of law. If there is 
no clarity at the level of elements, not only will there be the possibility that 
the applied definition will, unknowingly (or not), put more emphasis of 
certain elements over others (see section 2.1), there is also the chance that 
elements are left out (see section 2.2), or that stressing a particular element 
will negatively impact another156 (see section 2.4).
Section 2.5 showed that the EU’s understanding of the rule of law in 
development cooperation and in enlargement is unbalanced and incom-
plete. Out of the three categories, the institutional one receives the most 
attention, with the procedural category a close second, and the first category 
149 Commission Communication on Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, 
COM(2012) 600 fi nal, 10 October 2012, p. 59.
150 Walker ( 2009), p. 119.
151 Martin Mendelski ‘Europeanization and the Rule of Law: Towards a Pathological Turn’ 
40 Southeastern Europe (2016), pp. 346-384 at 378.
152 Olga Burlyuk ‘An Ambitious Failure: Conceptualising the EU Approach to Rule of Law 
Promotion (in Ukraine)’ 6 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2014), pp. 26-46 at 43.
153 Marko Kmezić EU Rule of Law Promotion. Judiciary Reform in the Western Balkans London: 
Routledge (2017), p. 164.
154 Jeremy Waldron ‘The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure’ in James E. Fleming 
(ed) Getting to the Rule of Law New York: New York University Press (2011), pp. 3-31 at 5-7.
155 See, for example, Martin Mendelski ‘The Rule of Law’ in Adam Fagan & Petr Kopecky 
The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics London: Routledge (2018), pp. 113-125 at 
122.
156 See Martin Mendelski ‘The EU’s Rule of Law Promotion in Post-Soviet Europe: What 
Explains the Divergence Between Baltic States and EaP Countries?' 7 Eastern Journal of 
European Studies (2016), pp. 111-144.
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of formal elements having been left out all-together. This chapter further-
more showed that within each of these two categories the emphasis is on a 
few particular elements, with others, while part of the Union’s definition, 
not nearly receiving the same level of attention. Moreover, the analysis has 
made it clear that a number of the identified rule of law elements are left 
underdefined. Thus, before discussing a ‘comprehensive’ approach towards 
the rule of law, the insight is proposed here that the EU’s institutions would 
do well to understand the rule of law’s different elements, their interaction 
and complementary combination in order to come to a more balanced and 
complete conceptualisation.
3.2 Acknowledge policy influence and the emphasis it brings with it 
on the rule of law definition
The case studies unveiled two things. First, the findings in relation to the 
existence of certain elements (judicial review, separation of powers, judicial 
independence) and the EU’s understanding of these (limited articulation, 
focus on judicial reform), are similar. Secondly, there is a different emphasis 
on certain other elements (access to justice in development cooperation, 
and impartiality, judicial effectiveness, judicial accountability in enlarge-
ment). From this, the conclusion can be drawn that the EU’s definition of 
the rule of law in the examined policy areas is largely overlapping, how-
ever, it is apparent that the policy area itself also impacts the various rule 
of law elements either in relation to why they are there or how they are 
interpreted.
The insight here is not to propose that the rule of law is purely contex-
tual. As shown above, the concept itself allows for some measure of flexibil-
ity, and as long as the interplay between the various elements is recognised, 
a different balance can be found in a different country. After all, the rule of 
law is applied at the domestic level of states and many variations exist. This 
insight is about the fact that the case studies show that the definition of the 
rule of law per se is impacted by the policy area; the policy areas are such 
that they influence, at least to a certain degree, the prioritisation of certain 
rule of law elements over others. To give an example, the EU understands 
the rule of law in enlargement in terms of judicial reform, inter alia because 
of the centrality of well-functioning courts in the applicant states as future 
Member States. In development cooperation, the EU’s focus on court reform 
is reinforced by the fact that adjacent policy areas such as security and good 
governance, emphasise the reform of the same sector (see section 2.1). In a 
similar vein, reasons were found to underpin the emphasis of the rule of 
law elements in the procedural and institutional categories, stemming from 
the particular nature of the two external areas, (section 2.3). Consequently, 
by understanding these influences on its rule of law definition, the EU can 
make more conscious choices about its rule of law reform and the elements 
it wishes to emphasise therein instead of being pushed into a particular 
direction on grounds of policy considerations.
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3.3 Distinguish between the definition of the rule of law, its threats, 
and its instrumental use-value
In order to have a clearer definition of the rule of law, the EU should more 
carefully distinguish between the definition of the rule of law on the one 
hand, and its perceived benefits as well as threats on the other. Section 2.4 
showed that the rule of law’s instrumental use-value, and the EU’s assump-
tions that come with it, have, at least to some extent, impeded a more 
precise articulation. The rule of law has a reputation as a ‘panacea’157 and 
as a bringer of many societal benefits. The section argued that because the 
notions positive reputation is so strong, seeing the rule of law as a means 
to an end (economic growth, a rise in foreign investment, and increasing 
stability and security), has led to a strong emphasis on the ends themselves 
and a lack of attention to defining the rule of law needed for achieving those 
ends. More particularly, it was shown that the rule of law’s instrumental 
use-value subsumes the need for a precise definition; the assumption that 
more rule of law is better (without a clear idea of what the rule of law pre-
cisely is), is entirely based on the positive connotations the notion carries 
with it. Next to this, the case studies revealed that the rule of law is often 
conflated with the issues that threaten it, such as urban crime and violence, 
corruption, and organised transnational crime related to arms, drugs, and 
human trafficking.158 This is exemplified by the treatment of enlargement 
Chapters 23 and 24 as ‘rule of law-chapters’ (see chapter 4, section 4.3.1), 
which the case study showed to be a misnomer, inter alia, for exactly this 
reason.
The problems of the above in relation to the definition of the rule of law 
can be illustrated on the basis of the New European Consensus on Develop-
ment, which provides, inter alia, that:159
Poverty, conflict, fragility and forced displacement are deeply interlinked and 
must be addressed in a coherent and comprehensive way also as part of the 
humanitarian-development-nexus. The EU and its Member States will address 
their root cases at all levels, ranging from exclusion, inequality, food insecurity, 
human rights violations and abuses, impunity and the absence of the rule of law 
to environmental degradation and climate change.
According to this statement, absence of the rule of law is one of the root 
causes of conflict, fragility, and poverty. This displays the notion’s use-value, 
as, clearly, its existence is a means of preventing these matters from occur-
ing. The Consensus, in a further paragraph, also provides more positively 
157 Thomas Carothers ‘The Rule-of-Law Revival’ in Thomas Carothers (ed) Promoting the 
Rule of Law Abroad – In Search of the Question of Knowledge Washington: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace (2006), pp. 3-13 at 3.
158 New European Consensus on Development (2017), pnt. 63.
159 Ibid., pnt. 64.
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that the rule of law will ‘proactively contribute to stability and security as 
well as resilience’ and a host of other benefits.160 It would be expected that 
the EU would provide a comprehensive definition for a concept able to 
attain such complex goals. Moreover, each of these goals requires a focus on 
a different type of rule of law reform, with measures ranging, inter alia, from 
more and better equipped police forces and prisons to an understanding of, 
and enforcement and protection of property rights. However, as far as the 
rule of law is concerned, the Consensus simply advances the following: the 
EU ‘will promote independent and impartial courts, and support the provi-
sion of fair justice, including access to legal assistance.’161 If the EU is more 
aware of its oft unstated and under-explicated assumptions, it will be able 
to acknowledge these and subsequently make a conscious choice whether 
or not to take these into account in relation to its rule of law definition.
4. Conclusion
This final chapter showed that the findings resulting from the examination 
of the rule of law in development cooperation and enlargement can, to a 
large extent, be explained on the basis of the characteristics and influences 
of the policy areas. The strong institutional emphasis on judicial reform, the 
lack of formal legality, the prominence of certain procedural and institutional 
elements and not others, as well as the limited articulation of a number of 
rule of law elements, developments in the external areas as well the EU’s 
policy emphasis therein provide the reasons behind these findings. The 
chapter also argued that the discrepancy between the rule of law elements, 
as they are found in the Member States (chapter 1), and those that have been 
identified in the case studies, is problematic. Even though the rule of law 
allows for flexibility in how its various elements relate to each other and 
in how they are implemented, this flexibility does not stretch so far as to 
exclude core components altogether; a definition of the rule of law that does 
not include legality and clarity on judicial review is missing its core compo-
nents. Furthermore, it was shown that the financial instruments underpin-
ning the EU’s rule of law reform efforts also require a level of clarity, which, 
for reasons of legal certainty, the EU should at least attempt to provide. 
Finally, the last section provided three insights for improvement regarding 
the EU’s conceptualisation of the rule of law. First, it was argued that the 
Union should make a concrete effort to first define the rule of law elements 
and the way these elements interrelate, before entering into a more ‘compre-
hensive’ approach. Secondly, it was put forward that the EU would do well 
to acknowledge that developments within a policy area also influence the 
weight attributed to different elements within that particular area in order 
160 Ibid., pnt. 68.
161 Ibid., pnt. 61.
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to keep a clear focus on the rule of law despite the fluctuating developments 
in different policy areas. Thirdly, it was asserted that the Union should be 
more aware of its own cognitive bias vis-à-vis the rule of law’s instrumental 
use-value, i.e. its use as a means to other ends, which has led to a strong 
emphasis on the end goals and a lack of attention to precisely what elements 
of the rule of law are needed to achieve those very ends.

Summary
This thesis explores the question of what the EU’s conceptualisation of 
the rule of law is in its external relations. How does the EU understand 
and portray the rule of law in its external relations, with a particular focus 
on development cooperation and enlargement? While there is a growing 
amount of research on the rule of law in the context of the EU, what is miss-
ing from the literature is a comparative analysis of the rule of law concept 
the EU promotes in its external relations in different foreign policy fields. 
The increasing focus on the external aspects of the rule of law in the EU’s 
external action coupled with the Union’s post-Lisbon global ambitions as an 
international actor highlight the need for more clarity in relation to the EU’s 
approach to the rule of law.
To this end, the main research question is divided into two sub-ques-
tions: a. Are there discernible differences between the legal concept of the 
rule of law as defined in legal theory and as applied in the practice of the 
European Union? b. Subsequently, is the legal concept of the rule of law the 
same or different in the practice of the EU in its policy areas of development 
cooperation and enlargement as two specific subfields of EU external rela-
tions? In order to tackle these questions, the thesis is divided into two parts.
Part I provides the rule of law analytical framework. Since there is no 
definition of the rule of law in the EU Treaties, the only relevant reference 
is that the rule of law is a value ‘common to the Member States’ (Article 
2 TEU). Therefore, the traditions of the Member States form the point of 
departure for exploring the theoretical definition of the rule of law. For this 
purpose, chapter 1 examines the legal theories of the three major national 
legal systems (the German Rechtsstaat, the French état de droit, and the 
Anglo-Saxon rule of law). The analysis proves that although there is no 
common definition of the concept, a number of common elements can be 
identified. First, it shows that the three legal systems have adopted the rule 
of law as a solution to the common problem of the need to restrain govern-
mental power with the aim of the protection of the individual. Secondly, in 
order to address the control of power and to ensure that the government 
not only rules on the basis of law, but is also bound by it, the thesis argues 
that all three traditions require a form of the functional separation of pow-
ers, whereby, at a minimum, the judiciary is accorded a large amount of 
independence in relation to the legislative and executive branches of gov-
ernment. Thirdly, the analysis highlights that in Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom, legality forms the rule of law’s common substance. More 
particularly, it demonstrates that legality provides requirements both for the 
302 Summary
legislature in relation to the law it produces, as well as for the validity of 
law itself. Fourthly, the rule of law, in order to achieve its aims, requires 
safeguarding mechanisms in the form of judicial review.
In chapter 2, the thesis proceeds to examine whether, and if so, to what 
extent, legal doctrine considers the same features crucial for the existence 
of the rule of law concept. It concludes that, indeed, the elements found in 
the legal systems of the three Member States analysed, can also be located 
in the literature. However, it makes the observation that there are discrep-
ancies regarding the weight attached to these elements; the main focus of 
legal scholarship has been on the notion’s core element of legality and its 
requirements. Part I ends with the introduction of the analytical framework. 
It asserts that the elements can be categorised as follows: formal, procedural, 
and institutional. Formal elements are concerned with the predictability and 
determinacy of laws, procedural elements cover those related to the impar-
tial administration of the law, and institutional elements are concerned with 
the institutional requirements for upholding the rule of law.
Against this backdrop, Part II, examines whether, and to what extent, 
the elements identified in the analytical framework can be found in the field 
of EU external relations. For this purpose, it tests the analytical framework 
against the background of the two case studies, namely the EU’s develop-
ment cooperation policy (chapter 3) and its enlargement policy (chapter 
4). It does so with detailed reference to the relevant EU legal framework, 
instruments, and policy in the respective policy areas. Regarding develop-
ment cooperation, chapter 3 shows that the element of legality – around 
which much of the rule of law discussion of legal doctrine is centred – and 
judicial review – the core element safeguarding the rule of law in national 
legal systems – have remained largely underdeveloped. In contrast, it 
asserts that the EU puts great emphasis on both the procedural element 
of access to justice, and the institutional element of judicial independence. 
However, the analysis also demonstrates that the EU’s articulation of both 
elements leaves much to be desired.
Furthermore, chapter 3 highlights two general findings. First, in the 
almost total absence of formal elements, the Union’s understanding of the 
rule of law in development cooperation mainly revolves around the insti-
tutional element of judicial reform. Exploring the reasons underpinning the 
EU’s emphasis on a fundamentally institutional understanding of the rule 
of law in its development policy, it is argued that the international frame-
work, which the EU has committed itself to implement, steers the policy of 
development cooperation towards the improvement of institutional capac-
ity in aid receiving countries in general. Moreover, the chapter argues that 
the EU’s institutional conceptualisation of the rule of law can, in particular, 
be explained on the basis of the impact of the notions of good governance 
and security sector reform on this external policy field. Both notions focus 
on the effective functioning of institutions, which, in the case of the rule 
of law, has resulted in a concomitant understanding of the rule of law in 
terms of the reform and strengthening of judicial institutions. Secondly, it 
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is shown that the EU’s methodology in the area of development coopera-
tion has led to conceptual confusion in a number of the rule of law element 
identified. Even though the use of indicator lists is common practice in a 
result-based cooperation policy, the Union’s indiscriminate application of 
these lists, without a comprehensive rule of law definition, has led to vague-
ness and ambiguity.
In chapter 4, the second case study focusses on the EU’s conceptualisa-
tion of the rule of law in its enlargement policy. The analysis demonstrates 
that, similar to the previous case study, in this policy area the EU has paid 
little attention to the element of legality. More particularly, chapter 4 shows 
that the methodology of enlargement in relation to the process of legislative 
approximation is based on a mostly quantitative demonstration of progress. 
As a consequence of this, the qualitative requirements of legality (such as 
legal stability and coherence) have actually been undermined. In relation to 
the procedural elements, impartiality and judicial efficiency are shown to 
form the core elements in this category. However, the examination of the rel-
evant documents highlights that there is a frequent lack of clear articulation 
of EU standards in these areas. Turning to the category of institutional rule 
of law elements, chapter 4 argues that the formulation of the Copenhagen 
criteria and the relevant legal framework have been very influential in the 
EU’s adoption of a mainly institutional focus in its activities to strengthen 
the rule of law in the applicant states. It claims that the rule of law is con-
ceptualised in terms of judicial reform with an emphasis on the structure 
and functioning of the courts, resulting in a particular emphasis on the 
institutional element of judicial independence.
From the analysis, three general conclusions are drawn. First, the EU’s 
conceptualisation of the rule of law in enlargement is strongly geared 
towards both procedural and institutional element, with an almost total 
absence of the formal element of legality. Moreover, the extensive institu-
tional focus of the policy has led to an emphasis on judicial reform, which 
has also led to an institutional approach towards a number of the proce-
dural elements, such as judicial review. Secondly, even though the EU pro-
fesses to domestic rule of law reform, its conceptualisation of the rule of law 
is heavily influenced by the fact that the applicant states are future Member 
States; for upholding EU law within the Member States, domestic courts 
fulfil a crucial role. It is further asserted that this has resulted in neglecting 
certain rule of law elements (legality) and disproportionately emphasising 
others (judicial independence). Thirdly, the Commission has refrained from 
clearly differentiating between the rule of law elements under the Copen-
hagen political criteria and as part of the acquis, and, moreover, has actually 
converged its analysis of the functioning of the judiciary as part of the rule 
of law under both sections, thereby codifying the political criterion of the 
rule of law.
Lastly, the final concluding chapter summarises the key findings of this 
thesis and provides a comparative analysis of the case studies. It shows that 
the findings resulting from the examination of the rule of law in develop-
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ment cooperation and enlargement can, to a large extent, be explained on 
the basis of the characteristics and influences of the policy areas. The strong 
institutional emphasis on judicial reform, the lack of formal legality, the 
prominence of certain procedural and institutional elements and not oth-
ers, as well as the limited articulation of a number of rule of law elements, 
developments in the external areas as well the EU’s policy emphasis therein 
provide the reasons behind these findings. The chapter also argues that 
the discrepancy between the rule of law elements, as they are found in the 
Member States (chapter 1), and those that have been identified in the case 
studies, is problematic. Even though the rule of law allows for flexibility in 
how its various elements relate to each other and in how they are imple-
mented, this flexibility does not stretch so far as to exclude core components 
altogether; a definition of the rule of law that does not include legality and 
clarity on judicial review is missing its core components. Furthermore, it 
claims that the financial instruments underpinning the EU’s rule of law 
reform efforts also require a level of clarity, which, for reasons of legal 
certainty, the EU should at least attempt to provide. Finally, the last section 
provides three insights for improvement regarding the EU’s conceptualisa-
tion of the rule of law. First, it argues that the Union should make a concrete 
effort to first define the rule of law elements and the way these elements 
interrelate, before entering into a more ‘comprehensive’ approach. Secondly, 
it is put forward that the EU would do well to acknowledge that develop-
ments within a policy area also influence the weight attributed to different 
elements within that particular area in order to keep a clear focus on the 
rule of law despite the fluctuating developments in different policy areas. 
Thirdly, it asserts that the Union should be more aware of its own cognitive 
bias vis-à-vis the rule of law’s instrumental use-value, i.e. its use as a means 
to other ends, which has led to a strong emphasis on the end goals and a 
lack of attention to precisely what elements of the rule of law are needed to 
achieve those very ends.
Samenvatting (Dutch summary)  
The EU's Conceptualisering van de ‘Rule of Law’ 
in haar Externe Betrekkingen
Casestudy's in het ontwikkelings samenwerkings- en 
uitbreidingsbeleid
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de vraag wat de EU’s conceptualisering van de 
‘rule of law’ is in haar externe betrekkingen. Het concentreert zich op de 
wisselwerking tussen theorie en praktijk in relatie tot het rechtsstaatconcept 
in de externe betrekkingen van de Unie, meer specifiek binnen het ontwik-
kelingssamenwerkingsbeleid en het uitbreidingsbeleid. Hoewel er steeds 
meer onderzoek wordt gedaan met betrekking tot het EU-rechtsstaatcon-
cept, ontbreekt in de literatuur een vergelijkende analyse hiervan. De toene-
mende aandacht voor de externe aspecten van de rechtsstaat in het externe 
optreden van de Unie in combinatie met de EU’s post-Lissabon ambities als 
een internationale speler, onderstrepen de noodzaak voor meer duidelijk-
heid met betrekking tot de EU-benadering van het rechtsstaatconcept.
De onderzoeksvraag is onderverdeeld in twee deelvragen: a. Zijn er 
waarneembare verschillen tussen het rechtsstaatconcept zoals dat wordt 
gedefinieerd in de rechtstheorie en zoals het wordt toegepast door de EU in 
haar beleid? b. Wordt vervolgens dezelfde of een verschillende definitie van 
het rechtsstaatconcept gehanteerd in het ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsbe-
leid en in het uitbreidingsbeleid? Om deze vragen te kunnen beantwoorden 
is het proefschrift in twee delen onderverdeeld.
Deel I biedt het analytische kader voor de latere toetsing van het 
rechtsstaatconcept in de EU-praktijk. Daar een definitie van rechtsstaat als 
zodanig ontbreekt in de EU Verdragen, is het uitgangspunt de verwijzing 
naar dit concept in het EU Verdrag als een waarde die de lidstaten gemeen 
hebben (artikel 2 VEU). Op basis hiervan vormen de tradities van de lidsta-
ten het vertrekpunt voor het verkennen van de theoretische definitie van 
het rechtsstaat begrip. Hiertoe worden in hoofdstuk 1 de drie voornaamste 
lidstaat-tradities onderzocht: de Duitse Rechtsstaat, de Franse état de droit 
en de Angelsaksische rule of law. De analyse toont aan dat hoewel er geen 
gemeenschappelijke definitie van het concept bestaat, er wel degelijk een 
aantal gemeenschappelijke elementen kunnen worden geïdentificeerd. Ten 
eerste laat het zien dat de drie rechtsstelsels de rechtsstaat beschouwen als 
een oplossing voor de noodzaak om de regeringsmacht te beperken met het 
oog op de bescherming van het individu. Ten tweede stelt het proefschrift 
dat, om de macht te kunnen controleren en om ervoor te zorgen dat de 
overheid ook zelf gebonden is aan de eigen wet- en regelgeving, alle drie 
de rechtsstelsels een vorm van functionele scheiding der machten vereisen. 
Hierbij krijgt de rechtelijke macht een grote mate van onafhankelijkheid 
toegewezen in relatie tot de wetgevende en uitvoerende macht. Ten derde 
vormt zowel in Duitsland en Frankrijk alsook in het Verenigd Koninkrijk 
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legaliteit (legality) de gemeenschappelijke inhoud van het begrip. Meer in 
het bijzonder toont het proefschrift aan dat legaliteit niet alleen eisen stelt 
aan de wetgever in relatie tot de kwaliteit van wet- en regelgeving, maar 
ook aan de geldigheid van het recht zelf. Ten vierde vereist de rechtsstaat 
bepaalde beschermingsmechanismen in de vorm van rechterlijke toetsing.
In het tweede hoofdstuk van Deel I gaat het proefschrift na of, en zo ja, 
in welke mate de doctrine dezelfde kenmerken van cruciaal belang acht voor 
het rechtsstaat concept. Het onderzoek laat zien dat dezelfde elementen, 
zoals deze voorkomen in de nationale tradities van de drie lidstaten, ook 
een belangrijke rol spelen in de rechtstheorie, alhoewel sommige elementen 
meer de nadruk krijgen dan andere. Deel I eindigt vervolgens met de intro-
ductie van het analytische kader. Het stelt dat de gevonden elementen als 
volgt kunnen worden gecategoriseerd: formeel, procedureel en institutioneel. 
Formele elementen hebben betrekking op de voorzienbaarheid en de vorm 
van regels, procedurele elementen hebben betrekking op de onpartijdige 
rechtspraak en institutionele elementen zien op de institutionele vereisten 
die ten grondslag liggen aan de handhaving van de rechtsstaat.
Tegen deze achtergrond wordt in Deel II van het proefschrift onderzocht 
of, en in welke mate de elementen die zijn geïdentificeerd in het analytische 
kader voorkomen in de twee externe EU-beleidsterreinen, ontwikkelings-
samenwerking (hoofdstuk 3) en het uitbreidingsbeleid (hoofdstuk 4). In 
relatie tot ontwikkelingssamenwerking toont de eerste casestudy in hoofd-
stuk 3 aan dat het formele element van legaliteit – het element dat centraal 
staat binnen de rechtstheorie – en het procedurele element van rechterlijke 
toetsing – het kernelement voor de waarborging van de rechtsstaat in de 
lidstaten – onderontwikkeld zijn gebleven. Daarentegen laat het proefschrift 
zien dat de EU de nadruk legt op het formele element van toegang tot de 
rechter en het institutionele element van rechterlijke onafhankelijkheid. De 
analyse toont echter ook aan dat de EU een duidelijke definitie van beide 
elementen achterwege laat.
Hieropvolgend brengt het hoofdstuk twee algemene bevindingen naar 
voren. Ten eerste, tegen het licht van de welhaast volledige afwezigheid 
van formele elementen, berust het EU-rechtsstaatconcept in ontwikkelings-
samenwerking grotendeels op het institutionele element van justitiële 
hervorming. Onderzoek naar de redenen die aan deze eenzijdige definitie 
ten grondslag kunnen liggen laat zien dat het internationale kader waarbin-
nen de EU haar ontwikkelingssamenwerking uitvoert, sterk van invloed 
is en het beleid met name richt op institutionele capaciteitsopbouw in 
ontwikkelingslanden. Meer in het bijzonder kan de institutionele conceptu-
alisering worden verklaard door de impact van het ‘good governance’ begrip 
alsook het belang dat door de EU wordt gehecht aan de hervorming van 
de veiligheidssector binnen het beleidsterrein. Beide hebben een focus op 
het effectief functioneren van instellingen wat in relatie tot de rechtsstaat 
heeft geresulteerd in een formulering van dit begrip in termen van de her-
vorming en versterking van de justitiële sector. Ten tweede, de casestudy 
toont aan dat de door de EU gehanteerde methodologie in relatie tot het 
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ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsbeleid heeft geleid tot conceptuele verwarring 
met betrekking tot een aantal van de geïdentificeerde elementen. Alhoewel 
het gangbare praktijk is om te werken met indicator-lijsten om resultaats-
gebieden vast te kunnen stellen heeft de willekeurige toepassing hiervan 
door de EU, zonder onderliggende definitie van de rechtsstaat, geleid tot 
vaagheid en onduidelijkheid.
In hoofdstuk 4 richt de tweede casestudy zich op het rechtsstaat begrip 
in het EU-uitbreidingsbeleid. Het onderzoek toont aan dat, net als in de 
vorige casestudy, ook binnen dit beleidsterrein de Unie weinig tot geen 
aandacht besteedt aan het formele legaliteitselement. Meer in het bijzonder 
laat de analyse zien dat de methodologie onderliggend aan het uitbrei-
dingsbeleid met betrekking tot de harmonisatie van wet- en regelgeving 
gebaseerd is op een kwantitatieve evaluatie van gemaakte vorderingen. Als 
gevolg hiervan worden kwalitatieve criteria van legaliteit (zoals stabiliteit 
en coherentie van wet- en regelgeving) feitelijk ondermijnd. Met betrekking 
tot de procedurele elementen blijkt uit het onderzoek dat onpartijdigheid 
en efficiëntie van het juridisch proces de twee kernelementen in deze cate-
gorie vormen. Uit nauwkeurige bestudering van de relevante documenten 
blijkt echter dat een duidelijk verband met EU-standaarden ontbreekt. Met 
betrekking tot de institutionele rechtsstaat-elementen betoogt de casestudy 
dat de formulering van de criteria van Kopenhagen en het relevante juridi-
sche kader van invloed zijn op de overwegend institutionele focus van de 
EU bij de activiteiten met betrekking tot de versterking van de rechtsstaat in 
de kandidaat-lidstaten. Het laat zien dat de rechtsstaat geconceptualiseerd 
is in termen van justitiële hervorming met een nadruk op de opbouw en het 
functioneren van rechtbanken. Wat vervolgens weer resulteert in specifieke 
aandacht voor het institutionele element van de onafhankelijkheid van de 
rechterlijke macht.
Op basis van het onderzoek in deze casestudy zijn drie algemene 
conclusies getrokken. Ten eerste is de conceptualisering van het rechtsstaat-
begrip in het EU-uitbreidingsbeleid sterk gericht op bepaalde procedurele 
en institutionele elementen en is het formele legaliteitselement bijna vol-
ledige afwezig. Daarnaast blijkt dat uitgebreide institutionele focus van het 
onderliggende beleid heeft geleid tot een specifieke nadruk op justitiële 
hervormingen en op een institutionele aanpak van een aantal procedurele 
elementen, zoals rechterlijke toetsing. Ten tweede, hoewel de EU aangeeft 
zich in te zetten voor de versterking van de rechtsstaat op nationaal niveau, 
toont de analyse aan dat de EU rechtsstaat-conceptualisering sterk wordt 
beïnvloed door het feit dat de kandidaat-lidstaten toekomstige lidstaten 
zijn; voor het garanderen van de doorwerking en toepassing van het Euro-
pese recht in de lidstaten is immers een goed functionerende rechterlijke 
macht onontbeerlijk. De analyse laat verder zien dat dit heeft geleid tot het 
negeren van bepaalde rechtsstaat-elementen (legaliteit) en het onevenredig 
benadrukken van andere (onafhankelijkheid van de rechterlijke macht). 
Ten derde heeft de Europese Commissie afgezien van het aanbrengen van 
een duidelijk onderscheid tussen de rechtsstaat elementen zoals die zijn 
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geformuleerd onder de zogeheten ‘politieke’ criteria van Kopenhagen en als 
onderdeel van het acquis. Bovendien toont de casestudy aan dat de Commis-
sies analyse van het functioneren van de rechterlijke macht als onderdeel 
van het monitoren van de vorderingen die gemaakt zijn op het gebied van 
het versterken van de rechtsstaat in de kandidaat-lidstaten hetzelfde is, wat 
gezien kan worden als de codificatie van de rechtsstaat onder de politieke 
Kopenhagen criteria.
Tenslotte geeft het laatste concluderende hoofdstuk een overzicht van 
de kernbevindingen van het proefschrift en biedt het een vergelijkende ana-
lyse van de casestudy’s. Het laat zien dat de bevindingen die voortvloeien 
uit de analyse van het rechtsstaatconcept in het ontwikkelingssamenwer-
kingsbeleid en uitbreidingsbeleid grotendeels kunnen worden verklaard 
aan de hand van de specifieke kenmerken van beide beleidsterreinen. Zo 
benadrukt dit hoofdstuk onder meer dat de nadruk op justitiële hervor-
mingen, het ontbreken van het formele legaliteitselement, de nadruk op 
bepaalde institutionele en procedurele kenmerken ten koste van andere, als-
ook de beperkte uitwerking van een aantal deelelementen van het concept, 
gezien moeten worden in het licht van specifieke beleidsaccenten en ont-
wikkelingen binnen deze terreinen. Het hoofdstuk stelt vervolgens ook dat 
de discrepantie tussen de rechtsstaatelementen zoals die zijn aangetroffen 
in de lidstaten (hoofdstuk 1) en die zijn geïdentificeerd in de casestudies, 
problematisch is. Hoewel het rechtsstaatconcept een inherente flexibiliteit 
in zich draagt in de manier waarop verschillende elementen met elkaar in 
verband staan en in de manier waarop ze worden geïmplementeerd, strekt 
deze flexibiliteit zich niet uit tot het uitsluiten van kerncomponenten; een 
definitie van de rechtsstaat zonder legaliteit en duidelijk omtrent rechter-
lijke toetsing mist deze kerncomponenten. Voorts toont de analyse ook 
aan dat de financiële instrumenten die de hervormingsmaatregelen van 
de EU met betrekking tot de versterking van de rechtsstaat ondersteunen 
een zeker niveau van duidelijkheid vereisen, welke de EU in het kader 
van rechtszekerheid ook dient te bieden. Tenslotte biedt het laatste deel 
van hoofdstuk 5 drie inzichten ter verbetering van de EU’s conceptuali-
sering van de rechtsstaat. Ten eerste betoogt het dat de Unie een concrete 
inspanning moet leveren om eerst de elementen van de rechtsstaat en hun 
onderlinge samenhang te definiëren, alvorens over te gaan tot een ‘allesom-
vattende’ aanpak. Ten tweede stelt het dat de EU er goed aan zou doen te 
erkennen dat de ontwikkelingen binnen de verschillende beleidsterreinen 
van invloed zijn op de invulling van het rechtsstaatconcept en de nadruk 
die wel of niet op bepaalde subelementen wordt gelegd. Alleen zo kan het 
rechtsstaatconcept zelf worden ontdaan van fluctuerende beleidsinvloeden. 
Ten derde geeft het hoofdstuk aan dat de EU zich meer bewust moet zijn 
van de eigen voorkeur om zich op rechtsstaathervormingen te beroepen 
terwijl het in feite andere doelen voor ogen heeft. Dit heeft er immers toe 
geleid dat er te veel aandacht is voor deze doelen, zonder dat er expliciet bij 
wordt stilgestaan of en zo ja welke rechtsstaat elementen er precies beno-
digd zijn om die doelen te bereiken.
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